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Abstract
The Legal Services Act 2007 brings about radical changes to both the regulatory structure 
of the legal profession in England and Wales and the way in which legal services can be 
provided to clients. For nearly 40 years successive Governments sought to bring about 
changes to the regulation of the legal profession. Changes were achieved with only 
limited success. Following an Office of Fair Trading report in 2001 and a Government 
consultation titled ‘In the Public Interest?’ in 2002, the legal profession was given the 
time and opportunity to bring about changes themselves. With the advent of Lord 
Falconer as Lord Chancellor, a major review of legal services was announced in 2003. 
The report on the review produced by Sir David dementi was used as the basis for a 
Government White Paper which, contrary to the 2002 ‘In the Public Interest?’ 
consultation, made no reference to the public interest. Following this White Paper a Draft 
Legal Services Bill was presented to Parliament in 2006. It made no reference to the 
public interest. The absence of any reference to the ‘public interest’ was identified when 
the Draft Bill received pre- legislative scrutiny by a Joint Select Committee. Reacting to 
the Committee’s report, the Government included three references to the public interest 
in the Bill presented to Parliament for debate. These limited and discrete references to the 
public interest were not accepted as satisfactory by the House of Lords and the 
marginalisation of the public interest fuelled a prolonged debate. Calls were made for the 
public interest to be included as a regulatory objective of the legislation. These calls were 
sustained by the Government’s very public commitment to the consumer interest. The 
Government eventually conceded and a regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting 
the public interest’ was inserted into the legislation.
This thesis examines the inclusion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’ in an attempt to discover whether, in the hands of 
regulators, it is capable of realising the legislative intention which underpinned its 
inclusion in the Legal Services Act 2007. It examines the term ‘public interest’ and how 
it is difficult both to define and to integrate it into decision making processes. Difficulties 
experienced by regulators are considered. A range of public interest theories are 
examined. It is argued that one public interest theory presents an opportunity to overcome 
some of the difficulties associated with understanding the public interest. It is suggested 
that this particular theory, coupled with a proposed methodology for its integration into 
policy and regulatory decision making processes, enables the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ to more systematically and realistically 
achieve the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion in the Legal Services Act 
2007.
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INTRODUCTION. RESEARCH QUESTION. CHAPTER OUTLINE &
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The Legal Services Act 2007 has been described as a blockbuster piece of legislation.1 
Besides the vast size of this piece of legislation, when measured in terms of sections, 
schedules and pages,2 it brings about unprecedented change to the practice of law. It is 
generally recognised that there were two dominant forces which, when responded to by 
the Government, culminated in the Act. The first was the economic and competition 
policy at international; European and domestic levels which sought to improve the 
availability and quality of legal services by eliminating a variety of restrictions on legal 
practice. The second was a political desire in England and Wales to promote consumer 
protection within a variety of sectors and, in particular, within the self-regulating legal 
profession.
Part 1, Section 1, of the Legal Services Act 2007, outlines explicitly the regulatory 
objectives of the Act. The regulatory objectives are referred to throughout the Act and in 
many places specify that the regulators of legal services, of which there are many, and 
maybe more in the future,3 must operate in a way that is compatible with these objectives. 
The regulatory objectives, and the way in which they are interpreted, therefore, have the 
potential to shape the future of legal services regulation and provision, most notably 
through the approaches that regulators take towards regulatory policy and decision 
making.
The regulatory objectives that appeared in the Legal Services Bill presented to Parliament 
for first reading differed markedly, in some respects, from those that appeared in the text 
of the Legal Services Act 2007. The Government’s Legal Services Bill initially appeared 
with regulatory objectives clearly promoting competition and the consumer interest, but
1 James Thome & Ian Miller, Guide to the Legal Services Act (Lexis Nexis 2009) (Preface)
2 The Legislation includes 214 sections (covering 120 pages) 24 Schedules. The official version runs to 389 pages).
3 Legal Services Act 2007, sch 4 pt 2
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with no reference to the public interest. The Act, however, includes the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ heading the list of regulatory 
objectives. The insertion of this regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest’ was clearly not within the Government’s contemplation or desire. The 
Government’s primary intention throughout was to focus the legislation towards the 
consumer. On account of the fact that the Legal Services Bill was introduced into the 
House of Lords rather than the House of Commons this meant that the debates and tabled 
amendments, in the House of Lords, assumed a greater significance.4 After what may be 
described as a series of hard fought debates, the Government gave way to the inclusion of 
a regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’ The overriding 
view of the House of Lords was that a regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting 
the public interest’ would balance the legislation’s focus on consumer issues and 
interests. This balancing was considered very important by the House of Lords because 
the legislation dealt with the legal profession, which they regarded as an instrumental part 
of the legal system.
The importance of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ was not only considered important by the House of Lords. A number of 
commentators seized on the importance of regulating legal services in the public interest 
as well as the consumer interest.5 Despite the insertion of the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’, recent claims have been made that the 
Legal Services Board, the oversight regulator of legal services and the body charged with 
a broad set of powers, is prioritising the consumer’s interest.6 It has therefore become
4 The nature of a Bill, originating in the House of Lords means that, at the Committee Stage, the debates on 
amendments are unrestricted. Moreover, there is the prospect that an amendment could be re- introduced at the Third 
Reading stage, (provided there has not been a vote on the amendment). The effect of this is that it could frustrate the 
passage of the Act - i f  no agreement is reached between the Government and the House of Lords. The discussions if 
extensive usually mean that the Bill fails to be passed within the requisite parliamentary time frame. The House of 
Lords therefore, exercises a degree of influence over the legislation.
5 Jonathan Goldsmith, ‘The Core Values of the Legal Profession for Lawyers Today and Tomorrow’ (2008) 28 North­
western Journal of International Law & Business 441; David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of 
Law’ (Master of the Rolls Speech, 25th Annual Bar Conference, London, 6 November2010) 
<htto://\vww.iudiciarv.gov.uk/media/sneeches/2010/sr>eech-mor-tvrannv-of-the-consurner-or-the-rule-of-law> accessed 
29 November 2012; Ruth Deech, ‘The Legal Profession: Regulating for Independence’ (Speech delivered at Gresham 
College, London, July 30th 2012) <http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/the-legal-profession-regulating-for- 
independence> accessed 27 November 2012
6 Ruth Deech, ‘Regulating the Regulators’ (Speech delivered at Gresham College, London, 23rd May 2012) 
<http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/regulating-the-regulators> accessed 27 November 2012
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timely to question whether the Government’s unwavering vision of protecting and 
promoting the consumer interest has been realised. It is also timely to consider whether 
the legislative intention which resulted in the inclusion of the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ is capable of being realised.
Central Research Question
The central research question that this thesis seeks to address is as follows:
‘Is the regulatory objective of'protecting and promoting the public interest' capable of 
realising the legislative intention which underpinned its inclusion in the Legal Services 
Act 2007?’
In addressing this research question the chapters in this thesis are structured as follows:
Chapter 1- The Legal Services Act 2007. the Legal Profession and Legal Services 
This chapter seeks to locate the study of the Legal Services Act 2007 and the regulatory 
objectives contained within it. This chapter outlines the main provisions of the Legal 
Services Act 2007 and then draws attention to the regulatory objectives. The regulatory 
objectives are examined and the benefits associated with them are discussed. A number 
of problems connected with the regulatory objectives are also identified. One of these 
problems encapsulates the question attended to by this thesis. This pertains to the 
definition to be accorded to the public interest. It is identified that whilst the public 
interest provides a strong rhetorical indication, as to the purpose and objective of the 
Legal Services Act 2007, its meaning dissolves upon critical inspection. To locate the 
importance of the insertion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest’, this chapter examines the factors that precipitated the Government’s 
introduction of legislation regulating legal services. Attention throughout this chapter is 
placed on the increasing emphasis accorded to the consumer. The penultimate section of 
this chapter examines a variety of studies and reports, delivered in the main to the 
Government in the years preceding the Legal Services Act 2007. It highlights a changing
12
approach to the legal profession, from one of trust and confidence in self-regulation, to 
one that saw fit to propose legislation framed ostensibly in terms of the consumer interest 
as opposed to the public interest.
Chapter 2 -  The Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007
This chapter addresses the question: ‘what was the legislative intention that underpinned 
the insertion of a regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in 
the Legal Services Act 2007?’ This chapter examines the period between the introduction 
of the Legal Services Bill and the enactment of the Legal Services Act 2007. It examines 
in detail the debates in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. This chapter 
endeavours to understand why the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest’ was inserted into the legislation. This chapter is dedicated to 
understanding the true legislative intent which underpinned the inclusion of the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the Legal 
Services Act 2007.
Chapter 3- The Consumer Interest
This chapter addresses the following three sub research questions:
1) What is the consumer interest?
2) What are the issues associated with regulating ostensibly in the consumer’s 
interest?
3) For what reasons might the consumer interest come to subordinate other 
regulatory objectives?
This chapter builds on the conclusions drawn in chapter two. One of the conclusions 
drawn was that the motivation underpinning the insertion of the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ was to counter the Government’s policy of 
regulating legal services ostensibly in the consumer’s interest. This chapter builds on this 
conclusion by examining the consumer interest. The analysis centres on the way in which 
the consumer interest can be defined, how the consumer interest is considered within
13
approaches to regulatory decision making and its consideration within competition 
policy. It outlines a number of possible reasons why it is imprudent to regulate ostensibly 
in the consumer interest. This chapter seeks to draw some of these findings together by 
examining a commonly cited example of successful deregulation. This example is based 
on the optical sector and the market for spectacles. The claimed benefits to the consumer 
are considered. The final section of this chapter examines existing research into other 
regulators which have been charged with achieving multiple statutory objectives, 
including the consumer interest and the citizen interest. This examination reveals a 
number of problems associated with regulators pursuing multiple regulatory objectives. A 
number of observations are also discussed regarding the approach taken by regulators 
towards their regulatory obligations. By examining the consumer interest, a foundation is 
established upon which further determinations about the public interest in regulatory 
policy and decision making can be made.
Chapter 4- The Public Interest, the Legal Services Act 2007 and Regulatory Objectives 
This chapter addresses the following three sub research questions:
1) What attempts have been made to understand the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the context of the Legal Services 
Act 2007?
2) How have regulators, and in particular the Legal Services Board, pursued the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’?
3) Can the public interest, when used as a regulatory objective, be distinguished 
from other uses of the term ‘public interest’ in legislation?
This chapter examines a number of attempts to define the public interest in connection 
with the Legal Services Act 2007. Following this examination, the approach of the Legal 
Services Board towards the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ is examined. A number of key statements about its understanding of the public 
interest are discussed. The Legal Services Board’s outlined approach to regulatory 
decision making is also examined. Regarding the second question that this chapter seeks 
to address, the approach that the Legal Services Board took towards deciding whether to
14
recommend changes to the rules relating to referral fees is discussed. An absence of 
systematic considerations relating to the public interest is identified. Conclusions are 
drawn in this chapter regarding the extent to which regulators have been able to identify 
and understand the public interest. The final section of this chapter examines other pieces 
of legislation to elucidate how the public interest is positioned in them. This thesis 
discovers that there are very few instances in which regulatory objectives are explicitly 
set out in legislation, and even fewer that include the term public interest. This is 
reflected upon and the regulatory objectives are considered in light of the better 
regulation initiatives. This chapter then considers the better regulation initiatives and 
examines a body of scholarship which argues that regulation must be orientated towards 
the public interest.
Chapter 5- Defining the Public Interest
Drawing on the findings in chapter four that regulators experience difficulties defining 
the public interest this chapter addresses the question: ‘Can the public interest be 
meaningfully defined?’ The diverse literature connected with the public interest and 
public interest theories is examined. After a short description of the scope of the 
literature, a sub set of the literature which classifies public interest theories is considered. 
These theories are considered in light of the scholarly literature, and it is discussed 
whether they offer any opportunity of meaningfully defining the public interest in the 
context of the Legal Services Act 2007. One particular set of theories is identified as 
offering some possibility of defining the public interest in the context of the Legal 
Services Act 2007. These theories are examined further and conclusions are drawn as to 
the way in which these theories may be adapted for use in the context of the Legal 
Services Act 2007. It is argued in this chapter that there is no universal understanding of 
the public interest. It is argued that the theories which offer a possibility of identifying the 
public interest, in the context of the Legal Services Act 2007, are based on a process of 
deliberative discussion, which is orientated by normative criteria derived from values. In 
answering the question that this chapter sought to address, it is argued that the public 
interest may be better understood, but that this is inherently based on a process of 
identification.
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Chapter 6- Operationalizing the Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007 
This chapter address three sub research questions:
1) What values might form the normative substantive criteria to be used to assess 
policies and regulatory proposals, within a deliberative process, to ascertain the 
public interest in connection with the Legal Services Act 2007?
2) Is it possible to devise a methodology to incorporate the public interest into 
decision making processes such that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public’ interest might fulfil the legislative intention which 
underpinned its insertion into the Legal Services Act 2007?
3) Do theories of the public interest present an opportunity to understand the public 
interest, such that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ fulfils the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion into the 
Legal Services Act 2007?
This chapter builds on the theories outlined in chapter five. The first section seeks to 
identify the values which might be used in a deliberative process which considers these 
values in relation to proposed policies or regulations, in an attempt to approximate the 
public interest in legal services. A number of strengths and weakness regarding the 
identification of relevant values are identified. The second section of this chapter 
proposes a methodology, which this thesis argues enables considerations regarding the 
public interest to be built into existing approaches to policy and regulatory decision 
making. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are identified. The final section 
of this chapter seeks to evaluate public interest theories generally and also the approach 
advocated in this thesis. Overall conclusions are drawn. This chapter identifies a number 
of variables which impact on the overall ability of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting 
and promoting the public interest’ to realise the legislative intention which underpinned 
its insertion in the Legal Services Act 2007.
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Chapter 7 -  Conclusion
This chapter draws the various findings of this thesis together and addresses the central 
research question of this thesis.
Research Methodology
The approach that this thesis has taken towards answering the central research question in 
this thesis is bom out of the need to identify and consider a variety of bodies of 
information and literature. The research involved wholly desk based research and the 
analysis of information and scholarship. The methodology employed throughout the 
various chapters is both qualitative, based on the analysis of documents and materials 
and, in part, empirical.7 The work is empirical in that it fits within the broader 
understanding of the term as it is based on observations drawn from a variety of sources 
including the texts of debates in the House of Lords, government reports, publicly 
available documents from regulators, market reports and policy statements. Throughout 
this thesis, distinct bodies of academic scholarship and literature are considered. The 
information and literature considered is not wholly drawn from the law. Literature is 
considered from a range of disciplines, as the central research question cannot be solely 
answered from a legal perspective. Literature from the political science, philosophy, 
public-administration and sociology disciplines is considered. The following describes 
the main approaches taken in each of the chapters in this thesis.
The first chapter of this thesis seeks to locate the central research question. It draws on 
both the text of the Legal Services Act 2007 and associated commentaries on the 
legislation. The limited literature on regulatory objectives in pieces of legal services 
legislation is discussed. The balance of the chapter outlines the various changes and
7 Lee Epstein ,Gary King, ‘Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69 
University of Chicago Law Review 1 : “What makes research empirical is that it is based on observations o f the world, 
in other words, data, which is just a term forfacts about the world. These facts may be historical or contemporary, or 
based on legislation or case law, the results o f interviews or surveys, or the outcomes o f secondary archival research 
or primary data collection. Data can be precise or vague, relatively certain or very uncertain, directly observed or 
indirect proxies, and they can be anthropological, interpretative, sociological, economic, legal, political, biological, 
physical or natural. As long as the facts have something to do with the world, they are data, and as long as the 
research involves data that is observed or desired, it is empirical. ” See also: Mike McConville,Wing Hong Chui, 
Research Methods for Zaw(Edinburgh University Press 2012)
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catalysts which precipitated the regulation of the legal profession in 2007. Reference 
throughout is made of the various reports and consultations which have been undertaken 
by the Government and the Competition Authorities. The information is synthesised to 
frame the importance of studying the public interest in connection with legal services. It 
also illuminates the prominence accorded, in the years before 2007, to the consumer 
interest and competition in the provision of legal services.
To answer the sub research questions posed in chapter two, an understanding is required 
of the legislative intention which underpinned the insertion of the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007. The only 
reliable and practicable way of addressing this question involved a comprehensive 
analysis of the Hansard record of the debates in the Houses of Commons and Lords. The 
analysis of these debates consisted of an approach which identified the debates connected 
with the public interest. Relevant speeches were identified, and pertinent and relevant 
parts have been reproduced in this chapter. These speeches have been analysed and 
conclusions drawn from them. This chapter draws, in spirit, on the favourable decision in 
Pepper v Hart8, which acknowledges the legitimacy of referring to extrinsic aids in 
statutory interpretation. In the context of this thesis, the search focused on why the public 
interest was inserted in the Legal Services Act 2007. It also searches for an understanding 
of the legislature’s understanding of the public interest.
The third chapter in this thesis endeavoured to elucidate a better understanding of the 
term ‘consumer interest’ and why a number of stakeholders, commentators and Members 
of the House of Lords were uneasy with the prominence accorded to the term. In search 
of an understanding of the term, reference is made to reports which outline the 
Government’s understanding of various terms connected with economic regulation, 
including the consumer and public interests. The clear definition accorded to the 
consumer interest by the Government is framed within a discussion of the literature 
associated with consumerism and consumer interests. From this literature issues 
associated with pursuing the consumer interest are discussed. Literature associated with
8 Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42, CA
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the connection between consumer interests and competition is also discussed. To locate 
the arguments emanating from the literature, this chapter discusses these in light of a 
number of claims regarding the perceived advantages of the deregulation of the optical 
sector. This chapter considers the limited body of available research and evidence on the 
deregulation of the optical sector. This thesis attempted to find evidence of benefits 
derived by consumers, however, little was forthcoming. Logical inferences are drawn 
about the paucity of empirical evidence about the benefits of liberalisation of the optical 
sector. To further locate points made in this chapter, a number of market studies are 
examined. Because the Legal Services Board and the Government have sought to extoll 
the benefits of the optical sector and argue that similar results should be derived in the 
legal services market, the composition of the optical market is considered. Emerging 
evidence in the legal services market is considered and conclusions drawn in light of 
research into other sectors, including banking, financial services and electricity markets 
as to the appropriateness of this market model for the provision of legal services. This 
chapter also analyses the report of a Select Committee on Regulators.9 Particular 
reference is paid to the way in which regulators have understood the term public interest 
and often assimilated it with the consumer interest. The findings of this report are 
considered. The findings of a research project into the Communications sector are also 
considered. This research project profiled the difficulties that Ofcom have had since its 
creation discerning the difference between the citizen interest and the consumer interest. 
A number of findings of this report are discussed and used in addition to the previous 
findings in this chapter to outline why the members of the House of Lords felt uneasy 
about the Government’s primary policy focus on the consumer in the Legal Services Bill.
The fourth chapter in this thesis is concerned with the way in which the public interest 
has been understood in the context of the Legal Services Act 2007 and also in the context 
of legislation more generally. The first part of this chapter discusses all the discoverable 
literature on the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in 
connection with the Legal Services Act 2007. Three definitions were found - these are 
discussed. This chapter also seeks to understand the approach that the Legal Services
9 The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic Regulators(HL 2006-2007,189-11)
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Board has taken towards the public interest regulatory objective. By virtue of the 
principle of transparency, the Legal Services Board publishes details of all its activities 
on its internet website. This thesis, as outlined in the Appendix 2, reviewed all documents 
connected with regulatory decision making. A summary of the findings are included in 
this chapter along with a review of the approach taken by the Board to one of the most 
recent and contentious decisions that it has made. This concerned referral fees. In 
addition to the information publicly available on the Legal Services Boards website, the 
minutes of the Joint Select Committee on Justice10 are also considered. This committee 
annually invites senior members of the Legal Services Board to be questioned before the 
Committee. These two resources provided a reliable basis upon which to make a number 
of determinations about the approach that the Legal Services Board has taken towards the 
public interest and the regulatory objectives. This chapter also considers the location of 
the public interest in legislation and cases more generally. The approach taken towards 
this research was to use a number of Westlaw searches to discover each and every piece 
of legislation that included the public interest. It was also used to discover all pieces of 
legislation in England and Wales that include regulatory objectives. In connection with 
the instances in which the term public interest occurs in legislation, the results were 
synthesised and this thesis classified the ways in which the term arises and is used in 
legislation. The final section of this thesis examined the instances in which the public 
interest appears in legislation and also in defined regulatory objectives. Two bodies of 
literature are considered and discussed. The first related to ‘Better Regulation’ initiatives, 
the second related to scholarship concerned with making the case that the public interest 
should be the main reason for legislation.
Chapter five of this thesis endeavours to understand the public interest and whether it is 
capable of meaningful definition. There exists a voluminous multidisciplinary literature 
associated with the public interest. This is to be found in scholarship emanating from the 
fields of philosophy, political philosophy, political science, public administration and 
law. This literature is considered. To establish whether any existing public interest 
theories may assist with understanding the public interest in the context of the Legal
10 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Operation o f the Legal Services Board (2013 HC 963-1)
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Services Act 2007, a sub-genre of scholarship which is primarily orientated towards 
classifying theories of the public interest was considered. A number of theories were 
considered and discussed in light of the Legal Services Act 2007. This thesis argues that 
one set of theories offer the possibility of a better understanding of the public interest 
which connects with the legislative intention which underpinned the public interest 
insertion in the Act. In an attempt to operationalize the public interest in legal services, 
one strand of theories were considered, but in operationalizing these theories a better 
understanding of ‘values’ was required. This chapter therefore also includes a discussion 
of the multidisciplinary literature on ‘values’ emanating from sociology and public 
administration disciplines.
Chapter six of this thesis attempts to operationalize the hybrid theories in light of the 
modifications outlined in chapter five. This thesis suggests, through a review of salient 
literature that the main value that approximates the public interest in legal services is the 
rule of law. It also seeks to identify a number of values which need to be realised such 
that this value can be achieved. This thesis reviewed a number of international sets of 
principles and declarations regarding the role of lawyers in society. In line with the 
methodology outlined in chapter five a broad brushed approach towards the identification 
of values is undertaken. The values were assimilated and then categorised. The purpose 
of the categorisation of common values was to facilitate a discussion of the broader 
literature concerned with these values and their interrelationship with legal services. To 
cure a number of identified weaknesses with just identifying values, in the context of the 
public interest, the second part of this chapter attempts to set out a methodology to 
operationalize the theories identified in chapter five. Despite extensive library and web 
based searches, less than a handful of resources were identified which included methods 
designed to operationalize the public interest in policy and regulatory decision making. 
Building on the theories discussed in chapter 5, this thesis suggests a methodology for the 
systematic consideration of values in regulatory policy and decision making which 
should approximate the public interest in legal services and therefore arguably realise the 
legislative intention which underpinned the inclusion of the public interest in the Legal 
Services Act 2007.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007, THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION AND LEGAL SERVICES
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to set out why it is pertinent to examine the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 
2007. This chapter first outlines the major provisions of the Legal Services Act 2007 and 
introduces the regulatory objectives included in the first section of the Act. It then 
examines the way in which these regulatory objectives appear throughout the Act. This is 
followed by an explanation of why the regulatory objectives have assumed a greater 
degree of significance than just a mere expression of the purpose of the legislation. 
Problems regarding the way in which the regulatory objectives are interpretea are 
discussed with emphasis placed on the public interest and the consumer interest.
Whilst it is important to introduce the Legal Services Act 2007 right at the beginning of 
this thesis, in a chronological sense doing so starts in the middle of the story. The 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to examining the factors that led to the perceived 
need for legislation which culminated in the Legal Services Act 2007. This chapter 
considers a number of general factors which precipitated new policy and regulatory 
initiatives. It considers a number of policies at international, European and domestic level 
designed to promote economic prosperity and reduce competitive restriction within the 
market for legal services. The final section of this chapter considers how these issues 
have been framed in a variety of reports, mainly conducted for the Government or the 
competition authorities. By examining the historical context of the Legal Services Act 
2007, it is demonstrated that an increasing emphasis was been placed on competition and 
the consumer of legal services in the period leading up to the introduction of the Legal 
Services Bill. In the immediate period before the Legal Services Bill, this chapter 
evidences a focus on the consumer interest and the absence of any mention of the public 
interest.
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1.2 THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007
The Legal Services Act set the scene for what has been described as: “the most 
fundamental change ever in the structure o f the provision o f legal services."1 The 
proponents of the Act had three main objectives: the first, to create a new regulatory 
regime based on a set of regulatory objectives, the second, to strengthen the machinery 
for dealing with complaints against lawyers and the third, to facilitate the creation of new 
structures of legal practice. These objectives have been enshrined in a colossal piece of 
legislation. The following outlines the main aspects of the Act. This outline demonstrates 
the magnitude of the changes and why general study of this subject is important.
1.2.1 The Legal Services Act 2007 and the Regulation of Legal Services 
The Legal Services Act 2007 created a new regulatory regime. This involved a 
fundamental change in the way in which the legal professions self-regulate. The eight 
previously existing regulators2 of the branches of the legal profession became approved 
regulators in the Act.3 Whilst the approved regulators retained the right to set their own 
rules, their regulatory arrangements must now, by virtue of the Act, be approved by the 
Lord Chancellor on the recommendation of the newly established Legal Services Board.4 
The Legal Services Board created by the Act became fully operational on the 1st January 
2010. The Legal Services Board is responsible for the oversight of all front-line 
‘approved’ regulators. This brings about a new tier of oversight regulation. The powers of 
the oversight regulator are extensive. The Board’s powers and duties include authorising 
bodies to be approved regulators,5 authorising bodies to license Alternative Business 
Structures,6 approving approved regulators professional rules and directing changes to 
them if necessary,7 directing approved regulators to take a particular action8 and applying
1 James Thome & Ian Miller, Guide to the Legal Services Act (Lexis Nexis 2009) V
2 The Law Society, The General Council of the Bar, The Master of Faculties, The Institute of Legal Executives, The 
Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, The Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys, The Association of Law Costs 
Draftsmen; The Council for Licensed Conveyancers
3 Approved regulators are those who are approved to regulate professionals to practice ‘reserved areas of work’ (the 
exercise of a right of audience; the conduct of litigation; reserved instrument activities; probate activities; notarial 
activities; the administration of oaths) The Approved regulators are: The Law Society; The General Council of the Bar; 
The Master of Faculties; The Institute of Legal Executives: The Council for Licensed Conveyancers; The Chartered 
Institute of Patent Attorneys; The Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys; The Association of Law Costs Draftsmen).
4 Legal Services Act 2007, sch 4 pt 2 para (2)(b)
5 Legal Services Act 2007, sch 4
6 Legal Services Act 2007, pt 4
7 Legal Services Act 2007, pt5
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sanctions if they do not;9 and recommending to the Lord Chancellor which services 
should be reserved activities10 and therefore compulsorily regulated. Of particular interest 
is the Legal Services Board’s broad powers connected with approved regulators 
‘regulatory arrangements.’ The term ‘regulatory arrangements’ is given a broad meaning 
in the Act and includes those actions related to authorising persons11 to undertake 
reserved work,12 conduct and practice rules, disciplinary arrangements, qualification 
regulations, indemnification or compensation arrangements, any of its other rules or 
regulations13 and its overall licensing rules.14 Moreover, approved regulators now have to 
distance regulatory and representative functions and comply with corporate governance 
rules made by the Legal Services Board.15 The Act also requires the Legal Services 
Board to establish a ‘Consumer Panel’ to represent the interest of consumers. The 
changes radically alter the balance of control exercised by the legal professions. Every 
aspect of the regulatory environment has been covered by this piece of legislation. The 
following outlines two further important parts of the Act, before moving on to examine 
the regulatory objectives of the Act.
The Legal Services Act 2007 created the Office for Legal Complaints (OLC).16 The OLC 
is an independent body set up to administer an ombudsman scheme to deal with all 
consumer complaints against lawyers or legal services. The OLC has become the single 
point of entry for all consumer complaints about lawyers and legal services. The 
jurisdiction of the OLC extends to any complaint against an authorised person relating to
8 Legal Services Act 2007, pt4
9 Legal Services Act 2007, pt4 s37 -  48
10 Legal Service Act 2007, s24-26
11 Legal Services Act 2007, pt 3 s 18 - defines authorised persons as “a person who is authorised to carry on the 
relevant activity by a relevant approved regulator in relation to the relevant activity^. Relevant activity is in effect a 
reserved area of work (the definition of reserved work is outlined in Legal Services Act 2007, si 2 .
12 Legal Services Act 2007, s 12 - defines reserved legal activity as: a) the exercise of rights of audience; b) the conduct 
of litigation; c) reserved instrument activities; d) probate activities; e) notarial activities; f) the administration of oaths.
13 Any of its other rules, covers “any of its other rules or regulations (however they may be described), and any other 
arrangements, which apply to or in relation to regulated persons, other than those made for the purposes o f any 
function the body has to represent or promote the interest o f person regulated by it” (Legal Services Act 2007, 
s21(l)(i)
14 Legal Services Act 2007, s21(l)
15 Legal Services Act 2007, s30 (the purpose of the corporate governance rules are to ensure 1) that the exercise o f an 
approved regulator’s regulatory functions are not prejudiced by its representative function 2) that decisions relating to 
the exercise of an approved regulator’s regulatory function are so far as reasonably practicable taken independently 
from decision relating to its representative function.
16 Legal Services Act 2007, pt 6
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reserved legal activities. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or excluded by agreement17 
The OLC may provide redress but disciplinary action remains the responsibility of the 
approved regulators. Section 15718 of the Act also removes the ability of approved 
regulators to make provision for redress. The Act therefore seeks to address the serious 
problems of complaints described later in this chapter. The Act has essentially removed 
the overall responsibility for handling complaints away from the profession, and created 
an independent body with a serious catalogue of sanctions at its disposal.
A major feature of the Act is the removal of certain restrictions on the practice of law. 
The Act has made multi-disciplinary partnerships and much more possible. The 
restrictions effectively confining barristers to chambers and solicitors to partnerships 
have been removed. The introduction of Legal Disciplinary Partnerships (LDP) allows 
firms to be owned and managed by lawyers and non-lawyers. There can now be up to 
25% individual non-lawyer managers if approved by an appropriate approved regulator. 
Alternative Business Structures (ABS) allow for the creation of multi-disciplinary 
practices and beyond. This means that not only will lawyers be able to share the 
management and control of a firm with non-lawyers, but will also be able to provide any 
type of legal service, both reserved and unreserved, as well as other related services. ABS 
will also be able to raise capital by listing on the stock exchange and sell shares which 
can be publicly traded. It means that non-lawyers, including venture capitalists or 
commercial conglomerates can own firms that provide legal services. This development 
in and of itself represents a major opportunity for legal practice but is not without its 
risks.19 Regarding the opportunities opened up by ABS and the Legal Services Act 
2007,20 the first Chairman of the Legal Services Board noted in the Foreword21 of the 
standard guide to the Legal Services Act 2007 the following:
17 Legal Services Act 2007, sl25(3)
18 Legal Services Act 2007, si 57
19For a general discussion of the problems associated with MDP see Harry McVea, ‘Predators and the Public Interest -  
the ‘Big Four’ and Multi-Disciplinary Practices’ (2002) 65 Modem Law Review 6; Lawrence Fox, ‘Accountants, the 
Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issues of 
MDP’s’ (2000) 84 Minn. L. Rev 1097; Laurel Terry, “MDPs, "Spinning," and Wouters v. Nova” (2002) 52 Case 
Western Law Review, 867; Paul Paton, ‘Multidisciplinary Practices Redux: Globalisation, Core Values, and Reviving 
the MDP Debate in America’ (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2193.
20 James Thome & Ian Miller, Guide to the Legal Services Act (Lexis Nexis 2009) V
21 James Thome & Ian Miller, Guide to the Legal Services Act (Lexis Nexis 2009) V
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"In opening up the market to new forms o f business practice, we can legitimately 
expect consumers and providers alike to take advantage o f new opportunities and 
benefits. We can anticipate innovation and creativity in service provision as new 
entrants seek to join the market and existing providers at last have the chance to 
access new sources o f capital. Non-lawyers, who for many years have played a 
central role in developing legal businesses, can at last, have a seat at the 
boardroom table and their contribution properly recognised. Consumers can start 
to influence service delivery by identifying and negotiating for the business 
models that best suit their needs. ”22
Moving beyond this snapshot of the changes that the Legal Services Act 2007 has 
brought about in connection with the regulation of legal services, the following section 
considers one particular aspect of the Act, the regulatory objectives.
1.3 THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007 AND THE REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 
Of central importance to this thesis are the regulatory objectives set out in the first 
provision of the Act. This section outlines the regulatory objectives and then explains 
how their role extends far beyond a symbolic insertion of the purpose of the legislation. It 
then goes on to consider both the importance of the regulatory objectives and some of the 
problems that they pose for regulators and stakeholders. The regulatory objectives of the 
Legal Services Act 2007, which appear in Part 1, Section 1, are outlined below and they 
are accompanied by sections 2 and 3 which qualify aspects of section 1.
(1) In this act a reference to "the regulatory objectives" is a reference to the 
objectives of:
(a) Protecting and promoting the oublie interest:
(b) Supporting the constitutional principle o f the rule o f law;
(c) Improving access to justice;
22 James Thome & Ian Miller, Guide to the Legal Services Act (Lexis Nexis 2009) Preface (David Edmonds)
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(d) Protecting and promoting the interests o f consumers;
(e) Promoting competition in the provision o f services within subsection (2);
(f) Encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession;
(g) Increasing public understanding o f the citizen's legal rights and duties;
(h) Promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles.
(2) The services within this subsection are services such as are provided by 
authorised persons (including services which do not involve the carrying on o f 
activities which are reserved legal activities).
(3) The "professionalprinciples" are-
(a) that authorised persons should act with independence and integrity;
(b) that authorised persons should maintain proper standards o f work,
(c) that authorised persons should act in the best interests o f their clients,
(d) that persons who exercise before any court a right o f audience, or conduct 
litigation in relation to proceedings in any court, by virtue o f being authorised 
persons should comply with their duty to the curt to act with independence in the 
interests o f justice and
(e) that the affairs o f clients should be kept confidential.
The regulatory objectives run through the Legal Services Act 2007 like the lettering in a 
stick of rock. Appendix 1 to this thesis outlines and discusses each reference to the 
regulatory objectives in the Act. In all there are 30 substantive references to the 
regulatory objectives in the Act. Far from being a passive declaration of the purpose of 
the Act, the regulatory objectives underpin the statutory obligations of the Legal Services 
Board23 and the approved regulators.24 The Legal Services Board, the approved 
regulators, and the Office for Legal Complaints25 are all obliged to act in a way that they
23 Legal Services Act 2007, s 3 (2)(a)
24 Legal Services Act 2007, s 28(2) (b)
25 Legal Services Act 2007, si 18 (2) (b)
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consider appropriate for meeting the regulatory objectives. The Legal Services Board26 
and the Office for Legal Complaints27 need to prove how they have met the regulatory 
objectives in their annual reports. The Legal Services Board has a considerable range of 
powers, regarding setting approved regulators performance targets28, directions regarding 
actions that need to be taken29, censuring approved regulators30, giving intervention 
directions allowing for the removal of a regulatory function from an approved regulator,31 
and, most dramatically, removing an approved regulators licence to regulate.32 Each of 
the foregoing powers rests on the Legal Services Board’s determination as to how the 
approved regulator’s actions or omissions have affected one or more of the regulatory 
objectives.
The importance attached to understanding what each regulatory objective means is 
undeniable. Regulators and administrative authorities are often charged with making 
complex judgements. In the context of the Legal Services Act 2007 individual objectives, 
within a broad spectrum of regulatory objectives, need to be rationalised, by the 
regulators, with each other. A recent comparative analysis of regulatory objectives in 
pieces of legal services regulation has revealed that the Legal Services Act 2007 has the 
most diverse and arguably contentious set of regulatory objectives in any piece of 
legislation connected with the regulation of legal professions and legal services.33 The 
ranking or lack of ranking of the regulatory objectives in the Legal Services Act 2007 has 
raised many questions about which regulatory objectives are more important than others. 
Consensus is building that the public interest is the most important regulatory objective34
26 Legal Services Act 2007, s 6 (2) (b)
27 Legal Services Act 2007, si 18 (2) (b)
28 Legal Services Act 2007, s31 (2) (a)
29 Legal Services Act 2007, s 32(4)
30 Legal Services Act 2007, s 35
31 Legal Services Act 2007 s 41(1)
32 Legal Services Act 2007, s45
33 Laurel Terry, Steve Mark & Thalia Gordon, ‘Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession’ (2012) 80 
Fordham Law Review 2685 (pp 2687)
34 Stephen Mayson, ‘The Regulation of Legal Services: What is the case for reservation?’ (Legal Services Institute 
Interim Strategic Discussion Paper, February 2011) <http://www.leualservicesinstitute.org.uk> page 3-4; Legal 
Services Board, Business Plan 2009-2010. (Legal Services Board 2009)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/2009/pdf/Legal Services
Board draft business plan 2009 10.odf> accessed 12 July 2012
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but the explanatory notes35 to the Legal Services Act 2007 definitively states that the 
regulatory objectives are not ranked in any order of priority. To add to this problem it is 
notable that many other jurisdictions compared in the aforementioned piece of 
comparative research, have not attached as much emphasis in their regulatory objectives 
to the promotion of consumer interests or the promotion of competition.36
The need for a clear understanding of the objectives is magnified by the split pattern of 
regulatory responsibility for legal services in the Legal Services Act 2007. This exists 
between the Legal Services Board, 8 approved regulators and the Office for Legal 
Complaints. In the absence of definitional clarity, regulatory objectives are effectively 
open to be interpreted in a multitude of ways. It is perhaps inevitable that the approved 
regulators will interpret the objectives in 8 different ways, whilst the Legal Services 
Board might interpret them in another way. There are equally legitimate, out subtle or 
explicit ways of interpreting the regulatory objectives. The seriousness of these points 
comes into view when one of the Legal Services Board’s powers could be invoked. If the 
Legal Services Board sought to recommend to the Lord Chancellor that the Bar or the 
Law Society should lose its approved regulator status, the determination of what 
‘protecting and promoting the consumer interest’ or ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ or any of the other regulatory objectives might mean, is important. Therefore, 
the approach adopted by regulators, and in particular the Legal Services Board will 
inevitably affect the way in which the legal profession and legal services are regulated. 
The approach taken by regulators towards consumers and the way in which they choose 
to interpret competition policies and interact with the competition authorities could also 
have a profound effect on the course of legal services regulation.
1.3.1 The Regulatory Objective ‘Protecting and Promoting the Public Interest’
From the perspective of definition, one of the regulatory objectives provides serious 
problems. Underlining this point, the following section from a Select Committee Report
35 HMSO, Explanatory Notes, Legal Services Act 2007 (HMSO 2007) 
<httrr//m\w.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/notes> accessed 28 November 2012
36 Laurel Terry, Steve Mark & Thalia Gordon, ‘Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession’ (2012) 80 
Fordham Law Review 2685, 2687
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on Regulators and Regulation in 2006 provides some apposite observations on the subject 
of this difficult to define regulatory objective, namely the public interest.
“The generality o f the concept o f the public interest is at once both its strength 
and its weakness. It encourages debate but most witnesses thought that providing 
regulators with a duty to act in "the public interest" without further definition or 
qualification was o f little practical use and allowed too much scope for  
interpretation in the hands o f unelected officials. ” 37
The report drew heavily on the assertions made by George Yarrow, Director of the 
Regulatory Policy Unit at Oxford University:
"Regulators should not be required to pursue the ’public interest': [it] is far too 
vague a concept to be helpful. "S8
Drawing on these observations, the public interest as a regulatory objective provides a 
strong rhetorical signal about the purpose of the Legal Services Act 2007. It is difficult to 
imagine the Legal Services Act 2007 without it. The rest of this thesis builds on these 
points. The importance of the insertion of the regulatory objectives has been the subject 
of a recent comparative study, as mentioned earlier.39 The paper compared a number of 
recent pieces of legal services legislation from around the world which have included 
regulatory objectives. It appears that in a number of instances the Legal Services Act 
2007 has been used as a template for the drafting of similar legislation in other 
jurisdictions. In particular these jurisdictions all include ‘regulatory objectives.’ All 
jurisdictions considered in the study included the public interest as a regulatory objective. 
The authors of this paper extoll the benefits of including regulatory objectives in legal 
services regulation as follows:
37 The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic Regulators(HL 2006-2007,189-11) p 523, p 596
38 The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic Regulators(HL 2006-2007,189-11) 596
39 Laurel Terry, Steve Mark & Thalia Gordon, ‘Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession’ (2012) 80 
Fordham Law Review 2685, 2687
“Firstly, the inclusion o f regulatory objectives definitively sets out the purpose o f  
lawyer regulation and its parameters. Regulatory objectives thus serve as a guide 
to assist those regulating the legal profession and those being regulated. 40
Second, regulatory objectives identify, for those affected by the particular 
regulation, the purpose o f that regulation and why it is enforced. 41
Thirdly regulatory objectives assist in ensuring that the function and purpose o f 
the particular legislation is transparent. Thus, when the regulatory body 
administering the legislation is questioned, for example, about its interpretation 
o f the legislation - the regulatory body can point to the regulatory objectives to 
demonstrate compliance with function and purpose 42
Fourthly, regulatory objectives can help define the parameters o f the legislation 
and o f public debate about proposed legislation 43
Finally, regulatory objectives may help the legal profession when it is called upon 
to negotiate with governmental and nongovernmental entities about regulations 
affecting legal practice. ” 44
This is a timely contribution to the literature on legal services regulation and regulatory 
objectives. The discussion of regulatory objectives in England and Wales, as outlined in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, has until the publication of this comparative study, been the 
preserve of the Legal Services Board,45 The Legal Services Policy Institute46 and a few
40 ibid 2687
41 ibid 2687
42 ibid 2687
43 ibid 2687
44 ibid 2687
45 Legal Services Board , Business Plan 2010-2011. (Legal Services Board 2010)
<http://www.1egalservicesboard.org.uk/news nublications/miblications/pdf/fïrial annual plan 201 Q.pdf> accessed 15 
August 2012
46 Stephen Mayson, ‘Legal Services Regulation and ‘The Public Interest” (Legal Services Institute, July 2011) 10
<http://\vww.goog1e.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=i&q=stephen+mavson+and+pubh'c+interest&source:=web&cd=4&ved-0CDA 
OFiAD&ur1=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.1egalserviccsinstitute.org.uk%2FWorkArea%2FDown1oadAsset.aspx%3Fid%3D 
6442451899%261ib]D%3D6442451899&ei=OVWFUM3nAeLWOOWAsoHwBA&usg=AFOiCNEN2RGUmw4REirF
Vclv3FT0fbbr2O> accessed 15 June 2012
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embryonic assertions in speeches made by members of the judiciary47 or stakeholders in 
the legal services industry.48 The assertions made in the comparative analysis applaud the 
insertion of regulatory objectives. At face value these assertions make a good deal of 
sense. Viewed from the perspective of not having regulatory objectives, the point of the 
regulation, how it is to be used and interpreted and how it is to be enforced becomes 
certainly less clear cut. This is, however, to be referred to as a relative observation, 
because as this thesis discusses, many of the terms used, and in particular the ‘public 
interest’ are capable of many meanings. Regulatory objectives connected with the 
independence of the legal profession, the rule of law, access to justice are laudable 
objectives. However, objectives raised in connection with ‘consumer interests’ and 
competition raise a number of questions, and as mentioned earlier, a number of 
jurisdictions have sought to either curtail or frame these objectives in light of other more 
important or less contentious objectives. It is, however, questionable the extent to which 
the regulatory objective connected with the public interest can achieve the benefits 
outlined in the comparative analysis, and in particular those set out above. In light of the 
comments made in the Select Committee Report and those made by George Yarrow both 
outlined at the beginning of this section, it is questionable the extent to which the 
regulatory objective of protecting and promoting the public interest might be of any use 
at all.
This thesis does not disagree with the authors of the comparative study that the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ is a very important one. Were 
the objective of the Legal Services Act 2007 not to achieve the public interest something 
would be very wrong. Indeed the rest of this thesis is dedicated to understanding why its 
insertion is both valuable and how it can be understood. This thesis, however, takes issue 
with the assertions made by the authors of the comparative report. It questions whether
47 David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ (Master of the Rolls Speech, 25th Annual Bar 
Conference, London, 6 November2010) <httn://www.iudiciarv.gov.uk/media/sneeches/2010/sDeech-mor-tvranny-of- 
the-consumer-or-the-rule-of-law> accessed 29 November 2012
48 Jonathan Goldsmith, ‘The Core Values of the Legal Profession for Lawyers Today and Tomorrow’ (2008) 28 North­
western Journal of International Law & Business 441; David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of 
Law’ (Master of the Rolls Speech, 25th Annual Bar Conference, London, 6 November2010)
<http://www.iudiciarv.gov.iik/media/sDeeches/2010/speech-mor-tyrannv-of-the-consumer-or-the-rule-of-law> accessed 
29 November 2012; Ruth Deech, ‘Regulating the Regulators’ (Speech delivered at Gresham College, London, 23rd 
May 2012) <httD://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/regulating-the-regu1ators> accessed 27 November 2012
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upon critical inspection, the public interest is capable of clearly and transparently 
indicating the purpose of lawyer regulation. Moreover, it questions whether the public 
interest, alongside the other regulatory objectives, is capable of ‘guiding regulators’, and 
the ‘regulated’ as to the purpose of the legislation. It further questions whether it 
‘articulates clearly the purpose of regulation’ or whether the public interest ‘guides 
discourse’ or ‘helps the legal profession in any meaningful way in negotiations with the 
Government or non -governmental entities.’
Returning to the importance of the public interest, the imperative to study the public 
interest is brought starkly into relief when it is considered alongside the other regulatory 
objectives, and in particular the consumer interest and competition. To provide a simple 
determination between the difference between the consumer and public interest, the 
following, from a Government Memorandum prompted by a number of challenges to the 
language used in the Communications Bill 2002, is useful.49 It noted that the consumer 
interest can be defined as the interest of a purchaser or other user of a good or service, 
normally based on an economic relationship between the individual and the supplier of 
the good or service in question.50 In comparison, the citizen interest may be defined as 
the interest of the individual in his or her capacity as a member of society and the public 
interest as the interest or good of society as a whole.51 Throughout the rest of this thesis, 
the difference between the consumer interest and the public interest is explored. As noted 
previously the public interest is remarkably difficult to define though it is variously 
connected with the longer term interests of society.52 In counterpoint to this, the 
consumer interest is equated closely with the free market, where emphasis is placed on 
individual preferences.53 As such the consumer interest is often connected with the short 
term interests of individuals.54 Throughout the passage of the Legal Services Bill, some 
of the longest debates surrounded the difficulties of understanding the role of the
49 DTI/DCMS, Note by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department for Culture. Media and Sport on the 
meaning of "Customer", "Consumer" and "Citizen" (June 2002), <httD://ww\v.t)ar1iainent.the-stationery- 
office.co.uk/Da/it200102/itselect/itcom/169/2070808.htm> (accessed 16 July 2012)
50 ibid
51 ibid
52 The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic Regulators(HL 2006-2007,189-H) 596
53 ibid
54 Pascoe Pleasance, Sarah Maclean, ‘The Public Interest’ (Legal Aid Board Research Unit 1998) 25
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consumer interest and public interest in the context of the proposed legislation. More than 
any other of the regulatory objectives, it is strongly argued that these two have the 
capacity to shape the future course of legal services regulation.
Regulating legal services ostensibly in the interests of consumers could potentially result 
in an outcome that differs considerably from regulation that aims to protect and promote 
the public interest. The importance of examining the public interest is also derived from 
the fact that, as the remainder of this chapter bears out, consideration and mention of it 
gradually disappeared, to be replaced with the consumer interest, in the months and years 
before the Legal Services Bill was introduced to Parliament. The remainder of this 
chapter is concerned with demonstrating how, and why, greater and greater emphasis was 
placed on the consumer of legal services as opposed to the public interest in legal 
services. As the next section outlines, there have been a number of attempts to alter the 
regulation of legal services. Until recently those attempts have either failed or resulted in 
partial changes which bedevilled the protagonists of more fundamental structural 
reforms. Beyond a short account of these changes, this chapter considers how, and why, 
change, in the form of the Legal Services Act 2007 happened when it did. This chapter 
pays reference to changes which, politically speaking made it possible for the 
Government to bring about far reaching changes.
1.4 CHANGE AND LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION
There is a rich pedigree of reports and reviews of the legal profession. Barely a decade 
has passed in modem times without calls to alter the regulation of lawyers and the legal 
profession. The following outlines a number of reports and developments since the early 
1970s. Influenced by the UK’s joining of the Common Market, (now the European 
Union) in 1972, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) undertook a number 
of reviews of the legal profession and drew conclusions regarding the anti-competiveness 
of the legal profession.55 These conclusions closely mirror those that were to be later 
drawn by the OECD,56 European Union57 and OFT.58 The political environment was not,
55 MMC, A Report on the General Effect on the Public Interest o f Certain Restrictive Practices (Cmnd 4463,1970);
56 OECD, Competition in Professional Services, (DAFFE/CLP, 2000, 2)
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however, conducive to change, and the legal profession successfully managed to resist 
calls for reform outlined in the main MMC report in 1970.59 Evidence from 11 further 
investigations60 into legal services undertaken by the MMC found, generally, that costs 
were too high, clients were receiving a poor service and that the legal profession was 
failing to meet the needs of all sections of society. This led the Government to establish 
the Royal Commission on Legal Services, otherwise known as the Benson Commission.61 
It was given wide terms of reference to examine the structure, organisation, training and 
regulation of the legal profession. The Commission found, however, that the practice of 
law was a professional activity and that it displayed a number of admirable common 
characteristics. This conclusion has been regarded as “the last act o f a gentler age, not 
imbued by market economics and the ravages o f competition andfree market ideology.”62
The Royal Commission’s findings were both criticised and short lived. They were short 
lived, because soon after publication scandal rocked the solicitors’ branch of the 
profession when a prominent member of the profession was found liable of serious 
professional negligence in 1983.63 The publicity that this attracted was enormous.64 A 
Private Members Bill was introduced to Parliament with the intention of breaking the 
solicitor’s monopoly on conveyancing.65 This was retracted, but the Government agreed 
to introduce legislation permitting licensed conveyancers. This took the form of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1985 which permitted licensed conveyancers. Having lost 
the conveyancing monopoly, solicitors turned their attention to the monopoly enjoyed by
57 Communication from the Commission: Report on Competition in Professional Services COM (2004) 83 Final (Feb.
9,2004) Page 3
58 OFT, Competition in Professions (OFT328,2001) 19
59 MMC, A Report on the General Effect on the Public Interest o f Certain Restrictive Practices (Cmnd 4463,1970);
60 MMC, Advocates ’ Services: A Report on the Supply o f Advocates ’ Services in Relation to Restrictions on Advertising 
(HC 560, 1976) ; MMC, Advocates ’ Services : A Report on the supply by Senior Counsel o f their services ( HC 513,
1976); MMC, Services of Solicitors in Scotland: A Report on the Supply o f Services o f Solicitors in Scotland in 
Relation to Restrictions on Advertising ( HC 557,1976); MMC, Services o f Solicitors in England and Wales: A Report 
on the Supply of Services o f Solicitors in England and Wales in Relation to Restrictions on Advertising (HC 557, 1976); 
MMC, Barristers ’ Services: A Report on the Supply of Barristers ’ Services in Relation to Restrictions on Advertising 
(HC 512, 1976); MMC, Accountancy Services : A Report on the Supply o f Accountancy Services in Relation to 
Restrictions on Advertising (CMND 6573,1976); MMC, Architects ’ Services: A Report on the Supply o f Architects ' 
Services with Reference to Scale Fees (HC 4,1977).
61 Home Office, Report o f the Royal Commission on Legal Services in England and Wales (Cmnd 7648, 1979)
62 Robin White, A Guide to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (Fourmat Publishing 1991) 5
63 This was the Glanville Davies affair which erupted in 1983.
64 Robin White, A Guide to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (Fourmat Publishing 1991) 5
65 1983 Austin Mitchell MP introduced a Private Member’s Bill. The Bill proposed the establishment of licensed 
conveyancers.
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barristers over rights of audience. An unfriendly debate broke out between the two 
professions. To resolve the stalemate, the General Council of the Bar proposed a joint 
committee with the Law Society to consider jointly the friture of the profession. The 
result was the Marre Committee66 whose findings, when read in light of the Legal 
Services Act 2007, were Cassandra like. The Committee noted that the professions 
should consider carefully their structures and retain only those rules that were “essential 
for the maintenance o f professional standards in the public interest. ”67 They also noted 
“realism was needed in providing new services because o f resource constraints”6* The 
Report was rubbished by the profession and a note of dissent was attached to it by the 
Bar.69
Set in the context of Prime Minister Thatcher’s Government’s general policies, during the 
1980s, which favoured increased competition and markets, the DTI stated that it intended 
to apply competition law to the legal profession. The Prime Minister sacked Lord 
Hailsham, notably one of the legal profession’s closest allies, and appointed Lord 
Mackay to the post of Lord Chancellor. He had a reputation for radical thinking.70 In 
1989 Lord Mackay issued three Green Papers which rocked the foundation of the legal 
profession with a series of radical proposals.71 The papers were broadly criticised.72 The 
Green Papers included many mentions of the terms ‘value for money,’ ‘efficiency,’ ‘free 
competition’ and ‘market forces.’73 Notably, however, the papers referred to clients as 
opposed to consumers. The papers advocated radical changes and included proposals as 
to how the profession regulated itself, removal of the Bar’s monopoly over rights of 
audience, the permission of barrister’s direct access to clients, advertising, contingency 
fees and mutli-disciplinary partnerships. They also advocated the establishment of a
66 Marre Committee (On the Future of the Legal Profession), A time for Change (Bar Council and Law Society, 1988)
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69 Richard Abel, English Lawyers between Market and State (OUP 2004) 15
70 Robin White, A Guide to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (Fourmat Publishing 1991) 5
71 LCD, The Work and Organisation of the Legal Profession (Cm 570, 1989); LCD, Conveyancing by Authorised 
Practitioners (Cm 572,1989); LCD, Contingency Fees (Cm 571, 1989)
72 Richard Abel, English Lawyers between Market and State (OUP, 2004) See also: Michael Zander, ‘The Thatcher 
Government’s Onslaught on the Lawyers: Who Won?’ (1990) 24, International Law 753, 759 and Fiona Cownie, ‘The 
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Legal Services Ombudsman.74 The Bar and the Judiciary mounted a fierce campaign 
opposing the proposals.75 The campaign was of such novel proportions that the prominent 
academic, Richard Abel, published a book extending to over 700 pages devoted to the 
times.76 The Government was forced to retreat as a result of the campaign and more 
modest proposals were included in the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. 77
With the exception of the Benson Report, common to the findings of the various 
investigations and reports on the legal profession were the hostile reactions to them by 
the legal profession. The reactions to the Green Papers by the Bar and the Judiciary 
meant that the Government had to capitulate. In many ways the Legal Services Act 2007 
embodies significant aspects of the Green Papers, together with other more profound 
changes which would have been unthinkable in 1989, including the ideas of an oversight 
regulator and Alternative Business Structures. The following outlines and discusses a 
number of factors which precipitated the changes in the early to mid-2000s, providing the 
opportunity for the Government to bring about change and also do it in such a way that 
the fierce resistance, prominent for many years, could be overcome.
1.4.1 Change and the ‘New Moral Economy’
The foregoing section considered the regulatory objectives and referred to a recently 
published piece of work which examined the insertion of regulatory objectives in recently 
enacted pieces of legal services legislation around the world.78 It is striking that in what is 
a relatively short period of time; so many jurisdictions have initiated legislation 
connected with legal services.79 This is not altogether unsurprising. The term 
globalisation is a contested term.80 It does, however, present a useful lens through which
74 ibid
75 Richard Abel, English Lawyers between Market and State (OUP, 2004) 8
76 ibid; See also: Michael Zander, ‘The Thatcher Government’s Onslaught on the Lawyers: Who Won?’ (1990) 24, 
International Law 753, 759 and Fiona Cownie, ‘The Reform of the Legal Profession’, in Fiona Patfeild and Robin 
White (eds) The Changing Law (Leicester Univ Press 1990)
77 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 for an in-depth commentary see: Robin White, A Guide to the Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990 (Fourmat Publishing 1991)
78 Laurel Terry, Steve Mark & Thalia Gordon, ‘Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession’ (2012) 80 
Fordham Law Review 2685, 2687
79 ibid 2744
80 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton 'Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics and Culture ’ ( Polity Press Cambridge 1999)
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to understand some of the wider developments that have occurred during the latter part of 
the 20th century and into the early part of the 21st Century connected both with the law 
and legal services regulation.81 Globalisation has arguably affected many, if not all areas 
of the laws transformation to some extent, and consequently its practice. How this has 
occurred is explained by Trubek82 who argues that national legal fields have become 
more internationalised in two ways. Firstly, legal and political arenas which had 
previously been mainly national in terms of background assumptions, actors and 
orientation, have been increasingly influenced by external factors.83 Secondly, domestic 
decisions have been conditioned, shaped or even actually made elsewhere as 
transnational legal regimes penetrated national legal fields.84 Trubek argues that this has 
resulted in an interconnected approach to policy and regulatory development.85
In relation to services and specifically legal services, the role that the United Nations,86 
World Trade Organisation,87 the OECD88 and the European Union have played in this 
field are evidence of the powerful international influences which blur the distinction 
between international and domestic law and policy. Two examples demonstrate the 
effects that international developments have had on the legal profession in the period 
after Lord Mackay’s Green Papers. Terry discusses, in an important contribution to the 
discourse about the legal profession, how the 1994 General Agreement on Trade in
81 Snyder notes that the main shaping factors of globalisation have been the growth of multinational companies and 
international production networks, new technologies, changes in the nature and form of work, and the rise of new 
actors on the international scene, unprecedented advances in telecommunications, transportation, changes in the nature 
and form of work, information retrieval systems, and political upheavals that replaced communist and socialist regimes 
with democratic systems of government and capitalist economic policies. Francis Snyder, ‘Economic Globalisation 
and the Law’ in A Sarat (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Blackwell Publishers 2003); Francis 
Snyder, ‘Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Law’ (1999) 5 European Law 
Journal 334
82 David Trubek et al, ‘Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalisation of Legal Fields and the 
Creation of Trans-national arenas’ (1994) 44 Case Western Law Review 407.
83 ibid 407
84 ibid 408
85Reinvigorated competition law in the UK can be traced to the initiatives and policy ideologies of the European 
Commission See: Laurel Terry, ‘The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services’ 
(2009) 29 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 1,9,10
86 United Nations, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, (UN. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 118,1990) 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/lawvers.htm> accessed 19th November 2012
87 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (World Trade Organisation)
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/06-gatt e.htm> accessed 11 November 2009
88 OECD, Competition in Professional Services, (DAFFE/CLP, 2000, 2) page 202 
<http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/35/4/1920231.pdf> accessed 7 October 2012
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Services (GATS)89 evidences a paradigm shift from the notion of ‘legal professions’ to 
an international trend in the marketization of ‘legal services.’90 The GATS agreement 
was signed as part of the establishment of the World Trade Organisation. This agreement 
included jurisdictions from all over the world and in it there was a section devoted to 
Legal Services.91 Terry92 argues that this was a clear signal that legal services were to be 
regarded as something to “be traded in both a literal and a political sense. ”93 Whilst as 
noted earlier the Monopolies and Mergers Commission reviewed many aspects of the 
legal profession in the 1970s as a result of the UK’s joining the Common Market, 
reinvigorated emphasis and developments in competition policy in the UK can be traced 
to the more recent initiatives and policy ideologies of a number of supra-national 
organisations, and the European Union, in particular, during the late 1990s and early 
2000s.94 In characterising many of the policy developments initiated by the OECD and 
the European Union, Webb95 has described them as creating a "new moral economy", 
one that through strongly value-laden rhetoric, aims to liberate and democratise social 
relations largely through market mechanisms.,96 Through the development of markets, 
liberalisation, de-regulation and the effects of the neo-liberalism paradigm, Webb notes 
that the key emphasis has been on the importance of choice and individual freedom as 
well as enhanced access to both material and non-material goods through competition. 
The legal profession has concomitantly been the focus of many policies designed to 
liberalise and de-regulate the market.97 The following outlines the emphasis placed on 
competition and consumers in polices by the OECD and the European Union.
89 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (World Trade Organisation)
<htto://www.wto.ors/english/docs e/legal e/06-gatt e.htm> accessed 11 November 2009
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1.4.2 Legal Services, Competition. Consumers and the OECD
In 1985, the OECD’s Committee on Competition Law and Policy presented a report titled 
‘Competition Policy and the Professions.’98 This report concluded that in the majority of 
countries professions were not subject to competition rules and, in consequence, 
recommended to the States to eliminate existing restrictions regarding access, price, 
advertising and association structure, with the aim that “exceptions o f competition laws 
should not go beyond what is necessary and only to serve to reach public interest 
aims”?9 This report was one of the factors which precipitated the Green Papers in 1989. 
Linked directly to the focus on services in the GATS, the Conferences and Round Tables, 
between 1995 and 1999,100 focused on the need to reduce restrictions evident in a number 
of service sectors. A much greater appetite for reform of professional services is evident 
in the OECD’s 2000 report 'Competition in Professional Services 2000.'101 The following 
outlines the concerns expressed about the regulation of professional services.
“Concerns have been raised that these structural and behavioural regulations 
restrict competition more than is appropriate or necessary, raising the price and 
limiting innovation in the provision o f professional services. In addition, where a 
professional association is delegated certain regulatory powers, such as the 
power to discipline its members, concerns have arisen that professional 
associations may use these powers as a tool to restrict entry, fix  prices and 
enforce anti-competitive co-operation between its members. In some cases, 
studies have found that restricting entry to the most highly qualified providers 
may lower service quality overall as consumers forego professional services or 
seek to provide the services for themselves. ”102
98 OECD, Competition Policy and the Professions (Paris , 1985)
99 Regarding Access, it recommended that access systems be objective and equitable, and that policies be created that 
would afford foreign professionals the right to provide their services in both temporary and permanent fashion. With 
regard to advertising, it suggested the adoption of measurements to assure that consumers be afforded sufficient 
information to choose between different professionals. In reference to fees, it recommended that the mandatory tariff 
fixations be submitted to review to avoid diversion from the price setting freedom principle. In relation to professional 
corporations it emphasised that the use of new business structures to provide professional services could allow for 
greater efficiency.
100 OECD, Competition in Professional Services, (DAFFE/CLP, 2000, 2) pages 3&4
101 ibid 2
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In 2008, the OECD issued a report that focused on the legal profession and identified 
antitrust issues raised by various kinds of lawyer regulations.103 This report noted that 
traditionally, the legal professions were heavily regulated; that regulation appeared to 
serve mainly the private interests of the profession rather than the broader consumer 
interest; and those professional bodies may capture public authorities or attain the right to 
regulate themselves.104 It further concluded that the benefits of self-regulation, which 
allows for quality standards to be set by informed professionals, may be outweighed by 
the harm from potential anti-competitive restrictions.105 It therefore called on the OECD 
members to identify and remove those lawyer restrictions that were unnecessary or 
disproportionate to achieve the public interest. It encouraged its members to consider the 
differences between informed and uninformed buyers and to focus in particular on issues 
related to independent regulatory authority for legal services, entry restrictions, exclusive 
rights, and advertising and price restrictions and business structures.106 Whilst the 2008 
OECD report could not have directly influenced the policy which resulted in the Legal 
Services Act 2007 in England and Wales it is clear that the theme of the earlier reports, 
from 1985 and through to 2000 influenced the Government and the approach of the 
Office of Fair Trading in the UK. Further to this it is important to note the OECD’s 
emphasis on the removal of anti-competitive restrictions in the provision of legal 
services, the interests of the consumer and the un-informed consumer’s interests. In a 
similar way, the following demonstrates the increased emphasis placed on competition 
and consumers by the European Commission.
1.4.3 Legal Services. Competition. Consumers and the European Union 
The most important contemporary development regarding services in Europe was the 
Lisbon Strategy. Outlined at a meeting of the European Council in March 2000 it was 
agreed that the European Union should “become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable o f sustainable growth with more and
103 ibid 287-94
104 ibid 26- 27
105 ibid 26- 27
106 Laurel Terry, ‘The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services’ (2009) 29 
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better jobs and greater social cohesion.’'’101 The effects of the Lisbon Strategy have been 
numerous. It has been used to justify a number of policy initiatives including those 
related to professional services and competition.108 Direct policy considerations in 
connection with professional services date back to the early 2000s. Whilst two major 
cases were being heard before the European Court of Justice,109 both connected with the 
compatibility of competition law and professional regulation, the Commission tendered a 
contract to study 5 of the liberal professions. The contract was awarded to the IHS in 
Vienna.110 The IHS delivered their report in January 2003. The IHS report111 was the 
subject of intense criticism.112 Many of these criticisms were never publicly responded to 
by the European Commission. The report concluded that some countries in the European 
Union regulate professional services more than others. Countries that regulated 
professional services less did not have more consumer complaints. Countries that more 
heavily regulated professional services appeared to be less efficient and less profitable. 
Therefore, it appeared to the authors of the report that some countries with heavier 
regulatory intervention could reduce that regulation without detrimental effects.113 The 
Commission relied on the findings of the IHS study which informed many of the 
subsequent reports published by the Commission. In March 2003 the European 
Commission launched a stocktaking exercise with a consultation framed in terms of ‘an 
invitation to comment.’114 The invitation to comment included a rationale for undertaking
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a stocktaking exercise. It also took the opportunity to set out its policies, including direct 
references to the OECD’s approach to Services and the findings of the IHS Report.115 Of 
particular note is the following articulation of the Commission’s position in the 
introduction:
“The Commission’s established policy is to fully apply the competition rules to 
this sector, whilst recognising its specificities and acknowledging that liberal 
professions ’ special status in the economies o f the Member States and in society 
in general. The overall objective must be to improve welfare for all users o f 
professional services and for consumers in particular: better choice and better 
value for money. ”116
In launching the Stocktaking exercise, Mario Monti made the following comment which 
indicated a bold agenda to examine the liberal profession’s regulatory environment from 
a market based perspective and the viewpoint of consumers.
“The present level o f rules and regulation o f liberal professions owe some debt to 
historical convention. How many are still needed in the modern world? Do they 
hinder or favour the development o f the sector? Do they vrotect the consumers or 
the professionals? I  propose to examine whether existing rules and regulations, 
which, remember were devised and enacted in a very different economic context 
to that which exists today, continue to serve the legitimate purposes. I  would also 
like to assess whether they are the most efficient mechanism available in the 
current market situation. ”117
115 Commission Services Working Document, Regulation in Liberal Professions and its Effects, Invitation to Comment 
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The European Commission’s Competition Directorate General published a summary of 
the responses to the invitation to comment in October 2003.118 The summary outlined a 
wide range of views, covering the various stakeholders from across the liberal 
professions in Europe. Building on the responses to the consultation and the IHS study, 
the Commission published, in 2004, a report on ‘Competition in Professional 
Services.’119 This document referred to the Lisbon agenda and focused on five main 
categories of potentially restrictive regulation, namely: price fixing, recommended prices, 
advertising regulations, entry requirements and reserved rights and regulations governing 
business structure and multi-disciplinary practices.120 The report, in section 2.2121 noted 
that professional services were very important because of their ‘direct import for 
consumer’.122 It noted that “greater choice in the range o f services available and their 
prices empowers users to choose for themselves the combination o f vrice and quality 
which best suits their needs. ”123 The report referred specifically to the OECD’s 2000 
report124 and it was used as evidence of the negative effects that excessive regulation may 
have for consumers.
The Commission’s 2004 report squarely rejected many of the legal profession’s claims 
regarding existing regulations.125 The Commission recommended that all Member States 
should carry out a “thorough analysis o f the need for reform in the respective professions 
and o f the compatibility o f existing rules with competition law principles. ”126 This was 
followed up by the Commission asserting that it would report on progress achieved in 
eliminating the restrictions identified in 2005. The Commission indicated that it would 
contact responsible regulatory authorities and ask them to report on any adopted
118 Commission, DG Competition, Invitation to Comment, Regulation in Liberal Professions and its Effects, Summary 
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measures falling within the scope of the report. Further to this they noted that any explicit 
justification of restrictive rules that Member States wished to maintain would have to be 
communicated to the Commission.127 This directly connects the European Commission’s 
policy of removing anti-competitive restrictions in the professions, and the legal 
profession in particular, with the approach taken by the national competition authorities, 
and the OFT in England and Wales. The following quote from the concluding section of 
the report illustrates the Commission’s commitment to the removal of restrictive 
regulation and their emphasis on competition and the benefits to be derived by 
consumers.
“The Commission concludes by repeating that the efforts o f all concerned parties 
are needed to improve the regulatory environment in which providers o f  
professional services operate in Europe. An environment in which quality and 
ethical behaviour are guaranteed through more pro-competitive mechanisms will 
allow the liberal profession to innovate and to increase the quality and choice o f  
their services. More efficient and competitive professional services will benefit 
consumers directly and, as key inputs for other businesses, they will also bring 
greater productivity to the economy as a whole, thus contributing to the Lisbon 
agenda o f making Europe the most dynamic knowledge based economy in the 
world. ”128
The Commission’s 2005 follow up report129 was accompanied by a paper130 assessing the 
progress made by Member States in reviewing and eliminating restrictions to competition 
in professional services. The Commission noted that the UK had made “substantial 
structural reforms. ” The Commission concluded that more urgency was needed in the
127ibid 24 (para 6.3 section 103)
128 ibid 24
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majority of Member States to bring about systematic pro-competitive reform in the sector 
which it argued would bring about significant economic and consumer benefits.
There is a profound connection between the policies of the OECD and the European 
Commission. Of particular note is the focus placed on competition and consumer 
interests. Terry has summarised the aims of both these reform agendas as being driven by 
a market-orientated approach that located competition in the market for professional 
services as a major goal.131 Further commenting on these developments, Garoupa132 
noted that most of the research in the area of liberal professions was undertaken by 
economists, and as a rule they were not too friendly to the special claims of the 
professions. Whilst he noted that they may have been aware that there would be certain 
difficulties about the operation of free market forces in the professions on account of 
uncertainty and asymmetric information; on balance he noted that they tended to regard 
departures from free competition in the professions as serving the purpose of a restrictive 
cartel.133 The following sets out how the aforementioned emphasis on competition and 
the consumer manifested itself in England and Wales post the election of the New Labour 
Government in 1997.
1.4.4 Legal Services and New Labour
Shortly after New Labour was elected in 1997 a White Paper titled ‘Modernising 
Justice’134 was published. It proposed major changes to the way the legal system served 
the public. The paper included proposals to open up access to justice, revolutionise legal 
aid and sweep away restrictive practices in the legal profession.135 The paper focused in 
the main on the public provision of legal services, connecting it to the Governments 
agenda of reforming public services. The paper included plans to create a Legal Services
13'Laurel Terry, ‘The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Professions as 
“Service Providers’” (2008) Journal of the Professional Lawyer 189
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134 LCD, Modernising Justice (White Paper, Cm 4155,1998)
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Commission to oversee two new services: the Community Legal Service (CLS) and the 
Criminal Defence Service (CDS) to take over the £1.6 Billion annual spending on legal 
aid.136 It was proposed that the CLS and CDS would purchase legal services on contract 
from lawyers and other providers with established skills and expertise. New fixed price 
contracts with lawyers were also suggested as an incentive to bring about efficiencies. It 
was argued that competition for contracts would ensure quality service for the public. 
This approach to competitive tendering for work signalled the start of an aggressive 
competitive strategy in the market for legal services.137 Some commentators suggest that 
the approach to competition was underlined by a desire to drastically reduce the 
expenditure spent on legal aid.138 The White Paper also suggested that an alternative to 
state funding of certain types of litigation had to be found. The rationale was that this 
would broaden access to justice to middle income litigants for whom legal aid was not 
otherwise available.139 Detailed thinking behind proposals for conditional fees emerged 
later in a paper by the Lord Chancellor’s Department.140
Corresponding closely with the White Paper141 and the LCD's paper on conditional 
fees,142 in 1999, the Access to Justice Act143 was passed. The Act was primarily aimed at 
overhauling the legal aid programme; it also had a serious effect on the regulation of 
legal services. It revisited rights of audience and provided that all lawyers should be able 
to appear before the Courts, subject to passing relevant tests.144 It required a 
simplification of the process for the professional bodies to grant rights of audience.145 
The AJA 1999 also attended to complaints. It created the office of Legal Services 
Complaints Commissioner to serve a general oversight function.146 The Access to Justice
136 ibid 27-38, 59
137 ibid 27-38
138 Judith Maute, ‘Revolutionary Changes to the Legal Profession’ (2006) 17 The Professional Lawyer 4 , 1, 7.
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Act 1999 also allowed for conditional fee arrangements in certain aspects of the civil 
justice system.147 These changes represented the first attempt by the new Government to 
get to grips with the legal profession. Independent of the Government’s initial tranche of 
changes to the legal professions the OFT, aware of the European Commission’s 
developing interest in the professions following the Lisbon Declaration, reignited its 
interest in the professions.148
1.4.5 The Office of Fair Trading and the Legal Profession
The OFT published a consultation paper in May 2000149 that discussed a number of 
issues in depth and raised questions about regulation and competition in a number of 
professions. The consultation paper was sent to a range of professional bodies, industry 
representatives, leading firms, consumer groups, independent experts and opinion 
formers. In 2000 the OFT concluded that legal services should be fully subject to general 
competition law and called upon the professions to justify ethics rules that impeded free 
and open competition limiting consumer choice.150 Reflecting on the responses to the 
consultation the OFT decided the legal profession warranted further study. The OFT 
commissioned the Law and Economics Consulting Group (LECG)151 to undertake an 
investigation into the Legal Profession. In March 2001 the OFT published a report152 
which identified a number of rules that it viewed as being potentially unduly restrictive 
and having negative implications for consumers. The report included the report produced 
by LECG. LECG’s report built on the OFT’s own consultation with a series of 
questionnaires addressed to professional bodies, firms, customer representatives, 
government departments and independent experts. They followed these questionnaires 
with a programme of interviews and then analysed the results.153
147 ibid s 27
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The LECG154 report concluded that the necessary balance between benefits and adverse 
effects of regulation was best struck by the competition authorities, since they had 
considerable experience of balancing effects in other sectors of the economy. Under the 
Competition Act 1998, they noted that the OFT had to consider whether agreements 
which appreciably restricted competition might nevertheless be justified on grounds of 
improved production, distribution and/or economic progress. LECG did not believe that 
the exercise of striking a balance was significantly different in the professions from that 
in other sectors. With respect to the restrictions they investigated, they stressed that their 
remit was to assess their effect on competition, rather than to carry out a full assessment 
dealing with public interest concerns.155 LECG classified restrictions under three 
headings: direct entry,156 indirect entry157 and conduct.158 On direct entry restrictions, the 
LECG report found no evidence of a deliberate attempt by professional bodies to restrict 
entry in order to increase the average incomes of those in the profession.159 They found 
evidence that indirect entry restrictions and rules on permitted conduct were restricting or 
distorting competition.160
LECG believed that the demarcation between solicitors and barristers restricted 
competition. They found that third party perceptions possibly limited the number of 
solicitor- advocates and their ability to compete in the market.161 LECG’s evidence 
suggested that competition in the conveyancing market between solicitors and other 
providers of these services remained inhibited.162 LECG’s evidence suggested that 
competition in the probate market between solicitors and other providers of these services 
was restricted.163 LECG also focused on the restrictions on employed solicitors acting for
154 LECG, Restrictions on Competition in the Provision o f Professional Services (OFT 328 2001)
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third parties believing that these restrictions reduced competition in certain markets.164 
LECG formed the view that legal professional privilege restricted competition in areas 
such as tax advice as only lawyers benefitted from the privilege.165 The major area where 
LECG saw indirect entry restrictions arising from constraints on the structure of law 
firms was with the prohibition of multi-disciplinary partnerships (MDP). LECG noted 
that rules which prevented the establishment of MDPs were anti -  competitive because 
there were other professionals who believed they could operate or compete more 
effectively in that form. 166 The press release which accompanied the report encapsulates 
the general perspective LECG took.
“Competition brings consumers lower prices, more choices and new services. The 
law to combat restrictions on competition should apply as widely as possible and 
the scope to exclude professional rules from competition law should be removed. 
There remain numerous restrictions on competition in the professions. Apart from  
those shown to be necessary for economic efficiency and consumer benefits, 
restrictions on competition should go. ”167
The OFT’s overall conclusions in their report168 which accompanied the publication of 
the LECG Report can be summarised as follows: the conveyancing and probate markets 
should be liberalised to remove lawyer’s monopolies; legal professional privilege should 
be restricted because of a concern that it may distort competition in favour of lawyers as 
against non-lawyers; cold-calling by lawyers should be permitted and multidisciplinary 
practices should be permitted. The OFT also pointed out that there was a regulatory maze 
surrounding lawyers. The OFT identified 22 regulators of legal services. The structure of 
regulation was regarded as incoherent as it did not interface easily and exhibited 
regulatory gaps. The OFT concluded that the best way of progressing was to encourage 
the Law Society and the Bar to remedy the restrictions identified in the report.169 A 1 year
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grace period was granted for this action to take place.170 This, the OFT noted, would 
avoid the need for further action to be taken.171 The overall conclusion of the OFT is of 
critical interest to this thesis. The OFT noted:
The recommendation that competition law apply to the professions without 
potential exclusion is a specific expression o f our more general view that the 
professions should be subject to competition law in the same way as other 
economic actors. I f  the application o f competition to the professions is restricted, 
so too is the ability o f the OFT to ensure that markets for professional services 
work well and that consumers benefit from this.
In April 2002, the OFT published a statement reviewing the progress made by the 
professions in assessing and amending their rules.172 Pages 11- 19 of the 21 page report 
were dedicated to the legal profession. The OFT expressed dissatisfaction with the 
professions’ arguments made in support of the rules identified in the 2001 report.173 They 
were also unhappy with the relatively limited action taken by the Bar. The OFT resolved 
to subject the Bar’s arguments against further action to further analysis.174 Regarding the 
Law Society, the OFT acknowledged that they had embarked on a process of engagement 
and rule review, and that the best course of action was to monitor the Law Society closely 
and ensure that progress was being made.175 The OFT took the view that public action 
was not immediately necessary. The report noted that the Lord Chancellor had decided 
to initiate a consultation on the matters raised in the OFT’s 2001 report and the OFT 
indicated that it looked forward to engaging and commenting on the findings.176 From a 
competition perspective, it is apparent that the OFT was not about to suggest public 
intervention, and was happy to negotiate with the professions. It is arguable that these
170 ibid 19
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conclusions were drawn in the knowledge that the LCD was about to consider the legal 
profession in detail.177
1.4.6 The Lord Chancellor’s Department’s Consultation - ‘In the Public Interest?’
Just before the OFT drew its conclusions on the Bar and Law Society’s progress in April 
2002, as outlined above, the Lord Chancellor’s Department took the opportunity to look 
at issues that “fell to it” following the 2001 OFT report. This took the form of a 
consultation titled ‘In the Public Interest?’178 It was published by the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department in July 2002. The consultation itself was confined to the following five areas: 
implementation of legislation on conveyancing, probate, multi-disciplinary environments, 
legal professional privilege, and the QC system.179 The consultation paper itself 
concentrated on existing statutory provisions, and hence the expression ‘fell to it’ 
meaning this consultation only pertained to existing provisions within the contemplation 
of the Lord Chancellor’s Department. The Consultation Paper noted that the Government 
was aware of the European Commission’s work on the liberal professions (as described 
above). The paper also noted that the regulatory environment was complex and not 
delivering well enough where complaints were concerned.180 A direct connection in terms 
of time can be made at this point with the general breakdown of complaints handling in 
the Solicitor’s profession, as discussed later in this chapter. The consultation document 
also announced that the Government had decided to undertake a review of the regulatory 
framework for legal services. How this would progress was to be concluded in light of 
the findings of the consultation.181
The results of the ‘In the Public Interest?’ consultation182 were published in May 2003 in 
the form of an initial report. The report proposed, in the first instance taking forward
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measures to open up the probate market, taking no further action with regards to opening 
up the conveyancing markets, making no changes to legal professional privilege, ‘in 
principle agreement’ that the legal services market should be opened up to new business 
entities, and that further consultation regarding the QC system was necessary. A further 
report was published in late June 2003.183 This report included details of how the 
Government would progress with reviewing legal services. This report included details in 
Annex B184 of a comprehensive ‘options appraisal’ and ‘cost benefit analysis’ of 
instigating a regulatory review. Of the 4 options outlined, Option I 185 set out to include 
the broadest set of factors connected with the legal profession, whereas Option 4186 only 
sought to deal with consumer complaints.187 Option 1 was selected in the June 2003 
report as the most appropriate way of progressing. This was based on evidence set out in 
the June 2003 report that the '’the current framework is out-dated, inflexible, over­
complex and insufficiently accountable or transparent.,188 It also noted that the current 
framework did not meet the demands of the market place, or the needs of consumers. The 
handling of complaints against the profession was singled out for intense criticism. The 
following passage sets out what was decided:
"Government has therefore decided that a thorough and independent 
investigation without reservation is needed. The terms o f reference are: to
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consider what regulatory framework would best promote competition, innovation 
and the public and consumer interest in an efficient, effective framework which 
will be independent in representing the public and consumer interest, 
comprehensive, accountable, consistent, flexible , transparent, and no more 
restrictive or burdensome than is clearly justified. "189
The ‘In the Public Interest’ consultation and subsequent reports mark a critical point in 
the policy approach towards regulation of legal services. Behind the scenes it is well 
documented that there were serious political differences between the Government and the 
Lord Chancellor.190 Lord Irvine left his position of Lord Chancellor in early June 2003.191 
The consultation and the May 2003 summary of response to the consultation were 
published under his tenure. Before the June 2003 report, the report on the ‘In the Pubilc 
Interest?’ consultation appeared to give the profession time to act on the findings. Other 
work was suggested but nothing along the lines proposed in the later report was 
realistically suggested. This is likely connected with the approaches of Lord Irvine 
towards the legal profession. Lord Irvine had publicly lambasted Lord Mackay’s Green 
Papers in the 1980s.192 There were detectable traces of a conservative approach to the 
process of regulatory review throughout the ‘In the Public Interest?’ consultation 
document. The title ‘In the Public Interest?’ reflected, in part, the title of a book 
published in 1968 by Michael Zander193 and interestingly the consultation closely 
mirrored the same subject matter. The choice of title suggests a measured approach to 
reform and one preoccupied with achieving cautious change. Most importantly, the title 
of the consultation also suggests that the review was orientated to the public interest as 
opposed to the consumer interest. Indeed, references throughout the ‘In the Public 
Interest?’ consultation to the consumer and client were tempered by references to the 
public interest. The ‘In the Public Interest?’ consultation was the last time, in the run up 
to the Legal Services Bill, that the term ‘public interest’ appeared disconnected from the 
consumer interest.
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The report following the Consultation was published in late June 2003 under the new 
tenure of Lord Falconer as Lord Chancellor. In the interim there were serious discussions 
about which of the options for the regulatory review was to be pursued. By late June, and 
with the advent of Lord Falconer’s tenure as Lord Chancellor the matter of how to 
approach regulation of legal services markedly changed. The adoption of Option 1 (to 
comprehensively review the legal profession) overtly signalled a re-calibration of the 
orientation of the regulatory review towards the consumer away from the public interest. 
This is evidenced by virtue of the very wide terms given to the independent review and, 
interestingly, the inclusion of matters that the report on the consultation in May 2003 had 
earlier appeared to settle, and in particular the decision not to engage in a process of 
opening up the conveyancing market.194 At the critical point of deciding how to progress 
with regulatory change, it is clear that the Lord Chancellor and the Government were at 
one in late June 2003. Rather than deal just with the issue of complaints and leave the 
professions to undertake change as the initial report on the ‘In the Public Interest?’ 
consultation and the OFT Progress Report had suggested, the preferred option that 
emerged in late June 2003 was to effectively leave no stone un-tumed. It is arguably 
from this point of political consensus between the Lord Chancellor and the Government 
that events quickly unfolded. Against a backdrop of serious discontent with lawyers 
emanating from the complaints handling fiasco, the Government was in the perfect 
political position to undertake a broad series of changes. The following sets out the 
problems to do with complaints -  which provided the perfect platform upon which to 
attempt root and branch reform.
1.4.7 Complaints and the Legal Profession
The ability to handle client complaints has been an enduring problem in the legal 
profession.195 The problem had existed for a long time and been the subject of
194 LCD, Report following the Consultation “In the Public Interest? ” (27th June 2003)
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legislative intervention.196 Because the problem appeared to be getting worse, it was 
squarely cited by the Government as one of the main reasons for the Legal Services Bill. 
There had been a persistent and strong concern by Government with the way in which 
complaints were handled by, in particular, the solicitors’ profession. The issue of 
complaints handling is intrinsically intermingled with the perceptions of self-regulation 
and the growing distrust of the professions in general.197 The disappointing record of 
handling complaints against solicitors first came to light in the mid-1980s when it 
emerged that some complaints had not been considered for up to 2 years since they were 
received.198 In 1994 the National Consumer Council described the complaints system as a 
‘bureaucratic nightmare’ plagued by delays and biased in favour of the solicitor.199 By the 
Millennium one complaint was being made to the professional bodies for every five 
practicing solicitors and for every twenty two practising barristers.200 Consumers 
regarded the complaints handling model as complicated and confusing.201 The problems 
with the system were summed up by the Legal Services Ombudsman for England and 
Wales in 2004 in what has become an often cited statement:
“Through the complaints that are referred to my Office, I  see any number o f 
instances where the existing system fails to meet the needs o f consumers or afford 
them adequate protection from the dishonest or fraudulent behaviour o f a very 
small minority o f legal professionals. I  am astounded at the complexity o f the 
existing multi -  step and multi-layered complaints handling model and I  feel 
strongly that it imposes an unacceptable and disproportionate burden (in terms o f  
time and effort) on the complainant. In my view, the degree o f patience, tenacity
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and endurance that complainants need to show in order to negotiate this system is 
quite unreasonable. There can be little doubt that it deters all but the most 
determined complainants from seeking redress for their grievances. ”202
This failure led to a perception that the regulation of lawyers, by lawyers, was inherently 
biased away from the interests of the consumer. The Ombudsman’s view was that “the 
very notion o f complaints handling by the profession had lost all legitimacy among 
consumers.”202. The Communications Director at Which? summed up the public’s 
perception as follows:
“Self-regulation is not working. People complain to Which? time and again about 
the second rate service they receive from solicitors; often during stressful times. 
Other professions can’t get away with this type o f behaviour and it’s time for the 
government to rein in this complaint ridden industry. ”204
Although the Legal Services Ombudsman created by the Courts and Legal Services Act 
1990,205 was regarded as effective in investigating complaints by a number of 
commentators, its effectiveness as a mechanism to resolve grievances was questioned by 
both consumer groups and the government. The scheme was neither well publicised nor 
widely used.206 The Solicitors Complaints Bureau reported that 30% of its complaints 
were not resolved to the consumer’s satisfaction, but only about 8% of those 
complainants contacted the Legal Services Ombudsman.207 The Legal Service 
Ombudsman continually requested the Law Society to improve its performance but 
without success. This culminated in 2004 with the Secretary of State using powers, 
scheduled in the Access to Justice Act 1999, 208 to require the Legal Services Complaints
202 Annual Report of the Legal Services Ombudsman for England and Wales (HMSO 2003- 2004), 7
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Commissioner (LSCC) to take further action.209 The timing of this intervention was 
critical as it coincided with Government’s reviews into competition in the Legal Services 
market. This intervention galvanised the Government’s resolve to decide on regulatory 
intervention. It also provided the perfect political imperative to deal with the legal 
professions and, as argued by some, to introduce widespread competition reforms.210 In a 
sense what came next, as a result of the LSCC’s intervention, merely reinforced the 
Government’s case. The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) was asked to submit 
plans to the LSCC as to how it intended to improve its complaints handling procedures. 
The SRA's 2006-7 improvement plan was declared inadequate by the LSCC. The LSCC 
found the plan did not include all the targets the LSCC had set, nor did it aim to deliver 
sufficient improvements in complaints handling which consumers and the profession 
‘expect and deserve.’211 The LSCC levied a penalty of £250,000 on the SRA. In July 
2006, the SRA submitted a new Improvement Plan which was deemed to be adequate. 
The SRA’s complaints handling performance in 2006-7 was deemed to be a ‘mixed 
picture.’ Progress had been made in some respects though it appears from the LSCC's 
annual report that problems were still endemic. The report noted: "Getting to grips with 
their own processes and embedding them into their culture still appears to pose a 
significant challenge to the SRA"211 The LCSS's Improvement Plan for 2006-7 set 
thirteen targets for the SRA in thirteen strategic areas, three of the most important 
included timeliness, quality of decisions, and implementation of the plan.213
By virtue of the LSCC's involvement, Moorhead notes that the Government became 
boxed in by the need to issue warnings and final warnings to the profession which, once 
breached, required action. Complaints handling had lacked resources, proper
209 This authority includes the power to require the professional body to provide information or make reports to the 
LSCC about the handling of complaints about its members; to investigate the handling of complaints about members of 
a professional body, to set targets in relation to the handling of complaints; and to require a professional body to submit 
to the LSCC a plan for the handling of complaints about its members (Access to Justice Act s 52(2).
Where a plan is required but the professional body fails to submit one that the LSCC considers adequate for securing 
that such complaints are handled effectively and efficiently, or if a professional body submits a plan but fails to act in 
accordance with it, the LSCC may require the body to pay a penalty.
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management, and independence.214 Both professionals and complainants viewed the 
system as biased and inept.215 Moorhead notes that, had lawyers been able to clear up 
backlogs of consumer complaints and been responsive to designated consumer 
watchdogs, they might have prevented or postponed what was to come, namely the 
Clement! Review and the Legal Services Act 2007.216
1.4.8 The Clement! Review
Sir David Clement!217 was commissioned to undertake the review into the regulatory 
framework of legal services announced in the report that followed the ‘In the Public 
Interest?’ consultation in June 2003. The terms of reference for Sir David Clement! were: 
“to consider what regulatory framework would best promote competition, innovation and 
the public and consumer interest in an efficient, effective and independent legal sector; to 
recommend a framework which would be independent in representing the public and 
consumer interest, comprehensive, accountable, consistent, flexible, transparent, and no 
more restrictive or burdensome than is clearly justified ”2n He was given until 31 
December 2004 to make his recommendations. It is pertinent to note that the terms of 
reference included the public interest, but by this time it had become linked to the 
consumer interest. The term ‘public interest’ was soon to disappear and, as the following 
outlines it did not appear again until nearly two and a half years later.
Clement! issued a consultation paper, which focused on five key regulatory issues: (1) 
existing regulatory structures; (2) complaints handling and discipline; (3) unregulated 
providers; (4) professionalism and self-regulation within the industry; (5) new business 
structures for legal practices.219 The consultation prompted 265 responses. Clement!
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considered the many responses, further consulted with interested parties, and issued his 
final report in December 2004. He made a number of recommendations.220 The first 
recommendation was the creation of a new oversight regulator. Clementi favoured the 
model he referred to as B+, vesting all regulatory powers in an oversight regulator called 
the Legal Services Board. This Board would delegate front-line regulatory functions to 
recognised professional bodies, so long as it was satisfied that they were handling their 
responsibilities competently and had properly separated their regulatory and trade 
functions.221 The second recommendation that Clementi made was for the establishment 
of a single, independent complaints handling body for all consumer complaints against 
legal services providers.222 This body, which Clementi suggested would be called the 
Office of Legal Complaints (OLC), would be under the authority and general supervision 
of the Legal Services Board, but independent in its handling of complaints. The OLC 
would operate by developing feedback loops with the front line regulators, enabling them 
to learn from the claims experiences and serve as ‘an upward driver on quality standards.’ 
Clementi envisioned the OLC playing a strategic role in setting targets for practitioners’ 
in-house complaints handling and monitoring indemnity insurance schemes and 
compensation funds controlled by the front line bodies.223 Clementi was of the view that 
this would promote consistency and clarity, eliminating the regulatory maze that 
befuddled disgruntled clients when it came to them filing their complaints.224 The third 
major recommendation that Clementi made was in response to extensive comments about 
business structures. His recommendations were two-fold. The first was that Legal 
Disciplinary Partnerships (LDPs) should be allowed permitting lawyers to form large, 
consolidated practices in which all qualified legal professionals were eligible for 
partnership. He endorsed LDPs as currently viable. Clementi was of the view that non­
lawyers should be allowed to invest in and influence the management of LDPs, provided 
that lawyers made up the majority of the management group.225 Clementi suggested that 
outside owners would be subject to a fitness to own test set by the Legal Services
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Board.226 Clementi also endorsed Multidisciplinary Practices (MDPs) as potentially 
viable, with the caveat that “if  at subsequent juncture the regulatory authorities 
considered that sufficient safeguards could be put in place.”211 Clementi observed that 
MDP’s presented a range of difficulties. The on-going issues associated with Enron and 
Worldcom, led Clementi to argue that this area would require considerable thinking. 
Clementi, effectively put them on a backbumer, content with LDPs as a good step 
forward.228 The final recommendation that Clementi made in the report was the inclusion 
of six key objectives for any regulator of legal services. 229 Clementi suggested the 
following:
Maintaining the rule o f law 
Access to justice
Protection and promotion o f consumer interests 
Promotion o f competition
Encouragement o f a confident, strong and effective legal profession 
Promoting public understanding o f the citizens legal rights
Reference to the public interest, which punctuated the Lord Chancellor’s ‘In the Public 
Interest?’ consultation, had by the time the terms of the review of regulatory framework 
been settled, become directly connected with the consumer interest. Namely the terms of 
reference made reference to ‘the public and consumer interest.’230 In outlining 
suggestions for the ‘regulatory objectives’ no direct reference was made in the Clementi 
Report to the public interest. Clementi felt that the regulatory objectives he had suggested
226 These individuals could not have access to information about individual cases and must provide indemnity 
protection for loss of client money (Clementi final report 124). It was also required that every LDP management group 
must include a “Head of Legal Practice”, a qualified legal lawyer who is nominated to the regulatory authorities as 
having overall responsibility for the entity’s compliance with legal service standards ( Clementi final report 112,124). 
The LDP must also nominate to the LSB a senior manager as “Head of Finance and Administration” to be responsible 
for proper management of financial accounts.(Clementi Final Report pi 13). LDPs would need, and be subject to the 
Legal Services Board. They would need front line regulator approval. Upon formation, the LDP manager would opt to 
register with a particular front line regulator, which would have authority over the as a unit. Individual legal 
professionals would still be subject to regulation by their relevant professional bodies (Clementi Final Report p 127- 
128.)
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were broadly the right ones.231 Clementi shied away from dealing with the regulatory 
objectives precisely. The wording of the statutory objectives, he said, would be subject to 
detailed analysis by parliamentary draftsmen, and subsequent examination by Parliament 
itself. He believed that the six regulatory objectives set out could provide the core 
objectives around which a regulatory framework for legal services could be built. 232 The 
following discusses the prominence accorded to the consumer in the Clementi report as 
this connects with many of the policies propounded by the competition authorities, the 
OECD and the EU which have already been discussed in this chapter.
1.4.9 The Consumer. Clementi and the Government
In contextualising the prominence generally accorded to the consumer throughout the 
Clementi Report, it is pertinent to note that Clementi was particularly keen to hear and 
understand the voice of the consumer. The National Consumer Council, Which and The 
Consumer Association were very active in responding to the review.233 The general thrust 
of their submissions was that the legal profession had been, for too long, operating in its 
own interest and manipulating the public interest to its own self-interest. The Clementi 
report concentrated on the consumer and it dismissed the idea that the profession was 
worthy of special treatment. In general terms the Report regarded it as a service indistinct 
from any other. In the same way that Lord Mackay, some 15 years earlier had dismissed 
many of the risks raised by the professions, so did the Clementi Report.234 In the same 
way as Lord Mackay’s Green Papers, the Clementi Report dismissed the regulatory 
structures of the two professions as ‘flawed’ and ‘inappropriate’ and reported a lack of 
consumer confidence in the principle of self-regulation.235 The report also found no need 
to prove that state regulation would be more acceptable and effective.236 The 
concentration on the consumer interest was also arguably inevitable. It has been argued 
that the Clementi review and report was highly unlikely to deliver findings which 
contradicted the Government’s conclusions outlined in the final part of the report on the
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consultation ‘In the Public Interest?’ 237 Further to this, commentators note that the focus 
on the consumer was part of a much broader change in regulatory environment and 
societal attitudes towards the professions.238 Webb notes that the Clementi report and the 
Government’s subsequent actions were a clear reflection of changing perceptions about 
the function of the regulatory state.239 He identified these developments with an emerging 
need for systems of regulation that were themselves fit for the new moral and political 
economy: efficient, systematic, transparent and accountable.240 In the context of legal 
services, Webb notes that the language of competition and the consumer wholeheartedly 
replaced the traditional considerations of professional service and autonomy.241 This can 
be directly connected with diminishing trust in professionals and their ability to self- 
regulate. A causal connection can be made with the very serious problem of complaints 
outlined earlier in this chapter. Far from trust in the legal profession, it appears that the 
general perception, as evidenced throughout the Clementi Review and Report, was that 
respondents viewed lawyers as self-interested and that the interests of lawyers and clients 
were generally not aligned.242 The conclusion that emerged was that consumers needed 
protection from the legal profession and that emphasis needed to be accorded to the 
consumer.243 This is inherently connected with the emphasis on the market and 
competition outlined earlier in this chapter and the OECD, European Commission and the 
OFT’s desire to improve consumer welfare and the removal of restrictive practices. It is 
pertinent to consider the broader policies of the New Labour Government as this locates 
further the emphasis accorded to consumers in the regulation of legal services.
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1.4.10 New Labour. Modernity and the Consumer
In the late 1990s and into the new Millennium the Labour Government was actively 
engaged in systematic reform of public services. Underpinning political ideology was the 
notion of modernity. Modernity was used as a powerful organising theme to bring many 
policies in line with the characteristics of the modem world.244 In the early years of the 
new millennium policy considerations moved beyond public sector reforms. These 
policies were formed with the same ideological foundations. The traditional conceptions 
of the legal profession, coupled with the widespread consumer dissatisfaction, did not fit 
easily into the vision of modernity.245 Whilst traditionally there was trust in professionals 
and their ability to self-regulate this, as noted previously, had become an outdated ideal. 
In line with modem thinking it was broadly acknowledged that the country had become a 
‘consumer society’ in which a proliferation of goods and services enabled a wide variety 
of wants and needs to be satisfied.246 One of the critical incidents of modernity was the 
consumer. The focus on the consumer, in public services and arguably beyond, was a 
central consideration. Clarke notes, “almost every policy document and many o f the 
major speeches grounded themselves in this conception o f the tradition to modernity 
symbolised by the figure o f the consumer — the consumer became the focus o f reform. ”247 
Specific evidence of the Government’s interest in the consumer can be traced back to 
1999 when the Government published its Consumer White Paper ‘Modem Markets: 
Confident Consumers’ which set out a new agenda for consumer policy in which it 
stated:
“Confident consumers, making informed decisions in modern, competitive 
markets, promote the development o f innovative and good value products. And 
better performance in business in turn benefits consumers. ” 248
To deliver this mission statement, the Government set a new agenda to:
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“Promote open and competitive markets
Provide people with skills, knowledge and information they need to become 
demanding consumers; and
Encourage responsible business to follow good practice. ”249
It is perhaps no coincidence that the focus of the White Paper, outlined below, was on the 
consumer, given that the Government published a consultation paper and report 
concerning consumer issues in July 2004,250 drawing on a comparative benchmarking 
report in October 2003.251 As the following outlines, not only the rhetoric but also the 
substance of subsequent developments in legal services focused positively on the 
‘consumer.’ A clear connection therefore emerges between the regulation of legal 
services and the Government’s predilection to promote the interests of the consumer.252
1.4.11 The White Paper ‘The Future of Legal Services: Putting Consumers First”
The Government, following the Clementi Report, published a White Paper titled '‘The 
Future o f Legal Services; Putting Consumers First. ’253 It set out proposals for the future 
of legal services in England and Wales. It followed most of the Clementi Report’s 
recommendations. It, however, included revisions far beyond what the Bar and Law 
Society had anticipated, or previous consultations had outlined. In particular, the White 
Paper suggested proposals that went beyond those of the Clementi Report in three ways: 
firstly, by the creation of a Consumer Panel, secondly by greater binding authority of the 
new complaints handling entity, and thirdly by greater openness to Alternative Business 
Structures. The Consumer Panel would provide the Board with expert input and advocacy 
from the perspective of those who used legal services.254 The purpose of the Consumer
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Panel would be to ensure that the views and concerns of consumers were heard. The 
panel was designed to be a partner for the Legal Services Board in taking forward its 
regulatory objectives of protecting and promoting consumers’ interests. The White Paper 
further noted that the Consumer Panel would be developed in light of the Government’s 
proposals for strengthening consumer advocacy in a number of sectors.255 In connection 
with the new complaints handling entity, the OLC would provide a single point of entry 
for all consumer complaints about legal service providers. Operating under the Legal 
Services Board oversight, the OLC would be independent from both the government and 
the legal services industry. Any possibility of delegating these complaints to front line 
regulators was rejected.256 The rationale was that consumers lacked confidence when 
there was the ‘appearance of professionals judging their own.’257 The White paper 
deviated most from dem enti’s report in the field of Alternative Business Structures. The 
Government’s White Paper supported a flexible and robust licensing scheme that was 
fully open to a wide range of business and ownership structures. The Government stated 
that this pro-competitive scheme offered substantial benefits to both consumers and legal 
service providers.258
Announcing the publication of the White Paper, Lord Falconer confirmed that the 
purpose of the changes embodied in the White Paper was to put the consumer first. The 
Government stated that it had accepted dem enti’s recommendations and set out its own 
proposals.259 The words of Lord Falconer leave no margin of doubt as to the direction of 
the reforms:
“This White Paper sets out the Government’s agenda for reforming the regulation
and delivery o f legal services, in order to out the consumer first  Consumers
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need, and deserve, legal services that are efficient, effective, and economic. They 
want to have choice, and they want to have confidence in a transparent and 
accountable industry. "260
"The Government’s policy is to create a regulatory framework that directs 
regulation at those areas where it is needed. The proposed regulatory framework 
sets the parameters within which firms can deliver consumer focused legal 
services. I f  those services are provided, both the consumer and the profession will 
benefit, with individual lawyers providing high quality services that meet 
individual client needs. Our vision is o f a legal services market, where excellence 
continues to be delivered; and a market that is responsive, flexible, and puts the 
consumer first. This paper sets out the steps we will take to achieve it. ” 261
Lord Falconer’s introduction to the White paper illustrates the extent to which the 
consumer was to be put first in regard to the future of legal services and was qualified 
further by Part 2 of the White Paper, titled ‘Putting Consumers First.’ The following 
important extracts need little further qualification.
“What are we trying to achieve for consumers?
- The interests o f consumers, not providers, drive decisions about regulation;
-An end to the regulatory maze;
-A new system that is transparent and accountable so that consumers know what 
to expect;
-Regulation that is proportionate and based on best practice, so that consumers 
are protected in the right way, when it is necessary;
-Consumers are confident that regulation is independent o f providers and 
Government. ” 262
Part 2 Section 3.2 of the White Paper noted:
“Today’s consumers have higher expectations than ever before. Consumers are 
right to expect services delivered in ways that suit them, not the providers. This is 
happening across all sectors, and legal services need to change to keep pace with 
consumer expectations.
What are we trying to achieve for consumers?
High quality legal services from all practitioners delivered to suit 
consumers not providers
Business models and practices which support this 
Systems that foster innovation and diversity
How will we deliver this?
Removing barriers to make it easier for new providers to enter the market
through ABS, stimulating competition and innovation
Reductions in costs as a result o f efficiencies can be passed to consumers
One-stop-shops will deliver packages o f legal and other services that better meet
consumers ’ needs will provide greater convenience for consumers
Tapping into external investment and allowing different types o f lawyers as well
as lawyers and non lawyers to work together on an equal footing will enable firms
to upgrade their infrastructure and generate fresh ideas about providing services
in consumer friendly ways
Robust safeguards to ensure that standards o f legal practitioners remain high and 
consumers are protected. ”263
Of specific note in connection with this thesis, the objectives of the regulatory framework 
were set out on page 20 of the White paper. It noted that regulators must have clear
263ibid 21
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objectives. The White paper indicated the purpose of these regulatory objectives was as 
follows:
“These guide them in exercising their function. They also act as a way for  
consumers to call regulators to account. The objectives for the regulation o f legal 
services will be set out in legislation, and all parts o f the system will need to work 
together to deliver them ”264
“The objectives will be:
To support the rule o f law 
To improve access to justice 
To protect and promote consumers ’ interests 
To promote competition
To encourage a strong and effective legal profession
To increase public understanding o f the citizen’s legal rights
To maintain the principles o f those providing legal services (independence,
integrity, the duty to act in the best interests o f the client, and client
confidentiality) ”265
The White paper decided not to rank the regulatory objectives.266 It stated that partners in 
regulation would be best placed to do this on a case-by-case basis. This was based on the 
need to balance the regulatory objectives if tensions arose between them in certain 
instances. The White Paper emphasised the interests of the consumer. There was, 
however, no reference to the ‘public interest’ anywhere in the document. The White 
Paper clearly exemplifies the Government’s approach to the reform of legal services. It 
also demonstrated a profound interconnectedness with the Government’s other policies 
designed to promote the consumer’s interest. The White Paper leaves little doubt as to the 
Government’s preferred policy objectives for the regulation of the legal services market
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at that time. The contents of the White Paper were translated into proposed legislation 
with little omitted from the White Paper.
1.5 THE LEGAL SERVICES BILL
The Legal Services Bill was published on the 24th May 2006267 together with 
explanatory notes and a regulatory impact assessment. The Bill mirrored the main 
developments set out in the White Paper, including the setting up of a Consumer Panel to 
advise the new oversight regulator, which would be given broad ranging powers. A new 
complaints system would be established and Alternative Business Structures would be 
permitted. Of particular interest to this thesis are the regulatory objectives in the proposed 
legislation. They appeared in a form which closely resembled those outlined in the White 
Paper. There were, however, some discernible changes. Objective (a) was changed from 
supporting the rule of law to include the ‘constitutional principle of law.’ Objective (d) 
which read ‘promote competition’ in the White Paper was changed to ‘promote 
competition in the provision of services within subsection (2)’. This effectively directed 
competition towards those authorised persons pursuing reserved activities and other 
activities that authorised persons pursue, which did not necessarily fall with the reserved 
areas of work.268 The term ‘diverse’ was inserted into objective (e). Objective (g) 
included a change in terminology, from ‘maintain’ professional principles to ‘promote’ 
and ‘maintain adherence’ to professional principles.269 Reference to the ‘public interest’ 
was conspicuously absent from the regulatory objectives.
The full set of regulatory objectives appeared in the Bill as follows:
Part 1 The Regulatory Objectives
1(1) (a) Supporting the constitutional principle o f the rule o f law;
(b) Improving access to justice;
267 Legal Services Bill (HL Bill 9 - 1 )  si
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(c) Protecting and promoting the interests o f consumers;
(d)Promoting competition in the provision o f services within 
subsection(2);
(e)Encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal 
profession;
(f) Increasing public understanding o f the citizen’s legal rights and duties;
(g) Promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles
1.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has outlined the importance to be attached to the regulatory objectives in the 
Legal Services Act 2007. It has referred to a limited but developing discourse regarding 
regulatory objectives and their importance in framing the course of future developments 
in the regulation of legal services. This chapter has outlined how a number of changes 
have, over the course of 40 years, been proposed to revolutionise legal services 
regulation. It then focused in on the period immediately before the introduction of the 
Legal Services Bill and drawn specific reference to not only the approach of the 
competition authorities but also made reference to the Labour Government’s policy 
predisposition to the consumer. The incremental focus on the consumer of legal services 
is evidenced by policies promoted by the competition authorities, issues surrounding 
complaints and finally domestic Governmental policy orientated firmly towards the 
consumer. More importantly to this thesis, the gradual decrease in focus on the public 
interest has been illustrated.
As noted in the introduction and throughout this chapter, this thesis is about the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’. This section has 
outlined, in the context of the regulatory objectives of the Bill, what was put before 
Parliament. This chapter started by introducing the Legal Services Act 2007 and it set out 
a list of the regulatory objectives which included the regulatory objective ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’. Therefore part of the story is missing. This is how, and 
why, the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ came to be 
included in the Legal Services Act 2007. This is the subject of the next chapter. The
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search in the next chapter is not only to understand how the public interest came to be 
included in the Bill and then the Act, but why, and what was the legislative intention that 
underpinned its inclusion. This will provide a basis for the rest of this thesis to address 
the central research question.
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CHAPTER 2- THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 
2007
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the first section of chapter one, the Legal Services Act 2007 was outlined and a list of 
the regulatory objectives in the Act was set out. The penultimate section of the last 
chapter set out the main developments that led to the Legal Services Bill. It also outlined 
the regulatory objectives set out in the Bill. In the context of this thesis, the one 
difference between the two, which is of interest, is the appearance in the Legal Services 
Act 2007 of a regulatory objective ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’ This 
did not appear in the Legal Services Bill when it was introduced to Parliament. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explain what happened between the Legal Services Bill and 
the Legal Services Act 2007 regarding the aforementioned regulatory objective. The 
following chapter aims:
1) to understand how and why the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’ came to be included in the Legal Services Act 2007 
in the form that it did.
2) to understand the legislative intention that underpinned the inclusion of the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’
3) to understand further what the public interest means, in the context of the Legal 
Services Act 2007.
4) to understand further the Government’s policy underpinning the Legal 
Services Act 2007.
This examination is important because it frames the analysis undertaken in subsequent 
chapters. A fuller understanding of the four points outlined, immediately above, provides
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the basis upon which to examine the role that was intended for the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’
The approach taken to provide a fuller understanding to the points outlined above is to 
examine the report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill1 and the 
relevant aspects of the debates on the Legal Services Bill dealing with the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the House of Lords and 
House of Commons. The report of the Joint Committee provides a valuable starting point 
from which developments in the debates can be examined. The aspects of this chapter 
concerning the debates draw on the Hansard record of Parliamentary speeches. Parts of 
the relevant speeches are reproduced and the important aspects of the speeches are 
explained and analysed. The speeches are considered chronologically, from the Legal 
Services Bill’s introduction, to the point where the Government conceded and included 
the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the form in 
which it appears in the Legal Services Act 2007. A brief section then follows, 
highlighting important instances where the public interest was mentioned in other 
speeches not directly connected with the subject matter of the regulatory objectives. This 
is followed by a discussion framed around the four aims outlined above.
The main aim of this chapter is to understand the legislative intention which underpinned 
the inclusion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’. 
Further to this, understanding of the scope and meaning of the public interest is also 
considered. In this regard it is posited that the Hansard record of the Parliamentary 
debates is the only readily accessible resource which can be used to provide a fuller 
understanding of these enquiries. The following therefore progresses on the basis of the 
favourable judgement in Pepper v Hart,2 recognising the legitimacy of Hansard as a tool 
to understand the purpose of legislative provisions.3
1 Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume 1: Report (2005-2006, HL 232-1, 
HC 1154-1)
2 Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 AU ER 42, CA
3 See further: Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford University Press, 2012); Serge Lortie, ‘Providing 
Technical Assistance on Law Drafting’ (2010) 31 Statute Law Review 1;
Krishnapradsad K V, ‘Pepper v Hart: Its continuing Implications in the United Kingdom and in India’ (2011) 32 Statute 
Law Review 3; Stephen Laws, ‘Giving Effect to Policy in Legislation: How to Avoid Missing the Point’ (2011) 32
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2.2 THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE AND PRE LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY OF
THE DRAFT LEGAL SERVICES BILL 2006
2.2.1 The Joint Select Committee
The Draft Legal Services Bill was published on the 24th May 2006 prior to its formal 
introduction to Parliament on the 23rd November 2006. The reason for the Bill’s 
publication was so it could be passed to a Joint Select Committee for pre-legislative 
scrutiny, prior to formal introduction into Parliament.4 The Joint Select Committee on 
the Draft Legal Services Bill was appointed and directed to meet for the first time on the 
25 May 2006/ It was ordered to report on the draft bill by the 25th July 2006. This gave 
the committee less than eight sitting weeks to hear evidence, deliberate and publish their 
report on the Bill.6 The Committee produced an extensive report contained in Volume I.7 
They also published a second volume which contained the minutes of the oral evidence 
that the committee heard and further written evidence that the committee had received.8 
The Joint Committee made it very clear that they were unhappy with the short period of 
time that they had been allocated to scrutinise the Bill.9 They noted that the shortage of 
time meant that they were constrained in the number of witnesses from whom they could 
hear oral evidence. As a consequence, questions put to witnesses were restricted to only 
major points. The Committee also indicated that there were many issues that they might
Statute Law Review 1; John James Maygar, ‘The Evolution of Hansard Use at the Supreme Court of Canada: A 
Comparative Study in Statutory Interpretation’ (2012) 33 Statute Law Review 3;
4 For an interesting account of the process of legislative scrutiny and an explication of the few Bills that received pre­
legislative scrutiny in the 2005-2006 parliamentary session see: Richard Kelly, Pre-legislative scrutiny, Standard Note 
SN/PC/2822 (House of Commons Library, 2010)
<http://www.narliament.uk/docuinents/commons/lib/research/briefmgs/snpc-02822.pdf> accessed 5 October 2012
5 Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume 1: Report (2005-2006, HL 232-1, 
HC 1154-1) P8
6 The Draft Bill included 159 clauses and 15 schedules covering 172 pages.
7 The Report of the Joint Committee Volume 1, HC 1154-1, HL Paper No.232-I (Published 25th July 2006)
8 The Evidence of the Committee Volume II, HC 1154-11, HL Paper No. 232-11 (Published 3 August 2006)
9 Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume 1: Report (2005-2006, HL 232-1, 
HC 1154-1) P22 : ‘‘Given the significant impact o f the Bill’s provisions -  it is the first attempt to draw the entire legal 
services market within one regulatory framework- and the complexity of some of the issues involved, we believe that the 
priority should have been to ensure that the Committee had sufficient time to scrutinize the draft Bill effectively. It is in 
the interests o f both the executive and the legislature that the provisions o f the Bill are right. The timetable for our 
inquiry has not allowed us or the Government to realize the full potential o f the pre-legislative scrutiny process. We 
reiterate the recommendation o f the Joint Committee on the draft Charities Bill that any future Committee should have 
at least 12 sitting weeks in which to consider and report on a draft Bill and we specifically draw this recommendation 
to the Leaders o f both Houses and the Commons Liaison and Modernisation Committee"
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have investigated further10 had they had the time to do so.11 A further matter of concern 
to the Committee undertaking pre-legislative scrutiny was that important details of 
amendments to existing legislation were not provided to the Committee until after they 
had finished hearing evidence.12
The comments made by the Joint Committee about the time that the Government had 
afforded it to scrutinise the Bill is interesting to this thesis as it evidences the constraints 
imposed by the Government. These constraints were ultimately connected with its desire 
to bring about regulation of the legal services market quickly. The following response 
that the Joint Committee received from Bridget Prentice, Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State, Department of Constitutional Affairs and the Minister charged with the legal 
service reforms, regarding the limited timescale for scrutiny clearly evidences the 
Government’s appetite for reform, at the expense of scrutiny. The response also 
evidences the Government’s primary objective of the policy, namely the consumer.
“We have already undertaken extensive consultation on the policy proposals 
before we published the draft Bill. As you will know in line with best practice we 
have published a White Paper setting out those proposals for reform last October 
with responses by the end o f January this year. We wanted to publish the draft 
Bill as soon as possible in order to allow pre-legislative scrutiny to take place this 
session because we want to give ourselves the best possible opportunity to have 
legislation ready to introduce early in the next session, so as to deliver these 
consumer focused reforms as quickly as possible. ”13
10Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume 1: Report (2005-2006, HL 232-1, 
HC 1154-1) p 21 s 69. The matters noted that the committee would like to have further investigated included: the 
complex ABS provisions in the draft Bill and the options for a compensation fund.
11 ibid
12 The response that the Committee received from Baroness Ashton was ‘‘I  did see what the Master o f the Rolls had to 
say and I understand the position but in terms of the Bill itself which gives the overall policy, the changes to the 
Solicitors Act... are Secondary". The Committee did not agree. The Committee further noted that even if the 
Government had undertaken extensive consultation on its proposals, this was no substitute for allowing sufficient time 
for parliamentary pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft bill which was intended to implement those proposals. Joint 
Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume 1: Report (2005-2006, HL 232-1, HC 
1154-1) p 21
13 Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume II, HC 1154-11, HL Paper No. 
232-11 (Published 3 August 2006) page 231
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2.2.2 The Joint Select Committee’s Comments on the Regulatory Objectives
Of direct concern to this thesis, the Joint Committee highlighted the Government's 
change in policy focus regarding legal services since 2002. It specifically noted that 
emphasis had shifted from the ‘public interest’ to the ‘consumer interest.’14 Whilst 
regulatory objective C of the Draft Bill covered ‘protecting and promoting the interests of 
consumers’, the Committee noted that the regulatory objectives contained no mention of 
the public interest. The Committee then queried this, noting the Government’s 2002 
consultation exercise was titled ‘In the Public Interest?’ and that the emphasis of the 
report was on the wider public interest.15 The Committee also considered the terms of 
reference given to the dem enti’s review, one of which included consideration of ‘the 
public and consumer interest.’16 The Joint Committee went on to note that in March 2005 
the Lord Chancellor made a speech on the Government’s proposed reforms in which he 
said:
“the framework [for legal services] we had in place was failing to meet the
demands o f the market place and the needs o f consumers ” 17
The Committee further noted that the White Paper in 2005 was titled ‘The Future of 
Legal Services; Putting Consumers First.’ Whilst these issues were identified in chapter 
one, it is Bridget Prentice’s evidence to the Joint Committee18 which is revealing. She 
made no apologies for the Government’s focus on the consumer. She indicated that her 
intention, and that of the Government, was that the consumer was the priority in the 
reforms set out in the draft Bill.19 In responding to this change in emphasis, in their 
report, the Committee noted:
14 Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume 1: Report (2005-2006, HL 232-1, 
HC 1154-1) Chapter 3, page 24,25
15 ibid 24,25
16 David dementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England and Wales, Final Report 
(December 2004) 1.
17 Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume 1: Report (2005-2006, HL 232-1, 
HC 1154-1) pages 7, 9,24,25
18 Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume II, HC 1154-11, HL Paper No. 
232-11 (Published 3 August 2006) page 231
19 ibid 231
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“We note the shift in emphasis in the Government's approach to reform o f the 
legal profession — the change in focus from the public interest to the consumer 
interest - reflected in the regulatory objective (C). The public interest and the 
consumer interest do not always equate to the same thing, particularly in matters 
o f law, and we are concerned that the necessity for a public interest criterion has 
been lost as reforms have been developed. We therefore recommended that 
objective (C) should be redrafted to read
“(C) Protecting the public interest and the interest o f consumers”20
This was the first time the issue of the public interest had been raised, and it was followed 
up by the specific suggestion by the committee that it should be included in the 
regulatory objectives.21 The Committee did not go so far as to suggest that the public 
interest should stand as a distinct regulatory objective, independent of the consumer 
interest. The Joint Committee took the terms of reference for the Clementi Review as the 
justification that the two should be taken together. The Joint Committee did not make any 
further recommendations on this point. The recommendation they did make, however, 
was an important one as it proved to be the catalyst for further debate.
2.2.3 The Government’s Report responding to the Joint Committee regarding the Public 
Interest.
In the Government’s response to the recommendations made by the Joint Committee 
regarding the insertion of the public interest in the regulatory objectives,22 it made the 
following comment:
"The wording in the Bill follows that recommended by Sir David Clementi in his 
2004 report, which stated that there should be an objective to protect and 
promote the consumer interest. On the public interest the Government considers
20 Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Draft Legal Services Bill Volume 1: Report (2005-2006, HL 232-1, 
HC 1154-1) Chapter 3, page 24,25
21 ibid 9
22 The Government’s Response to the Report by the Joint Committee on the Draft Legal Services Bill, Session 2005- 
2006 (CM 6909) <httn://\vww.officia1-docuinents.gov.uk/document/cm69/6909/6909.ndfi> accessed 8 October 2012
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that, taken as a whole, the seven objectives set out at Clause 1 o f the draft Bill 
will protect and promote the wider public interest, not only the interests o f 
consumers o f legal services. For example, all partners in the regulatory 
framework will be under a duty to act with independence and integrity. It is right 
that the consumer is at the heart o f these reforms and that their needs are central 
to the provision o f high quality, effective legal services. The Government believes 
that it is in the public interest to do this. "2S
From the perspective of understanding the Government’s position this passage is 
revealing. It shows that the regulatory objectives were largely modelled on those 
suggested in the Clementi Report. Further to this, the Government understood the 
fulfilment of the 7 regulatory objectives to be in the public interest. Moreover, their 
policy was to place the consumer at the centre of the reforms and this was expressed to be 
in the public interest. The Government qualified their understanding with the following 
statement:
"Nevertheless, we agree that the public interest should be protected and 
promoted, and that this should be reflected in the Bill. However, as the Joint 
Committee has highlighted, the public interest and the interests o f consumers are 
not always the same, so we do not think it appropriate that the two should sit 
within the same objective. We believe that the matters listed in clause 1 do reflect 
the need o f the Board to have regard to the public interest and we will ensure that 
it is more obviously brought out. ”24
This part of the report could be read as the Government capitulating to the desire 
expressed in the Joint Committee’s report for the public interest to be included in the 
regulatory objectives. Whilst the Government clearly acknowledged that the public 
interest should be promoted and protected, it stopped short of including this as a 
regulatory objective. As the next section outlines, the Government did include the public
23 ibid
24 ;u ;r i
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interest in the Bill, not as a regulatory objective, but in three places in the Bill presented 
subsequently to Parliament. It is suggested that by not including the public interest in the 
regulatory objectives, this raised a degree of suspicion. It is clear that the Government 
believed that this piece of proposed legislation was in the public interest and it did not 
need to expressly state this. It is also surmised that the Parliamentary Draftsmen 
expressed caution regarding the context within which the term public interest could be 
inserted into legislation. They were likely well aware of the difficulties associated with 
including the public interest in legislation and advised accordingly.
2.2.4 The Legal Services Bill and the Public Interest after pre- Legislative Scrutiny 
Following pre-legislative scrutiny the Government partially conceded on the issue of the 
public interest. The Bill was published formally on the 24th November 2006. The 
concession to the Joint Committee on the points about the public interest manifested 
themselves as follows. The public interest was inserted into sections 325, 2726 and 11327. 
These sections, as drafted, required the Legal Services Board, the approved regulators 
(ARs) and the Office for Legal Complaints (OLC), respectively, when pursuing their 
activities, and in particular, their statutory responsibilities, to ‘have regard to the public 
interest.,28
25 Section 3 Legal Services Bill (HL Bill 9 - 1  54/2 )
The Board’s Duty to promote regulatory objectives
(1) In discharging its functions the Board must comply with the requirements of this section
(2) The Board must, so far as is reasonably practicable, act in a way -
(a) Which is compatible with the regulatory objectives, and
(b) Which the Board considers most appropriate for the purpose of meeting those objectives
(3) The Board must have regard to -
(a)the principles under which regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and 
targeted only at cases in which action is needed,
(b)any other principle appearing to it to represent the best regulatory practice, and 
fclthe public interest.
26 Section 27 (3) Legal Services Bill (HL Bill 9 -  1 54/2 )
The approved regulator must have regard to -
(a) The principles under which regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable, proportionate and 
targeted only at cases in which action is needed,
(b) Any other principle appearing to it to represent the best regulatory practice, and,
(c) The public interest
27 Section 113 Legal Services Bill (HL Bill 9 -  1 54/2 )
The OLC must have regard to:-
(a) Any principles appearing to it to represent the best practice of those who administer ombudsman 
schemes, and
(b) The public interest
28 Legal Services Bill (HL Bill 9 -  1 54/2 )
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The insertion of the public interest in the three sections in the Legal Services Bill was not 
regarded as satisfactory. In particular, members of the Joint Committee, when they spoke 
in the debates in the House of Lords were not satisfied that the Government had taken 
their recommendations seriously. The Government’s view that this piece of legislation 
was in the public interest was, in a sense, legitimate. If the Government was not 
legislating in the public interest, then something would have been very wrong. However, 
the strength with which the Government made its arguments that this piece of legislation 
was orientated towards ‘the consumer’ was arguably, from their perspective, counter­
productive. The focus towards the consumer clearly concerned the Joint Committee. By 
including the public interest in the text of the Bill, as opposed to a clear expression of the 
objective of the legislation being in the public interest, resulted in the Government’s 
motive being questioned. This was not helped by the way in which the public interest was 
included and more specifically, the wording that accompanied it. The accompanying 
phrase, ‘have regard to’ in all three instances was considered less than satisfactory. The 
following sets out how these matters, and more, were raised throughout the debates of the 
House of Lords and House of Commons.
2.3 THE DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THE LEGAL SERVICES BILL
2.3.1 The First and Second Reading of the Legal Services Bill
Lord Falconer introduced the Bill to the Lords on the 23rd November 2006. The second 
reading of the Bill commenced on the 6th December 2006.29 During the Second Reading, 
Lord Falconer outlined the Bill in more detail. He referred to the regulatory objectives as 
follows:
“Part one sets out the regulatory objectives. Regulators must have clear 
objectives to guide them in exercising their functions and to provide a basis on 
which consumers can hold them to account. Part 1 sets out these objectives and 
principles. They will apply to the LSB, approved regulators and the Office o f
29 HL Deb 6th December 2006, vol 687, col 1162
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Legal Complaints. We have also included a specific duty for the LSB to have 
regard to the public interest, again at the suggestion o f the Joint Committee. ”30
From Lord Falconer’s speech it is useful to note the role that the regulatory objectives 
were intended to achieve. This reinforces the analysis outlined in chapter one regarding 
the importance to be attributed to the regulatory objectives. In the context in which Lord 
Falconer was making his speech, at a time when the public interest had not been inserted 
into the Bill as a regulatory objective, it can be extrapolated that the Government’s policy 
was that the legislation should be focused towards the consumer as well as the other six 
regulatory objectives. It was not long before the policy disposition towards the consumer 
was challenged as the next section outlines. Lord Thomas31 in the second speech 
following Lord Falconer’s outline of the Bill, dealt directly with the issues identified in 
the Joint Committee’s report. His speech evidences a degree of suspicion concerning the 
Government’s policy focus towards the consumer. He also directly referred to the ‘public 
interest’ and how this differed from the consumer interest.
“Since I  started, the language o f the market has intruded into the legal 
profession. We used to talk o f clients; now we talk o f consumers and stakeholders. 
It was a profession; in the Bill; it is called a ‘legal service provider”. Advertising 
was regarded as touting and ambulance chasing; now it is accepted and 
promoted. Under the Bill; legal services are to be sold along with a tin o f beans. 
It is interesting that when the Co-operative Society expressed an interest in setting 
up a legal division in May, Bridget Prentice, the Minister in Charge o f the Bill in 
another place, said in a press release that we should perhaps call the Bill ‘Co-op 
Law” It sums up the Bill’s ambition quite well. "32
“We have moved to a consumer-directed legal profession. The proposal is to put 
the “consumer firs t” — a phrase in the title o f the White Paper. I  have always 
believed that the public interest comes first, but that is not at all the same thing.
30 ibid col 1164
31 Lord Thomas of Gresford HL Deb 6th December 2006, vol 687, col 1171
32 ibid
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The Bill will be judged by its ability to maintain the essentials o f the legal 
profession-its integrity and its independence. Contained in those essentials is the 
basic concept that the lawyer’s primary duty is to the administration o f justice 
and to the court. ”3S
“The duty to the client as consumer is vitally important although it is secondary 
to that prime duty that I  spoke of. The duty to the client includes client 
confidentiality, the avoidance o f conflicts o f interest, and, importantly, the ability 
and willingness to challenge the various organs o f state in whatever guise they 
impact upon the rights o f the citizen. ”34
Lord Thomas, referring directly to the Government’s policy predisposition to the 
consumer, argued that this had overshadowed the very important roles that the legal 
profession plays in society. He noted, in the concluding part of his speech that it was no 
surprise to him that the Government had presented a draft Bill that included no reference 
to the public interest, the duty of a lawyer to the court, or the independence of the legal 
profession.35 Shortly after Lord Thomas’s speech, Lord Neill’s speech36 commenced 
with an account of how, in the Bill introduced into Parliament, the regulatory objectives 
now included reference to the word ‘independent’ in regards to the lawyer’s role. For this 
he praised the Government’s acceptance of the Joint Committee’s recommendations. He, 
however, noted that the Government had ignored the spirit of the Joint Committee’s 
recommendation on the public interest. Lord Neil noted:
“We suggested that the regulatory objectives ought to include a reference to the 
public interest, with words such as ‘protecting and promoting the public interest ’. 
That has not been accepted in full, although we pick up reference to the public 
interest elsewhere. The committee would have seen that put squarely on the front 
o f the Bill. ” 37
33 Lord Thomas of Gresford HL Deb 6th December 2006, vol 687, col 1171
34 ibid
35 ibid col 1172
36 Lord Neil of Bladen HL Deb 6th December 2006, vol 687, col 1183
37 ibid
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Reference was not made to the regulatory objectives in the following 3 speeches which in 
the main concentrated on the issues of complaints handling and the process of pre­
legislative scrutiny. Reference to Lord Thomas’s speech and the public interest was, 
however, followed up with some force by Baroness Butler Sloss. She38 delivered one of 
the most compelling speeches in the debates, concentrating on four aspects of the Bill. 
Her initial concern was to do with the public interest. It is at this point the concerns raised 
by Lord Neill and Lord Thomas were developed in a forthright manner. Baroness Butler 
Sloss noted:
“First, there is Clause l(l)(c), which refers to the objective o f “Protecting and 
promoting the interests o f consumers” The report o f the two Houses pointed out 
that there had been a shift from public interest to consumer interest The 
government consultation paper issued in 2002 was entitled “In the Public 
Interest?” and placed emphasis on the wider public interest. The terms o f 
reference set by the Government for the Clementi report included consideration o f 
the “public and consumer interest”. The promotion o f the interests o f those who 
use legal services is enormously important, but is not always identical with the 
public interest. It is possible for narrow consumer interest to be contrary to the 
wider public interest. At present, there is no provision for promotion or protection 
o f the public interest and there appears to be no explanation for its omission from  
the Bill. I  support the recommendation o f the Joint Committee at paragraph 78 
that subsection (1) (c) should be redrafted to read “protecting and promoting the 
public interest and interests o f consumers. ”39
From the three speeches outlined so far there is evidence of a concern regarding the 
omission of the public interest, coupled with the omnipresent focus on the consumer 
interest in the Bill. Whilst the consumer interest was accepted as being important, the 
speeches outlined the importance of legal services beyond the consumer. The strength of
38 HL Deb 6th December 2006, vol 687, col 1193
39 ibid
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feeling, regarding the Government’s change in emphasis, together with the Government’s 
policy, gained momentum. Following Baroness Butler Sloss’s speech, Baroness Ashton, 
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Constitutional Affairs40 
made her first contribution to the debates. Baroness Ashton outlined the Government's 
position as follows, making at this point little acknowledgement of the concerns raised 
about the public interest in the Bill:
“/  shall consider the points about public interest in the front o f the Bill raised by 
the noble Baroness, Lady Butler Sloss, and about proportionality raised by the 
noble Lord, Lord Maclennan o f Rogart. Noble Lords will know that, in Clause 
3 (3) (a), we have tried to address the issue in the context o f the work o f the Board. 
We think that it is appropriate, as opposed to using Clause 1 as noble Lords have 
suggested. Because we have talked about accountability, proportionality, 
consistency and so on, we think that that is a way to tackle the issues that noble 
Lords have raised. ” 41
This response by Baroness Ashton was clearly regarded as unsatisfactory by some 
members of the Lords. Baroness Ashton’s speech reveals that the Government believed it 
had addressed the Joint Committee’s recommendations and that no further action was 
necessary. However, unsatisfied by this response and the Government’s unwillingness to 
consider the matter further, amendments were tabled at Committee Stage directly relating 
to the public interest.
2.3.2 The Legal Services Bill -  Debates at the Committee Stage (House of Lords)
It is at the Committee Stage of the legislative process that most can be learnt about the 
insertion of the term ‘public interest’ into the Legal Services Bill. From the preceding 
account of the second reading, it began to emerge that the Lords were unhappy with the 
Government’s focus on the consumer interest at the expense of other considerations. 
Additionally, there was discernible irritation that the Government had ignored the Joint
40 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 6th December 2006, vol 687, col 1208
41 ibid
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Committee’s recommendations. Baroness Ashton's unwillingness to accommodate the 
Lord's concerns, in her response (as outlined above) led to two proposals to amend the 
Bill. The amendments were as follows:
Amendment I 42
Lord Thomas moved Amendment No I 43:
Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert -
“protecting and promoting the public interest, ”
Amendment 2 44
Page 1, line 8, after “promoting” insert “thepublic interest and”
To read -  “protecting and promoting the public interest and the interests o f 
consumers ”
Having made a speech at the second reading stage, and been dissatisfied with the lack of 
attention accorded to the recommendation to insert the public interest into the Bill in a
42 Clause 1 Proposed by Lord Thomas of Gresford, Lord Maclennan of Rogart 
Page 1, line 7, at end insert -  “( ) protecting and promoting the public interest)
Supported by : (Lord Kingsland, Lord Hunt of Wirral, Lord Neill of Bladen) Revised Marshaled Lists of Amendments 
to be moved in Committee.
^ttpV/w'ww.Dublications.nar1iament.uk/Da/ld200607/ldbi11s/009/amend/m1009-ir.htm> accessed 23 June 2012
43 Lord Thomas of Gresford HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 116
44 Page 1, line 8, after “promoting” insert “the public interest and”
Proposed by Lord Kingsland Supported by Lord Thomas of Gresford, Lord Maclennan of Rogart.
Revised Marshaled Lists of Amendments to be moved in
Committee.<httn://\vww.publications.parliament.uk/Da/ld200607/ldbil1s/009/amend/ml009-ir.htm> accessed 23 June 
2012
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more prominent way, Lord Thomas45 was moved to introduce an amendment 
(Amendment 1). He outlined his rationale for the amendment as follows:
“I  am concerned to ensure that the public interest stands at the forefront o f the 
Bill. The Minister’s brief may contain words to the effect that this is all 
unnecessary and goes without saying, but that is not the case. It is important that 
we do not succumb to political correctness or modern day fashion by putting the 
consumer ahead o f the public interest in its widest connotations. Protecting and 
promoting the public interest is a lawyer’s prime duty. It sometimes means that 
they are, as I  said at second reading, in conflict with the consumer, the client for  
whom they are acting. Nevertheless, it is a lawyer’s duty to put the public interest 
first. I  submit to noble lords that that should be the first principle, ahead o f 
consumer interests, in the Bill. I  beg to move. ” 46
Lord Thomas’s speech was followed directly by that of Lord Hunt. Lord Hunt had 
chaired the Joint Committee and advocated the insertion of the term ‘public interest’ 
during pre- legislative scrutiny. Lord Hunt has latterly been recognised as a leading force 
in attempts to return the Legal Services Bill back to something that reflected the 
proposals made in the Clementi Report. Lord Thomas’s amendment was supported by 
Lord Hunt. Lord Hunt made one of the longest speeches at the Committee stage. His 
speech was also one of the defining points in connection with the public interest. For this 
reason, a large part of his speech is outlined and subsequently discussed.
“I  strongly agree. It is difficult to understand what has changed since the 
previous Lord Chancellor issued a consultation paper entitled “In the Public 
Interest?” I  believe he had it absolutely right -  it is very much in the public 
interest that the reforms o f the legal profession should take place. But the noble 
Lord, Lord Thomas o f Gresford, has quite rightly noticed that the terminology has 
changed. It has suddenly become o f concern to the Government that the reform o f
45 HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 117
46 ibid
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the legal profession should be in the interest o f consumers and no longer in the 
public interest. "4?
"/ thank my noble friends who served with me on the Joint Select Committee. This 
matter came to our attention and, in our report published on 25 July, we stressed 
the importance o f bringing back “public ”. I  pause for a moment to consider what 
the word means. It is a much wider term than the consumer interest. The 
consumer interest is important -  it is part o f the public interest, but it is o f course 
the interest o f those who have used, or who use, the service. There is a much 
wider concept here, which was rightly recognised by the previous Lord 
Chancellor, that any move towards reforming what has always been seen as an 
independent, impartial legal profession must be in the interest not just o f those 
who use the service, but o f the much wider public interest. ” 48
“The Minister has already heard me say previously that the definition o f “public ” 
covers what could be termed as being in the national interest — interests o f this 
country as a whole. Is it in the interest o f this country that we should have an 
independent, impartial legal profession? O f course it is. The consumer wants it 
pretty cheap, and quite rightly so, but not necessarily high quality. Although one 
always tries to seek the advantage o f having not only value for money, but also 
high quality, quality perhaps does not rate as highly as the cost with some 
consumers. O f course many consumers, particularly those o f the criminal legal 
system, are to be found in some o f her Majesty’s institutions. That we should be 
bringing forward reform in the interests o f the criminals is not something which 
should be paramount in our minds. 49
“The public interest covers what is in the interest o f UK pic. It is clearly in our 
minds that our legal profession should continue to be respected across the world. 
There are lawyers, solicitors and barristers who practise across the world - not
47 Lord Hunt of Wirral HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 117-118
48 ibid
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only in the Commonwealth countries and not only in those that accept the 
English system o f common law, but on a much wider scale. It is therefore surely 
in the national interest that whatever bodies we establish under this Bill should be 
in the interest o f UK pic. ”50
It has also come to our attention that these words apply not only to the Legal 
Services Board, but will apply to the Office for Legal Complaints and to approved 
regulators. Therefore, we are dealing with a very wide concept. I  warmly applaud 
the words o f the noble Lord, Lord Thomas o f Gresford. I  took the oyportunitv to 
surf the internet just before this debate to try to work out a definition o f public 
interest. Wikivedia. the free encyclopaedia, directed me to “common well-bein2 ”. 
which is an interesting concept. It also reminded me that public interest is often 
contrasted with private or individual interest, so one could say that it is very 
different from consumer, private or individual interest. It is much wider. 
Wikivedia repeats the words o f many vhilosovhers throu2hout the a2es who stress 
that the public interest is a crucial concept in much political vhilosovhv. 
Protection o f minority rights is arguably part o f the public interest. It is also a 
defence against certain lawsuits. I  was also looking at the ruling on 11th October 
last year in a very important case by our Judicial Committee, upholding the vital 
principles ofpress freedom in the public interest. Therefore, “the public interest” 
is found not only in this amendment, but in other key locations. I  could say much 
more on the subject, but it strikes me that the Minister has been listening carefully 
and nodding from time to time. Her body language is very acceptable to this 
House. Therefore, I  will sit down and hope that she will respond positively. ”51
2.3.3 Analysis of Lord Hunt’s Speech at the Committee Stage
Lord Hunt’s speech is possibly the most enlightening of all those connected with the
public interest. His speech alludes to the influence that successive Lord Chancellors had
on the policy orientation of reform of legal services. He highlighted the fact that Lord
50 ibid
51
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Irvine had a conservative approach to reform, and that his successor, Lord Falconer, was 
much more open to reform. Lord Hunt also drew attention to the fact that this change of 
orientation was mistaken, and that the reforms should be in the public interest. The 
balance of his speech was directed towards understanding what the public interest meant. 
From his interpretation of the public interest, he regarded it as dealing with a broader set 
of interests than the consumer interest. He made the argument that the consumer interest 
is one of the interests that goes to make up the public interest. The key determination he 
made is that the public has an interest in a strong and independent legal profession, and 
that this is more important than those who use legal services. Crucially he noted that the 
consumer is generally preoccupied with price and maybe quality, but, that legal services 
are consumed by a broad range of interests. These interests he noted concerned matters 
beyond basic considerations of price. He specifically made reference to the reputation of 
the legal profession abroad. Moreover, regarding consumer’s interests, he noted that 
some are more important than others. It is presumed that this was with regards to price, as 
opposed to individuals’ rights to justice. To steer his understanding, Lord Hunt, rather 
extraordinarily for a lawyer, relied on the Wikipedia Free Encyclopaedia.
It is posited that the real rationale behind Lord Hunt’s arguing for the insertion of the 
public interest was an attempt to re-orientate the policy of the Government. Whilst the 
Lords understood and accepted the interest of the consumer, they clearly viewed the 
interests of a broader cross section of society as more important. Lord Hunt’s speech 
outlines something of a definition of the public interest. Whilst this is interesting, it only 
briefly references some of the wide views connected with the public interest (many of 
which will be explored in subsequent chapters). The broad terms of the definition 
suggested by Lord Hunt, are also interesting, because they pertain to an understanding of 
the public interest which has not been laboured over extensively. It suggests that Lord 
Hunt had been championing the inclusion of the public interest with a particular idea of 
what it meant in mind, and that this was intuitively shared by many other members of the 
House of Lords. It is posited that many members of the House of Lords seemingly knew 
what the public interest meant. This particular point will be addressed in Chapter 4. For 
present purposes, it would appear that with an intuitive understanding of the public
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interest in mind a consensus was emerging, which in essence concerned combatting the 
Government’s policy orientated ostensibly towards the consumer.
At this point in the debates the vision of the public interest can be explained as follows. 
Firstly, that the public interest is regarded as being an interest broader than individual 
interests. Secondly, in the context of legal services this meant an independent, impartial 
legal profession, with a good reputation around the world. Thirdly, the public interest 
included the benefits that the legal profession delivers to the economy. There were subtle 
variations in the views pertaining to the ways in which the public interest should be 
connected to the consumer interest to achieve the overall objection to the consumer 
interest and realise the vision of the public interest in legal services. This is evidenced in 
the speech delivered after Lord Hunt by Lord Campbell.
2.3.4 The Debates at Committee Stage - Continued.
Lord Campbell’s52 speech concentrated on two themes, firstly how the public interest 
qualified the consumer interest and secondly, the extent to which this was important. 
Regarding these two points he noted:
“I  agree with everything that was said by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas o f 
Gresford, and my noble friend, Lord Hunt o f Wirral However, I  have one 
reservation about Amendment number 1, which relates to access o f justice. 
Amendment number 2 is preferred because, as was pointed out so clearly by my 
noble friend just now, the public interest qualifies the consumer interest. Having 
said that, the only justification for this Bill as amended is i f  it is in the public 
interest, which includes the interests o f the client now referred to as the 
consumer”53
In terms of the application of the term ‘public interest’ Lord Campbell continued:
52 Lord Campbell of Alloway HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 119
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91
‘The width o f public interest, which comes within the remit o f the board, is 
fantastic. Before it makes any o f its administrative decisions — be they on 
directions, public censure, financial penalties, interventions, cancellations, 
designation, policy, statements, practising fees, regulatory conflicts or, indeed, 
the licensing - it has to take account the public interest. It is a very wide remit. 
The amendment is o f crucial consequence because it stands as guardian over all 
the other amendments to the Bill. My noble friend Lady Butler Sloss she was once 
my learnedfriend — said on Second Reading that consumer interest, i f  contrary to 
the public interest, is subservient to it. That is recognised by the drafting o f 
Amendment No.2. ”54
Lord Campbell’s speech re-iterates the argument posited earlier that the public interest’s 
insertion was to counter the consumer interest. In advocating the second amendment, 
Lord Campbell sought to do this in a more direct sense, by qualifying the regulatory 
objective of protecting and promoting the consumer interest with the public interest. This 
can largely be viewed as an attempt to qualify the significance to be accorded to the 
consumer interest. Lord Campbell’s speech again underlines the importance of the public 
interest’s insertion. In his view, it had the ability to affect the nature of the subsequent 
amendments and the character of the proposed legislation. It also illustrates the different 
understandings of the public interest, and how different locations in the regulatory 
objectives could lead to different interpretations. It may also explain why the 
Parliamentary Draftsmen, along with presumably direct instructions from the 
Government, retained a consumer orientated focus to the legislation. They may have also 
counselled against direct insertion of the public interest in the regulatory objectives of the 
Bill for reasons outlined in chapters four and five of this thesis. Though not outlined 
above, Lord Campbell went on to briefly mention his view of the public interest, which 
included the fact that the client should have independent and quality advice. He also 
highlighted the importance of the standing of the legal profession as seen by other
54Lord Campbell of Alloway HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 119
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countries in the world.55 The speech given by Lord Neill that followed Lord Campbell’s 
represents a turning point in the debates.
Lord Neill started his speech by asserting that the debate regarding the public interest 
should be one connected with the form in which it appeared in the Bill, as opposed to its 
actual appearance in the Bill. Lord Neil skilfully exploited the Government's previous 
concession regarding the public interest. The Government's amendment as a result of the 
pre-legislative scrutiny, as noted, was merely to include the term the public interest 
qualified by the words ‘have regard.’ This was distinctly different from the shift in 
emphasis that the insertion of the public interest could have had as a regulatory objective. 
By revealing a letter, in which Baroness Ashton had assured Lord Neil that they “shared 
the same interests with regard to the public interest" it put the Government in a difficult 
position. It appears a masterstroke in logical argument, turning on the question that if the 
Government agreed to the fact that the public interest should appear in the Bill, why 
should it be confined to relatively minor clauses? It also begged the question -why should 
the public interest not be in the regulatory objectives? The following sets this important 
part of Lord Neil’s speech out below. The Government’s argument that they had 
accommodated the public interest, from this point on, became weaker and weaker.
"Once you concede that, there is really no basis in principle on which you can 
object to our proposal that the Bill should proclaim on its front the importance 
attached to the public interest and that it not be a matter o f scurrying through a 
lot o f clauses and getting as far as Clause 113, i f  anybody goes that far. We 
should put it right up on the front o f the Bill, just like the Consultation Paper that 
was put out earlier about the public interest. It fits in very well beneath the 
reference to the rule o f law but ahead o f that to consumers. Without abandoning 
my colleagues on Amendment No.2, I  prefer the notion o f the noble Lord, Lord 
Thomas o f Gresford, that this should go in as a separate provision, coming in as 
Clauses 1(1) (c ). That is the place it obviously belongs and it should be put in
55 ibid
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there. I  am grateful for the noble Baroness for having written to me, and I  hope 
we shall see further actions reflecting the body language witnessed earlier on. ” 56
The following speech by Lord Berwick57 consisted of one sentence agreeing that the 
public interest should be included, because the consumer interest was. The speech that 
followed this, by Lord Graham, illustrates the view of a non-lawyer. It is notable that 
most of the speeches so far referring to the public interest had been delivered by lawyers. 
Lord Graham noted:
“As a person who does not claim to be at all familiar with the law, the legal 
profession or legal service, I  am a little puzzled by the need to distinguish the 
public interest and the interest o f consumers. I  do not intend to make heavy 
weather o f that. I  have listened carefully from the beginning to the arguments that 
have been advanced. As a consumer o f legal services and many other things, I  
welcome the reference to the interest o f the consumer in a Bill o f this kind, while 
not remotely arguing that one interest should take preference over another. "58
“The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said that the consumer interest may be best defined 
as people wanting to find the cheapest services they can, which may not always be 
services o f quality. That may be so in respect o f certain consumers or certain 
services, but we should remember the phrase “caveat emptor”, let the buyer 
beware. Certainly the cost o f services, legal or otherwise, needs to be taken very 
seriously. So I  shall listen carefully to the Ministers arguments as to whether the 
amendment is appropriate and necessary. I  have no objection as a consumer to 
placing the interests o f the public above that o f consumers provided that the 
interests o f the consumer are treated equally fairly and on the same line as the 
public interest. ”59
56 Lord Neil of Bladen HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 119
57 Lord Berwick HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 120
58 Lord Graham HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 120
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Lord Graham’s speech reveals the fact that the subtleties of the distinction between the 
public and consumer interest did not concern all members of the House of Lords. What is 
notable, however, is that from the perspective of someone not particularly concerned with 
the distinction between the public interest and the consumer interest, intuitively, Lord 
Graham appears to acknowledge the importance of the public interest. Baroness 
Camegy60 followed Lord Graham’s speech and she posed, in her speech, a very simple 
question challenging the Government’s rationale for omitting to include a reference to the 
‘public interest.’61 She received a response to this question later on in the debates. This 
response is outlined later on in this section. Moving beyond the actual need for the 
public interest in the Bill the debates turned to the terminology of the proposed 
Amendments. Lord Lyell’s speech62 followed the short one delivered by Baroness 
Camegy. His speech challenged the Government's assertion that they had dealt with the 
public interest. He voiced the concern that there is a big difference between ‘protecting 
and promoting’ and ‘having regard to’. He noted as follows:
“I  support the objectives o f both amendments, although I  slightly prefer 
Amendment No. 1. There is an important distinction between the point made by 
the Minister in her letter to the noble Lord, Lord Neil o f Bladen, and the point 
that we are considering. Amendment No. 1 suggests that the regulatory objectives 
should protect and promote the public interest. That is what I  believe we should 
seek to do. The other three clauses -  Clause 3 (3) (c )  , Clause 27 (3) (c )  and 
Clause 113 simply require that those governed by those provisions "have regard 
to” the public interest. It is not quite the same thing. Promoting and protecting 
are stronger, the words are clear. ”63
60 Baroness Camegy of Lour HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 121
61 Baroness Camegy of Lour HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 121 She also noted: "I hope thaï we will make 
heavy weather of this. I look forward to the Minister’s response but in telling us her view, could she say precisely why 
the Government omitted a reference to the public interest from the regulatory principles in Clause 1 .1 am not asking 
what they have put into the other clauses - 1 understand why they have done that -  but it would be very interesting to 
know why they have omitted that reference”.
62 Lord Lyell HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 121
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Lord Lyell in highlighting this point complemented the subtle argument made by Lord 
Neil and as such this appears to have begun to exert pressure on the Government. The 
Government was, however, to receive considerable support for its policy towards legal 
services from the next speech, delivered by Lord Whitty. Throughout all the stages which 
had led to the Bill being introduced to Parliament, the Government, and its policy 
favouring the consumer, had been supported by various consumer organisations. In the 
Lords, the Government was supported by Lord Whitty. Lord Whitty64 was an outspoken 
critic of the legal profession and sceptical of what he saw as their attempts to manipulate 
the public interest for their own self-interest. The following extract from his speech 
evidences the strength with which he, and others, viewed the importance of the consumer 
interest.
“I  hope that the Minister’s body language is not too conciliatory on this. I  declare 
an interest as chair o f the National Consumer Council. This Bill is about 
regulating the relationships between the legal profession and its clients. It is not 
about broader matters; it is about precisely that. It is therefore important that the 
consumer interest is given primacy. The two interests are not equal. On the face 
o f it I  would have no objection to a reference to the public interest. However, I  
have a deep suspicion that what certain protagonists here mean by the public 
interest includes a big chunk o f the interests o f the legal profession itself. I  am not 
going to participate much in committee, but my noble friend needs to be aware 
that some o f the amendments tabled today raise that suspicion. Whatever 
concessions the Minister may be prepared to make, we need to be clear that this 
Bill is primarily about consumers. It should have regard to the public interest — 
and there is provision for that later in the Bill, as the noble and learned Lord has 
just said — but the purpose is to protect consumers. ” 65
Lord Whitty’s speech demonstrates the strong link between the Government and the 
Consumer Organisations. It also demonstrates the strength with which the professions
64 Lord Whitty HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 121
65 ibid
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were viewed with grave suspicion, validating in a sense the assertions made in the first 
chapter regarding the new moral economy and the commensurate breakdown in trust in 
the professions. Whilst briefly referred to in the passage above, Lord Whitty went on to 
make a number of outspoken criticisms of the legal profession. He also challenged many 
of the speeches made previously in the debates in the House of Lords by members who 
were lawyers. In a rather un-gentlemanly way he alleged that they were more interested 
in protecting the profession’s monopoly than recognising the consumer’s interest. This 
point was not received well by other member of the Lords.66 The speech that followed 
Lord Whitty’s concentrated, in the first instance, on the second amendment. Lord 
Kingsland outlined why he had tabled it as follows:
"Our reason for aligning, in Amendment No. 2, public interest with consumer 
interest is simply this: the Legal Services Board is entitled to intervene on the 
basis o f any one o f seven criteria in Clause 1(1) so that i f  you have public interest 
as a standalone category, the consumer interest is also left as a stand -  alone 
category. For example the LSB could intervene solely on consumer grounds, quite 
independently o f the public interest. That is why we combine public and consumer 
interest: it forces the LSB to balance the consumer interest against the public 
interest before intervening.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas o f Gresford, and so many other noble Lords who 
have spoken have rightly said that the public interest and the consumer interest 
will not always coincide. A number o f your Lordships have hazarded a definition 
o f the public interest, but to me the crucial ingredient o f the public interest in this 
context is justice. The courts are here in the UK to attain justice; that is their role. 
There will sometimes be a conflict between the attainment o f justice and the
66 Lord Kingsland HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 121-122 He also noted: "I thought that it was uncharacteristic 
-  not to say unworthy -  of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, to suggest that, in putting forward this amendment, I was in 
some way trying to protect the interests o f the legal profession. That is not the case. I think that putting the consumer 
first strengthens a perception among the public that it is only the consumer or client who counts. The lawyer is not the 
paid mouthpiece of the client who is prepared to say whatever the client will pay him to say. He has a much more 
independent position. Perhaps the public perception is that lawyers are just paid mouthpieces, but the discipline and 
ethos of the legal profession are entirely against that -  they are to act independently and to take into account the public 
first”
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provision o f legal services at a certain price. It is that conflict with which the 
Legal Services Board has to grapple. Unless the public interest is one o f the 
objectives, there will be no requirement for the LSB to grapple with it. That is the 
worry. " 67
My concern about public interest is about the courts and justice, which is a very 
distinct phenomenon from the interests o f the legal profession. Members o f the 
legal profession are advocated in front o f the courts, but the courts ultimately are 
run, and their decisions are made, by judges in the interests ofjustice. That is the 
public interest I  think crucial. ”68
Lord Kingsland, demonstrated a similar strand of thinking, regarding the regulatory 
objectives to that already articulated by Lord Campbell. He drew attention, again, to the 
point that the consumer interest, in the hands of the Legal Services Board needed to be 
tempered by the public interest. He also noted that as the Bill stood there was a need to 
pursue a variety of objectives, but there was no direct obligation to consider the public 
interest. Lord Kingsland’s speech is notable as he directly connects the public interest 
with justice and the functioning of the courts. Lord Kingsland’s speech was followed by 
Baroness Ashton of Upholland69 responding in her capacity as the Member of the House 
of Lords responsible for the Bill. At this point, despite challenging arguments the 
Government stood firm. In reply to the points put forward so far Baroness Ashton, for the 
Government, noted:
"For me, the public interest is why you regulate. Regulation is about something 
that we do as a Government to support the public interest. As noble Lords have 
rightly pointed out, the Government were very keen, in responding to the Joint 
Committee to tackle the issue appropriately. The noble Lord, Lord Neil o f Bladen, 
referred to the letter that 1 sent him and the fact that in Clauses 3, 27 and 113 we 
have put in,
67 Lord Kingsland HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 121-122
68 ibid
69 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 123
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“Have regard t o  the public interest”
for the specific aspects o f the Bill. That was our attempt to respond to the Joint 
Committee appropriately ”70
In response to the challenge that the policy behind the legislation had changed from the 
public interest to the consumer interest, Baroness Ashton made the following response:
“What has changed? Nothing has changed. We felt that we had dealt with the 
issue appropriately in those clauses. I  accept the concerns o f my noble friend 
Lord Whitty. When the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, talked about the balance 
between the consumer interest and the public interest, it made me a little nervous, 
because I  do not see it that way. I  accept and I  wanted to listen to this debate very 
carefully — that there is an issue that we have not quite got right in the Bill, and I  
am very keen to address it. I  did not know whether we would go for the approach 
in Amendment No. 1 or in Amendment No. 2, so it was interesting that we had a 
mixture o f both. Perhaps the amendment o f the noble Lord, Lord Thomas o f  
Gresford, found more favour in this particular debate.71
I  worry a little that we are trying to balance something when in this instance the 
regulation, as my Noble friend rightly says, is primarily about the relationship 
between the legal profession and the consumer, customer, citizen or client — 
whichever word noble Lords prefer -  whom the profession is seeking to serve. 
That all takes place within the context o f the public interest, whether the definition 
is from Wikipedia or from the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland. I  am very mindful o f  
what my noble friend Lord Whitty has said. Indeed, in discussions, organisations 
that are particularly concerned about consumer interest have been keen to make 
sure that we are mindful o f what the regulation is seeking to achieve. None the
70 ibid
71 Amendment 1. ( Protecting and promoting the public interest) Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, 
col 123
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less, I  think that we have something that we need to address and we will 
endeavour to do so.
‘So in essence we agree with what the Joint Committee was seeking to do. We 
believed that we had resolved it appropriately. I f  noble Lords believe that we have 
not, we will endeavour to do so, building on this debate and perhaps in discussion 
with those who put forward amendments nos 1 and 2, but being very mindful o f 
what my friend Lord Whitty and Lord Graham o f Edmonton said about ensuring 
that we are clear about the vurvose o f regulation. I  do not think that there is any 
difference between us. On that basis, I  hope that noble Lords will feel able not to 
press their amendments, and I  shall return to the subject at report".73
Baroness Ashton's response, at first, regarding the public interest appeared to present an 
unshakeable commitment to the amendments that had already been made following the 
Joint Committee’s recommendations. The response to Baroness Canegy’s question 
evidences again the Government’s very strong policy commitment to the consumer 
interest. It also demonstrated a close connection to Lord Whittyand a veritable array of 
consumer organisations. It is also interesting to note that Baroness Ashton assimilated, or 
confused, the terms citizen, client and consumer. This is a point that will be attended to 
later on in this thesis. Beyond this, and of particular note, is the passage underlined 
(above), which pertains to the purpose of the regulation. At this point in the speech, 
absent direct mention of the public interest, the purpose of the regulation, certainly in the 
Government’s mind, was the consumer. Any subsequent amendments therefore, by direct 
implication on this point alone, would count as a modified expression of the purpose of 
regulation.
The debate regarding the public interest did not end with Baroness Ashton’s speech. She 
was questioned specifically on the terminology of the Government’s amendments 
following the Joint Committees recommendations by Lord Roper.74 He argued forcefully
72 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 123
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that ‘have regard to’ is very different to ‘protecting and promoting.’ Baroness Ashton's 
response, below, indicates an awareness that the Government not only misjudged the 
Joint Select Committee's comments, but that this particular point was not going to go 
away.
"They are [similar]. The purpose o f the phrase “have regard to” was to focus on 
the particular institutions, i f  I  can call them that, in the Bill. The question that I  
was seeking to get advice and a steer on from debate was whether by including 
the public interest with the consumer interest, as suggested in Amendment No. 2, 
that could have put the public interest either in conflict or in a secondary 
position, or whether what we were seeking to do was to have an overarching 
principle within clause 1 that would cover this. I  need to reflect on where I  think 
noble Lords have got to with that debate. That was really what I  was seeking. The 
aim is not to say “have regard to ” in Cause 1; it is rather to put this issue in a 
different position in order to reflect what I  think the noble Lord, Lord Hunt o f  
Wirral, believes we did not quite get right from the Joint Committee. ”75
By this point, Baroness Ashton was facing heavy opposition. In trying to assert that the 
amendment requiring the regulators to ‘have regard to’ the public interest was the same 
as a specific regulatory objective was convincing few. The tone of her speeches was, 
however, beginning to change. Baroness Camegy,76 following Baroness Ashton’s speech 
made a strong and powerful argument for the public interest as the overall objective of 
the Bill. The relevant passage of the speech is outlined as follows:
"But the public also understands very well the importance o f the public interest 
because what a particular consumer wants is not necessarily what everybody else 
wants. People understand the importance o f the rule o f law. I  do not think that 
politically the Government need be frightened o f giving paramountcy to the public
75 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 124
76 Baroness Camegy of Lour HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 124
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interest. I  think the public understand that but they also know very well that they 
need to be protected from lawyers. "7?
In regards to this point Baroness Ashton responded;78
“What I  should have said, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt o f Wirral quite rightly 
indicated, is that it was my noble and learned friend Lord Irvine o f Lairg who 
began all this with a document about the public interest. My noble and learned 
friend is always right and in this case we begin to see the fruits o f his labour 
being writ large within the Bill. I  will o f course take this away. ” 79
This statement by Baroness Ashton marks a shift in her thinking regarding the public 
interest. It also draws attention to the approach advocated by Lord Irvine, again 
underlining the personal and political dimensions to the policy of reform of the legal 
services market. Baroness Ashton sought to conclude the debate. The following passage 
is of particular interest as it further signals a modification in her thinking on the subject of 
the public interest.
"Within this debate, we were looking to recognise the strength o f feeling in this 
Chamber that this matter needed to be considered and to think about how best to 
reflect what noble Lords have said. As Members o f the Committee know, the 
different amendments offer different approaches. The view that I  have taken from  
the debate is that we probably need to think about the public interest in a slightly 
more overarching sense. Obviously, I  shall need to consult colleagues because I  
am not the policy Minister in this case, but I  think that the sense o f the debate is to 
go in that direction and I  have no difficulty with that. But we also need to be 
mindful o f the purpose o f the regulation, which I  think is where my noble friend 
Lord Whitty was coming from. "80
77 ibid
78 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 125
79 ibid
80 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 12
102
Neither of the tabled amendments was accepted, though Baroness Ashton resolved to go 
away and think about the debates. Baroness Ashton was undoubtedly conscious of the 
amount of time that had been consumed debating the first clause of the Bill. The nature of 
the Bill, originating in the House of Lords meant that, at the Committee Stage, the debate 
on amendments is unrestricted.81 There was the prospect that an amendment could have 
been introduced at the Third Reading stage, frustrating the passage of the Act - i f  no 
agreement was reached between the Government and the House of Lords. The fact that 
the issue would not go away is underlined by the following passage from Lord Thomas’s 
speech in which he withdrew the amendment.82 Lord Thomas’s speech leaves no margin 
of doubt that the Lords regarded the matter of the public interest as vitally important. His 
speech also draws attention to the way in which the expressed purpose of the regulation 
directly affected the nature of the Bill. Lord Thomas noted:
“The Bill is not simply concerned with regulating the legal profession’s 
relationship with consumers. The regulatory body, the LSB, has relationships with 
the Bar Council, the Law Society and other regulators and the regulatory 
objectives are to be used in connection with those relationships. I  am very 
heartened by the expressions that we have heard from the Minister’s lips — I  leave 
out references to other parts. In the course o f discussions before Report stage, I  
hope that we can sort out this point. I f  not, we shall pursue it. For the moment, I  
beg to leave to withdraw this amendment. "83
81 The nature of a Bill, originating in the House of Lords means that, at the Committee Stage, the debates on 
amendments are unrestricted. Moreover, there is the prospect that an amendment could be re- introduced at the Third 
Reading stage, (provided there has not been a vote on the amendment). The effect of this is that it could frustrate the 
passage of the Act - i f  no agreement is reached between the Government and the House of Lords. The discussions if  
extensive usually mean that the Bill fails to be passed within the requisite parliamentary time frame. The House of 
Lords therefore, exercises a degree of influence over the legislation.
82 Lord Thomas of Gresford HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 12
83 ibid
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2.3.5 The Report Stage of the Legal Services Bill and the Insertion of the Public Interest
as a Regulatory Objective in the Legal Services Bill
On the 16th April 2007, during the Report stage of the Legal Services Bill, Baroness 
Ashton84 moved Amendment No 1 which was:
Clause 1, page 1, line 5, at end insert (the Regulatory Objectives of the Legal Services 
Act)
“Protecting and promoting the public interest”.
The comments that accompanied this amendment are of importance to this thesis. They 
evidence an acceptance by the Government of the modified purpose of the proposed 
legislation and an acceptance of the arguments outlined in the various speeches during 
the debates. Baroness Ashton, on behalf of the Government explained the amendment as 
follows:
“The Government has given very serious consideration to the view expressed by 
noble Lords in Committee that recognition o f the public interest should be given 
greater prominence in the Bill. I  was very persuaded by the views expressed, and 
I  now bring to your Lordship's house this group o f amendments to alter 
provisions in the Bill which deal with the public interest. ” 85
“In Committee, noble Lords felt that there were two principle ways in which we 
could achieve this objective, and I  want to explain why I  have taken the approach 
that I  have. I  resisted the initial thoughts o f the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, who 
sought to add the public interest to the objective o f protecting and promoting the 
consumer interest, which noble Lords will find at Clause 1(1) (c). I  said in 
Committee that I  was concerned that they had the potential to create confusion
84 Baroness Ashton of Upholland HL Deb 16th April 2007, vol 691 col 12
85 ibid
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because, as noble Lords indicated, the consumer interest and the public interest 
may not always coincide. Although we expect to see healthy tension between 
individual objectives, I  want to try to prevent the creation o f tension within each 
objective. Therefore, I  was more attracted to the proposition o f Noble Lord, Lord 
Thomas o f Gresford. He proposed creating a new regulatory objective to protect 
and promote the public interest, which I  felt had the clear advantage o f 
recognising the need to protect and promote the public interest as an important 
objective in its own right. ” 86
The amendment was well received by the Lords. Lord Carlile87 summed up the 
importance to be attributed to the change as follows:
“I  thank the Minister for the important concession made in these amendments. 
The specificity o f the public interest within the statute is, in our view, a matter o f 
considerable importance, and it is o f course o f paramount importance that the 
Government have accepted that. ”88
The Bill, including this amendment was republished on the 8th May 2007.89 The Bill 
appeared with Amendment 1, inserted as the first regulatory objective. The Lords had 
therefore secured an important change which explicitly included the new purpose of the 
legislation being to ‘protect and promote the public interest’. The appearance on its own, 
disconnected from the consumer interest and as the first regulatory objective arguably 
reflects its importance. The explanatory notes to the Legal Services Act 2007 do, 
however, indicate that the regulatory objectives appear in no particular order of 
importance.90
86 Baroness Ashton of Upholland HL Deb 16th April 2007, vol 691 col 12
87 Lord Carlile of Bernew HL Deb 16th April 2007, vol 691 col 12
88 ibid
89 HL Bill 67 06-07 Volume 1<
httr>://wvvw.rmblications.pariiarnent.uk/pa/ld200607/ldbil1s/067/2007067a.pdf>accessed 20 October 2012
90 Explanatory Notes to the Legal Services Act 2007, Part 1, si, (ss 27,28)
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Despite this important change in the regulatory objectives of the Bill, the following 
briefly outlines the introduction of the Bill into the House of Commons. It clearly 
demonstrates that despite the amendment expressly including the public interest, the 
Government’s primary policy focus was still towards the consumer. In policy terms little 
notice appears to have been taken by the Government of the amendment to include the 
new regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’
2.4 THE DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
The Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on the 4th June 2007. Bridget 
Prentice91, the Government Minister charged with the Justice Portfolio, on introducing 
the Bill demonstrated that the Government’s approach to the legislation had not been 
influenced by the insertion of the regulatory objective to ‘protect and promote the public 
interest’. Her speech noted the following. Whilst the following extract is lengthy, it 
evidences a variety of very important points.
“/  am absolutely delighted that, at last, after much debate in the other place, the 
Bill has finally reached this house. It is an especially important Bill because 
above all it puts consumer interests at the heart o f legal services provision. The 
consumer focus, as the volume and nature o f amendments in the other place show, 
was clearly forgotten during the Bill’s long and drawn out six month passage 
there, so I  now look forward to this House reacquainting the bill with its real 
purpose. This is our opportunity to give voice to the needs and aspirations o f 
consumers as opposed to providers o f legal services.
Before I  deal with the Bill, let me pay tribute to Citizens Advice, the Federation o f 
Small Businesses, the National Consumer Council, The Office o f Fair Trading 
and Which? And particularly to the members o f those organisations who have 
worked tirelessly on the Government’s consumer advisory panel to inform and 
shape the Bill and to ensure that it properly reflects the consumer interest. I  am, 
o f course, also grateful to leaders o f the legal profession who have welcomed our
91 Bridget Prentice HC Deb 4 June 2007, vol 461 Col 24.
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agenda for reform and who have engaged with the Government, sometimes very 
constructively, in the development o f the Bill. I  also want to acknowledge the hard 
work and foresight o f Sir David Clementi, whose independent review and report 
in December 2004 set very solidfoundation stones for our proposals.
For too long, regulation o f legal services has focused on the suppliers o f  those 
services at the expense o f the consumer. It has been the consistent message from 
consumers, who have told us loud and clear -  as, indeed Sir David Clementi -  
that their needs are simply not being met. In particular, they told us that they 
were not satisfied with the way that legal services were delivered, as the focus 
was on what suited the provider as opposed to the consumer; that they had lost 
confidence in self -  regulation alone; and that their experience o f poor 
complaints handling had undermined their confidence in the system as a whole.
„92
This speech by Bridget Prentice reaffirms two things, firstly, that the Government, 
despite the insertion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest,’ still exhibited a strong policy orientation towards the consumer. Secondly, it 
further evidences the extent to which the Government had interacted with a variety of 
consumer organisations and the fact that the Government drew very heavily on the 
Consumer Advisory Panel. This speech evidences a fierce political will to keep the 
consumer focus of the legislation. With regards to the rest of the Bill, the Government 
tussled with the Lords over various aspects, beyond the scope of this thesis, ping ponging 
back and forth between the two houses.93
2.5 OTHER REFERENCES TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST
This section highlights instances where the public interest was mentioned beyond its 
specific insertion as a regulatory objective. The purpose of including this section is to 
facilitate the enquiry into what the term ‘public interest’ means in the context of the
92 Bridget Prentice HC Deb 4 June 2007, vol 461 Col 24.
93 Solicitors Journal, ‘Mps and Lords rip into Legal Services Bill for going beyond ‘Clementi” (Solicitors Journal, 25 
July 2006) httn://mvw.solicitorsioumal.corn/node/2970 accessed 27th November 2012;
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regulation of legal services. This section is structured by virtue of the main subjects under 
consideration in the debates.
2.5.1 Funding of the Legal Services Board
Funding of the oversight regulator became a matter for concern during the debates. The 
Lords argued strongly that the cost of this extra tier of regulation should not be borne by 
the professions alone. This question was raised throughout the legislative process, and 
represents one area in which the Government would not give way. The Legal Services 
Board was to be wholly funded by a levy on practitioners. The objection to this idea was 
expressed by Lord Kingsland.94 Three particular speeches are of interest, not because 
they relate to the funding of the Legal Services Board, but for the reason that they refer to 
the public interest. The first speech of interest was made by Lord Borrie, who explicitly 
interpreted the public interest to include the professional standards of lawyers developed 
over many hundreds of years.95 The second speech of interest was made by Lord Hunt 
who, further to his attempt at a definition outlined earlier, explicitly referred to access to 
justice and independence as being in the public interest.96 The third speech of interest was 
made by Baroness Ashton who referred to a range of ‘public interest’ activities 
undertaken by lawyers including - participation in human rights work and law reform 
activities. The references in these speeches to the public interest variously connect it with 
the professional standards of the legal profession, access to justice, human rights and law 
reform work. This evidences the wide sense in which the public interest could be, and 
was, interpreted.
2.5.2 Alternative Business Structures TABS")
As noted in chapter one, the Legal Services Bill sought to facilitate major changes in the 
ownership structures of law firms. The proposals to allow Alternative Business Structures 
were debated at length. Lord Thomas97 noted the serious problems that may arise from
94 Lord Kingsland HL Deb 8 May 2007, vol 691 col 1320.
95 Lord Borrie, HL Deb 8 May 2007 vol 691 col 1323
96 Lord Hunt HL Deb 8 May 2007 vol 691 col 1324.
97 Lord Thomas of Gresford, HL Deb, 6th Feb 2007, vol 689 col 629.
108
legal services being opened up to a market model. Of interest to this thesis is the fact that 
his argument was based on the public interest. Lord Thomas noted:
“I  started my remarks on Second reading by saying that the market has taken 
over and that perhaps that is not a good thing. It does not follow that it is in the 
oublie interest — that driving down cost to the client will produce a better service. 
I f  we put into the balance the fact that solicitors in small towns such as the small 
town in which I  practised — have to make a living and have a reasonable standard 
o f living for all the qualifications that they have obtained and the money that they 
have invested to reach their position, the weakening o f the community service that 
large organisations are likely to bring is undesirable. ” 98
Lord Thomas interprets the public interest to be not only wider than the consumer interest 
as discussed above but also that it was a primary consideration with regard to the tangible 
provision of service. His arguments directly connect the public interest with the supply of 
legal services and their sustainability. Lord Thomas made specific reference to the impact 
that ABS may have on the wider community provision of legal services. He further 
explored these points in the following part of his speech:
"The amendment is to be wholeheartedly supported, because at least it proposes a 
consideration o f the wider community in the authorising o f ABS services. In parts 
o f north and mid Wales that I  know well, i f  the supermarkets, which tend to 
dominate on the outskirts o f towns, take over the profitable parts and leave the 
rest, that will be against the public interest. The public interest is a matter that the 
regulatory body must take into consideration when it comes to ABS. ” 99
From this reference to the public interest Lord Thomas appears to make an important 
connection with the interests of certain communities, beyond individual consumer 
interests. This section has set out a number of instances in which the public interest was
98 Lord Thomas of Gresford, HL Deb, 6th Feb 2007, vol 689 col 629.
99 ibid
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referred to outside the debates that dealt with the public interest as a regulatory objective. 
It demonstrates that the term was used in a number of ways. Underpinning each of them, 
however, was the public interest’s connection with the provision of legal services or other 
activities related to the law. The following address the aims outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter.
2.6 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The first aim of this chapter was to understand how and why the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ came to be included in the Legal Services 
Act 2007 in the form that it did. The omission of the public interest in the Legal Services 
Bill was diagnosed during the pre-legislative scrutiny undertaken by the Joint Committee. 
Observing that the draft Bill was heavily orientated towards the consumer, as well as the 
Government’s strong rhetoric about the purpose of the legislation, the recommendations 
made by the Joint Committee indicated that they thought that this was not appropriate. 
Their suggestion that the public interest should be inserted into the Bill was partially 
acted upon by the Government. The Bill that was first introduced to Parliament included 
reference to the public interest, but in a way that was deemed unsatisfactory. This attempt 
by the Government to integrate the public interest into the Bill attracted significant 
attention and, in part may be responsible for the attention given to the public interest 
throughout the subsequent debates. Many members of the House of Lords were not 
convinced that the integration of the public interest in defined sections of the Bill would 
be sufficient to re-calibrate the purpose of the regulation sufficiently away from the 
consumer. Throughout the debates the majority of speeches articulated the importance of 
the proposed legislation beyond the consumer’s interest. The number of speeches that 
drew attention to the term, and the strength with which the Lords’ points were made, 
forced the Government to reconsider its position. The Government tabled amendments at 
the Report Stage to include the public interest as a regulatory objective on its own. In 
regards to the aim outlined above, the Lords and the Government were in disagreement, 
seriously at times, as to the purpose of this legislation. The public interest was included, 
as a regulatory objective, in part, as an attempt to orientate the Bill away from the 
Government’s clear disposition to the consumer.
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The second aim of this chapter was to understand the legislative intention that 
underpinned the inclusion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest.’ The foregoing provides a number of clues as to the legislative intention 
that underpinned the inclusion of the public interest. The debates in the House of Lords 
provide the backdrop to the term’s inclusion. One passage of Baroness Ashton’s speech 
directly connects the regulatory objectives with the purpose of the legislation.100 This 
might be an obvious point, but nevertheless, it is useful in that it directly locates 
legislative intention. The Government, prior to the inclusion of the regulatory objective, 
had been pursuing a policy which ostensibly focused on the consumer interest. By 
Baroness Ashton referring to the purpose of the regulation in the way that she did, this 
leads to the conclusion that by submitting to the amendment, including the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’, this was a new expression of 
the purpose of the legislation and the intention of the legislature. The focus was to be on 
the regulatory objectives and not just, as appeared from the Government’s rhetoric, the 
consumer. Therefore, the purpose of the regulation, in the context of the regulation of 
legal services, is to protect and promote the public interest, alongside the other regulatory 
objectives. A number of other assertions can be made, in an attempt to understand the 
legislature’s intention. Firstly, the tenor of the speeches suggests that the primary 
motivation for the public interest’s insertion was to act as counterweight to the consumer 
interest. Secondly, the public interest was the regulatory objective that was to be 
considered the most important. This is implicitly recognised by virtue of the 
Government’s arguments against explicitly inserting the public interest in the Bill. If, as 
they argued,101 the public interest was why legislation existed, it is sensible to deduce that 
all actions undertaken in the public interest would be more important than other 
considerations. Whilst this contradicts the guidance provided in the explanatory notes to 
the Act,102 it is the only logical conclusion that can be drawn on this point.
100 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 124
101 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 124
102 Explanatory Notes to the Legal Services Act 2007, Part 1, si, (ss 27,28)
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The third aim of this chapter was to understand further what the public interest means in 
the context of the legislation. The speeches revealed that the public interest was 
considered to be broader than the consumer interest. Lord Hunt drew parallels with the 
national interest and the common good. In essence the conclusion to be derived is that the 
public interest moves beyond individual consumer interests and takes account of more. 
The speeches also reveal that the public interest was largely to be considered in the 
context of legal services. In other words references were always made in connection with 
the performance of legal services, whether this was a reference to their importance in 
terms of the rule of law, access to justice, the economy as a whole, or the perceived 
impression abroad of the legal profession. In all cases, legal services were the 
springboard for consideration of the public interest. The importance of this point is 
considered in later chapters where scholars have defined the public interest in much 
broader terms to include national defence, public health and the natural environment. In 
these instances it is arguable that the connection with legal services is less immediate. 
Beyond this, the speeches revealed a number of things were considered to be in the public 
interest. Lord Thomas103 computed the public interest with integrity, independence, the 
administration of justice, the court, confidentiality, the avoidance of conflict of interests, 
and the ability of lawyers to challenge the various organs of state. In a later speech Lord 
Thomas noted that there was a public interest in a sound supply of legal services that 
were both continuous and sustainable.104 He also noted that protecting and promoting the 
public interest was a lawyer’s primary duty.105 Lord Neil106 echoed the primary focus of 
the public interest being the effective administration of justice. Lord Hunt107 portrayed a 
much wider set of issues, including the commercial and reputation interests of UK pic as 
being in the public interest. Lord Kingsland108 framed his public interest in terms of 
justice and the courts. Lord Borrie109 maintained that the public interest was in the legal 
profession maintaining existing good standards and the status quo. Lord Hunt110 in
103 Lord Thomas of Gresford HL Deb 6th December 2006, Vol 687, Col 1171
104 Lord Thomas of Gresford, HL Deb 6th February 2007, vol 689, col 629
105 Lord Thomas of Gresford, HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 116
106 Lord Neil HL Deb 9th January 2007, Vol 688, Col 119
107 Lord Hunt of Wirral, HL Deb, 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 117-118
108 Lord Kingsland, HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 121-122
109 Lord Borrie, HL Deb 8 May 2007, vol 691, col 1323
110 Lord Hunt of Wirral, HL Deb 8 May 2007, vol 691, col 1324
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another speech aligned the public interest with access to justice. Lord Campbell asserted 
that the public interest involved clients having independent and quality advice. He also 
noted the importance of the standing of the legal profession as seen by other countries in 
the world.111 Baroness Ashton112 noted the public interest in the activities of lawyers 
beyond the service of clients for money. This variety of uses for the term is illuminating 
as it clarifies some of the instances in which the term may be used to construct a vision of 
the public interest in legal services. It also portrays the variety of uses with which the 
term can be deployed. Unifying themes are certainly apparent from these assertions; 
however, the parameters of the public interest are not. It is noteworthy that during the 
debates few questioned the wisdom of the public interest. Those who did not hazard a 
definition implicitly seemed to know what it meant and agreed to its inclusion. 
Definitional opacity aside the public interest was regarded, on the whole, as being more 
important than the consumer interest.
The final aim of this chapter was to understand further the Government’s policy 
underpinning the Legal Services Act 2007. In addressing this point, it was clear from the 
discussion of the events leading to the introduction of the Legal Services Bill in chapter 
one that the Government’s policy was orientated towards the consumer. In this chapter 
this has been confirmed. The speeches by Baroness Ashton and Bridget Prentice leave 
little margin to argue otherwise. The foregoing discussion has provided evidence of the 
very close connection between the Government and a number of consumer organisations. 
The introduction of the Legal Services Bill into the Commons after the insertion of the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ was framed 
exclusively in terms of the consumer. Little substantive reference, in policy terms, was 
made at any point, by the Government of the other regulatory objectives.
This thesis proceeds having drawn the following conclusions. The regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ was inserted as a result of a compromise 
made by the Government, who advocated a strong policy disposition towards the
111 Lord Campbell, HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 119
112 Baroness Ashton, HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 123
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consumer. The principle purpose of the Legal Services Act 2007 is to ‘protect and 
promote the public interest’ in legal services. This means that the interest of the broader 
public in legal services, as opposed to the narrower interest of the consumer of legal 
services, should take precedence in the event that these interests are not aligned. 
Moreover, the public interest has to be actively protected and promoted in connection 
with all the activities of the relevant bodies, as outlined in chapter one. The principle 
motivation behind the insertion of the public interest was to subordinate the interest of the 
consumer to that of the public. The continuing expression by the Government that the 
purpose of the regulation of legal services in the Legal Services Act 2007 was the 
consumer evidences an entrenched belief that survived the insertion of the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’
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CH APTER 3: THE CO NSUM ER INTEREST
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Central to an understanding of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest’ is the ability to define the term ‘public interest.’ This underpins its 
effectiveness and its ability to be pursued alongside the other regulatory objectives in the 
Legal Services Act 2007. As has already been noted in the first chapter and will be 
discussed further in subsequent chapters, the public interest is a notoriously difficult term 
to define and operationalize. For members of the House of Lords, the insertion of the 
public interest represented something of an achievement. From the day the Act came into 
force, however, the public interest became a matter to be understood and operationalized 
by those subject to the legislation. The regulators of legal services have to follow the 
regulatory objectives, and through their operations make decisions, form policies and 
implement regulations. There are 8 regulatory objectives in the Legal Services Act 2007 
that need to be balanced and pursued by the regulators.1 Of these, the regulatory 
objectives which mandate the ‘protecting and promoting the interests of consumers’ and 
the ‘promoting competition in the provision of services’ are backed by methods for 
implementation in policy and decision making. The other regulatory objectives are less 
easy to define or integrate into commonly used policy and decision making processes. 
The risk therefore, is that decisions may come to be orientated towards the consumer and 
the promotion of competition and not towards other purposes underpinning the Legal 
Services Act 2007.
This chapter seeks to address three questions:
1) What is the consumer interest?
2) What are the issues associated with regulating ostensibly in the consumer’s 
interest?
3) For what reasons might the consumer interest come to subordinate other 
regulatory objectives?
1 Explanatory Notes to the Legal Services Act 2007, Part 1, si, (ss 27,28)
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The following concentrates on the consumer interest and demonstrates that whilst it is 
difficult to define conclusively, it has become a term associated with the free market. A 
conception of the consumer interest is integrated into a number of methods of policy and 
decision making commonly utilised by regulators. The following outlines the 
contemporary understanding of the consumer interest. It then sets out a number of 
potential reasons why policies and regulatory actions pursued solely in the consumer 
interest may be problematical. This chapter also examines the prevailing ideology behind 
competition policy in the UK and the way in which the consumer is located within these 
policies. This chapter draws many of the issues associated with the consumer interest and 
competition policy together in an examination of the optical sector. The optical market 
has been singled out as an example by the Government and the Legal Services Board of a 
successful deregulation exercise bringing benefits to consumers. These claims are 
discussed and the limited evidence about the optical market discussed. The composition 
of the optical market is also discussed and it is questioned whether these market 
developments would be appropriate in the legal services market.
There are a number of other regulatory objectives set out in the Act, a further reason for 
understanding the consumer interest at this point is that in other schemes of regulation 
that incorporate a duty to promote the consumer interest, there is both a theoretical 
argument and practical evidence to suggest that it is prioritised above other regulatory 
objectives. This chapter sets out these arguments and draws attention to a number of 
other reasons why regulators may seemingly regulate in the consumers’ interest as 
opposed to a broader range of interests.
The reason this chapter, focusing on the consumer interest, precedes discussion of the 
public interest is as follows. Firstly, it is important to expand on the reasons why 
members of the House of Lords objected to the Government’s focus on the consumer of 
legal services. In doing so, it implicitly maps out an argument for interests beyond the 
consumer interest to be taken account of in regulating the legal services market. 
Secondly, understanding the characteristics of the consumer interest provides a basis 
upon which to further understand the importance of the regulatory objective of
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‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’ Thirdly, by outlining how the consumer 
interest might subordinate other regulatory considerations, it frames the theoretical and 
practical challenges which regulating in the public interest needs to overcome, if, it is to 
fulfil the purpose for which it was included in the Legal Services Act 2007.
3.2 THE CONSUMER INTEREST AND COMPETITION POLICY
3.2.1 Defining the Consumer Interest
This first section attends to the consumer interest, and seeks to frame an understanding of 
the term. The Legal Services Act 2007 in part helps in the search for an understanding of 
the consumer. Of all the terms that appear in the regulatory objectives, the only one that 
is further defined in the Act is ‘consumer.’ Section 207(1) defines consumers as follows:
Legal Services Act 2007, s207 (I)2 ‘consumers’ means persons
(a) who use, have used or are, or may be contemplating using, services within 
(subsection 2)3
(b) who have rights or interests which are derived from, or are otherwise attributable 
to, the use o f such services by other persons, or
(c) who have rights or interests which may be adversely affected by the use o f such 
services by persons acting on their behalf or in a fiduciary capacity in relation to 
them
This definition is broadly constructed, however, adding ‘interest’4 to it, to make 
‘consumer interest,’ presents more of a definitional challenge. Prominent scholars in the 
world of consumer affairs have concluded that the term consumer interest “resists a
2 Legal Services Act 2007, s207 (1)
3 Legal Services Act 2007 s 2(a) “any services provided by a person who is an authorised person in relation to an
activity which is a reserved legal activity, and, (b) any other services provided by a person which consist of or include a
legal activity carried on by, or on behalf of, that person.
4 For the purposes of this thesis, the term interest is not taken to be a sense of feeling or curiosity. Rather it relates to 
something being done, or enacted, or brought about, or maintained. It is a separate question from that of whether an 
individual must be aware of his interest. This approach broadly is an articulation of that commonly adopted in the 
literature pertaining to public interest scholarship. Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic 
Books 1970) 18
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single definition” and is “highly politicised”5 This is an experience borne out by many 
established regulators, who have made concerted efforts to understand what the consumer 
interest is.6 Complex toolkits have been developed in the pursuit of diagnosing the 
consumer interest. Broebeck, has however, noted that the consumer interest can be most 
usefully thought of in terms of “competition, representation, information and redress.”1 
Building on this, the following examines how politics has shaped the consumer interest, 
particularly in regards to competition and neo-liberal approaches to the market.8
3.2.2 New Labour and Consumerism
It was outlined in chapter one, that from 1997 onwards, New Labour embraced a policy 
of consumerism. The consumer played a prominent role in the reforms of public services 
in the UK. This policy was to carry over and continue to influence polices not ostensibly 
concerned with public services. Central to the Labour Government’s widespread reforms 
of public services, which included energy, communications, water and the post, was a 
need to not only introduce changes to the public sector, but also to do it in such a way 
which was ideologically seen to depart from Old Labour and the Conservatives.9 The 
Labour Government narrated the consumer interest as addressing and settling a number 
of political, moral and social problems.10 In addressing these problems the focus on the 
consumer provided a necessary smokescreen for New Labour to continue with a bold 
neo-liberal approach, which largely commenced in the 1980s when the Conservative 
Government privatised many state owned companies. The traditional Labour party was 
not in favour of the privatisation of public services. By placing emphasis on ‘choice’ and 
the ‘consumer’ this provided a convenient rhetorical distinction by which New Labour
5 Stephen Broebeck, ‘Defining the Consumer Interest: Challenges for Advocates’ (2006) 40 The Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 1 p 178
6 Ofcom, ‘Capturing the Consumer Interest: A Report of the Launch of the Toolkit for Regulators and Government’ (2 
February 2006)
<http://www.communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/downloads/Policv/Consumer%201nterestToolkit/Events/Capturing 
%20the%20Consinner%20Interest%20A%20rer>ort%20ofK)20the%20Launch%20etc.ndf >accessed 19 October 2012
7 Stephen Broebeck, ‘Defining the Consumer Interest: Challenges for Advocates’ (2006) 40 The Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 1 p 178
8 For a more in depth treatment of the conceptualisation of the consumer tracing its development before 1997 see Anne 
Brown and Colin Scott, ‘The Citizen’s Charter Programme’ (1992) 55 Modem Law Review 4, 526; Michelle Everson, 
‘Legal Construction of the Consumer’ in Frank Trentmann (ed) The Making o f the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and 
Identity in the Modern World ( BERG, 2005)
9 John Clarke, Janet Newman, and Louise Westmarland, (2007). ‘Creating citizen-consumers? Public service reform 
and (un)willing selves’. In Sabine Maasen and Barbara Sutter eds. On Willing Selves:Neoliberal Politics and the 
Challenge of Neuroscience. (Pal grave Macmillan 2007) pp. 125-145.
10ibid 125-145. 141
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could continue and expand upon previous Conservative Government’s reform plans. In 
some ways the Legal Services Act 2007, can be seen as fulfilling the objectives that the 
Thatcher Government sought to achieve in the late 1980s.11
The narrative of the consumer in the Labour Government’s policies required a subtle 
change in the strict understanding of the term consumer as derived from the term 
consumption.12 Traditionally consumption refers to the practice of making use of, or 
even using up objects. As Clarke et al notes, consumption, and the consumer, under the 
new narrative became equated to market exchange mediated by the cash nexus. This they 
explain meant the consumer became construed as a person (individual) who forms 
choices and realises them through money.13 They argued that this meant that the feature 
of the consumer is thus primarily understood through their act of purchase. As a 
consequence commoditised goods, services or experiences were largely seen as a means 
of consummating needs, wants or desires. In policy discourse therefore, the transition 
firmly connected the citizen with the consumer and the consumer with the market.14
This transition has been further explained by Frank, who argued that “the individuating 
conception o f the empowering or liberating character o f purchase is a core element o f 
market populism.,,1S This has also been argued to be intimately intertwined with the 
emergence of neo-liberalism.16 As a result, the figure of the consumer, as noted, came to 
dominate New Labour’s discourse in a range of policy fields. Clarke et al notes that the 
traditional foci of regulation, including the citizen and public interest were increasingly 
subordinated to the consumer interest.17
11 LCD, The Work and Organisation o f the Legal Profession (Cm 570, 1989); LCD, Conveyancing by Authorised 
Practitioners (Cm 572, 1989); LCD, Contingency Fees (Cm 571, 1989)
12 John Clarke, Janet Newman, and Louise Westmarland, (2007). ‘Creating citizen-consumers? Public service reform 
and (un)willing selves’. In Sabine Maasen and Barbara Sutter eds. On Willing Selves:Neoliberal Politics and the 
Challenge ofNeuroscience.( Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) pp. 125-145. 141
13 ibid 125-145. 141
14 ibid 125-145. 141
15 Thomas Frank 'One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism and the End o f Economic 
Democracy ’ (New York: Anchor Books, 2001) 25
16 Wendy Lamer, ‘Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Govemmentality’ (2000) 63 Studies in Political Economy 5-25
17 John Clarke, Janet Newman, and Louise Westmarland, (2007). ‘Creating citizen-consumers? Public service reform 
and (un)willing selves’. In Sabine Maasen and Barbara Sutter eds. On Willing Selves:Neoliberal Politics and the 
Challenge ofNeuroscience.( Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) pp. 125-145. 127 See also Catherine Needham, 
‘Citizens, Consumers and Beyond: Multiple roles and their definitions in local government’ (Conference Paper 
Citizenship and Consumption: Agency, Norms, Mediations, and Spaces, Cambridge, 30 March 2006)
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In understanding the effects of this period of change, Clarke et al locates the political and 
conceptual move from citizen to consumer, as reflecting a set of much wider distinctions. 
These are outlined in the following passage:
“from the state to the market; from rights to contracts; from the public to the 
private; from collectivism to individualism; from social democratic welfarism to 
neo-liberalism; or from ‘government from a social point o f view’ to advanced 
liberal rule ”18
The Labour Government reinforced some of these distinctions during the heated debates 
between itself and the House of Lords over proposed legislation, which later became the 
Communications Act 2003.19 To clarify the difference between the consumer and the 
citizen, borne out of a series of challenges to the language used in the Communications 
Bill presented to Parliament, the Government provided an explanatory memorandum.20 It 
noted that the consumer interest can be defined as the interest of a purchaser or other user 
of a good or service, normally based on an economic relationship between the individual 
and the supplier of the good or service in question.21 In comparison, the citizen interest 
may be defined as the interest of the individual in his or her capacity as a member of 
society and the public interest as the interest or good of society as a whole.22 In 
connection with the consumer interest, this has led scholars to note: "in a general sense 
one can define consumer interests in the market as related to four market characteristics 
o f price, service, quality and choice. " 23
This characterisation of the consumer, therefore, moves beyond a more general 
understanding of the consumer interest in terms of consumer rights and consumer 
protection. It reflects a more enhanced understanding of the consumer, as an individual 
with preferences and as a prime feature of the market. The Government’s focus on the 
consumer in the Legal Services Bill clearly follows the trend embodied in the public
18 ibid 127
19 Communications Act 2003
20 DTI/DCMS, Note by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department for Culture. Media and Sport on the 
meaning of "Customer", "Consumer" and "Citizen" (June 2002), <http://www.parliament.the-stationerv- 
office.co.uk/pa/it200102/itselect/itcom/169/2070808.htm> (accessed 16 July 2007)
21 ibid
22 ibid
23Eugène Buttigietg, Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest - A Comparative Analysis o f US Antitrust 
Law and EC Competition Law (Wolters Kluwer 2009), p 1.
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sector reforms. This leads therefore to an argument and hypothesis that ‘protecting and 
promoting the consumer interest’ was concerned with ensuring the market mechanism 
worked effectively.24
The market perspective of the consumer interest is arguably of critical importance, as in a 
number of situations the market may not be compatible with other socially desirable 
outcomes.25 The following builds on the understanding of the consumer as a crucial 
component of the market system. It outlines how, through frequently used approaches to 
policy and decision making, focus centres on the consumer as an autonomous individual 
market participant. It then examines the approach of competition law and policy and its 
connection with the consumer.
3.2.3 Market Failure Analysis and the Consumer
Although economic theory does not provide an unequivocal answer to the question how 
regulation should be applied, it does provide a framework that facilitates making choices 
when designing policy and regulation. Market failure is commonly used as the 
intellectual premise upon which many regulators approach regulation.26 It therefore 
provides a valuable lens with which to further view the consumer interest. The use of 
market failure is clearly apparent among many of the regulators created since 1997. The 
F SA27 and the Legal Services Board28 explicitly note that they use this approach in the 
process of decision making regarding policy and regulation. There is evidence that other
24 There is clear evidence of this assertion in the following speeches by senior members of the Legal Services Board. 
Chris Kenny, ‘Alternative business structures and the legal services market -  impact one year on and future challenges’ 
(Speech at the Westminster Legal policy Forum, 18th October 2012); David Edmonds, ‘Quality and Standards in a 
Liberalised Market’ (Address by the Chairman of the Legal Services Board, Russell Cooke Forum, 10 May 2012)
25 For an outline account see Stephen Mayson, ‘Legal Services Regulation and ‘The Public Interest” (Legal Services 
Institute, July 2011); for a more developed account Mike Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (OUP, 2004), 
Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest (Georgetown University Press 2007); Deborah Satz, Why Some 
Things Should Not be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets (OUP 2010)
26 Harry McVea ‘Financial Services Regulation Under The Financial Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market 
Failure Thesis’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 2,413.
27 National Audit Office, ‘Effective inspection and enforcement: implementing the Hampton vision in the Financial 
Services Authority’ (NAO, 2008) <http://www.nao.org.uk/Dub1ications/0708/hampton financial services au.asnx> 
accessed 20 October 2012
Harry McVea ‘Financial Services Regulation Under The Financial Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market 
Failure Thesis’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 2,413.
28 Alex Roy, Understanding the Economic Rationale for Legal Services Regulation (Legal Services Board, 2011)
<httD://w w w .lega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest new s/pdf/econom ics o f  legal services regulation di
scussion papers publication final.pdf> accessed 20th October 2012
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regulators, including Ofcom29 commonly use this method, though they do not appear to 
have explicitly stated so, in the same way as the FSA and the Legal Services Board.30 The 
Government’s Green Book31 also mandates market failure analysis and cost benefit 
analysis as the principal rationale for government intervention regarding the operation of 
markets and institutions.32 The following outlines the theory, and then considers it as a 
tool for policy and decision making.
3.2.4 Market Failure Theory
The market failure theory is a consumer orientated theory of regulation,33 rooted in the 
idea that market forces are the best means of ensuring that consumers’ needs are met. 
Underlying the theory is the assumption that consumer preferences are more likely to be 
satisfied when firms engage in fierce and constant competition with each other. In the 
situation of a perfect market,34 the market is said to generate benefits for consumers in 
terms of price, innovation, quality, and variety of service (choice). These outcomes are 
only true under conditions of perfect competition.35 Given that markets are seldom 
perfect and suffer from a variety of deficiencies, regulation is justified when it aims to 
eliminate market failures and so restore a competitive equilibrium. The justifications for 
regulation under the market failure thesis are limited to instances of information 
asymmetries; externalities; anti-competitive practices and public goods.36 The economic 
justification for the market failure approach is that through market based transactions 
enshrined in the idea of mutually beneficial, voluntary exchanges -  consumer preferences 
are best satisfied and scarce resources are shifted to where they are most valued on the
29 For an overall account of the market failure approach taken by Ofcom see Tony Prosser, ‘Regulation and Social 
Solidarity’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 3 364-87, 367 369
30 Alex Roy, Understanding the Economic Rationale for Legal Services Regulation (Legal Services Board, 2011) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/economics of legal services regulation di 
scussion papers publication final.pdf> accessed 20th October 2012
31 HM Treasury, The Green Book Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (HMSO, 2003) 52
32 HM Treasury, The Green Book Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (HMSO, 2003) 52
33 Harry McVea ‘Financial Services Regulation under The Financial Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market 
Failure Thesis’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 2,413.
34 ibid
35 Perfect competition presupposes: clearly defined property rights, non- natural monopolies; no barriers to entry; no 
transaction costs.
36 Frank Stephen, ‘The Market Failure Justification for the Regulation of Professional Services Markets and the 
Characteristics of Consumers’ in Claus Dieter Ehlerman and Isabela Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 
2004: The Relationship between Competition Law and (Liberal) Professions (Hart Publishing, 2004)
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basis of willingness to pay otherwise known as “allocative efficiency.”37 Market failure 
establishes, however, only a prima facie case for regulation, and in some instances the 
costs of regulation may outweigh any benefits. Market failure analysis is therefore often 
accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis.38 The consumer interest is, through this 
approach, essentially a by-product of the process of the market operating properly. The 
market, free of regulation, yields benefits in the consumer’s interest in terms of lower 
prices, more innovative services, better choice of services and better quality. However, 
within what is a relatively simple hypothesis, the consumer is construed narrowly. The 
following outlines some broad problems associated with the approach.
3.2.5 The Problems with Market Failure and its Conception of the Consumer 
The market failure theory is, by definition, rooted in the theory of private value and is 
driven by a concern for pricing efficiency.39 The narrowness of the approach has led to a 
number of studies which have shown that market failure negates broader public values, 
beyond the economic, and especially outcomes where the technical efficiency of prices is 
not a primary consideration.40 Bozeman41 notes that the pervasiveness of market failure 
reasoning ensures a built in conservatism in public policy which often results in the 
neglect of public values. This is because the model marginalises many collective values 
by simply not dealing with them. This raises an important point. The market, by 
definition, is concerned with individual values; it is not concerned with collective values 
which may be important to the whole of society. This is significant in matters to do with 
the law, the environment and culture. In regards to law, concepts such as the rule of law, 
access and administration of justice, honesty and dignity, duties to the court, reputation, 
sustainability, independence and ethics are not easily translated into values that can be
37 ibid
38 HM Treasury, The Green Book Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (HMSO 2003) 52 ; Harry McVea 
‘Financial Services Regulation under The Financial Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market Failure Thesis’ 
(2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 2,413.
39 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest (Georgetown University Press, 2007) 5
40Richard Zerbe & Howard McCurdy ‘The Failure of Market Failure’ (1999) 18 Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 4, 558-78 The comprehensive critique analyses Lighthouses, Land Tenancy, Bees and Crops, Common 
Property, concluding that in each of these cases the theoretical proposition put forward by Market Failure when tested 
empirically was incorrect. The authors suggest that the correct normative theory rests on transaction costs, which is 
inherently based on significant empirical enquiry.
41 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest -  Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 20
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expressed in monetary terms. The market failure model and the consumer are therefore 
just concerned with the market. It is not concerned with other factors which may be of 
importance. Market failure, is, as Sagoff argues, a perfectly appropriate measure of the 
consumer’s interest.42 Interests can accurately be assessed in terms of price, which 
reveals what individuals are willing to pay to obtain what they want.43 He posits that the 
model deals with the efficiency of markets and how one knows that markets are not 
efficient. It is not, he asserts, about people and social institutions.44
Despite these problems, market failure is widely used by policy makers and regulators. 
Decker and Yarrow have commented on the unreflective use of market failure analysis 
and concluded that analysts tend to jump straight from a finding of ‘market failure’ to a 
conclusion that intervention is not just potentially warranted, rather, they omit further 
investigation and assert that intervention is actually warranted.45 Beyond, this, there are a 
number of more subtle problems with the way in which the model constructs the 
preferences the market seeks to promote. The following sets these out.
3.2.6 Issues Associated with Market Failure Analysis Based on Consumer Preferences. 
The traditional view of the free market is a presumption that what justifies regulation is 
market failure, or more specifically the failure of the market by itself to achieve 
efficiency.46 The purpose of regulation under this model is to restore the market to its 
natural condition, or as close an approximation of that condition as can be hoped for.47 
Efficiency in this context has been explained by Posner as follows: “Efficiency is a 
technical term: it means exploiting economic resources in such a way that human 
satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and 
services is maximised”4* Whilst, as noted, this approach is good at understanding the
42 Mark Sagoff, ‘Economic Theory and Environmental Law’ (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 1393
43 ibid
44 Peter Brown, ‘The Failure of Market Failures’ (1992) 21 Journal of Socio Economics 1,1-24 argues that it is 
premised on shallow utilitarianism and as such is a prisoner to its foundations in economic individualism
45 Christopher Decker & George Y arrow, Understanding the Economic Rationale for Legal Services Regulation (Legal 
Services Board, 2010) 12
46 Edward Rubin, ‘Deregulation, Reregulation, and the Myth of the Market’ (1988) 45 Washington and Lee Law 
Review 1249,1258
47 ibid
48 Richard Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 2, 335
124
consumer’s interest, a number of scholars have queried whether the consumer interest is 
worth satisfying. Notably, Sagoff has argued: “an efficiency criterion assumes that the 
goals o f our society are contained in the preferences individuals reveal or would reveal 
in markets”*9 These individual preferences are not fixed,50 are subjective51 and reflect a 
number of cultural and maybe societal conditions.52 Further to this, these individual 
preferences are capable of changing. Were they not, there would be no place in the world 
for advertising, salespeople and consumer psychologists. Moreover, the theory works on 
the premise that autonomously created, materially defined self-interests do exist, and it is 
the collective expression of these interests through market purchases which leads to 
optimal resource allocation.53 A critical argument flows from this that a preference 
satisfying policy will only be as good as the preferences as understood, and there is 
nothing that guarantees that the preferences will be the right ones, or ones worth having.54 
Many examples abound to explain this point. Sagoff, frames the key issue as follows:
“As consumers, indeed, we buy the least expensive goods, and in that way reveal 
a preference for lower worker safety standards, since they bring lower prices with 
them. Yet as citizens we may regard ourselves as Americans together and 
therefore responsible for the decency o f workplace conditions. Likewise many o f 
us who never visit a magnificent landscape may believe nevertheless that society 
has a duty to preserve it. Concerns such as these impersonal values rather than 
consumer preferences may become more important to us than our personal or 
economic interest.”55
49 Mark Sagoff, ‘At the shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or why Political Questions are not all Economic’ (1981) 23 
Arizona Law Review 1283.
50 Jane Barron and Jeffrey Dunoff ‘Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal 
Theory’ (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 431 and Mark Sagoff‘On Preserving the natural environment (1974) 84 Yale 
Law Journal 205, 207.
51 Stephen Broebeck, ‘Defining the Consumer Interest: Challenges for Advocates’ (2006) 40 The Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 1 p 178
52 Edward Rubin, ‘Deregulation, Reregulation, and the Myth of the Market’ (1988) 45 Washington and Lee Law 
Review, 1249,1267
53 Harry McVea ‘Financial Services Regulation Under The Financial Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market 
Failure Thesis’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 2,413.441
54 Mark Sagoff, ‘The Principles of Federal Pollution Control (1986) 71 Minn. L.Rev. 19, 58.
55 Mark Sagoff, ‘Values and Preferences’ (1986) 96 Ethics 2,311.
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In the context of legal services, Stempel makes a similar point but builds on it by noting 
the importance of considering collective values in addition to individual consumer values 
in the context of the law.
"As a consumer, I  am a participant in markets. My aim is to enhance my own 
well-being, by satisfying my preferences, which I  express through market 
behaviour. As a citizen, my concern is different. It is a concern not with what is 
best for me but with what is right for us. My aim is to participate in deliberation 
with my fellows, and I  consider not only my preferences but my (and our) values 
as well. Frequently, my consumer preferences coincide with the values I  support 
as a citizen; sometimes, however, they do not. Because our aims as consumers 
and citizens are somewhat schizophrenic, public and private life both require a 
never-ending negotiation between consumer values and citizen values. ” 56
The focus on consumer preferences alone is not desirable. McVea57 argues that consumer 
preferences “tells us nothing about, indeed, it seems unconcerned with whether —those 
preferences are worth having. ”58 This is not an isolated assertion. Sagoff suggests that it 
cannot be argued that the satisfaction of preferences is a good thing in itself for many 
preferences are sadistic, envious, racist or unjust.59 Furthermore, in the context of 
preferences, McVea has noted that markets also pander to particular types of preferences 
(more is better than enough) and tend to systematically favour the lowest common- 
denominator amongst the spectrum of consumer preferences.50 What emerges from the 
foregoing is that one of the main methods of regulators decision making is largely 
predicated on both a narrow conception of the consumer interest, and secondly, is 
compromised in considering collective interests that may affect society as a whole. The
56 Jeffrey Stempel ‘Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for Conceptualising and Regulating 
the Legal Profession’, (1999) 27 Florida State University Law Review 120
57 Harry McVea ‘Financial Services Regulation Under The Financial Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market 
Failure Thesis’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 2,413.
58Harry McVea ‘Financial Services Regulation Under The Financial Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market 
Failure Thesis’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 2,413; Jane Barron and Jeffrey Dunoff ‘Against Market Rationality: 
Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory’ (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 431 ; Mark Sagoff‘On 
Preserving the natural environment (1974) 84 Yale Law Journal 205,207, and Mark Sagoff, ‘Values and Preferences’ 
(1986) 96 Ethics 301-302.
59 Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law (1986) 71 Minn. L. Rev. 19 58
60 Harry McVea ‘Financial Services Regulation Under The Financial Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market 
Failure Thesis’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 2,413.
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market model is concerned with the market. There is little in the model which can discern 
when the consumer interest is compatible with the public interest, or when it is not. The 
market model pursues the market vision, irrespective of whether this is in the collective 
public interest or not. This raises a number of questions as to whether this is an 
appropriate method of approaching the regulation of legal services. The key point to be 
taken from the foregoing is that the consumer interest is a prominent feature of this 
model. It is a conception of the consumer interest bom out of the free market. The 
following considers the connected concept of competition. It is both intimately connected 
with market failure theory, but, as the following illustrates, the consumer is also, 
rhetorically at least, the focus of much competition policy.
3.2.7 Competition Law and Policy
Competition law is aimed in part at remedying market failure. Modem competition law 
usually seeks to protect the process of free market competition in order to ensure the 
efficient allocation of scare economic resources. It is commonly believed that the pursuit 
of this objective helps to ensure that allocative and productive efficiency is maximised; 
and that these productive efficiencies ultimately mean lower prices, better products, 
wider choice and greater efficiency than would be obtained under the conditions of 
monopoly.61 In connection with competition policy the consumer interest appears to be 
receiving ever greater attention in the UK.62 The connection is saliently outlined by John 
Vickers, Chairman of the Office of Fair Trading
"Competition is increasingly being recognised as a core consumer 
issue... Competition policy and consumer interest should, and indeed, must be 
seen as inextricably linked and interdependent. " 63
61 Phillip Marsden, Peter Whelan, ‘’’Consumer Detriment” and its application in EC and UK Competition Law’ (2006) 
10 European Competition Law Review 569
62OFT, ‘Consumer Detriment under conditions of imperfect information’, (OFT Research Paper 11,1997) 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/repoits/consumer protection/oft 194.pdf> accessed 21 June 2012 ; John Hunter, 
Christos loannids, Elisabetta lossa, and Len Skerrat, ‘Measuring consumer detriment under conditions of imperfect 
information’ (March 2001) <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/renorts/consumer orotection/oft354.ndf > accessed 3 
October 2012; John Vickers, ‘Competition is for Consumers’ (OFT, Speech to the Social Market Foundation, 21st 
February 2002) <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0102.pdf accessed> 21 May 2012; Vincent Smith, 
‘Protecting the consumer : enforcing competition and consumer law’ (OFT,Speech to the Law Society's European 
Group 11 July 2006) <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/sneeches/0506.pdf> accessed 13 June 2012
63 John Vickers, ‘Healthy Competition and Its Consumer Wins’ (2002) 12 CPR 142.
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The OFT's Guidelines regarding market studies64 explicitly refers to the consumer as the 
key focus of its investigations.
"The OFT seeks to make markets work well for consumers by promoting and 
protecting consumer interests throughout the United Kingdom. "65
"When Markets do not work, consumers are adversely affected; competition by 
contrast helps to ensure innovation, diversity o f offerings and improvements in 
price and quality o f customer service. ” 66
This clear connection between the consumer and competition, when read in light of the 
regulatory objectives of the Legal Services Act 2007, leads to an argument that the 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the interest of consumers’ is galvanised. These 
two regulatory objectives tip the broader regulatory mission of the Legal Services Act 
2007 towards markets and efficiency. With the exception of the public interest, to which 
arguably all the other regulatory objectives should contribute, no other regulatory 
objective is either complemented or orientated, in the same way. That is to say they each 
pursue a different objective whereas the competition and consumer interests are 
complementary. Despite the rhetorical connection between competition and the consumer 
interest, outlined above, a number of other observations can be made in connection with 
how the ‘consumer’ is placed ideologically within competition law.
3.2.8 The Purpose of Competition Law
The first concern, having noted that competition law is connected to the consumer, is to 
further explain the ideology of competition law. In short there are a variety of ideas about 
what competition should do.67 There are arguments that the process of competition
64 Market studies involve an analysis of a particular market or practices across a range of goods and services with the 
aim of identifying and addressing any aspect of market failure from competition issues to consumer detriment and the 
effect of government regulations. These differ from market investigations, which usually follows a market studies.
65 OFT, Market Studies, Guidance on the OFT approach (OFT 2010). Para 1.1
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/business leaflets/enterprise act/oft519.pdf > accessed 23 October 2012
66 OFT, Market Studies, Guidance on the OFT approach (OFT 2010). Para 1.1
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/business leaflets/enterprise act/oft519.pdP> accessed 23 October 2012
67 Mark Furse, Competition Law of the EC and UK (OUP 2006) 11 ; Rex Ahdar, ‘Consumers, redistribution of income 
and the purpose of competition law’ (2002) 23 European Competition Law Review 7 (341)
128
should protect suppliers.68 Other arguments suggest that the primary focus should be 
towards rendering benefits for consumers.69 Other schools of thought argue that it is the 
process of competition that should be the main aim.70 The connection underpinning all of 
these approaches is that the competitive process will, at least, as a by-product 
theoretically yield some sort of consumer benefits.71
Arguments have been made that the essential purpose of competition law should be to 
protect the interest of consumers and not protect the competitive process itself. Richard 
Whish has made this point on a number of occasions.72 However, testing this hypothesis, 
Marsden and Whelan73 found that both case law and legislative provisions referring to the 
consumer, beyond the consumer welfare standard (mere efficiency of the market), were 
conspicuously scarce. Therefore, despite clear arguments that competition should be 
orientated towards delivering consumer benefits, the number of policies where this can be 
clearly extrapolated is limited. Instead, the general ideology of competition appears to be 
contested resulting in variously differing competition policies being adopted by 
competition authorities and courts.74 Arguably, the prevailing objective of competition 
law, though there are many views on this, as outlined, is to maximise consumer welfare.75 
This term has been broadly argued to be a misleading euphemism for efficiency.76 
Considerations which go further to achieve objectives beyond efficiency, namely social 
values or more commonly termed ‘non-economic values’ are conspicuously scarce in 
both the UK and European Union. The prevailing argument in connection with the aims 
of competition law, made by competition authorities, is that by protecting the competitive 
process it is presumed that this will bring benefits to the consumer.77 Papers written by
68 Mark Furse, Competition Law of the EC and UK (OUP 2006) 11
69 Richard Whish, Competition Law (5th ed, OUP, 2005)3-4
70 Bellamy and Child, European Community Law of Competition (Sweet and Maxwell 2001) p39-40; Claus Dieter 
Ehlermann ‘European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competitive Policy (Hart 1998)
71 Richard Whish, Competition Law (5th ed OUP, 2005) 19
72 ibid 18
73 Phillip Marsden, Peter Whelan, "’Consumer Detriment” and its application in EC and UK Competition Law’ (2006) 
10 European Competition Law Review 569
74 Richard Whish, Competition Law (5th ed, OUP 2005) 18
75 ibid
76 Barak Orbach, ‘The Antitrust consumer welfare paradox’ (2011)7 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 560
77 ibid 599
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Lavrijssen78 and Orbach79 question the extent to which competition law can 
accommodate anything other than the pursuit of efficiency. This situation has prompted 
other scholars to assert that the pursuit of efficiency through competition may hurt 
consumers and reduce total welfare.80
Whether competition polices pursued by the UK competition authorities are good for 
consumers’ raises a number of questions. Questions have been certainly raised in 
connection with competition in the transport market81 and more recently the supply of 
Gas82 and Electricity in the UK.83 The market for Gas is supplied by 6 large companies. 
Some have suggested that the market is not particularly competitive or yielding benefits 
for the consumer.84 So whilst the broad argument is that competition law should improve 
efficiency, which should in turn derive benefits for the consumer, it is by no means 
certain that consumer will benefit.83 What is clear is that competition authorities have 
framed policies in terms of the consumer. This is important as, formulaically the 
consumer is contextualised within the micro economic analysis that is commonly 
undertaken in policy decisions.86 In reality the effect of competition may not necessarily 
deliver these consumer benefits. Drawing on the connection between competition and
78 Saskia Lavrijssen, ‘What role for national competition authorities in protecting non-competition interests after 
Lisbon?’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 5 636-659.
79 Barak Orbach, ‘The Antitrust consumer welfare paradox’ (2011) 7 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (1)
80 ibid ; Rhonda Smith and Stephen King, ‘Does competition law adequately protect consumers?’ (2007) 28 European 
Competition Law Review 7 ,p 412
81 Corrinne Mulley, Can Quality and Deregulation go Hand in Hand? (2009) Journeys 14-22 
<http://www.Itaacademv.gov.sg/doc/J09Nov-pl4MuHev DeregulatedBus.pdf> accessed 12th November 2012
82 Terry Macalister, ‘Gas Prices: FSA examines whistle-blower’s claim of Libor-like’ manipulation’ (The Guardian, 
13th November 2012)
83 OFGEM, Retail Markets review (OFGEM, 2012)
<httD://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/rmr/Pages/rmr.aspx> accessed 12th November 2012; Rhonda Smith and 
Stephen King, ‘Does competition law adequately protect consumers?’ (2007) 28 European Competition Law Review 7 
,p 412; Louise Sylvan, ‘Activating Competition: The Consumer-Competition Interface’ (2004) 12 Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 191, p 192
84 OFGEM, Retail Markets review (OFGEM, 2012)
<http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/rmr/Pages/nnr.aspx> accessed 12th November 2012
85 Eric Bonneville and Anne Rialhe, ‘Impact of Liberalisation of the Electricity Market on Energy Efficiency, Quality 
of Supply and Environmental Performance’(Discussion Paper, Leonardo ENERGY September 2005) 
http://www.leonardo-energv.org/repositorv/Librarv/Papers/Impacts%20of%201iberalization%20on%20EE.pdf> 
accessed 12 November 2012; Catherine Mitchell, Bridget Woodham, ‘Regulation and Sustainable Energy Systems’ in 
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge eds The Oxford Handbook o f Regulation (OUP, 2010); Kati Cseres 
‘What has Competition Done for Consumers in Liberalised Markets’ (2008) 4 The Competition Law Review 2, 77; 
Catherine Waddams Price, ‘The effect of Liberalising UK Retail Energy Markets on Consumers’ (2005) 21 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 128-144
86 Evidence of this is to be found in the OFT report into the Professions, and indeed the LECG Report: LECG, 
Restrictions on Competition in the Provision of Professional Services (OFT 328 2001); OFT, Competition in 
Professions (OFT328, 2001)
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consumers, the following examines the fact that the process of competition may deliver 
short term benefits, but that these may sometimes be short-lived.
3.2.9 Competition Law and Short Term Consumer Benefits
The following outlines a paradoxical effect of competition law. Richard Whish has made 
the following argument:
"The obsession with protecting the consumer can also be considered short-sighted 
since, in the longer run, the producer might choose to abandon the market 
altogether rather than comply with an unreasonable competition law; short term 
benefits will then be outweighed by long-term harm to consumer welfare. ”87
This assertion is particularly poignant in the case of legal services. As a result of 
sustained changes in the legal services market, and the likelihood of increased 
competition, an ever increasing number of small law firms have already closed.88 A 
parallel can be made with the commonly cited example of supermarkets.89 Most high 
streets in the UK have seen a decrease in the number of smaller providers of groceries.90 
Whether this is in either the consumer or the public’s interest remains a moot point. 
However, it provides the basis for further elaborating on the prevailing ideology behind 
competition law. The intellectual approach to competition law appears to be centered on 
the Chicago approach.91 Of particular interest is its clear focus on efficiency. This 
philosophy permeates both the United States and European Union’s approaches to 
competition law.92 In considering efficiency, little attention is paid to the composition of
87 Richard Whish, Competition Law (OUP 5th ed, 2005) p 3 citing Bork, In the Antitrust Paradox (The Free Press 
1993).
88 Siobhain Butterwort, ‘High street law firms feeling the chill’ (The Guardian 9London, 20 August 2010); Legal 
Futures, ‘Going it alone in the new legal world “is simply a drawn out closing down’” (Legal Futures, 14 October 
2011) <http://www.legalfiitures.co.uk/pTactice-points/marketing-pr/going-it-alone-in-the-new-legal-world- 
%E2%80%9Cis-simplv-a-drawn-out-closing-down%E2%80%9D> accessed 23 October 2012.
89 Antony Seely, ‘Supermarkets: Competition inquiries into the groceries market’ (House of Commons Standard Note, 
SN03653,2 August 2012) <www.parliament.uk/briefing-Daners/SN03653.ndf>: Competition Commission, ‘The 
Supply of Groceries in the UK Market Investigation, ( Competition Commission, 30th April 2008) < 
http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocerv/index.htm>
90 Competition Commission, ‘The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market Investigation, ( Competition Commission, 
30th April 2008) <http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/iMouiries/ref2OO6/grocerv/index.htm>
91 Okeoghene Odudu, ‘The Wider Concerns of Competition Law’ (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3 599-613
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the market so long as a dominant position is not abused. Advocates of the Chicago theory 
are not interested in the market composition, or indeed broader factors connected with 
social welfare and ‘non-economic concerns.’93 The result of competition intervention is 
that undertakings, in some markets, in an attempt to become more competitive, merge or 
consolidate to get bigger. The benefit of size is that various economies of scale can be 
employed to make the costs of goods and services cheaper. As with supermarkets the 
economies of scale and the size of the undertaking can become considerable. The banking 
sector and energy markets, illustrate that this may present a problem. In the banking 
sector, following a number of consolidations between banks a particularly vexing 
question has emerged.94 Policy makers are now faced with trying to determine whether 
competitive forces are positively impacting on bank’s performance and efficiency or does 
the current market composition pose a threat to competition in this sector?95 Recent 
studies reveal that there have been decreases in bank efficiency.96 This could be due to 
excessive competition between a small number of undertakings or a signal that they are 
exploiting increased market power. At present no one knows which one is the case. The 
problem is further magnified, in certain cases, when a major undertaking disappears from 
the market. In the case of legal services this could prove to have serious consequences. 
Recent reports suggest that the market for Personal Injury litigation will, within a short 
period of time, be dominated by 5-6 major firms acting for claimants.97 A similar forecast 
has been made, in general, for the conveyancing market.98 The ramifications for access 
to justice and indeed both the consumer interest and public interest in this particular case 
remain to be seen. The paucity of research on the subject of Alternative Business 
Structures in the legal profession remains a serious issue. For present purposes, it remains 
an ever increasingly observed side effect of competition that markets become
93 ibid
94 Barbara Casu, Claudia Girardone, ‘Does Competition Lead to Efficiency? The Case of EU Commercial Banks’
(Cass Business School, Working Papers WP 01/09)< htto:/A\ww3.imperial.ac.uk/ols/nortallive/docs/l /48187697.PDF>
95 ibid
96 ibid
97 Legal Futures, ‘The future of the PI; external investment; few CMCs and five or six major claimant firms’ (Legal 
Futures, 10 October 2012) <http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/the-future-pi-extemal-investment-few-cncs-five- 
six-maior-claimant-firms> accessed 20 October 2012
98 Legal Futures, ‘Unsustainable pricing means most conveyancing firms are “bust”, says leading entrepreneur’ (Legal 
Futures, 20 November 2012) http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/unsustainable-pricing-means-convevancing- 
finns-bust-savs-leading-enterpreneur accessed 28 November 2012
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Consolidated, and the benefits to consumers sometimes become questionable." Whilst the 
short term effects of competition may be felt, the longer term effects may be less clear 
cut. A central point therefore emanates from these objections to competition law which, 
in one way or another, seek to promote the consumer interest. Arguably, in some 
instances they neither improve the lot of the consumer or promote and protect the wider 
public interest.100 The following seeks to outline further a series of other broader 
objections to the focus on the consumer interest and competition in legal services.
3.2.10 Issues Associated with the Consumer Interest and Competition 
Beyond the issues raised in the foregoing section, the following draws on scholars who 
have noted issues regarding consumerism, competition and the legal profession. These 
issues can be explained as potential perverse incentives that are created as a result of 
competition. Alice Wooley101 has argued that the constant consumer emphasis in the 
regulatory structure of England and Wales may undermine its ability to provide strong 
ethical frameworks defining the parameters within which lawyers operate within the law. 
Rather, she notes, the incentive structure is creating implicit and explicit pressure on 
lawyers to focus solely on the satisfaction of client interests. Wooley, along with others, 
are of the view that this is inconsistent with two of the normative principles that 
regulation must achieve: ensuring that lawyers stay within the bounds of legality in 
representing clients, and reducing pressure on lawyers to exceed those boundaries.102 
This point has been reiterated by Judge Spigelman who notes:
"There is no doubt that the application o f competition principles is capable o f 
undermining the performance o f such duties, not least by giving salience, indeed 
dominance, to the interests o f clients considered only as consumers. ” 103
99 Rhonda Smith and Stephen King, ‘Does competition law adequately protect consumers?’ (2007) 28 European 
Competition Law Review 7 p 412
100 Pascoe Pleasance, Sarah Maclean, ‘The Public Interest’ (Legal Aid Board Research Unit, 1998)
101 Alice Woolley, ‘Rhetoric and Realities: What Independence of the bar requires of lawyer regulation’ (University of 
Calgary SPP Research Papers 4/8,1 June 2011) < http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=l 920921> 
accessed 19 November 2011 42
102 ibid
103 James Spigelman ‘Are Lawyers Lemons? Competition Principles and Professional Regulation’ (2003) 77 Australian 
Law Journal 44
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Lord Neuberger, in a speech titled ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ 
made a robust argument for the contextualisation of the consumer interest, in light of the 
public interest. He noted
“The rule o f law would be little more than a phrase for idle moments, i f  lawyers, 
in the interest o f consumers - acted as i f  anything goes. The rule o f law is a rule o f  
integrity. It supports the foundations o f our society, without which reference to the 
consumer interest would be utterly empty o f content and meaning. "104
Lord Neuberger drew on a speech by the Chairman of the Legal Services Board, where 
David Edmonds outlined the benefits of Alternative Business Structures as follows “ABS 
free up the existing players to innovate, to create new partnerships and to be free to act 
in a less restrained way”. Lord Neuberger then went on to make some balanced 
comments that this meant a sensible set of changes to the way in which the legal 
profession structured itself. However, drawing on the Chairman’s comments of “act in a 
less restrained way” he argued that this might mean lawyers would take the consumer 
interest literally and be pressured into acting in ways that were not compatible with the 
interests of justice. He cited the idea that lawyers might become minded to coach 
witnesses or their clients in order to assist them in securing a favourable judgement. 
Moreover, he posited that it might mean lawyers could avoid drawing precedents 
unfavourable to their client’s case to the attention of their opponent and the court. Such 
conduct he asserts would be in the immediate client’s interest. His conclusion on these 
matters was as follows:
“The irony is that an unreflective commitment to the consumer interest, i f  it is 
simplistically equated with securing the lowest possible cost for the provision o f 
legal services, is that it would engender the opposite. And that is in no one’s 
interest. ”105
104 David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ (Speech by Lord Neuberger Master of the 
Rolls 25th Annual Bar Conference 6 November 2010)
105 David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ (Speech by Lord Neuberger Master of the 
Rolls 25th Annual Bar Conference 6 November 2010)
134
The comments made by Lord Neuberger were skilfully avoided by David Edmonds in a 
speech he made in reply in 2012.106 Rather than address the points raised, he extolled the 
benefits of liberalisation, the profound benefits that an enlivened competitive 
environment could bring. Moreover, he re-affirmed a strong commitment to the market, 
and its ability to deliver social and economic benefits. He also asserted that he wanted the 
legal profession to embrace modem business ethics alongside those of the legal 
profession.107 The point to be taken from the assertions made by Wolley, Neuberger, and 
Spieglman is that the environment in which law is practised deserves special attention. 
They each allude to competition creating incentives to behave in a particular way which 
is not compatible with the wider interests of the legal system. These issues were 
consistently side-lined in the developments that led to the Legal Services Act 2007, and
3.2.11 Interest Group Capture
This section draws attention to one final potential issue associated with the consumer 
interest. Much of the scholarship on the legal profession over the last 30 years has 
reflected the changing social dynamic referred to in the first chapter of this thesis as the 
‘new moral economy’. A discourse emerged challenging the legal professions perceived 
monopoly over legal services,109 and many questioned self-regulation.110 Some even
106 David Edmonds, ‘Quality and Standards in a Liberalised Market’ (Address by Chairman, Legal Services Board, 10 
May 2012) <http://www.1eaalservicesboard.ora.uk/news publications/speeches presentations/2012/20120510-david- 
edmonds-ntssell cooke speech.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012
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July 30th 2012)
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800; Richard Moorhead, ‘Self Regulation and the market for legal services,’ online: (2004) Cardiff Centre for Ethics, 
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Regulatable?’ (2007-2008) 45 Alta. L. Rev. 233; Alice Wolley, ‘Re-Envisioning Regulation: “Canadian Lawyers in 
the 21st Century’ (2008) 45Alberta Law Review, 5,5 -  14; P Andrews, ‘Self Regulation by Professions -  The Approach 
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characterised the professions as a conspiritational cartel,111 and viewed the self-regulating 
professions and the Government, who delegated the professions’ powers, as a classic 
example of regulatory capture112 and a validation of private interest theories of 
regulation.113 The general approach of private interest theories, encompassing elements of 
‘Chicago, Private Interest, Public Choice, Special Interest and Capture’,114 is that where 
either the legislature or an administrative regulator charged with regulating in the public 
interest, instead, advances the interests of the profession or sector that it is charged with 
regulating.115 Each of these theories ascribes a different motivation or theoretical 
interpretation of how regulation is not orientated towards the public interest.
In a similar vein, interest group theorists see regulatory developments as the product of 
relationships between different groups and the state or regulator. Olson’s theory,116 in 
particular, predicts that producer groups are likely to exert a greater influence on 
legislation than those representing consumers and other interests.117 His theory suggests 
that well-organised small interests will often disproportionately influence legislative and 
regulatory processes. 118 Whilst nearly impossible to prove, it might be asserted that 
throughout the course of the reforms of the legal services market, consumer groups 
exercised a disproportionate influence on the orientation of the legislation. It was 
certainly apparent, as highlighted in chapter two, that the consumer organisations, 
including Which? were collectively lobbying the government, and were closely
Bamardo Bortolotti, Gianluca Fiorentini (eds) Organised Interests and Self-Regulation: an Economic approach, 
(OUP,Oxford,1999) 89 -130.
111 Georg von Wangenheim, ‘Self Regulation as Two-Stage Rent Seeking’ (Latin American and Caribbean Law and 
Economics Association Annual Papers, 1 January 2009) < http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2d7653p9#t>age-2> 
accessed 10 June 2009; Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Kate Malleson, ‘Regulating Legal Services: Time for the Big 
Bang’, (2004) 67 Modem Law Review, 787-817.
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connected with the framing of the Government’s policy.119 It is possible to argue that 
these consumer organisations may have been pursuing a less than altruistic strategy. This 
is illustrated by Which? who since the enactment of the Legal Services Act 2007, have 
started offering a more comprehensive portfolio of legal advice services.120
Underpinning the argument that there is the possibility that consumer interest group 
capture might exist is the fact that the Legal Services Act 2007 required the creation of a 
consumer panel to advise the Legal Services Board.121 Empirical research122 into the US 
electric utilities market sought to determine how consumer advocates, who have a 
statutory mandate to represent consumer interest during state administrative and judicial 
hearings, affected the Public Utility Commissioners (PUCs) in determining rate 
structures. PUCs have a broad discretion to determine the financial rate of return that 
utility companies are allowed to earn and the rates that utility companies can charge 
different customer classes for their services. Their conclusions123 support a thesis that 
consumer interest advocates are associated with favourable policy biases. They also 
conclude that in implementing consumer representation institutions in the US this has 
shifted regulatory policy to the disadvantage of producers. In the context of legal services 
it is arguable that consumer representation may have a strong effect on the overall policy 
direction of the Legal Services Board. The only interest group that has direct 
representation, and is located within the Legal Services Board is the Consumer Panel. 
The degree to which the Legal Services Board takes notice of the consumer panel is 
outlined in the following from a Legal Services Board press release.
119 Bridget Prentice HC Deb 4 June 2007, vol 461 Col 24. David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for 
Legal Services in England and Wales, Final Report (December 2004). The long running campaign by consumer 
organisations can be seen in Alan Dugdale, ‘Consumer Justice: The Legal Profession and the Public Interest’ (1989) 52 
The Modem Law Review 5, 722
120 Which, Which Legal Services (Which, 2012)
httn://www.which1egalservice.co.uk/?cmp=google legal brand&adgroup^which legal e&kw=which legal services+ 
exact accessed 25 November 2012
121 Guy Holbum and Pablo Spiller, ‘Interest Group Representation in Administrative Institutions: The Impact of 
Consumer Advocates and Elected Commissioners on Regulatory Policy in the United States’ (Policy and Economics, 
University of California Energy Institute, UC Berkley, 10 January 2002) 
<http://escholarship.Org/uc/item/5cg3d8qQ#page-38> accessed: 11 July 2012 p 22
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"The range and quality o f the work covered in the Consumer Panel's annual 
report reflects the powerful mark it has already made on the regulatory 
landscape. Since the panel started work, it has produced substantial new 
evidence, based on research and analysis, which has contributed significantly to 
the Board's policy thinking. The panel's focus on the interests o f the consumer is 
an essential counter-balance in an industry where producer interests are 
powerfully entrenched. " 124
Whilst it is naturally the function of such panels to draw attention to the consumers 
interest, it is argued that this may lead to a form of interest group capture. In some 
regards it is possible to argue that if private interest accounts of the regulation of legal 
services are to be believed, in that the professions were benefitting from favourable 
regulation, a pendulum swing may now have occurred, whereby the only voice that the 
Legal Services Board might come to be hear is that of the consumers. It is pertinent to 
note that a practitioner’s panel, to put forward the viewpoint of the professions was 
suggested during debates in the House of Lords on the Legal Services Bill. The 
suggestion was rejected out of hand.125 This is indicative of the consumer orientation of 
the Act and the mild antipathy shown towards the professions. There have certainly been 
relatively caustic assertions made by the Legal Services Board regarding the voice of the 
legal profession. The following outlines the extent to which the voice of the profession 
has been marginalised.
"the interests o f the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be 
necessary for promoting that o f the consumer. And the consumer is all o f us. "126
It is curious that the Legal Services Board would be against reasoned argument from any 
quarter. Lord Neuberger has made the point that:
124 Legal Services Board ‘Transitional plans for Consumer Panel Chair announced as LSB welcomes Annual report’ 
(Legal Services Board 29 June 2011.)
<httn://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/2011/tra t>la.htm> accessed 21 June 2012
125 Lord Kingsland HL Deb 15th May 2007 vol 692 pt 86
126 David Edmonds, ‘Address to the Council of the Law Society’ (Legal Services Board, Law Society Council Address, 
8 June 2010)
<httn://www.]ega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/speeches présentât!ons/2010/2010 06 08 Law Society Co 
uncil.ndf ^ accessed 19 June 2011
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“Regulatory reform has to be viewed through the prism o f the public interest. It 
has to further the public interest, which means in the field o f law, the promotion 
o f a vibrant, honest and transparent legal profession. It achieves this i f  it does not 
act in accordance with any special interest or listen too closely to any form o f 
special pleading. It does not achieve this i f  it side-lines proper debate and 
reasoned argument by denigrating it as special pleading. To damn reasoned, 
cogent argument when advanced on behalf o f the professions as special pleading 
is a particularly egregious form o f advocacy, and one which furthers neither the 
public or the consumer interest. ” 127
It is pertinent to note reflections made in the 1930’s concerning research undertaken into 
the National Recovery Board in America, an initiative created during the first New Deal 
project.128 Ben Lewis drew attention to the following critical point: “to place any official 
in the position o f having to represent both the public interest and the consumer interest is 
to make him both the judge o f all parties and counsel for one o f the parties at interest. ”129 
It is perhaps no coincidence that after the failure of the financial system in 2007,130 there 
was a scramble to re-organise the architecture of the Financial Services Authority, which 
had previously been responsible for a whole host of matters, including prudential 
regulation of the financial services industry in the wider public interest and consumer 
protection in the consumers’ interest131 The Financial Services Act 2010,132 
comprehensively split these functions up to include the Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(concentrating on economic and financial stability), the Economic Crime Agency and the 
Financial Conduct Authority (concentrating on the conduct of business regulation). The 
latter now has a much less consumer orientated role than originally undertaken by the 
Financial Services Authority.133 The overall point to make, is that there is a potential
127 David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ (Speech by Lord Neuberger Master of the 
Rolls 25th Annual Bar Conference 6 November 2010) para 14
128 The 1997 Labour Government used the ideological label “New Deal”, based loosely on the ideas that underpinned 
the first ‘New Deal’.
129 Ben Lewis, ‘The “Consumer” and “Public” Interests under Public Regulation’ (1938) 46 Journal of Political 
Economy 1, 97, pp 100
130 Evan Turgeon, ‘Boom and Bust for Whom? The Economic Philosophy Behind the 2008 Financial Crisis’ (2009) 4 
Virginia Law & Business Review 1
131 Financial Services Act 2010
132 ibid
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risk, especially when a regulator such as the Legal Services Board orientates policies 
towards the consumer and utilises the market failure approach to regulation, that the 
result may be regulation and policy favouring the consumer but not necessarily the public 
interest.
3.3 CONTEXTUALISING ISSUES REGARDING COMPETITION AND CONSUMER 
INTERESTS
This section draws some of the issues outlined so far in this chapter together. The 
following examines claims made by Lord Chancellor Straw and the Legal Services Board 
that the benefits to consumers as a result of the Legal Services Act 2007 should be 
analogous to those that consumers benefitted from following the removal of regulations 
pertaining to restrictions on the sale of spectacles.
3.3.1 Changes in the Optical Market and Legal Services
The substance of the comparison between opticians and lawyers was most clearly 
articulated by Jack Straw, when he was Lord Chancellor, in a speech he made at the 
London School of Economics.134
“Look how one goes about getting a new pair o f spectacles. Few and far between 
are lone high street opticians, with expensive overheads and limited bargaining 
power when it comes to suppliers offrames or lenses. Now opticians’ services 
tend to be provided by larger chains, which benefit from substantial economies o f  
scale, which is in turn passed on to the customer. We are still seen by highly 
skilled opticians, but the customer benefits from the savings which accrue from 
more efficient procurement, and better systems and processes — including for  
instance using sales people rather than qualified opticians to help choose our
Compliance Officer Bulletin 1-33 whereby it was noted that “branding the CMP A as a consumer champion would be 
inappropriate, confusing and potentially dangerous. The job of a regulator is to ensure that regulation is effective and 
proportionate. That requires a balance between preventing abusive behaviour and ensuring that regulation does not 
impose excessive costs and restrictions. See also Nathan Willmott, ‘Equipping the modem regulatonassessing the new 
regulatory powers under the Financial Services Act 2010’ (2010) 78 Compliance Officer Bulletin, 1-28.
134 Jack Straw, 'Constitutional continuity: Jack Straw Speech at the LSE' (2009)
<httr>://www.iustice.gov.uk/news/sp030309.htm> accessed 4 January 2011 The statement is particularly insightful as 
Jack Straw was the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, during the passage of the Legal Services Act 
2007.
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frames. The important factor here is that there has been no decline in the quality 
o f the clinical service -  the opticians we see are just as well qualified as they ever 
were and they see more people, more quickly because they do not spend their time 
manning the till. And there has been a marked increase in the level o f customer 
service overall. Whilst I  appreciate that these are obviously very different 
professions, I  would suggest that the number o f law firms is not necessarily a 
proxy for access to, or quality ofjustice. ”135
Similar claims connecting opticians and legal services are to be found throughout the 
speeches of senior members of the Legal Services Board. One of the first pieces of work 
that the Legal Services Board undertook was a consultation in which a case study titled 
“Learning from another sector? — Retail Opticians ’ Services ” appeared. The following 
sets out an important section of the case study:
“In the mid-1980s many o f the restrictions on the advertising and supply o f 
spectacles were removed, and changes in the NHS arrangements allowed market 
forces to improve the range o f products available to the public. These 
developments helped to open up the market and encourage new entrants. The 
optical market was broadened beyond the limited range o f spectacle frames and 
lenses provided under NHS arrangements, which had remained virtually 
unchanged since 1948. In its place the Government introduced a scheme allowing 
eligible people an NHS voucher which could be used towards any spectacles o f 
their choice. This change encouraged the development o f improved designs o f 
both frames and lenses. In 1989 it became a requirement that following a sight 
test the patient should be handed a written copy o f any prescription found 
necessary following a sight test. This allowed freedom to have spectacles 
dispensed elsewhere. The dispensing function was deregulated, allowing 
unqualified and unregistered sellers to supply spectacles, other than to certain
135 ibid
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protected groups and subject to the production o f a valid prescription not more 
than two years old. ”136
This statement from the “Wider Access, Better Value, Stronger Protection”137 
Consultation can be located by the following excerpt from the same paper which 
underlines the approach the Legal Services Board adopted towards the delivery of legal 
services.
“The legal services market-place should be driven by the needs and preferences 
o f consumers today and less defined by the way in which professionals have 
traditionally chosen to offer their services in the past. The potential benefits to 
consumers from a liberalised legal services market-place include better value, 
improved information, increased choice, greater innovation, more flexible service 
delivery and new service combinations. ”138
Whilst no further reference or clarification is made in the case study regarding the 
‘optical sector’ in the Legal Services Board's consultation, the case study arguably exists 
to draw attention to the success of the deregulation of opticians. By implication it is 
presumed, especially in the context of the foregoing passage, that the Legal Services 
Board has concluded that the ‘optical sector’ not only delivered "better value, improved 
information, increased choice, greater innovation, more flexible service delivery and new 
service combinations" but that this template articulates the ideal developments which 
they aspire to seeing in the legal services market. The Legal Services Board’s 
Consultation case study on the optical sector referred to a report produced by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published in 2004.139 This report reviewed six 
case studies and aimed to illustrate the benefits of introducing competition into UK 
markets, where previously it had been absent or muted. Of the six cases covered in the 
DTI report, the spectacles case study turned out to be the least conclusive. The Legal
136 Legal Services Board Consultation Paper, 'Wider Access, Better Value, Stronger Protections' (Legal Services 
Board, 2009) <httD://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/2009/r>df/14Q5Q9.t)df > accessed 5 
January 2011.
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Services Board omitted the following finding set out in the report: that the evidence on 
price was mixed and inconclusive. In particular the DTI report indicated that there is no 
real empirical evidence to base assertions upon. The paper noted:
“There is no hard evidence that deregulation has helped force prices downwards. 
Indeed, the price rises observed for private spectacles in the last two to three 
years suggest the opposite, albeit some 15 years after deregulation. ”140
The paper also noted that for spectacles purchased with NHS vouchers, the evidence 
suggested that consumers paid considerably more, at least in the decade immediately 
following deregulation. Finally, the conclusions refer only to the average prices actually 
paid for spectacles, though the report then notes that casual empiricism suggests that the 
quality of spectacles, whether actual or perceived, may have improved over this period.141 
The report noted that these quality improvements should be factored into any satisfactory 
price comparison but, unfortunately, there was no index available on quality adjusted 
price.142 The DTI paper was therefore inconclusive, and indicated that there was little 
empirical evidence to demonstrate that the deregulation was a success. The OFT143 
projected in its 1982 report that deregulation should achieve at least a 28% reduction in 
prices. The DTI paper makes no reference to this figure and it is implicit from their 
findings that this was not achieved. More damning in regards to the claims made by Jack 
Straw and the Legal Services Board are other conclusions outlined in the DTI paper. In 
particular the report noted:
“Conclusive hard evidence on non-price factors is even more hard to establish. 
Again, casual empiricism might suggest that consumers now benefit from greater 
choice, higher quality products, and arguably, improved forms o f retailing, but 
we have no objective evidence on this. ”144
140 ibid
141 ibid
142 ibid
143 OFT 1 Opticians and Competition: A Report by the Director General o f Fair Trading’. ( HMSO, London, 1982)
144 Stephen Davies, Heather Coles, Matthew Olczak, Christopher Pike and Christopher Wilson 'DTI Economics Paper 
No. 9. The Benefits from Competition: Some Illustrative Cases '( Department of Trade and Industry, HMSO, 2004) 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/fnes/filel 3299.r>df> accessed 11 October 2012
144 OFT ‘Opticians and Competition: A Report by the Director General o f Fair Trading’. ( HMSO, London, 1982)
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“there is no evidence o f a decreased quality o f service and, since independent 
opticians are still in business (albeit in smaller numbers), consumers still have 
available the option o f the arguably higher quality, more personal service 
provided by such retailers”145
It is clear therefore, that evidence for many of the assertions that form the basis of the 
comparisons between lawyers and opticians are at best, coining the phrase used by the 
DTI, creatures of ‘casual empiricism.’ Beyond the DTI report, and despite interest in this 
legislation, surprisingly few studies have investigated the effects of the deregulation. 
Taylor146 considered its potential consequences but did not examine its actual effects. 
More recently, Calver,147 examined the factors affecting the prices of spectacles and he 
drew similar conclusions to the DTI Paper. Calver also noted that reliable date on prices 
is unlikely to be obtainable, as opticians commonly retain records for a maximum of 10 
years. Even with extensive records there have been such changes to typical or standard 
spectacles, due to technological developments, that today’s standard bears little similarity 
to the standard in the 1980s.
These studies demonstrate that there is an absence of reliable data upon which to make 
real determinations about the success of the deregulation of the optical sector. Only 
‘casual empiricism’ appears to suggest that changes have occurred in the market for 
spectacles and optical services. This leads therefore to the first conclusion in this section 
that any claims celebrating the success of the removal of the optician's monopoly cannot 
be supported empirically. It also connects with the arguments that sometimes consumer 
benefits are short lived. The DTI report draws attention to an increase in prices 15 years 
after the injection of competition into the market. This finding provides a basis upon 
which to further question the wisdom of the claims that positive lessons can be learnt 
from the optical sector.
145 Stephen Davies, Heather Coles, Matthew Olczak, Christopher Pike and Christopher Wilson 'DTI Economics Paper 
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3.3.2 Assessing Developments in the Optical Market
As a result of the perceived changes in the consumer interest, the following profiles the 
composition of the optical market today, highlighting a number of concerning aspects. 
Prior to the de-regulation of the optical sector, the retail market was un-concentrated. By 
far the largest firm was the Dolland and Aitchinson Group (D&A), established in 1750, 
which was comprised of over 450 practices and accounted for 15% of all sight tests. The 
group included ophthalmic opticians, dispensing opticians and prescription houses. Apart 
from D&A, only one other chain had more than 100 practices, and five others had 50 or 
more practices.148 The concentration (in terms of large chain practices) was only about 
12%, with the large majority of the market being served by small independent firms.149 
Between 1988 and 1991 alone, chain stores’ market share increased from 46% to 75%.150 
Total sales by the four leaders increased nearly fourfold from 1991- 2000.151 Immediately 
following de-regulation, Boots enjoyed a position as the market leader. Boots, an 
established firm in other markets opened its first optical department in 1983 and 
established Boots opticians in 1987. Specsavers entered the market in 1983 and Vision 
Express followed in 1988. In 2004, Boots had around 300 outlets, Vision Express 200, 
Specsavers more than 500 and D&A around 400. Their market shares by turnover were 
as follows Boots 32%, Vision Express 22%, Specsavers 17%, and D&A 10%. 152 
Spectacle frames and lenses make up the largest sector of the market, with sales of 2.54 
billion in 2009 representing 68.9% of the total optical sector. The second largest source 
of revenue was NHS and private sight tests, which are estimated to have generated 
income of £416.6 million in 2009, representing an increase of 4.9% and making this the 
only sector of the market exhibiting growth in 2009.153 This outline of the market
148 Mark Olczak ‘Chain Store Pricing and the Structure of Retail Markets’ ESRC Centre for Competition Policy and 
School of Economics (University of East Anglia) (CCP Working Paper 06-7)
<http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopolv fs/1.104484!ccD06-7.pdf> accessed 12 June 2010
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152 Olzack’s data is based on turnover figures for selected opticians and excludes a number of other small opticians and 
online retailers and supermarkets) Mark Olczak ‘Chain Store Pricing and the Structure of Retail Markets’ ESRC Centre 
for Competition Policy and School of Economics (University of East Anglia) (CCP Working Paper 06-7) < 
<http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopolv fs/1.104484!ccp06-7.pdf> accessed 12 June 2010
153 Key Note ‘Market Assessment 2010: Opticians and Optical Goods’ { Key Note Publications, Hampton, 2010) P5
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highlights some of the points outlined earlier regarding the way in which markets can 
become dominated by a relatively small number of companies which have driven out 
smaller businesses. In the same way that it has become difficult to ascertain whether the 
banking market is actually competitive, it might be questioned whether the optical market 
is too. The reference to increasing prices in the DTI report certainly raises questions to be 
answered. The following outlines the composition of the optical market today.
3.3.3 The Composition of the Market
Boots and Dollond and Aitchinson (D&A) -  merged their activities in 2009. Specsavers 
continued its store expansion programme both in the UK and overseas. Vision Express 
integrated the GC Bateman Group of opticians, which it acquired in 2008. Supermarkets 
such as Tesco and ASDA further increased the number of its in-store optical practices.154 
As a result of the Dolland and Aitchison merger with Boots, D&A disappeared from the 
high street, with the combined business now trading as Boots Opticians. The unification 
created a new chain of approximately 690 practices. D&A was owned by De Rigo, a 
market leader in the design, manufacture and marketing of high-quality eyewear. The 
merger gave Alliance Boots a controlling stake in the new company, along with De 
Rigo.155 According to Boots, the merger provided an extraordinary opportunity for 
expansion. In 2010 Boots Opticians had most outlets with around 690 outlets followed by 
Specsavers, with 635 optical branches (plus a further 119 UK hearing aid stores). Other 
large chains include Vision Express and Optical Express, which have around 333 and 200 
UK outlets, respectively, and Scrivens, which has 130. Within the supermarket sector, 
Tesco has 128 in-store optician practices and ASDA has 82.756 Whilst the foregoing 
outlines the increasingly concentrated optical market, the following reflects on the 
ownership structure of the optical sector.
3.3.4 The Ownership Structure of the Optical Market
The leading suppliers of spectacles and frames include Carl Zeiss/ SOLA, Essilor, 
Luxottica, Rodenstock, Safilo, Silhouette and the UK based Norville.157 Vision Express is 
a subsidiary of the French company GrandVision, one of Europe’s leading optical 
retailers, with stores and brands in 19 countries, including the UK, France, Belgium and 
Spain. At the end of 2008, it had 1235 stores. In the UK, Grand Vision operates two 
brands -  Vision Express and Batemans Opticians -  Vision Express acquired Batemans in 
May 2008. Together Vision Express and Batemans had 333 stores in the UK as of June 
2009. Vision Express is currently expanding its branch network and the company aims to 
open an additional 100 stores by 2013. Grandvision is owned by HAL investments, the 
European investment subsidiary of HAL Holding NV, and international investment 
company based in the Netherlands Antilles. Hal also controls the leading eyewear retailer 
Pearle Europe and, in October 2009, it made a major investment in Safilo, the spectacle -  
frames company which could result in Hal Holding owning almost half of the 
company.158 Specsavers is now the largest private optical retailer in the UK. Through its 
Specsavers stores in the UK, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, consumers can receive 
eye examinations, as well as buy glasses and contact lenses. The company makes more 
than 2,000 styles of glasses at its three UK factories.159 Undoubtedly, the deregulation 
permitted new entrants, on quite a dramatic scale. 29 years on from the initial 
deregulation, the market is now dominated by three leading players: Boots Opticians, 
Vision Express and Specsavers. Ownership structures are now such that in some 
instances entire supply chains are owned by the same holding company. Boots are now 
connected with De Rigo, and Vision Express’s holding company owns controlling stake 
in many spectacle manufacturing companies. Specsavers owns three factories and makes 
its own glasses. In essence, a large percentage of the retail sector of opticians is in the 
hands of off shore holding companies, or foreign ownership.
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3.3.5 The Question of Consumer Benefits
It still remains unclear whether the deregulation has delivered benefits to the consumer, 
or indeed will be able to with a market dominated by a handful of large companies. 
Whilst the method of retailing spectacles may have become more consumer friendly, it is 
pertinent to note industry reports which profile the rising costs of prominent premises in 
the high street, longer opening hours, two for one offers and glossy advertising 
campaigns.160 Whilst these features of the new retail environment might please 
consumers, the report also notes that these come at a price that is inevitably paid for by 
the consumer.161 Consumer benefits in terms of cost and quality, whilst hard to measure, 
have not necessarily been delivered but they have been varied.162 A more serious concern 
raised in recent times is the ability of the established players in the market to consciously 
or unconsciously prevent new market entrants. In September 2009, Glasses Direct, the 
UK’s largest direct seller of prescription glasses, launched its first television advertising 
campaign. The advertisements were timed to coincide with the launch of Glasses Direct’s 
customer service helpline, giving new customer access to its team of opticians. A retail 
consultant for Mintel has openly stated that "/f is a very dominated market”163 and “that 
there are considerable barriers to entry, particularly for smaller firms”. Murray Wells 
the founder of Glasses Direct is on record as saying “The big four basically have the 
British market sewn-up,” and “It's almost impossible for any new companies to get in.” 
Murray Wells also reported that when his company started up one of the big four put 
pressure on his suppliers and succeeded in getting a frame company to boycott him. He is 
clear that the money isn’t being made by the firms which actually manufacture the 
glasses, but by the big international optical groups which own most of the retailers. These 
have the purchasing power and a lock on the lucrative market for frames.164
160 The figures pertaining to advertising expenditure by opticians and on optical goods amounted to £70.2 m in the year 
ending September 2009, which represents a 20.7% decline on the corresponding period in 2007/2008. The leading 
advertisers are the opticians, who spent £56.6m promoting their services in 2008/2009. Specsavers, in particular, is one 
of the major users of main media advertising in the eyewear sector, investing £37.7m in 2007/2008 and £38.5 in 
2008/2009. Vision express spent £7.5 m on main media advertising in the year to September 2009 and Boots Opticians 
spent £3m
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3.3.6 Analysis and the Regulatory Objectives
In examining the claims made by Jack Straw and the Legal Services Board, it is revealed 
that there is little evidence upon which to draw any fixed conclusions. This is apposite 
because it is characteristic of a general lack of evidence and research to support a number 
of aspects of the Legal Services Act 2007. Notably, the Clementi review165 was very 
cautious about developing Alternative Business Structures. It suggested that a review of 
Legal Disciplinary Practices should inform whether steps should be taken to allow 
Alternative Business Structures. The Government ignored the advice of its own 
adviser.166 Another of the Government’s own advisers, who was a keen protagonist of 
market based reforms, in a recent book chapter, has only been able to suggest, sketchily, 
that there might be consumer benefits to be derived from ABS.167 The Government’s own 
appropriated research on ABS168 advocating a clear path for ABS is dwarfed by the 
academic literature which raises a range of objections to multidisciplinary practices and 
ABS.169
This signals that certain regulatory initiatives may be considered as a leap into the 
unknown, underpinned only by analysis based on slightly sketchy research evidence. 
Whilst, in the case of opticians outlined above, the effects of such steps do not have far 
reaching consequences; in the context of legal services it is argued that pursuing the 
consumer interest may have far reaching consequences. Whilst it may be too late to
165 David Clementi, Review o f the Regulatory Frameworkfor Legal Services in England and Wales, Final Report 
(December 2004)
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International Society for New Institutional Economics, University of California, June 14, 
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<http://webarchive.nati onalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://Avww.dca.gov.uk/legalsvs/lsreform.htm>
Jordi Vidal ,Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, ‘Legal Disciplinary Practices: A Discussion of the Clementi Proposals (DCA, 
2005) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/legalsvs/lsreform.htm>
Richard Brealey, Julian Franks , ‘The Organisational Structure of Legal Firms; a Discussion of the Recommendation of 
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169 169 Lawrence Fox, ‘Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus 
Other Runimations on the Issues of MDP’s’ (2000) 84 Minn. L. Rev 1097; Laurel Terry, ‘German MDPs: Lesson to 
Learn’ (2000) 84 Minn. L. Rev 1547; Laurel Terry, MDPs, "Spinning," and Wouters v. Nova. Case Western Law 
Review, 2002. 52: p. 867- 894; Charles Wolfram, ‘The ABA and MDPs: Context, History, and Process’ (2002) 84 Min. 
L. Rev 1625 ; Paul Paton, ‘Multidisciplinary Practices Redux: Globalisation, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP 
Debate in America’ (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2193; Harry McVea, ‘Predators and the Public Interest -  the ‘Big 
Four’ and Multi-Disciplinary Practices’ (2002) 65 Modem Law Review 6
149
suggest caution with regards to aspects of the Legal Services Act 2007 and ABS in 
particular, this section underlines the fact that it is far from conclusive that policies 
orientated towards the consumer actually yield consumer benefits, and that this should 
inform thinking in the future and with regards to the regulatory objectives of the Legal 
Services Act 2007. It further highlights the point that the pursuance of the consumer’s 
interest, without thoughtful consideration of broader factors, may in fact result in costly 
and unfortunate side effects.170 If the legal services market follows the example of the 
optical market, which early signs in the Personal Injury litigation171 and Conveyancing172 
fields seemingly suggest, the consequences may be serious. The overall point to be made 
is that unfettered pursuit of the consumer interest, as variously explained in this chapter, 
may have potential side effects. In the case of legal services, the stakes are arguably too 
high to entertain such a risk. It is not appropriate to pursue the consumer interest, and 
gamble with the public interest. The following section explains that, through a 
combination of definition and methodological incorporation of the consumer interest in 
policy and decision making there is both a theoretical argument and practical evidence to 
suggest that regulators subordinate public interests in favour of the consumer interest and 
competition.
3.4 THE CONSUMER INTEREST AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
It is possible to locate the Legal Services Act 2007 within a regulatory trend evident since 
1997. One feature of this trend is what has been described a ‘new breed of regulators,’ 
which are variously lighter touch, public facing, risk centred, created by statute, funded
170 Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Harvard University Press, 1984) p 10
171 Legal Futures, ‘Strong Consumer interest in legal services from brands’ (Legal Futures, 17th April 2013) 
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by a levy on the industry they regulate and accountable to Parliament.173 Where once 
regulation and regulators were characterised by ‘command and control’174 regulation 
through either Government or self-regulatory bodies, or a combination of the two, these 
new regulators are very different, using principles based regulation and strategies based 
on the identification of risks.175 These regulators are predominately concerned with 
economic regulation, and can be classed mainly as economic regulators. The creation of 
the Legal Services Board, by the Legal Services Act 2007 certainly exhibits many of 
these incidents of this new trend in regulation and oversight regulators. Whilst it is clear 
that the Legal Services Board remit is much broader than an economic regulator the 
Chairman of the Legal Services Board, in defending the role of the Board made the 
following assertion:
‘‘I f  we ’re not an economic regulator, why on earth did Parliament write in all the 
stuff in the Act about bringing in alternative business structures? What is that, i f  
not breaking down barriers to entry in a form o f economic regulation? ”176
This is an important assertion as it explains in part the approach that the Legal Services 
Board has taken towards its role in legal services regulation. For present purposes it 
provides a reason upon which to draw on the approaches taken by other recently 
established regulators. The previous sections in this chapter sought to outline various 
problems associated with regulating in the consumer interest. The following sections 
concentrate on why, despite the insertion of the public interest as a regulatory objective in 
the Legal Services Act 2007, it is likely that the consumer interest may come to dominate 
policy and decision making. The following sections are structured as follows. The first
173 Sonia Livingstone, Peter Lunt and Laura Miller, ‘Citizen Consumers and the Citizen -  Consumer: articulating the 
citizen interest in media and communications regulation’ (2007) 1 Discourse and Communication 1, 85-111
174 Robert Baldwin, ‘Is Regulation Right?’ (Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of 
Economics, 2000) Command and control is argued by Baldwin to characterise a situation where trusted regulators 
expert officials who acted in the public interest controlling the behaviour of the private sector. Regulators set standards 
and enforced these. Regulators in the 80s and 90s, were challenged for reasons of capture by those that they regulated. 
There was also a general decline in the trust in experts and an appetite for accountability, reason giving and 
transparency. In line with neo-liberalism, better regulation was demanded that was inherently less restrictive and 
incentive based leaving managers more free to manage. There were also calls to free enterprise from the red tape that 
prevented economic development.
175 Sonia Livingstone, Peter Lunt and Laura Miller, ‘Citizen Consumers and the Citizen -  Consumer: articulating the 
citizen interest in media and communications regulation’ (2007) 1 Discourse and Communication 1, 85-111
176 Legal Futures ‘Edmonds comes out fighting’ (Legal Futures, 27th April 2012) <httD://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest- 
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section draws attention to a range of approaches to the consumer interest and the public 
interest. This section draws, in part, on the revealed understandings of the consumer and 
public interest by some of the recently established regulators. The second section reflects 
on the way in which the consumer interest can be operationalized. The third section 
reviews recent work carried out to understand the extent to which citizenship values were 
considered by Ofcom, one of the ‘new breed’ of regulators.
3.4.1 Confusing the Consumer and Public Interest
A Select Committee of the House of Lords investigated a number of the new economic 
regulators in 2007.177 One question that was posed by the Select Committee, the answers 
to which made up a substantial part of the committee’s final report’s fifth chapter, was 
“Should regulators distinguish between the consumer/public/ citizen interest?”178 The 
report noted that regulators commonly work within a statutory framework that includes 
references to the terms consumer interest, public interest and citizen interest. The Report 
indicated that this had the potential to cause considerable confusion amongst all 
concerned. It suggested that there may be some serious difficulty unpicking the 
difference between the consumer interest and the public interest. The result the report 
noted was a conflation of the terms consumer and public, to ostensibly mean the 
consumer interest. The report noted that a number of witnesses suggested that there was 
little practical difference between the consumer interest and the public interest, and by 
implication, no great need for regulators to distinguish between the two terms.179 For 
present purposes, the attitude of the regulators and competition authorities is important.
Some of the views expressed were as follows:
“Where regulators are required to act in the consumer interest, the term 
"consumer" is often defined to include both current and future consumers. I f  one 
then adds the fact that the whole population consumes basic services such as
177 The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic Regulators(HL 2006-2007,189-1 ; The Select Committee on 
Regulators, UK Economic Regulators(HL 2006-2007,189-H) The report focuses on economic regulators. Whilst the 
Legal Services Act did not necessarily set out to create a specific economic regulator, the Legal Services Board has 
clearly acknowledged that it views a rather substantial part of its statutory remit as creating this responsibility.
178 The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic RegulatorsQiL 2006-2007,189-1) p 53
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water and electricity, there is often little difference between the groups covered by 
the two terms. ” 180
In line with these views a representative from Ofwat noted:
"Our duty is to protect the interests o f consumers, but given that water and 
sewerage services are essential to all, we consider the public interest and our 
duties are closely aligne, d"181
A representative from Postcomm made a similar observation:
"Our statutory duties, o f themselves, do not mention the phrase ’public interest'... 
in effect though the interests o f postal users ... are so wide, and i f  you interpret 
that widely to include the interests o f postal users for the future as well as the 
interests o f postal users today there is very little difference, in practice, between 
the public interest and the interest o f users. " 182
Reinforcing the importance of promoting competition, two statements from the 
competition authorities emphasise the perceived overlap between the consumer and 
public interest. These statements draw attention to the fact that the competition 
authorities consider that both the public interest and consumer interest are usually served 
by promoting competition. Both therefore closely align an understanding of the public 
interest, with the operation of the marketplace and the interest of the consumer.
John Fingleton of the OFT reported to the Committee
"Effective market competition generally promotes the public interest, it drives not 
just efficiency but also consumer benefits ... in general, I  would say that a 
consumer-focused competition test is aligned very closely with the public 
interest.1,183
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Similarly, David Newbery a Cambridge economist and member of the Competition 
Commission noted that,
"competition where possible is an ideal guarantor o f the public interest. " 184
In practice, this was also a view that gradually came to be established in the UK 
competition regime. Peter Freeman of the Competition Commission also noted that:
"for a number o f years before the Enterprise Act [2002], probably ten, maybe 15, 
the public interest test which the Commission applied was interpreted, essentially 
as a competition test ... so, in a sense, it had got ahead o f the black-letter law. 
The Enterprise Act made that explicit. " 185
In general terms, the report of the evidence can be summed up as follows. Regulators 
appear to see little difference between the consumer and public interest. The Competition 
Authorities acknowledge that there are occasional differences, but that competition, save 
for certain instances, is in the public and consumer interest. Representatives of civil 
society tended to disagree, noting critical differences between the consumer and public 
interest. The attitude of the regulators is, however, the most revealing in that it draws 
attention to the fact that they may come to see the consumer and the public interest as 
one. For this reason the interpretation of the terms by regulators may come to have an 
important effect on how they are subsequently operationalized. Building on this, the 
following briefly revisits the methodologies that regulators commonly use in their policy 
and decision making processes.
3.4.2 Operationalizing the Consumer Interest
The market failure approach was outlined earlier in this chapter. It was also noted that it 
was a commonly used tool of analysis by regulators. One of the effects of transparency, 
this being one of the Hampton principles of good regulation, is that regulators are keen to 
be able to justify their actions. This point can be seen in the evidence Peter Freeman, of 
the Competition Commission, gave to the Joint Committee on Regulators:
"we are an independent competition authority and we have a substantial 
delegation ofpower from Government ... The danger o f giving an authority like 
us unlimited power to break up companies on the grounds o f really quite general 
and sort o f soft public interest, is that I  think people would say, 'Well, that's too 
much delegation’ ... I  think the old days have gone, in that respect. "m
This observation underlines perhaps an eagerness to work within the strictures of the 
legislation. In the context of the Legal Services Act 2007, the public interest has been 
outlined as a regulatory objective. This does not, however, mean that regulators will not 
be in search of a methodology upon which to base their actions such that they can justify 
them. This contextualises the threat that the consumer interest poses to the public interest. 
It can be operationalized in a methodology which can then be used to justify the decision 
taken. The following takes the observations, outlined in the preceding sections and 
considers them in light of the results of a research project which in part examined how 
Ofcom went about achieving its statutory objectives set out in the Communications Act 
2003.
3.4.3 Ofcom and the Citizen and Consumer Interest
As part of a research project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, Sonia 
Livingstone and Peter Lunt investigated the public understanding of regimes of risk 
regulation. One particular strand of this research is relevant to this thesis. This strand of 
work examined the extent to which, in pursuance of their statutory objectives, regulators 
were fulfilling their statutory duties to the citizen and the consumer.187 It is apposite to 
outline some of Lunt and Livingstone’s findings, as in part, they re-affirm some of the 
observations made in foregoing sections. Their study also illustrates a number of other 
interesting points, regarding the nature of regulators, which contribute to an 
understanding as to why Ofcom and others have adopted a primarily consumer orientated 
approach to their activities.
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There are good reasons for profiling this piece of research as there are distinct similarities 
between the Communications Act 2003 and the Legal Services Act 2007. The first is that 
Ofcom is a recently created regulator. The second is that the legislative passage of the 
two Bills followed a very similar path. The third is that the Communications Act 2003 is 
one of the few pieces of legislation that also includes regulatory objectives expressly 
defined in the Act.
3.4.4 The Legislative Passage of the Communications Act 2003
The Green Paper on Communications,188 published in 1998 sought a moderate approach 
to regulation. Whilst it featured the consumer in a number of ways, it favoured an 
evolutionary approach that would perpetuate and adapt the existing regulatory 
framework. The Communications White Paper189 which followed in 2000 was altogether 
more radical and set out a new framework for communications regulation, which 
included replacing all the existing regulators with one super regulator called Ofcom.190 It 
had three main objectives which included the consumer interest,191 maintenance of high 
quality content and finally the protection of the interest of the citizen. An independent 
Consumer panel was also proposed. The White Paper was consulted on192 and it received 
a large number of responses. Livingstone and Lunt note that the consultation raised many 
issues surrounding the conception of the consumer and citizen.193 The Draft 
Communications Bill consolidated the White Paper but, notably, it changed the 
terminology of the statutory objectives, referring throughout to the customer and 
removing reference to the citizen and the consumer. The Bill was put out to consultation, 
and the term customer received considerable scrutiny. The Communications Bill, in the 
same way that the Legal Services Bill did, underwent pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint 
Select Committee. The Committee was chaired by Lord Puttnam. Possibly the most
188 DTI, ‘A New Future for Communications’ (Cm 5010,2000) < http://www.communicationswhitepaner.gov.uk/> 
accessed 23 October 2012
189 ibid
190 Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill, (HL Paper 169-1 Volume 1 Report, 2001) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/it200102/itselect/itcom/l 69/169.pdf> accessed 23 October 2012
191 The consumer interest was centred on choice and value for money, to be met by promoting market competition. See: 
Michael Schudson, ‘The Troubling Equivalence of Citizen and Consumer’ (2006) 608, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 193
192 DTI, A new future for communications (Cm 5010,2000) <http://www.communicationswhitepaper.gov.uk/> 
accessed 23 October 2012; Summary of Responses to the Consultation ‘A New future for Communications’ 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/resources> accessed 12 June 2012
193 Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, ‘Regulation in the Public Interest’ (2007) 17 Consumer Policy Review 4
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relevant statement from that committee to this thesis is to be found in paragraph 20 of the 
Committees report.194 Lord Puttnam identified as "an abdication o f responsibility” the 
failure by Parliament to specify a hierarchy of duties for the new super regulator.195 The 
report recommended explicitly the establishment of a ‘principal duty’ embodying 
specifically and explicitly ‘the long term interests o f all citizens. ,196 The Lords, in the 
same way as they later did in the Legal Services Bill, were very unhappy with the prime 
focus of the Communications Bill being on the ‘customer’ or ‘consumer.’ They were very 
keen to see that this was tempered. It is also notable that the Communications Bill was 
also introduced into the House of Lords. A similar attitude to the consumer interest 
profiled in chapter two of this thesis was also apparent in the debates in the House of 
Lords regarding the Communications Bill. Of particular note was the agreement between 
the members of the House of Lords that consumers are problematically short-termist, and 
that regulation was required to ensure their immediate choices were not damaging in the 
long term.197 It was suggested that the term ‘citizen’ was altogether more robust and took 
account of collective values which were necessarily regarded as taking account of the 
long term. It was regarded as being distinct from individual interests (consumers). After 
much tussling between the Government and the House of Lords, the Bill received Royal 
Assent on the 17th July 2003.198
Section 3, of the Communications Act 2003 appeared as follows.
It shall be the principal duty of Ofcom, in carrying out their function -
(a) to further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and
(b) to further the interest of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by 
promoting competition.
194 Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill, HL Paper 169-1 Volume 1 Report 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/it200102/itselect/itcom/l 69/169.ndf> accessed 12 June 2012 para 20
195 ibid
196 ibid
197 Sonia Livingstone, Peter Lunt and Laura Miller, ‘Citizens and consumers: Discursive debates during and after the 
Communications Act 2003’ (Social Contexts and Responses to Risk Network (SCARR) Working Paper 2006/10) 
<http://www.kent.ac.uk/scarr/papers/Livingstone%20Wk%20Paperl0/2Lpdft> accessed 10 July 2012 p 17.
198 Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill, HL Paper 169-1 Volume 1 Report para 20
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Whilst these duties are not the same as the regulatory objectives in the Legal Services Act 
2007 per se, they are of interest, as this thesis is concerned, not only with the regulatory 
objectives of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’, but also with the way in 
which the regulatory objectives are understood, interpreted and operationalized. It is 
argued that valuable lessons may be able to be learnt from the way in which Ofcom has 
gone about discharging its duties to the consumer and the citizen.
3.4.5 Ofcom and Operationalizing the Consumer and Citizen Interest 
Regarding the way in which Ofcom operationalized their statutory objectives, Lunt notes 
Ofcom, immediately took against the individual duties to the consumer and citizen that 
appeared in the Act.199 They argue that this was evidenced by senior members of Ofcom 
publicly challenging the assertions made by Lord Puttnam and observing how the Act 
differed from the Government’s prevailing policy orientation. Indeed Lord Currie, Chair 
of Ofcom, was so incensed that he is on record as saying that the wording of the Act 
confused the clear vision of Ofcom as an economic regulator.200 Ofcom immediately 
hyphenated the consumer and citizen in all of its policy documents. Lunt notes that this 
foregrounded competition as the primary instrument to further both consumer and citizen 
interests, positioning Ofcom primarily as an economic regulator.201 Lunt and Livingstone 
note that Ofcom formed a clear understanding of consumer interests in the first few years 
of its operation by conducting a large amount of market research on key policy issues. 
They note that there was robust liaison with the Consumer Panel (the statutorily 
established panel to advise Ofcom on consumer issues). Further they note that Ofcom 
also undertook to use a consumer toolkit, designed by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 
intended for use to audit consumer interests throughout Ofcom’s regulatory processes. 
The Toolkit was commissioned by the Consumer Panel.202
199 Sonia Livingstone, Peter Lunt and Laura Miller, ‘Citizens and consumers: Discursive debates during and after the 
Communications Act 2003’(Social Contexts and Responses to Risk Network (SCARR) Working Paper 2006/10) 
<http://www.kent.ac.uk/scarr/papers/Livingstone%20Wk%20Paperl O.^Lpdf^ accessed 10 July 2012
200 Lord Currie, (English National Forun Seminar Speech, 7 July 2003)
<‘http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2003/07/07/english-national-forum-seminar/> accessed 12 November 2012: Sonia 
Livingstone, ‘What is the citizen’s interest in communication regulation? Ofcom’s agenda for ‘Citizens, 
communications and convergance’ (Conference Paper, Media@LSE Fiftieth Anniversary Conference, 21-23 
September 2008) p2
201 Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, ‘Regulation in the Public Interest’ (2007) 17 Consumer Policy Review 4
202 Ofcom, ‘Capturing the consumer interest -  A toolkit for regulators and government’ (Ofcom, February 2006) 
<http://www.communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/downloads/Policv/Consumer%20InterestToolkit/Publications/capt 
uring the consumer interest%20a%20toolkit%20for%20regulators%20etc.pdf> accessed 25 October 2012
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Throughout their work Lunt and Livingstone refer to the semantic problems derived from 
the terms citizen and consumer. They draw attention to the problems that nearly all have 
had in distinguishing the term citizen from the consumer.203 Further to this they suggest 
that the citizen interest, in contrast to the consumer interest, is difficult to define clearly 
and unambiguously. Lunt and Livingstone drew the general conclusion that Ofcom was 
pursuing an economic-led approach, operationalized largely in terms of market 
research.204 Moreover, they noted that Ofcom adopted an economic (rather than political 
or social) view of the distinction between consumer and citizen interests.205 Lunt and 
Livingstone note a myriad of uses of both the consumer and citizen ranging from those 
that overlap to those that oppose, and that this resulted in a complex and contested 
mapping of terminology onto organisational structures, regulatory purposes and policy 
domains.206
Lunt and Livingstone finished their funded research project in 2007. The papers from this 
project, largely published in 2007/8, indicated that no real steps had been taken to 
understand the citizen interest, though they drew attention to Ofcom’s 2005/6 annual plan 
which promised: “to identify and articulate more clearly how the interests o f citizens 
should be incorporated in Ofcom’s decision making process in a transparent and 
systematic way”. They noted that no report materialised in 2007.207 Ofcom’s 2007/8 
Annual Plan did, however, promise increased use of deliberative processes of citizen 
consultation.208 In 2008, Ofcom published a consultation into the citizen interest.209 The 
consultation document suggested that Ofcom had made some inroads into understanding 
the citizen interest.210 It then went on to set out how a number of policies had been 
termed as citizen interests, mainly in connection with public service broadcasting. Ofcom
203 Sonia Livingstone, Peter Lunt and Laura Miller, ‘Citizen Consumers and the Citizen -  Consumer: articulating the 
citizen interest in media and communications regulation’ (2007) 1 Discourse and Communication 1, 85-111 pp 97.
204 Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, ‘Regulation in the Public Interest’ (2007) 17 Consumer Policy Review 2
205 ibid
206 Ofcom, Annual Plan 2005/06 (Ofcom, 2005)
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/annual nlan2005/accessed> 20 June 2011
207 Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, ‘Regulation in the Public Interest’ (2007) 17 Consumer Policy Review 2
208Ofcom, Annual Plan 2007/8 (Ofcom, 2007) http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/annual-reDorts-and-nlans/annual- 
Dlans/annual-plan-2007-08/ accessed 17 November 2012
209 Ofcom (2008) Citizens, Communications and Convergence: A discussion paper. London: Office of 
Communications, (no longer available from Ofcom’s website)
210 Ofcom, Citizens, Communications and Convergence: A discussion paper (Office of Communications, 2008)
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published a summary of stakeholder responses to the consultation and outlined their next 
steps for 2010 and beyond.211 In summarising the next steps, Ofcom, noted that it was 
pleased that many of the ideas highlighted by the responses to the discussion paper, were 
in some way being addressed. These, however, related mostly to public service 
broadcasting and the switchover to digital television. More importantly, they noted that 
their decision making processes should more explicitly account for how they draw a 
distinction between the interests of consumers and citizens.212 In a later piece of work, 
Lunt noted that these developments regarding the citizen interest were relatively limited, 
and mainly involved classing vulnerable and elderly consumers as citizens.213 Moreover, 
Lunt drew attention to senior sources at Ofcom, who had indicated that they were not 
particularly interested in this consultation into the citizen interest.214 To a certain extent 
this assertion is validated by the following. In summarising the next steps, (following the 
consultation) Ofcom indicated that one overall single comprehensive tool kit for policy 
makers should be developed and within it there should be a methodology for dealing with 
the citizen interest. Since this report, no steps have been taken to achieve this.215 Ofcom 
still uses as its principle tool of regulatory and policy diagnosis, the one constructed by 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP in 2006 which is dedicated to the consumer interest.216
3.4.6 Research policies - Ofcom and the FSA
Beyond the distinction between citizen and consumer interest, Lunt and Livingstone also 
made reference to some other interesting features pertaining to Ofcom. In one paper they 
evaluated the work of the Financial Services Authority. The following outlines one 
conclusion that they drew with regards to both of these organisations. Lunt and
211 Ofcom, ‘Citizens, Communications and Convergance A Summary of stakeholder responses, and our next steps 
‘(Ofcom, 6 April 2010)
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/citizens/statement/Citizen Statement.odf> accessed 24 
October 2012
212 ibid
213 Sonia Livingstone, ‘What is the citizen’s interest in communication regulation? Ofcom’s agenda for ‘Citizens, 
communications and convergence’ (Conference Paper, Media@LSE Fiftieth Anniversary Conference, 21-23 
September 2008) p2
214 ibid 2
215 Ofcom, Ofcom’s Programme of Work 2012-2013 (Ofcom, March 2012)
216 Ofcom, Ofcom’s Programme of Work 2012-2013 (Ofcom, March 2012) ; Ofcom, ‘Capturing the consumer interest -  
A toolkit for regulators and government’ (Ofcom, February 2006)
<http://www.communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/downloads/Policv/Consumer%20InterestToolkit/Publications/capt 
uring the consumer interest%20a%20toolkit%20for%20regulators%20etc.pdf> accessed 25 October 2012
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Livingstone217 note that both Ofcom and the FSA hold themselves out to be ‘evidence 
based’ regulators. They suggest that there were serious questions to be answered about 
the method and research appropriated. They noted that the research agendas of both 
Ofcom and the FSA were largely issue driven and included a number of biases. In 
particular they noted that there was a bias towards surveys and interviewing - favouring 
that which can be quantified over the qualitative. They noted that this favours that which 
can be reported by individuals over that which causes either unrecognised difficulties or 
problems at a societal level.218 Moreover, they noted that the regulators favour the 
commissioning of professional market research companies over other sources of research. 
Lunt and Livingstone argue that this resulted in a ‘service approach’ to research as 
opposed to one that draws on theoretical traditions, or complex multi-dimensional 
analysis.219 The research, they posit, tends to confirm rather than contradict the regulators 
prior assumption, and providing such information as is useful, rather than challenging.220
3.4.7 Summary
For the purposes of this thesis the results of Lunt and Livingstone’s research project 
reveals a number of interesting findings and from these a connection can also be made 
with the Legal Services Act 2007. The first point of interest is the fact that the Legal 
Services Bill and the Communications Bill were both commenced in the House of Lords 
and during the debates on the Bills attention was focused on broadening the scope of the 
regulation beyond the consumer interest. It appears that the House of Lords were 
concerned during this period with the emphasis placed on the consumer. The research 
demonstrates that in practice Ofcom found it difficult to differentiate between the 
consumer and the citizen and it did not wish to engage wholeheartedly with discerning 
the difference. Lunt and Livingstone’s work suggests that Ofcom’s vision of itself was 
important and that this underpinned their willingness to get to grips with its statutory 
duties. As Ofcom viewed itself primarily as an economic regulator this explains in part, 
why the citizen was marginalised. In a different review of Ofcom’s performance by Tony
217 Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, ‘Regulation in the Public Interest’ (2007) 17 Consumer Policy Review 2 
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Prosser, it is pertinent to note that he identified the fact that market failure analysis 
underpinned most of Ofcom’s policies and regulatory actions.221 In line with the account 
of market failure earlier in this chapter, this would connect with the findings that the 
consumer interest was promoted above the citizen interest. Linked to each of these points, 
Lunt and Livingston’s analysis of the evidence and research appropriated and then relied 
upon by Ofcom is particularly apposite. The quantitative nature of the research connects 
with the need, previously outlined in this thesis, for regulators to be able to justify their 
decisions. In drawing these strands together it would appear that there are multiple 
reasons why a regulator may make policy and regulatory decisions in the interest of 
consumers.
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter set out to answer three questions. The first question was: ‘What is the 
consumer interest?’ The first section of this chapter outlined that the consumer interest, 
when understood in light of the political environment at the time that the Legal Services 
Bill was introduced to Parliament, was closely connected with the market. The consumer 
interest does include matters of consumer protection but, the Government’s own 
interpretation of the differences between the consumer, citizen and public interests, 
clearly equates the consumer interest with the market. For this reason the consumer 
interest is usually understood to relate to price, quality, choice and innovation. This 
construction of the consumer is based on individual preferences and these are inevitably 
assessed in light of the consumers’ willingness to pay. This section outlined how market 
failure analysis accommodates the consumer interest and also how the consumer is 
commonly the focus of competition policy.
The second question that this chapter sought to address was ‘What are the issues 
associated with regulating ostensibly in the consumer’s interest?’ A number of issues 
were identified as a result of pursuing the consumer interest through competition. A 
number of questions still remain unanswered as to the extent to which the consumer 
benefits from competition. These questions pertain to the focus on efficiency and the
221 Tony Prosser, ‘Regulation and Social Solidarity’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 3 364-87, 367 369
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influences that the prevailing Chicago theory of competition has on competition policy. 
As a result it was identified that through the pursuit of efficiency it is theoretically 
questionable whether non-economic interests, which might be taken to include aspects of 
the public interest are taken account of. Problems appear to manifest themselves in the 
way in which the composition of the market changes because a small number of 
businesses acquire a very large share of the market. It was argued that this may present a 
problem for legal services. It was also identified that the benefits of competition may be 
short lived leading eventually to higher prices and a less diverse range of providers. A 
number of these concerns were illustrated in connection with the deregulation of the 
market for spectacles. This example was used to outline the potential composition of a 
liberalised market. It also queried the research underpinning the supposed benefits that 
consumers are theoretically said to derive in terms of price and quality. It was argued that 
if regulators listen too closely to the interest of consumers to the exclusion of other 
important interests or issues, this may lead to interest group capture. The close 
relationship between the Legal Services Board and the Consumer Panel was identified. 
As a result, this connection is examined further in the next chapter.
The third question that this chapter sought to address was ‘For what reasons might the 
consumer interest come to subordinate other regulatory objectives?’ A number of reasons 
were outlined regarding why the consumer interest might come to subordinate other 
regulatory issues. The first reason was that the consumer is clearly identified as the focus 
of market failure theory. Because of a need to justify decisions, regulators are attracted to 
commonly used decision making approaches. These have a formula which means that 
regulators can justify their decisions. The problem with these approaches is that they 
primarily focus on individual values as opposed to collective values. Because of a 
systematic focus on individual interests and the fact that these are normally understood 
through willingness to pay information, values that are not easily quantified in this way 
are arguably omitted from consideration. This means that many broader societal values 
might not be considered. The difficulties of discerning the difference between consumer, 
citizen and public interests has led some regulators to argue that they are synonymous. 
By either ignoring, or not being aware of the fact that there is a difference, regulators who
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pursue the consumer interest thinking they are fulfilling the citizen or public interest are 
in fact potentially not considering the public interest. The willingness of a regulator and 
their own understanding of their duties was also identified as a reason why interests 
beyond the consumers might not be considered.
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CHAPTER 4 -  THE PUBLIC INTEREST. THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007
and REGULATORY OBJECTIVES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter discussed the consumer interest. Whilst it is to be acknowledged 
that the consumer interest is important,1 and indeed aspects of the Legal Services Act 
2007 have brought about some important developments regarding complaints handling in 
particular, it remains questionable whether regulating ostensibly in the consumers’ 
interest is prudent. The House of Lords clearly considered that it was not. This is 
reflected in the intention of the legislature by including the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’ The previous chapter outlined the fact that 
the consumer interest is commonly equated with the market. A particular economic 
conception of the consumer was found to underpin both market failure analysis and 
competition policy and law. The difference between the consumer and public interest has 
vexed a number of regulators, and there is evidence of a propensity for regulators to 
centre their policies and actions towards the consumer interest. This is arguably a 
reflection of the fact that under an obligation to be transparent, regulators search for an 
approach that they view to be methodologically sound. Building on these findings, this 
chapter considers how, in connection with the Legal Services Act 2007, the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ has been considered and how 
it has, to date, been integrated into policy and decision making processes.
This chapter seeks to address the following three questions:
1) What attempts have been made to understand the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the context of the Legal Services 
Act 2007?
1 David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ (Speech by Lord Neuberger Master of the Rolls 
25th Annual Bar Conference 6 November 2010)
httn://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/l 00350/bar conference lecture lord neuberger speech 061110.ndf accessed 29 
November 2012; Michael Trebilcock, Lawyers and the Consumer Interest (Butterworths 1982); Mary Seneviratne, The 
Legal Profession: Regulation and the Consumer (Sweet and Maxwell 1999)
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2) How have regulators, and in particular the Legal Services Board, pursued the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’?
3) Can the public interest, when used as a regulatory objective, be distinguished 
from other uses of the term public interest in legislation?
This chapter examines a number of definitions of the public interest connected with the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’ It then examines 
how one of these has been used by the Legal Services Board. The conclusion is drawn 
that there are difficulties associated with both understanding and operationalizing the 
term the ‘public interest.’ Building on these findings, this chapter examines the way in 
which the public interest is integrated in other pieces of legislation. It identifies that few 
pieces of legislation in the UK have explicit regulatory objectives, and fewer still include 
the public interest. A connection is made between the better regulation initiatives of the 
last 20 years and regulatory objectives. This examination is used to make a further 
connection with a body of scholarship which has questioned the premise of legislation 
furthering better regulation policies. The basis of these challenges is that in adopting a 
primarily economic focus, regulation has deviated from the public interest which scholars 
argue should be the overriding objective and justification for regulation. In light of this 
scholarship it is argued that the Legal Services Act 2007 is an intriguing piece of 
legislation because of the direct insertion of the regulatory objective to ‘protect and 
promote the public interest’. Together with the problems outlined earlier in this chapter, 
an argument is made that, despite the benefit of inserting the public interest as a 
regulatory objective, two simple issues frustrate it. The first is definition; the second is 
how it is to be operationalized by regulators in a way that might fulfil the legislative 
intention which underpinned its inclusion in the Legal Services Act 2007. This chapter 
concludes by outlining the need to understand better, just what the public interest is.
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4.2 DEFINITIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CONNECTION WITH THE
LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007
This section outlines three different definitions of the public interest in connection with 
the Legal Services Act 2007.2 The first definition considered was made by Lord Hunt, not 
in his capacity as the Chair of the Joint Select Committee reviewing the Legal Services 
Bill, but as an independent consultant to the Law Society of England and Wales. The 
second definition was made by Stephen Mayson, Professor of Law at the Legal Services 
Policy Institute. Rather than suggest one definition he has suggested, in two different 
papers, two different definitions. His first suggested definition of the public interest was 
in research commissioned by the Legal Services Board into areas of work reserved to 
lawyers. His second definition was made independently of this commissioned work. The 
third definition is the Legal Services Board’s outlined understanding of the public interest 
first published in the Legal Services Board's 2010-2011 Business Plan.3
4.2.1 Lord Hunt’s Definition of the Public Interest
Shortly after the Legal Services Act 2007 passed into law, Lord Hunt was commissioned 
by the Law Society of England and Wales to review legal services in England and Wales. 
Of interest to this thesis are Lord Hunt's thoughts on the public interest, which appear in 
his final report to the Law Society:
"The Public Interest is a mercurial concept, but I  think it can most succinctly be 
defined as an aggregation o f the individual and corporate interests o f everyone 
within a given territory, within which it must be the role o f government and its 
agencies to arbitrate as and when those interests conflict or collide. Within that 
back o f an envelove definition it is self-evidently possible that some o f the 
regulatory objectives in the Act may come into conflict from time to time; and 
there seems to be a lot o f concern that the consumer and public interest may be 
the most likely to rub up against each other in such a fashion. ” 4
2 Lord Hunt of Wirrall HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 117-118
3 Legal Services Board , Business Plan 2010-2011. (Legal Services Board 2010)
<http://wvw.legalservicesboard.org.uk7news publications/publications/ndf/final annual plan 2010.r>df> accessed 15 
August 2012
4 David Hunt, The Hunt Review of the Regulation o f Legal Services (Law Society, London, October 2009) 32
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Lord Hunt, during the passage of the Legal Services Bill ventured a definition of the 
public interest. His definition in the Law Society report is not altogether that different. 
His approach to the public interest is interesting for a number of reasons. The first is that 
he views the public interest in a way which has been classified as ‘preponderance.’ This 
is due to the fact that it suggests that the public interest is defined by reference to a sum 
of individual and corporate interests. Some have argued that this majoritarian approach, 
may serve to exclude minority interests from the public interest.5 A number of criticisms 
are associated with this conception of the public interest, the most notable because it may 
fail to take account of future generations.6 Whilst it may appear to be a value neutral 
approach to the public interest, it is likely to incorporate the values of the status quo thus 
serving to reflect and reinforce the values and inequalities inherent in existing power 
relationships.7 In a regulatory context- and, more specifically, regarding the Legal 
Services Act 2007 this definition argues that it is for the Government, or its agencies, to 
decide what the public interest is. Assuming that the Legal Services Board and the 
approved regulators fall under the umbrella of the ‘government and its agencies,’ this 
definition includes no formula or direction stating what the public interest is, or what is of 
importance to be considered in its name. For these reasons this definition does not 
advance the discourse in relation to the public interest and legal services particularly far.
4.2.2 Stephen Mayson’s Definitions of the Public Interest
Stephen Mayson,8 Professor of Law at the College of Law's Legal Services Policy Unit 
in 2010/2011 wrote two papers for the Legal Services Board. The first paper9 was a 
historical account of reserved legal activities; the second10 was titled ‘What is the case for 
reservation’. It is within this second paper that Mayson attempts a definition of the
5 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books, 1970) 173.
6 ibid 173
7 ibid 173
8 Stephen Mayson, ‘The Regulation of Legal Services: What is the case for reservation?’ (Legal Services Institute 
Interim Strategic Discussion Paper, February 2011) http://\wvw.legalservicesinstitute.org.uk accessed 12th July 2012 
page 3-4.
9 Stephen Mayson, ‘The Regulation of Legal Services : Reserved Legal Activities : History and Rationale’ (Legal 
Services Institute, Strategic Discussion Paper, August 2010)
10 Stephen Mayson, ‘The Regulation of Legal Services: What is the case for reservation?’ (Legal Services Institute 
Interim Strategic Discussion Paper, February 2011) http://www.legalservicesinstitute.org.uk 3-4.
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‘public interest’. Throughout both papers he makes the argument that legal services 
regulation should be in the ‘public interest’. On pages 3-4 of his second report, the 
following can be found:
“in our view the public interest is a much broader concept -  albeit underpinned 
by the rule o f law, the broader legal system, and the administration o f justice. In 
this paper, therefore, we offer our own notion o f the public interest, which is not 
confined to matters legal:
“The public interest concerns objectives and actions for the collective benefit and 
good o f citizens in achieving and maintaining those elements o f society that are 
regulated by them as essential to their common security and well-being”11
On this view, public interest issues include national defence, public health, 
education, the rule o f law and the administration o f justice, access to justice, the 
protection o f human rights and the natural environment, effective government, a 
sound economy (including the free movement o f people and capital), and reliable 
personal, public and commercial relationships. The view taken by citizens o f what 
is regarded by them as essential will change over time; and o f course whether 
something is for the collective benefit or good o f society is itself a matter o f 
judgment. But governments, judges and regulators are, arguably, elected or 
appointed as the transitory arbiters o f that judgment. ”12
Mayson adopts a wide and all-encompassing approach to the public interest. In contrast 
to Lord Hunt, Mayson adopts an approach which indicates that the public interest is what 
is in all individuals' interests, not an aggregation of interests. Mayson also appears to 
suggest that the public interest is a normative ideal, specifying broadly what needs to be 
achieved in its name. However, as besets many definitions of the public interest, as noted
"ibid
12 ibid
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later in this thesis, this definition is not conducive to operationalization in the hands of 
regulators.
In an independent paper written after the research outlined above, Mayson refined his 
definition of the public interest.13 This definition was constructed predominately in light 
of Michael Feintuck’s book on the public interest in regulation. In being moved to 
produce this definition Mayson pointedly noted that the Legal Services Board needed to 
consider more than the consumer. He sought to be value neutral in his approach towards 
constructing the following definition:
“The public interest concerns objectives and actions for the collective benefit and 
good o f current and future citizens in achieving and maintaining those 
fundamentals o f society that are regarded by them as essential to their common 
security and well-being, and to their legitimate participation in society. ”14
This definition has much to commend it. It has been recognised as one of the clearest 
attempts at encapsulating the public interest.15 However, for present purposes, it is to be 
noted that this definition was not accompanied by any method or determination as to how 
regulators are to integrate the public interest into their policy and decision making 
approaches. In an overarching sense, it identifies with the aspects of the public interest 
outlined in chapter two of this thesis.
13 Stephen Mayson, ‘Legal Services Regulation and ‘The Public Interest’ (Legal Services Institute, July 2011)10 
<http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=i&q=stephen+mavson+and+public+interest&source=web&cd=4&ved:=0CDA 
OFiAD&url=http%3A%2F%2FwwwJega1servicesinstitute.org.uk%2FWorkArea%2FDownloadAsset.aspx%3Fid%3D 
6442451899%261ibID%3D6442451899&ei=OVWFUM3nAeLWOOWAsoHwBA&usg=AFOiCNEN2RGUmw4REirF 
Vc 1 v3 FT0fbbr2Q> accessed 15 June 2012; This paper was updated in January 2013 to take account of the Lord 
Leveson’s report into press freedom. The substantive definition of the Public Interest propounded by Stephen Mayson 
has not changed. Stephen Mayson, ‘Legal Services Regulation and ‘The Public Interest’ (Legal Services Institute, 
January 2013) <http://www.legalservicesinstitute.org.uk/LSI/Legal Services Regulation and the Public Interest -
updated/> accessed 15 January 2013
14 Stephen Mayson, ‘Legal Services Regulation and ‘The Public Interest” (Legal Services Institute, July 2011) 10
<http://www.goog1e.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=i&q=stephen+mavson+and+public-Hnterest&source=web&cd=4&ved-0CDA 
OFiAD&url-http%3A%2F%2Fwww.legalservicesinstitute.org.uk%2FWorkArea%2FDownloadAsset.aspx%3Fid%3D 
6442451899%261ibID%3D6442451899&ei=OVWFUM3nAeLWOOWAsoHwBA&usg-AFOiCNEN2RGUmw4REirF 
Vclv3FT0fbbr2Q> accessed 15 June 2012
15 Ruth Deech, ‘The Legal Profession: Regulating for Independence’ (Speech delivered at Gresham College, London, 
July 30th 2012) <http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/regulating-the-regulators> accessed 27 November 
2012
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4.2.3 The Legal Services Board’s Definition of the Public Interest 
In the Legal Services Board's Business Plan 2010-201116 working definitions of the 
regulatory objectives in Legal Services Act 2007 were set out. The following sets out 
their definition of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’:
“1) The public must have confidence in the legal system and those who work 
within it. That is because the legal system is key to the resolution o f disputes, the 
proper maintenance o f legal relationships and process -  the rule o f law, and 
indeed democracy itself
2) The duty is to protect and promote -  to place actively the public interest higher 
than sectional interests o f particular consumer or professional interests.
3) The Legal Services Board considers that the public interest is best served 
through a properly regulated market compatible with the regulatory objectives. 
But that alone does not guarantee the public interest. In meeting the regulatory 
objectives, the Legal Services Board’s approved regulators will face tensions 
between different objectives that allow for different courses o f action.
4) We also consider that a commitment to transparency is particularly important 
in relation to promoting the public interest. We will operate in that way, setting 
out in consultation documents how our proposals help to deliver the regulatory 
objectives and we expect approved regulators to do the same.
5) The principle o f separation o f regulation and representation within the 
approved regulators is key to this objective. Technical compliance with the rules 
is an important foundation but nothing less than public confidence will satisfy the 
public interest as secured by this objective.
6) We intend that over time public and consumer confidence in the legal sector
will rise, whether as measured by looking at complaints handling, faith in
16 Legal Services Board, Business Plan 2010-2011. (Legal Services Board 2010)
<httn://w\vw.1ega1servicesboard.org.uk/news miblications/publications/pdf/fïnal annual plan 2010.r>df> accessed 15 
August 2012
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lawyers, or trust in regulation. The Legal Services Consumer Panel will be 
important in holding the regulatory framework to account for the consumer 
interest. ”
Most likely because of the Hampton principles for better regulation17 and transparency, in 
particular, the Legal Services Board was prompted to outline its understanding of the 
regulatory objectives. This understanding of the public interest is interesting for a number 
of reasons. Foremost of which is that it provides a valuable insight into how the Legal 
Services Board understands this regulatory objective. Unfortunately the Legal Services 
Board did not publish any information or details about how it arrived at this definition. 
The Legal Services Board published this definition very soon after it became a fully 
functioning organisation.18 It is certainly unclear whether the Board drew on any 
precedents or theoretical understandings of the term ‘public interest’ in constructing this 
understanding of the public interest. For reasons which will become apparent later in this 
thesis, it is possible to argue that the Legal Services Board did not enquire into the 
considerable body of discourse associated with the public interest. This definition has, 
however, underpinned the Legal Services Board’s approach to the public interest since its 
publication. Recent publications still refer to this definition.19 The following examines 
the definition.
The first paragraph of the Legal Service’s Boards definition connects the public interest 
with confidence in the legal system and those who work in it. It also connects the public 
interest to much broader aspects of society. It is interesting, however, that it refers to
17 Inserted specifically in the Act at Legal Services Act 2007, Part 2, s3(a)
18Legal Services Board the oversight regulator for the legal sector, independent of both the profession and government. 
It is sponsored by the Ministry of Justice, paid for by levy on approved regulators (ARs). It currently has an operating 
budget of under £5m, with 33 employees, and 9 Board Members. In 2008, David Edmonds was appointed Chair of the 
Legal Services Board, and by July 2008 the other Board members were in place. The Board ‘went live’ on the 1st 
January 2009 with statutory powers to make rules. In September 2009 the Consumer Panel was appointed, chaired by 
Diana Hayter. The Board went ‘fully live’ on the 1st January 2010, replete with enforcement powers and full 
operational license.
1 Legal Services Board, Evaluation Framework (Legal Services Board, April 2011)
<http://www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/news miblications/publications/pdf/evaluation framework anril 2011.ndf>
accessed 12 October 2012
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confidence rather than justifiable confidence. Confidence is an impressionistic feeling. It 
has nothing to do with whether the system behind its image is appropriate or not.20
The second paragraph seeks to prioritise the public interest over sectional interests and 
the consumer interest.21 In a general sense a number of commentators have asserted that 
regulation must be in the public interest. The Government referred to this in the debates 
on the Legal Services Bill.22 However, in the explanatory notes on the Legal Services Act 
2007 it states that the regulatory objectives are all equal, and no one objective supersedes 
others.23 Operationally, it is logical for the public interest to supersede other regulatory 
objectives, provided it can be understood and discerned. This particular section raises a 
serious question about which regulatory objectives are to be regarded more important 
than others.
The third paragraph of the definition indicates that the Legal Services Board believes a 
properly regulated market is the best way of safeguarding the public interest. It then 
appears to indicate that there will be times when this is not appropriate, but does not seek 
to outline when this may be, or how they may go about dealing with this. The statement 
implicitly accepts that there may be other non-economic considerations to take into 
account when regulating. This section appears to be more of statement outlining the 
Legal Services Board’s ideology, as opposed to anything else.
The fourth paragraph merely indicates that transparency is in the public interest. Whilst 
this is undoubtedly an important statement, it is a repetition of the obligation for the 
Legal Services Board and the Approved Regulators to follow the Hampton Principles,
20 David Neuberger, ‘Professional Discipline -  Challenges for the Future’ (Lord Neuberger, Master of the Rolls, 
Keynote Speech, Disciplinary Conference, 5 February 2010)
21 Stephen Mayson, The Regulation of Legal Services: What is the case for reservation?’ (Legal Services Institute 
Interim Strategic Discussion Paper, February 2011) <httn://ww\v.legalservicesinstitute.ora.uk> accessed 14 July 2012 
page 3-4; David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ (Speech by Lord Neuberger Master of 
the Rolls 25th Annual Bar Conference 6 November 2010); Ruth Deech, ‘The Legal Profession: Regulating for 
Independence’ (Speech delivered at Gresham College, London, July 30th 2012) <http://www.gresham.ac.uk/1 ectures- 
and-events/the-legal-profession-regulating-for-independence> accessed 27 November 2012
22 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 123
^Explanatory Notes to the Legal Services Act 2007, Part 1, si, (ss 27,28)
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which are specifically included in sections 3(3)(a)24 & 28(3)25 of the Legal Services Act 
2007.
The fifth paragraph of the Legal Services Board’s definition squarely equates the public 
interest with the separation of the regulation and representation function of professional 
bodies. This is an intriguing statement, given that this is a statutory requirement of the 
Legal Services Act 2007.26 The section then talks about technical compliance. It is 
unclear whether this refers to the separation of regulation and representation, or the way 
in which lawyers abide by codes of conduct.
The final paragraph seeks to frame the public interest in terms of the consumer interest 
and public confidence.27 This, for reasons articulated below, is interesting as the 
consumer is only one facet of the public interest, and also the subject of its own 
regulatory objective. Importing the consumer interest into the public interest is also 
difficult to rationalise with section 2 of the definition, though it is arguably consistent 
with section 3 of the definition which connects the public interest with the market.
The six paragraphs which go to make up the Legal Services Board’s definition aligns the 
public interest with confidence, the free market, transparency, the separation of regulation 
and representation, and consumer confidence. It deals with concepts at a level of 
generality that cannot readily be translated into policy and regulatory decision making 
processes. The definition of the public interest by the Legal Services Board is, in part, 
difficult to understand. Whilst the Legal Services Board is to be commended for 
attempting to define the public interest, it is clear that it has subjectively arrived at what it 
thinks the public interest is without any identifiable theoretical basis or any stakeholder
24 Legal Services Act 2007, 3(3)(a)
25 Legal Services Act 2007,28(3)
26 Legal Services Act 2007, s29,s30.
27 Emphasis seems to be place on translating the public interest into public confidence. Under the heading of 
independence and the separation of regulation and representation, the Legal Services Board Annual Report 2009/10 
notes "many parts of the profession and their regulators were quick to accept the need for some level of independence 
of regulation to promote the public interest and in turn the commercial well-being of practitioners". Legal Services 
Board ‘Annual Report 2009-2010’ (Legal Services Board, 19 July 2010)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news nublications/nublications/ndf/Legal Services
Board009 annual report web 2 final.ndf> accessed 25 October 2012
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engagement. The content is limited and it also includes some statements which are 
difficult to rationalise. It falls short of capturing some of the important aspects of the 
public interest identified in chapter two. It is difficult to locate this approach to the public 
interest within any of the theoretical conceptions outlined in the next chapter. Instead it 
leads to the suggestion that it is a concoction of ideas pertaining to other regulatory 
objectives, the consumer interest and public confidence. The conclusion to be arrived at 
is that this understanding falls somewhat short of providing a robust understating of the 
public interest capable of satisfactorily orientating the regulation of legal services.
4.2.4 Analysis- The Definitions of the Public Interest
These three definitions vary considerably as to what the public interest is, and the way in 
which it is to be understood. This highlights a very important point. This is that there are 
a number of ideas associated with what the public interest is generally and, more 
specifically within the context of the Legal Services Act 2007. This can be contrasted 
with the construction of the consumer outlined in the last chapter whereby, relatively 
speaking, a much clearer image of what the consumer interest is emerged. Whilst the 8 
approved regulators and the Legal Services Board may come to differ regarding the exact 
nature of the consumer interest, there are ways in which it can be integrated into both 
policy and decision making frameworks. Moreover, toolkits have been designed to 
understand the consumer interest further.28 The following considers subsequent 
statements made by the Legal Services Board in connection with the public interest.
4.3 THE LEGAL SERVICES BOARD AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Since the publication of the Legal Services Board’s 2010-2011 business plan one 
comment made by the Legal Services Board is particularly noteworthy regarding the 
public interest. The Legal Services Board commissioned Christopher Decker and George 
Yarrow29 from the Regulatory Policy Institute to investigate the economic rationale
28 Ofcom, ‘ Capturing the Consumer Interest: A Report o f the Launch o f the Toolkit for Regulators and Government ’ 
(Ofcom, 2 February 2006)
<http://w\vw.coin rnunicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/down1oads/Po1icv/Consumer%20InterestToo1kit/Events/Canturing 
%20the%20Consumer%20Interest%20A%20report%20of%20the%20Launch%20etc.pdf>accessed 19 October 2012
29 Christopher Decker, George Yarrow, Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation 
(Regulatory Policy Institute, 31 October 2010)
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underpinning the regulation of legal services. The report was published in March 2011. It 
was published together with a collection of academic essays.30 The final essay in the 
collection was written by Alex Roy, for and on behalf of the Legal Services Board. Roy 
set out to draw conclusions from the Decker and Yarrow study and the academic 
commentary in the accompanying essays. The essay Roy wrote also sought to outline the 
Legal Services Board’s approach ‘moving forward.’ On the subject of the public interest 
Roy made the following observation:
"Further work is also required to define and understand what is meant by public 
interest, in particular to define how and where it differs from consumer interest 
and where it is more or less important? Public interest is clearly at the heart o f 
legal services but how we translate this concept and use it within an assessment 
framework will need to be considered carefully over the coming months. "31
Viewed in perspective, this comment would appear to signal that the Legal Services 
Board was grappling to understand the public interest, nearly three years after it was 
established. To a certain extent it underlines some of the problems identified above with 
regards to the definition that appeared in the Legal Services Board’s 2010-2011 Business 
Plan. Roy’s comment raises a number of pertinent questions. If the Legal Services Board 
was unsure of what the public interest is then how had they been fulfilling its duty to 
protect and promote the public interest? The essay also questions when the consumer 
interest is more or less important than the public interest. Such a statement is at odds with 
the Legal Services Board’s own definition, which indicates that the public interest is to be 
placed higher than sectional interest of consumers. It also strikes at the common
<http://www.1ega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/economic rationale for Legal Services R 
egulation Fina1.pdfi> accessed 12 June 2012
30 Legal Services Board, Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation - A Collection of Essays 
(Legal Services Board , March 2011)
<http://www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/economics of legal services regulation di 
scussion papers publication final.pdf> accessed 12 June 2012
31 Alex Roy, ‘Final Thoughts’ in, Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation A Collection of 
Essays, ( Legal Services Board, March 2011)
<http://www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publication/latest news/pdf/economics of legal services regulation dis
cussion papers publication final.odf> accessed 12 October 2012 p57.
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consensus that the public interest is more important than the consumer interest.32 This 
point is also at odds with an assertion that Roy then went on to make in his essay. In the 
paragraph that followed the forgoing excerpt, Roy noted:
"To understand legal services it is essential to consider the role o f legal services 
as “part o f the broader social-political-moral landscape that comprises a 
society’s legal system. ” This public interest aspect o f legal services is, i f  not 
unique to law, certainly a central feature o f law that must be considered in any 
impact analysis. "3S
Given that these comments were made in one of the Legal Services Board’s official 
publications, it is reasonable to imply that this is the formal position of the Legal Services 
Board. Alex Roy, at the time of writing, was the Legal Services Board’s research 
manager and has since been promoted to Head of Development and Research. The 
rationale for noting this is that the next thing that he went on to say, regarding the formal 
approach that the Legal Services Board would take towards regulatory decision making, 
was:
"The Framework we develop will therefore feature at its heart a standard 
approach to cost benefit analysis familiar to many who have previously used the 
Treasury’s Green Book. ”34
32 See: Jeremy Goldsmith , ‘The Core Values of the Legal Profession for Lawyers Today and Tomorrow’ (2008) 28 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 441; Stephen Mason, ‘The Regulation of Legal Services: What 
is the case for reservation?’ (Legal Services Institute Interim Strategic Discussion Paper, February 2011) 
<httn://www.legalservicesinstitute.org.uk> accessed 29 November 2012 page 3-4; ; David Neuberger, The Tyranny of 
the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ (Speech by Lord Neuberger Master of the Rolls 25th Annual Bar Conference 6 
November 2010); Ruth Deech, ‘The Legal Profession: Regulating for Independence’ (Speech delivered at Gresham 
College, London, July 30th 2012); James Spiegleman , ‘Are Lawyers Lemons?’ (The 2002 Lawyer’s Lecture : 
Competition Principles and Professional Lecture, Banco Court, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 29th October 
2002)
33 Alex Roy, ‘Final Thoughts’ in, Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation A Collection of  
Essays, ( Legal Services Board, March 2011)
<httir//www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publication/latest news/pdf/economics of legal sendees regulation dis 
cussion papers publication final.ndf> accessed 12 October 2012 p57
34 ibid 54
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This is a particularly curious assertion, given the main report by Decker and Yarrow had 
been at pains to point out the problems of market failure analysis and cost benefit 
analysis,35 and had suggested that an altogether different approach would be more 
appropriate for assessing the grounds for regulation in legal services. Decker and Yarrow 
drew attention to institutional economics, as a possible alternative, noting that it relies 
inherently less on unstated assumptions and more on empirical evidence.36 They also 
advocated a much greater consideration of the public interest, and the development of a 
framework for its analysis within regulation.37 Roy’s assertions regarding the Treasury 
Green book are all the more extraordinary, given the fact that market failure analysis is 
widely disparaged, for not being able to take account of non-economic public interests. 
This is no more so than in the Decker and Yarrow report.38 It is also a curious assertion 
for a supposedly independent regulator of legal services, charged with a range of 
regulatory objectives, to indicate that it is adopting the Green Book39 approach to 
economic regulation.
The comments made by Alex Roy in his essay suggest that the Legal Services Board was 
committed to an approach, irrespective of the Decker and Yarrow findings. There is 
certainly little publicly available evidence to suggest that the Legal Services Board has 
acted on the findings of the Decker and Yarrow report. This is no clearer than in a
35 Christopher Decker, George Yarrow, Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation 
(Regulatory Policy Institute, 31 October 2010)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/economic rationale for Legal Services R 
egulation Final.pdfi> accessed 12 June 2012 p9-l 1
36 ibid 9-11
37 ibid 9-11
38 ibid 9-11
39 HM Treasury, The Green Book Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (HMSO, 2003) The Green Book 
outlines that regulatory intervention should be based on market failure coupled with cost benefit analysis. Page 11 of 
the Green Book outlines the rationale for regulatory intervention as follows:
"The underlying rationale is usually founded either in market failure or where there are clear government 
distributional objectives that need to be met. Market failure refers to where the market has not and cannot o f itself be 
expected to deliver an efficient outcome; the intervention that is contemplated will seek to redress this"
Annex One to the Green Book develops the idea of market failure, and outlines the reasons why the market mechanism 
cannot achieve economic efficiency. These are Public Goods, Externalities, Imperfect Information, Market Power 
(Competition). Once a reason for action is found within market failure, and options suggested, the Green Book 
mandates that the relevant costs and benefits to government and society of all options should be valued, and the net 
benefits or costs calculated. The Green Book indicates that costs and benefits should normally be based on market 
prices. The Green Book does acknowledge that there may be wider social and environmental costs for which there is no 
market price. Annex Two to the Green book provides more information on how to take account of wider impacts. The 
advice in Annex two notes that where market values are not available for an identified cost of benefit, there are a 
number of approaches to attributing a value for inclusion in an appraisal. These include Willingness to Pay, 
Willingness to Accept, and Weighting and Scoring.
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consultation paper that the Legal Services Board published very shortly after the Decker 
and Yarrow report. The Consultation titled ‘Enhancing Consumer Protection, Reducing 
Regulatory Restrictions’40 was published on the 29th July 2011. The consultation set out 
how the Legal Services Board would approach the boundaries of legal services regulation 
and connected regulatory decisions in line with obligations in the Legal Services Act 
2007. The consultation document set out to pave a transparent approach to making 
regulatory decisions. On pages 37-38 of the report the Legal Services Board suggests an 
approach called the ‘regulatory decision making framework’. The first stage involves an 
identification of the area of legal services for review. The second stage seeks to identify 
relevant issues. The third stage compiles the information and identifies if further evidence 
is necessary. The fourth stage assesses whether any other pieces of law or non-statutory 
safeguards are more appropriate. The fifth stage involves a cost benefit analysis. It is 
pertinent to note that the Legal Services Board does draw attention to the public interest. 
They note as follows:
"The public interest is not easily defined: it often means different things to 
different people. We believe that all the regulatory objective together define the 
public interest. In practice regulating in the public interest means finding the 
right balance between the objectives in a given circumstance and aligning the 
objective with the better regulation principles. The public interest will not be 
static and will need to be assessed for each regulatory decision. The public 
interest will always be based upon "deserved public confidence in the legal 
system". Legal services are part o f a broader social-political-moral landscape 
that underpins the fabric o f our society built on the rule o f law. The importance o f  
public confidence in the provision o f legal services and the effective 
administration o f justice holds greater significance than might be attributed to 
other professional services. "41
Legal Services Board
40 Legal Services Board , Enhancing consumer protection, reducing regulatory restrictions — A discussion document 
about how the Legal Services Board will assess the boundaries o f legal services regulation and connected regulatory 
decisions (Legal Services Board, 29 July 2011)
<httr>://\vww.legalservicesboard.org.iik/what we do/consultations/open/pdf/cnhancing consumer protection reducing 
restrictions final 2807201 lx.odP> accessed 24 May 2012 p 10
41 ibid
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This statement resembles the Legal Services Board’s definition of Legal Services 
outlined above as it frames the public interest in terms of public confidence. It is to be 
noted that public confidence is accompanied here by the need for it to be deserved. 
Within the framework for decision making, the Legal Services Board mentions the public 
interest. The Legal Services Board notes it will ‘consider’ the public interest. The Legal 
Services Board also equates the public interest with ‘reaching vulnerable groups whose 
needs may be different to other parts o f society’. Whilst the references to the public 
interest are encouraging, the aforementioned outline of the public interest seemingly 
underpins their understanding. Moreover, Annex 5, included in the consultation outlines a 
framework for identification of regulatory needs regarding the possible reservation of 
legal work to reserved persons. This is in view of calls for will writing and probate to 
become regulated and practised by authorised persons. Throughout, the public interest is 
equated solely with the consumer and confidence in the legal system.42
Since the comments made by Alex Roy in the collection of essays43, no further publicly 
available and discoverable work has been undertaken in respect of understanding better 
the public interest. There is no publicly available evidence of "careful consideration over 
the coming months” as outlined in Alex Roy’s essay. The consultation44 made no 
reference to this better understanding of the public interest neither did the report which 
summarised the response to the consultation.45 There has been no published alteration of 
the Legal Services Board’s understanding of the public interest, or further evidence of 
how it should be considered. This was despite comments made by the Legal Services 
Board as to the seriousness of the public interest. Whilst the forgoing reveals that the
42 ibid 72
43 Alex Roy, ‘Final Thoughts’ in, Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation A Collection of 
Essays, ( Legal Services Board, March 2011)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publication/latest news/pdf/economics of legal services regulation dis 
cussion papers publication final.pdf> accessed 12 October 2012 p54
44Legal Services Board , Enhancing consumer protection, reducing regulatory restrictions -  A discussion document 
about how the Legal Services Board will assess the boundaries o f legal services regulation and connected regulatory 
decisions (Legal Services Board , 29 July 2011)
<http://www.lega1sendcesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/open/pdf/enhancing consumer protection reducing 
restrictions final 2807201 lx.pdf> accessed 24 May 2012 pi 1
45 Legal Services Board , Enhancing consumer protection, reducing regulatory restrictions -Summary o f responses to 
the discussion paper and decision document (Legal Services Board, April 2012)
<http://www.legalsendcesboard.org.uk/what we do/consu1tations/closed/pdf/6.pdf> accessed 17 October 2012
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Legal Services Board regards the public interest as difficult to define, it is not easy to 
rationalise the forgoing statement with the fact that it has articulated what it perceives the 
public interest to be in their definition. It is also difficult to rationalise as more recently 
published documents including an Evaluation Framework, based on metrics, seeks to 
measure the improvements in the legal services market. It also frame an understanding of 
the public interest in terms of confidence in the legal profession and the legal system.46 It 
should be noted that these metrics do not prefix the word ‘confidence’ with the 
description ‘deserved.’47
The references to the public interest outlined above, with the exception of the general 
definition of the public interest and the evaluation framework, are made in the context of 
the Legal Services Board’s self-described statutory function.48 This is where the Board is 
directly involved in creating regulation or statutory intervention. The function of the 
Legal Services Board is much broader than this. It has a broad remit as outlined in 
chapter one, whereby it oversees the regulatory arrangements of the other approved 
regulators. It has to make a number of determinations regarding which policies to 
promote, which risks to consider and generally how to further the regulation of the legal 
services market. The regulatory objectives pertain to all of the functions of the Legal 
Services Board, therefore, the regulatory objectives, and their understanding exist beyond 
just regulatory decision making. Other than the broad definition of what the regulatory 
objectives mean, the Legal Services Board has not published any information regarding 
how it incorporates the public interest into the range of other functions that it has. In line 
with its statutory obligation to outline how it has fulfilled the regulatory objectives,49 this 
has been done by way of charting activities against all of the regulatory objectives on an
46Legal Services Board, Evaluation Framework (Legal Services Board, April 2011)
<http://www.1egalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/evaluation framework anril 2011 .pdf> 
accessed 12 October 20; Legal Services Board, Strategic Plan 2012-15 Business Plan 2012/13 (Legal Services Board, 
April 2012)
<http://www.1ega1servicesb0ard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/business plan 20121.3 final.pdf> 
accessed 30 April 2012
47Legal Services Board , Evaluation Framework (Legal Services Board, April 2011)
<http://www.1ega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/evaluation framework april 2011 .pdf>  
accessed 30 April 2012
48Legal Services Board, Strategic Plan 2012-15 Business Plan 2012/13 (Legal Services Board , April 2012) 
<http://www.1egalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/business plan 201213 final.pd£> 
accessed 30 April 2012
49 Legal Services Act 2007, s 6 (2) (b)
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elaborate spread sheet.50 Everything done by the Legal Services Board receives a tick 
against the public interest column.51 This provides no further insight into the Board’s 
understanding of the public interest other than to signal that it regards everything that it 
does as being in the public interest.
4.3.1 The Legal Services Board’s Understanding of the Public Interest
The conclusion could certainly be drawn at this point that the Legal Services Board has 
struggled with the public interest. In connection with the regulatory objective, it is 
arguable that the objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ may not have 
been sufficiently identified. A simple query is how could the Legal Services Board have 
‘protected and promoted the public interest’ if it did not know what it is? Moreover, it is 
possible to argue that this conclusion is bolstered if they think that the consumer interest 
may at times be more important than the public interest. It becomes evident, in the 
following sections, that the Legal Services Board has directed considerable effort towards 
the consumer interest. From the attempt at defining the public interest, and the way in 
which it has been closely connected with confidence, the Legal Services Board may well 
be pursuing its own vision of the public interest. The following reflects on the overall 
approach that the Legal Services Board has taken towards its activities.
4.3.2 The Activities of the Legal Services Board
A number of observations, bolstered by the aforementioned acknowledgement by the 
Legal Services Board, regarding their difficulties with the public interest, draw attention 
to the fact that the Legal Services Board has been preoccupied with the consumer 
interest. This is reminiscent of the findings of the research undertaken by Lunt and 
Livingstone outlined in chapter three with regards to Ofcom. The Legal Services Board 
has made strident steps towards understanding the consumer interest,52 measuring the
50Legal Services Board, Legal Services Board Annual Report and Accounts 2011/2012 (Legal Services Board , June 
2012) <httD://\vww.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/ndf/Leiial Services 
Board annual report 2011 12 isbn 9780102978230.ndf> accessed 4 July 2012
51 ibid
52Legal Services Board, ‘Initial Consumer research results’, (Legal Services Board, 2009) 
<httD://wvvw.legalservieesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/ndf/Legal Services 
Board summary of you gov research .pdf>23 October 2012 ; Vanilla Research /Understanding consumer needs from 
legal information sources’ (Legal Services Board , July 2012)
<httD://wwvv.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/ndf/understanding consumer needs from
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extent to which the professions have accommodated it53 and how the consumer 
experience can be benchmarked.54 A significant percentage of the research appropriated 
by the Board has been orientated towards the consumer.55 In comparison with the 
consumer interest, there has been a palpable lack of attention paid to the public interest, 
despite a number of scholars suggesting to the Board that it should consider it more 
thoroughly.56 Beyond this there is ample rhetorical evidence to suggest that the Legal
legal information sources final report.pdf> accessed 23 October 2012; Rosaline Sullivan, ‘The Legal needs of 
consumer groups’ (Legal Services Board, April 2011)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/demand literature review.ndf> 23 
October 2012; IFF Research ‘Understanding the consumer experience of will writing’ (Legal Services Board, July
2011) <http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/Legal Services 
Board will writing report final.pdf>23 October 2012 ;Legal Services Board, ‘Legal Needs of Consumer Groups’ 
(Legal Services Board , April 2011)
<http://www.1egalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/consumer research.htm> 23 October 2012
53 ‘A Framework to monitor the legal services sector’ (OXERA, September 2011) 
<http://mw.legalsemcesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/Legal Services
Board will writing report fmal.pdf> accessed 23rd October 2012; Frontier Economics ‘Legal Services provided by 
special bodies’ (Legal Services Board, September 2011)
<http://mw.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/rep Legal Sendees
Board special bodies final report 07 07 11 stc.pdf> accessed 23rd October 2012; Legal Services Board ‘Quality in
legal services and other regulated professions (Legal Services Board, November 2011)
<http://mw.legalsemcesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/qualitv of the legal profession.pdf> 
accessed 23rd October 2012; Opinion Leader Developing measures of consumer outcomes for legal services (Legal 
Services Board, March 2011)
<http://mvw.lega1semcesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/consumer outcomes final research report. 
pdf> accessed 23rd October 2012; Vanilla Research /Understanding consumer needs from legal information sources’ 
(Legal Services Board , July 2012)
<http://mw.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/understanding consumer needs from 
legal information sources final report.pdf> accessed 23rd October 2012
54 Charles River Associates ‘Benchmarking the supply of legal services by city law firms’ (Legal Services Board, 
September 2011)
<http://www.1egalservicesboard.org.uk/riews publications/latest news/pdf/benchmarking city law firms final report 
v3.pdf> accessed 23rd October 2012; Pascoe Pleasance, Nigel Balmer, ‘A Framework for Benchmarking Small 
Business Consumers’ need for and use of Legal Services ‘ (Legal Services Board, May 2012)
<http://www.1egalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/a framework for benchmarking small 
business consumers need for and use of legal services Legal Services Board report 17 07 12.pdf ^ accessed 
23rd October 2012; Legal Services Board, ‘Market Impacts of the Legal Services act -  Interim Baseline Report’ (Legal 
Services Board 2012)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/market impacts o f the legal services 
act interim baseline report.pdf> accessed 23rd October 2012; BDRC Continental, ‘Legal Services Consumer 
benchmarking survey’(Legal Services Board, June 2012)
<http://mw.1ega1servicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdt/individual consumers use o f legal se 
rvices Legal Services Board report 17 07 12 ii.pdf> accessed 23rd October 2012;
55See in particular : Legal Services Board, Legal Services Board Annual Report and Accounts 2011/2012 (Legal 
Services Board, June 2012) <http://wmv.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/Legal Services 
Board annual report 2011 12 isbn 9780102978230.pdf> accessed 4 July 2012 pages 24-26
56 Laurel Terry ‘The Importance of Interdisciplinary Dialogues’ in, Roy et a l, Understanding the economic rationale 
for legal services regulation A Collection of Essays, ( Legal Services Board, March 2011)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publication/latest news/pdf/economics of legal services regulation dis 
cussion papers publication final.pdf> accessed 12 October 2012 p57; Julia Black, ‘Calibrating Regulation’ in, Roy et 
al, Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation A Collection of Essays, ( Legal Services Board, 
March 2011) 15
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publication/latest news/pdf/economics of legal services regulation dis
cussion papers publication final.pdf> accessed 12 October 2012 p57.
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Services Board has been heavily focused on the consumer and competition. Appendix 2 
in this thesis contains an account of the Legal Services Board’s activities over the first 
three years of its operation. During the year that followed the establishment of the Legal 
Services Board there was little or no mention of the public interest in press releases or 
policy documents. As noted above, the Legal Services Board did not set out its 
understanding of the regulatory objectives until nearly a year after it was established. 
From this point on, the public interest often appeared connected with the consumer 
interest, appearing regularly as ‘consumer and public interests.’57 More recently the 
public interest has appeared separate from the consumer interest and been aligned with 
the ‘rule of law.’58 The Legal Services Board also firmly views part of its role as an 
economic regulator.59 The focus of the Legal Services Board remains firmly orientated 
towards the consumer. The Legal Services Board’s 2012-1560 Strategic Plan notes:
“We have a very simple goal -  to reform and modernise the legal services 
marketplace in the interests o f consumers, enhancing quality, ensuring value for  
money and improving access to justice across England and Wales. ” 61
The Legal Services Board set out their vision for legal services regulation in the Strategic 
Plan as follows:
“The regulatory objectives described in the Act provide the framework for  
regulation. We have used these to develop a vision o f the legal services market 
that we believe regulation must strive to deliver. Our vision takes as its starting
57 Legal Services Board, Business Plan 2011/12 (Legal Services Board, April 2011)
http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/open/pdf/lsb_business_plan_10_web_final.pdf p 5. 
accessed 21 May 2011
58 Legal Services Board , Strategic Plan 2012-15 Business Plan 2012/13 (Legal Services Board , April 2012) 
<httn://www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/ndf/business plan 201213 final.pdP> 
accessed 30 April 2012
59 Legal Futures ‘Edmonds comes out fighting’ (Legal Futures, 27th April 2012) <http://www.lega1fiitures.co.uk/latest- 
news/edmonds-comes-out-fighting-in-defence-of-Legal Services Board>
Accessed 23 October 2012
60 Legal Services Board, Strategic Plan 2012-15 Business Plan 2012/13 (Legal Services Board, April 2012) 
<httn://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news nublications/publications/odf/business plan 201213 final.ndf> 
Accessed 30 April 2012
6'Legal Services Board , Strategic Plan 2012-15 Business Plan 2012/13 (Legal Services Board, April 2012) 
<http://www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/business plan 201213 final.pdf> 
Accessed 30 April 2012 pi 1
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point that a competitive legal services market, underpinned by appropriate 
regulation, will deliver the regulatory objectives most effectively. ” 62
“A market that works better for consumers and providers alike would be 
characterised by:
^greater competition and innovation in services delivery 
*access to justice for all
^empowered consumers, able to choose a quality service at an affordable price 
*an improved consumer experience with swift and effective redress when things 
go wrong
*a constantly improving and consistently ethical legal profession, as diverse as 
the community that they serve; and
*clear proportionate regulation, that removes barriers to entry and targets 
market failure and which command wide confidence in the public and the 
market. ” 63
The most overt references to the policy orientation and approach taken to the regulatory 
objectives of the Legal Services Act 2007 are to be found in a number of speeches and 
statements made by senior members of the Legal Services Board. In a speech delivered 
by David Edmonds, Chair of the Legal Services Board in 2012 he noted:
"We want regulators to step back from dictating the services offered and the 
structures o f businesses operating in the legal services market to allow market 
forces to play a greater role. This we believe will help create a legal services 
market that is the right size for consumers. ” 64
62 ibid 11
63 ibid 12
64 David Edmonds, ‘Regulatory Standards and assessing regulatory performance’ (2012) 20 Legal Compliance Bulletin 
accessible:
<httn://www.leqa1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/speeches presentations/2012/legal compliance bulletin arti 
cle issue 20 iulv 2012.pdf> accessed 23 October 2012
More recently, when questioned by the House of Commons Justice Committee the Chief 
Executive of the Legal Services Board made the following comments in response to a 
question65 on the regulatory objectives:
“Parliament deliberately did not set up a hierarchy. There were various 
discussions at the time o f the Act within the process o f debate. I  suspect that was 
rather wise, because the priority you give to any objective will vary with the issue 
under debate. We have never consciously taken a view on a hierarchy. We have 
tended in our work to 2ive rather more weight to the consumer and competition 
objectives, because, as I  said before, we see those as absolutely integral to 
achieving access to justice. Access to justice seems to me to underpin the rule o f 
law and the broader public interest. ”66
The same question was addressed to David Edmonds, the Chairman of the Legal Services 
Board. His response, which includes a direct contradiction of his own stance on the 
subject was as follows:
“Do I  have a favourite objective? No. The objective o f bringing the consumer to 
the heart o f regulation is key for me. After all, the Act was passed by Parliament 
following a great deal o f concern that the consumer did not have proper 
representation in the regulatory framework. Therefore, driving the consumer 
interest into all that we do has been fundamental to our work. Trying to create a 
competitive environment and introducing competition in a world where 
competition did not exist before has clearly been an important part o f our role. ”67
When questioned by the Justice Committee on his view of the criticisms made by a 
number of approved regulators of legal services, David Edmonds answered:
65 The question posed by Stephen Brine was “Let us look at the eight regulatory objectives. Do you have a favourite 
child among them? Do you think you give equal weight to each of them? If not, which one do you consider to be the 
most important? House of Commons Justice Committee, The Operation o f the Legal Services Board (2013 HC 963-1) 
p2
66 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Operation o f the Legal Services Board (2013 HC 963-1) p2
67 ibid
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“In an organisation that is determined to drive the consumer interest into 
regulation where perhaps it did not exist before there are bound to be some 
tensions. ”68
The forgoing hints at the consumer orientated approach that the Legal Services Board has 
taken. The following profiles one of the major policy decisions recently made by the 
Legal Services Board. It also outlines the approach that the Board took. It demonstrates a 
certain narrowness of approach taken toward decision making.
4.3.3 Referral Fees and the Legal Services Board’
Referral fees involve payments by lawyers from organisations who are in a position to 
capture potential clients e.g. estate agents, insurance companies and trade unions. The 
subject of referral fees has been very controversial.69 Following the OFT ‘Competition in 
the Profession’s Report’ in 2000,70 the Law Society changed its regulations to allow 
referral fees in 2004, as this form of restriction was regarded as being anti-competitive.71 
The rationale was that there was no apparent reason why an out-right ban on referral fees 
could be regarded as proportionate. It was argued that they would benefit access to justice 
by providing a less intimidating way of accessing lawyers. 5 years after the Law Society 
relaxed its regulatory rules to allow referral fees the Law Society voted to support a ban 
on referral fees.72 In the interim period an industry of claims management companies 
emerged. Certain law firms were buying blocks of claims that had been assembled by 
claims management companies. The Law Society’s objections to referral fees were based 
on the following arguments: (1) The financial relationship between lawyers and 
introducers had the potential to lead to the needs of the referrer being placed above those
68 ibid 6
69 John Cooper, ‘Referral fees: corrupt and criminal’ (2012) 176 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 29,422, ; Katherine 
Dillon, ‘Referral fees and PI- the way forward?’ (2007) 4 Journal of Personal Injury Law, 324-333
70 OFT, Competition in Professions (OFT328,2001)
71 Paula Rohan, ‘Law Society votes to allow referral fees’ (Law Society Gazette, 9 January 2004) 
httD://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/law-societv-votes-a11ow-referra1-fees-0 accessed 12th November 2012 ; Law 
Society, ‘Referral fees: An Overview’ (Regulation Board, The Law Society, 7 March 2006)
httD://govemance.lawsocietv.org.uk/secure/meeting/201322/SRA Board Paper Public Item 8 - Referral Fees.pdf 
accessed 12th November 2012
72James Dean, ‘Law Society Council votes against referral fees’ (2009) Law Society Gazette Online 
<httn://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/law-societv-council-votes-against-referral-fees> accessed 23 October 2012
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of the client; (2) Law firms having become reliant on buying work from claims 
management companies had framed their business plans accordingly meaning that, 
through competition, claims management companies would sell work to the highest 
bidder. (3) Given that there is no certainty that a claim would be successful, and that the 
cost of the referral fee had to be recovered, referral fees added unnecessary costs to legal 
advice because a percentage of cases have to be won to compensate for those that have 
not. This, it was argued, could lead to lower quality advice as lawyers would be forced to 
cut comers to deliver advice and make profits. (4) A further argument was made that 
referral fees cut choice and access to justice by pushing consumers to use referred 
lawyers, as opposed to the most appropriate lawyers and/ or the best quality.73 The Law 
Society noted that a number of personal injury claims were dealt with by what have been 
termed ‘Personal Injury factories’, employing a largely unqualified workforce. Overall 
the Law Society deemed that referral fees were doing untold damage to the reputation of 
the profession.74
In light of the new competitive environment brought about by the Legal Services Act 
2007 and changes to legal aid funding that lawyers were faced with in 2009, it would be 
easy to dismiss the claims of the Law Society as reactionary and protectionist. However, 
in 2009 Lord Justice Jackson, undertaking a comprehensive review of civil litigation 
costs, advocated a ban on referral fees in personal injury cases for similar reasons 
outlined above. The report noted the inappropriateness of having victims of personal 
injuries traded as commodities. The report also argued that the culture of ambulance 
chasing had led to the commoditisation of claims75 leading to serious problems in the 
insurance industry. This was largely because the merits of claims were seldom assessed 
until they reached the hands of lawyers, and that even then many claims were pursued
73 The Law Society, ‘Law Society Statement on Referral Fees’ (The Law Society 2011)
httr>://www.lawsocietv.org.iiT</news/t)ress-releases/law-societv-statement-on-refen-a1-fees/ accessed 12th November
74 The Law Society, ‘Law Society Statement on Referral Fees’ (The Law Society 2011)
httir.//www.1awsocietv.org/uk/news/Dress-releases/1aw-societv-statement-on-referra1-fees/ accessed 12th November 
2012; James Dean, ‘Law Society Council votes against referral fees’ (2009) Law Society Gazette Online 
<http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/law-societv-council-votes-against-referral-fees> accessed 23 October 2012
75 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report, ( TSO, January 2010), p204-6
<httn://www.iudiciary. gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/iackson-final-reDort-14011 Q.ndf> accessed 23
October 2012
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regardless.76 The cost of litigation meant that it was more cost effective for many 
insurance companies to settle cases rather than try and defend them. The problem was 
that this had resulted in an inexorable rise in insurance premiums. The report also 
highlighted the fact that referrers simply referred cases to the highest bidder and that this 
was inappropriate from the perspective of justice.77
The Legal Services Board began a review of referral fees in 2009 in response to the Law 
Society’s vote to ban them. In 2010 the Legal Services Board published proposals for a 
consultation. It then published the consultation. The executive summary in the 
consultation document noted that the Legal Services Board considered neither an outright 
ban nor a ‘free for all’ to be appropriate, but that there should be increased 
transparency.78 It would appear that the Board had made up its mind before publishing 
the consultation. Prior to publishing this consultation the Legal Services Board had asked 
the Consumer Panel to consider the subject. They produced a report,79 drawing on 
research conducted by Vanilla Research.80 This research had suggested that there was 
maybe a case for requiring more transparency when a client’s referral would result in the 
introducer receiving a payment. The substance of Vanilla Research’s research was a 
relatively small number of interviews and group discussion based on perceptions and 
preferences about making a claim. Based on this arguably limited research the Consumer 
Panel made a case that referral fees should be retained. They did not seek to assess 
anything other than the interests of the consumer. The Legal Services Board also 
commissioned Charles River Associates81 to consider a cost benefit case for referral fees.
76 ibid
77 ibid
78Legal Services Board, ‘Referral fees, referral arrangements and fee sharing -  Discussion document on the regulatory 
treatment of referral fees, referral arrangements and fee sharing’ (Legal Services Board , September 2010) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/pdf/20100929 referral fees.t>df> accessed 23 October 2012
79 Vanilla Research is a small market research consultancy specialising in consumer perceptions. Vanilla Research, 
‘Referral Arrangements Research’ (Vanilla Research, March 2010)
<http://www.legalscrvicesconsumerpane1.org.uk/publicntions/research and renorts/documents/VanillaResearch Consu 
merResearch ReferralArrangements.pdf accessed > accessed 23 October 2011 This report was based on ten group 
discussions of consumers or potential consumers.
80 Legal Services Consumer Panel, ‘Referral Fees’ (LSC, May 2010)
<httn://www.legalservicesconsumernanel.org.uk/nublications/research and renorts/documents/ConsumerPanel Referr 
alArrangementsReport Final.pdf > Accessed 23 October 2012
81 Charles River Associates ‘Cost Benefit Analysis of Policy options related to referral fees in legal services ’, (Charles 
River Associates, May 2010)
<http://govemance.lawsocietv.org.uk/secure/meeting/185852/Consultant report on referral fees Mav2010.pdf> 
accessed 24 May 2012
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Their methodology was based on market failure theory, as described in chapter three. 
Charles River Associates reported no problems with conveyancing referrals. They found 
no evidence to suggest that referral fees in personal injury cases were causing consumer 
detriment and advised that referral fees were unlikely to be problematical.82 The cost 
benefit analysis included in the report makes no reference to factors extending beyond 
consumer detriment and the consumer interest.83
The Legal Services Board sought views on its 2010 consultation and on the conclusions 
that it had initially arrived at, based on the Consumer Panel’s opinion and the Charles 
River report. A report combining these findings, with those of various stakeholders was 
published in September 2010.84 In this report the Legal Services Board posed a series of 
further questions and asked for stakeholders to respond.85 Drawing heavily on the 
Consumer Panel and the report prepared by Charles River, the Legal Services Board 
argued that it had developed robust evidence upon which to base its opinions. The final 
decision of the Legal Services Board was to not recommend banning referral fees, but 
instead to introduce requirements for transparency. The requirement for transparency 
meant that consumers would have to be apprised of the fact that a referral fee had been 
paid by a lawyer to the intermediary that introduced the lawyer to the consumer. This 
decision was published in May 2011.86 The recommendation for enhanced transparency 
has since been regarded as both aspirational and unworkable.87
82 ibid
83 Charles River Associates ‘Cost Benefit Analysis of Policy options related to referral fees in legal services’, (Charles 
River Associates, May 2010)
<http://uovemance.lawsocietv.org.iik/secure/meeting/185852/Consu1tant report on referral fees Mav2010.pdf> 
accessed 24 May 2012
84 Legal Services Board , 1 Referral fees, referral arrangements andfee sharing -  Discussion document on the 
regulatory treatment of referral fees, referral arrangements andfee sharing’ (Legal Services Board , September 2010) 
<http://www.1ega1servicesboard.org.uk/what we do/pdf/20100929 referral fees.ndf>
85 ibid
86 Legal Services Board , ‘Referral fees, referral arrangements and fee sharing Decision Document’ (Legal Services 
Board, May 2011)
<htto://www.1ega1servicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/closed/ndf/20110527 referral fees decision press 
release fina14.r>df> accessed 24 October 2012
87 Legal Futures, ‘Straw: Legal Services Board report on referral fees was “gobbledegook”’ (Legal Futures, 29 
September 2011) < httn://www.lega1futures.co.uk/news/straw-Legal Services Board-report-on-referral-fees-was-
gobbledegook> accessed 12 November 2012
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On the 9th September 2011, the Government announced that referral fees in personal 
injury cases should be banned and that it was taking steps to bring about legislation to 
this effect. In a written ministerial statement, Jonathan Djanogly88 noted that the current 
arrangements had led to the growth of an industry that actively encouraged individuals to 
bring cases, regardless of the merits of their claim, and spoke of the effect on insurance 
premiums. He also spoke of the serious effect on the reputation and integrity of the legal 
profession.89 On 26th October 2011, Ken Clarke90 announced that he was tabling 
amendments to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill to ban 
referral fees in connection with personal injury claims.91 The amendment was agreed to. 
Section 56 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 now 
prohibits referral fees in personal injury claims.92 The Law Society and the Bar, along 
with others, including a cross section of the Government, remains committed to banning 
referral fees outright.93
4.3.4 Analysis of the Legal Services Board’s Approach to the Public Interest and Referral 
Fees
It is clear from this example that the combination of the Consumer Panel’s research and 
the cost benefit analysis undertaken by the economic and business consulting firm, 
Charles River Associates, was deemed sufficient to address the public interests associated 
with referral fees.94 In particular, in arriving at their decision, the Legal Services Board 
noted:
Parliamentary Under- Secretary of State for Justice.
89 Ministry of Justice press release, Better protection from intruders and excessive compensation costs, 26 October 
2011 <http://www.iustice.gov.uk/news/features/feature26101 la> accessed 24 October 2012
90 Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor.
91 HC Deb 1 November 2011 cc822-849
92Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 c 10 pt 2 s 60
httn://www.1egislation.gov.uk/ukr>ga/2012/10/r>art/2/crossheading/referral-fees/enacted
93 The Bar Council, ‘Bar Council Welcomes move to ban Referral Fees but calls for Further Action’ (Bar Council, 9 
September 2011) http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media-centre/news-and-press-releases/2011/september/bar-council- 
welcomes-inove-to-ban-referral-fees-but-calls-for-further-action/ accessed 24 October 2012;
Catherine Baksi, ‘OFT calls for referral fee payment regulation’ (2010) The Law Society Gazette, 25th February.
httn://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/law-societv-council-votes-against-referral-fees
Accessed 24 October 2012.
94 Legal Services Board , ‘Referral fees, referral arrangements andfee sharing Decision Document ’ (Legal Services 
Board , May 2011)
httn://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consu1tations/closed/r)df/20110527 referral fees decision press re 
lease final4.pdf accessed 24 October 2012
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“our scrutiny has been focused on the regulatory treatment o f referral fees, 
assessed against the regulatory objectives set out in Section 1 o f the Legal 
Services Act 2007. We do not offer a view on any wider public policy arguments 
for their retention or abolition. ”95
This assertion, coupled with the consumer and economic research relied on by the Legal 
Services Board rather begs the question what does the Legal Services Board actually 
consider the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ to 
involve? There was no reference to the public interest in any of the documents published 
by the Legal Services Board. The force of the arguments from the Law Society, The 
Bar,96 Lord Justice Jackson, The Association of British Insurers, the former Lord 
Chancellor Jack Straw97 and, in part, the Office of Fair Trading were apparently not 
considered. Arguably they reflected the public interest, whereas the Legal Services Board 
seemingly favoured the findings of the Consumer Panel and the research from Charles 
River Associates.98 This assertion is bolstered by the following response to a question 
posed by a member of the House of Commons Justice Committee regarding the Legal 
Services Board’s approach to referral fees and whether the Board had been complacent in 
the approach it had taken to referral fees. David Edmonds, Chair of the Board responded 
as follows:
“I  think “complacency” is not a word I  would use. When my Board was set up, 
we instituted a consumer panel that did a significant tranche o f research into this 
area and produced a report that said they could not see consumer detriment 
arising from the administration o f referral fees in the legal services sector. The
95 ibid
96 Bar Council, Joint Response of the Bar council and Criminal Bar Association to the Legal Services Board Discussion 
Document on the Regulatory Treatment of Referral Fees, Referral Arrangements and Fee Sharing’ (Legal Services 
Board , 21 December 2010)
<httn://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/closed/ndf/ioint response of the bar council and 
criminal bar association.pdf> accessed 24 October 2012
97Legal Futures, ‘Straw: Legal Services Board report on referral fees was “gobbledegook”’ (Legal Futures, 29 
September 2011) < httn://www.legalfutures.co.uk/news/straw-Legal Services Board-reoort-on-referral-fees-was- 
gobbledegook> accessed 12 November 2012
98 Paradoxically, despite the ban, it is likely that is that Alternative Business Structures, it will be easy to circumvent 
the referral fee ban in the future. John Hyde, ‘SRA powerless to stop ABS circumventing referral fee ban’ (2012) The 
Law Society Gazette. < http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/sra-powerless-stoo-abss-circumventing-referral-ban> 
accessed 25 October 2012
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Secretary o f State and Parliament took a different view in terms o f personal 
injury, and that part o f the referral fee process has now been banned. ” 99
“I  am both defensive and protective o f our stance on referral fees. As a regulator 
with an interest in economic regulation, I  like to see markets operating in a way 
in which markets can operate, which is that referrals are made, satisfactory 
solutions are found and you don’t intervene where there is no evidence that you 
should intervene. I  guess there is a degree not o f complacency but o f agnosticism 
on the part o f my board, fuelled by the report o f my own consumer panel. I f  
anyone was going to complain about, or find evidence of, consumer detriment, it 
would be in the research that they commissioned in this area, and they didn’t find  
any. That is why, after a lengthy debate, my board took the decision that we did 
take As you have seen, the Minister took a different view over personal injury. ”100
This response evidences the strong commitment that the Legal Services Board has 
adopted towards the market. It also draws attention to the close connection between the 
Board and the Consumer Panel. The attention seemingly paid to the Consumer Panel’s 
findings affirms, in part, some of the concerns described in chapter three regarding the 
possibility of interest group capture.
4.3.5 The Legal Services Board’s Approach to the Public Interest 
The foregoing serves to illustrate that the Legal Services Board has had difficulty in 
understanding the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’ 
It has had difficulty operationalizing it. Regarding referral fees, the research that it 
commissioned and the body that it really listened to was the Consumer Panel. As outlined 
above, it did not comprehensively consider the public interest.
Not all the work that the Legal Services Board has done has focused on the consumer. 
Encouragingly, and intuitively the Legal Services Board have engaged with a number of
99 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Operation of the Legal Services Board (2013 HC 963-1) 14
100 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Operation of the Legal Services Board (2013 HC 963-1) 14
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eminent scholars on matters to do with ethics,101 the role of economics in undertaking 
regulatory reviews,102 and areas of reserved work.103 This work has yet, however, to be 
translated into either policy or regulatory decision making. For present purposes this 
thesis argues that the Board’s approach to the public interest suffers from difficulties of 
definition and it is compromised by the absence of a method by which it can be 
integrated it into their work.
In the context of the Legal Services Act 2007, it is pertinent to note that none of the 
approved regulators have published their understanding of the public interest in their 
work. Until recently, the General Council of The Bar had, on the introduction page of its 
website a paragraph stating that its function was to promote a vibrant, independent, 
honest and transparent legal profession in the public interest. This has now been 
removed. A number of key documents,104 produced by the Bar, refer to the public interest 
in earnest, connecting it with a variety of factors105 that do not correlate with the 
definition promulgated by the Legal Services Board. It may be inferred that they do not 
exactly share the same vision of the regulation of legal services as the Legal Services 
Board. This assertion is also evidenced by a number of differences of opinions between
101 Richard Moorhead, 'Designing Ethics Indicators for Legal Services Provision ’ (Legal Services Board, September 
2012)
<httD://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdfydesigning ethics indicators for legal 
services provision Legal Services Board report sep 2012.pdf> accessed 23rd October 2012
102 Christopher Decker, George Yarrow, Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation 
(Regulatory Policy Institute, 31 October 2010)
<httD://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/economic rationale for Legal Services R 
egulation Final.t>dfi> accessed 12 June 2012 p9-l 1 Note also a number of prominent academics view in the collection 
of essayes that accompanied this report: Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation A 
Collection of Essays, ( Legal Services Board, March 2011)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org/iik/news publication/latest news/pdf/economics of legal services regulation dis 
cussion papers publication fmal.odf> accessed 12 October 2012
103 Stephen Mayson, ‘The Regulation of Legal Services : Reserved Legal Activities : History and Rationale’ (Legal 
Services Institute, Strategic Discussion Paper, August 2010)
Stephen Mayson, ‘The Regulation of Legal Services: What is the case for reservation?’ (Legal Services Institute 
Interim Strategic Discussion Paper, February 2011)< http://www.legalservicesinstitute.org.uk> page 3-4.
104 Bar Council, ‘Response of the Bar Council to the Triennial Review by the Ministry of Justice of the Legal Services 
Board’ (The Bar, 30th March 2012)
<http://www.barcounci1.org.uk/media/132078/bar council triennial review final response paper 30032012.pd>f 
Accessed 23 October 2012;Bar Council, ‘Bar Council -  Quality Assurance must Protect Public Interest, Not Special 
Interest’ (Bar Council, 12th October 2012) <http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media-centre/news-and-press- 
re1eases/2012/october/bar-counci1-qualitv-assurance-must-proteet-pub1ic-interest.-not-speeia1-interests/>
105 Bar Council, ‘Response of the Bar Council to the Triennial Review by the Ministry of Justice of the Legal Services 
Board’ (The Bar, 30th March 2012)
<http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/l32O78/bar council triennial review final response paper 30032012.pdf> 
Accessed 23 October 2012; The General Council of the Bar, Legal Aid and the Public Interest- Towards an effective 
public-private partnership (General Council of the Bar, Discussion Paper, May 2008)
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the Legal Services Board, the Law Society and Bar Council during the second half of 
2012.106 Moreover, given the Legal Services Board has experienced difficulties with the 
public interest, it is plausible to suggest that the other regulators have encountered similar 
problems. At this point, therefore, it is possible to assert that through definitional and 
operational issues alone the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ may only be partially achieved. It may act as a steer and a conscience to 
regulators through some form of rhetorical signal, but the term public interest, in the 
hands of regulators is like a broken fishing net. It serves as a tool through which much 
can be passed.
The foregoing has demonstrated the issues that the Legal Services Board has had with the 
public interest, and made an argument that it tends towards policies and activities that 
pursue the consumer interest. It would appear that the Legal Services Board’s approach to 
the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ is neither 
consistent nor clear. The following considers the insertion of the term ‘public interest’ in 
other pieces of legislation.
4.4 THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN LEGISLATION
The following seeks to locate the use of the public interest as a regulatory objective, 
within the broader spectrum of regulation, and specifically regulation and legislation 
containing references to the public interest. A Westlaw search of the instances of the 
public interest appearing in UK legislation reveals 2362 references to the term in 
legislation and accompanying explanatory notes. 1134 of these references pertain to Acts 
of Parliament, and their connected explanatory notes. The remaining references pertain to 
orders, regulations, rules and other subordinate legislative instruments. The public 
interest is therefore a well-used expression. The majority of references to the term, in 
primary legislation, have appeared within the last 17 years. A further Westlaw search 
reveals that there are only five pieces of legislation, currently in force, which have 
expressly defined ‘regulatory objectives’ set out in the legislation. These are the
106Legal Futures, ‘Legal Services Board head gives the Bar Council public dressing down’ (Legal Futures, 24th October
2012) <httn://\vvvw.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/lega1-services-board-head-gives-bar-council-r>ub1ic-dressing-down 
accessed 24th October 2012
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Communications Act 2003,107 the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,108 the 
Financial Services Act 2010,109 the Legal Services Act 2007110 and the Legal Services 
(Scotland) Act 2010.111 Only the Legal Services Acts have a regulatory objective 
explicitly referring to the public interest on its own. The framing of a regulatory objective 
connected with the ‘public interest’ is therefore a rare occurrence. Before considering this 
particular point further, the following draws attention to one particularly convincing 
argument about the way that the public interest appears in a number of pieces of 
legislation. Justice Mason in the Australian case of O'Sullivan v Farrer, noted:
"Indeed the expression 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically 
imparts a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined 
factual matters, confined only in so far as the subject matter and the scope and 
purpose o f the statutory enactments may enable"112
The following evidences how, in line with this statement, considerations of the public 
interest are generally framed by the legislation which includes the term. In essence the 
public interest usually relates to relatively specific value judgments that need to be made. 
The following provides a general descriptive account of how the public interest appears 
in legislation.
4.4.1 Information and the Public Interest
The public interest is commonly connected with information, whether this is the retention 
of it in the public interest, or the provision of it in the public interest. Regarding the 
release of sensitive information, whether by the Government, the Courts,113 Regulators,114
107 Communications Act 2003
108 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
109 Financial Services Act 2010
110 Legal Services Act 2007
111 Legal Services (Scotland) Act 2010
112 O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210 at 216.
113 Government - Agriculture Act 1947 c.48, Airports Act 1986 s.45.; Companies Act 1989 c.40 s.60 and s.82;
Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 ch 15 s2; Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 c.25sl4- 
sl5; Data Protection Act 1998 c.29, s59; Drug Trafficking Act 1994 c.37, Part IV; Energy Act 2004 c.20, Pt2, para 6; 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000c.8 Part XXVI Notices; Freedom of information Act 2000 c.36 Part 1; Health 
Protection Agency Act 2004 cl7, s7; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 c.22 s25; Inquiries Act 2005 c.12 
s25; Intelligence Services Act 1994 c.13, para l(b)(i); Land Registration act 2002 C9 s. 104; Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 c.23, s60. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 c.23 si,2,3,4,
196
or quasi-govemmental bodies115 this legislation allows a determination to be made by the 
forgoing bodies to prevent information reaching the public domain. In a number of 
instances the term is used to prevent the public’s attendance116 at various important 
meetings, where public observance is judged to be detrimental to the matter under 
consideration. The term public interest is also used in several instances in connection 
with the regulation of the environment.117 It is commonly used to demand the serving up 
of information regarding pollution and toxic substances and as a justification for 
intervention by the authorities to achieve some publicly desired result.118
4.4.2 Occupations and the Public Interest
The term public interest is used in connection with the appointment of individuals to high 
ranking jobs in the civil service and public sector.119 In these instances a judgement is 
usually required regarding the suitability of an individual to hold that position, variously 
connected with the sensitivity of the post or the attributes of the individual, qualifications, 
criminal record or nationality. The public interest is also used as a basis upon which to 
make judgements in connection with the removal120 or justification for retention121 of 
individuals in particular jobs in both the public and private sectors. 122
4.4.3 The Public Interest and the Exercise of Power in Sensitive Matters 
The term public interest is connected in a number of instances with the exercise of 
judgements in rare and delicate circumstances, where the ramifications may have ethical 
or detrimental effects on human rights. Judgements requiring these sorts of considerations
114 Charities Act 2006, c.50 s216; Clean Air Act 1993 c .ll  s.37; Commissioner for Older People (Wales) Act 2006 c.30 
s.15; Commissioner for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 c .ll  s.20; Companies Act 2006 c.46, schlO; Companies 
(Audit, Investigation and Community Enterprise ) Act 2004 c.21 s i6; Coroners and Justice Act 2OO9c.25, s95,
115 Apprentices, Skills and Children Learning Act 2009 c.22 (explanatory notes); Audit Commission Act 1998, C 18.; 
Counter Terorism Act 2008 c28 s66; Local Government Act 1974 c.7 s.30; Local Government and Public Involvement 
in Health Act 2007 c.28 para 8; National Health Service Act 2006 c.41, part 13, s251; Police Act 1996 c.16, s22; 
Railway and Transport Safety Act 2003c.20, s60;
116 Inquiries Act c. 12, s.19,22,23, 25; Greater London Authority Act 1999 c.29, sch 18 para 15.
117 Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010/490 reg.27.
118 Environment Act 1995 c25 s 22, S.78T, s57, The Control of Pollution Act 1974, para 29; The Water Resources Act 
1991 para. 170
119 Care Standards Act 2000 c.14, s76; Medical Act 1983 c.54, s35b, s.38, s41A.
120 Dentists Act 1984 c.24 s32.
121 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 c41 s.77 (Age for retirement of certain Senior Courts officers)
122 Communications Act 2003 c.21s238; Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 c.46, s.7;
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are to be found in the Human Tissue Act,123 regarding the retention of tissue samples and 
developments in genetic research. The removal and deportation of immigrants124 in some 
instances requires a determination about their threat to society, or the human rights 
implications of deporting them back to home countries. Only where the matter is deemed 
to be of such importance to the collective benefit of society and the public interest will 
actions usually be sanctioned.
4.4.4 The Public Interest and Utilities
The public interest is used in connection with the general licensing of utilities and 
essential services, such as water suppliers,125 or regarding interventions to protect the 
public interest with respect to these essential supplies.126 In connection with critical 
infrastructure the public interest has been used to justify emergency regulation regarding 
the banking sector and the purchase of banks by the state.127 The term ‘protect the public 
interest’ appears in the Electricity Act 1989128 to do with the plurality of supply of 
electricity. It is also considered in light of environmental obligations and the imperative 
to begin to use renewable sources of power generation, in view of the environmental 
implications of using fossil fuels.
4.4.5 The Public Interest and Property
The public interest is connected with real property determinations in a number of 
instances. The first concerns the compulsory purchase of land.129 The legislation requires 
that the interference with private property rights should occur in only clear cases where it 
is in the public interest. No clear grounds are set for when this is to occur. As such, this is 
a clear example of a value judgement being informed by the circumstances of the 
application for compulsory purchase. In a connected way there is legislation concerned
123 Human Tissue Act 2004 c30 (Explanatory note para 1)
124 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 c.33, sl3
125 Water Industry Act 1991 c.56, sl70; Postal Services Act 2000 c26, sl5;
126 Postal Services Act 2000 c.26 sl5, (References to the Competition Commission. S16, sl7, si9a, Electricity Supply 
Act 1989 c29 sl2, sl3, sl4, si4a; Energy Act 2004 c20, sl57; Gas Act 1986 c44 s24, s25, s26, s26a. Broadcasting Act 
1990 s.96, s i7, s.42, s .l l l ;  Communications Act 2003, s238, Part 5 -Chapter 2,
127 Banking Act 2009 c.l s8, s9, part 1. s96, s228, s229, s231.
128 Electricity Act 1989 c.29. The term is used in relation to the public interest, in regards to the general electrical 
supply, certification obligations, renewable energy, fossil fuel levies.
129 Planning Act 2008 c.29, (Explanatory Note para 1)
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with matters of a historical, cultural and national interest, which refers to the public 
interest, regarding either the acquisition of assets or the preservation of property.130 The 
public interest also arises in connection with registration of common land. This moves 
property from essentially private ownership into a form of communal ownership. The 
Commons Act131 sets out usefully the interests to be considered to be in the public 
interest, which can then be used to underpin judgements. The public interest is deemed to 
be matters connected with -  nature conservation, conservation of the landscape; the 
protection of public rights of access to any area of land, and the protection of 
archaeological remains and features of historic interest.132
4.4.6 The Public Interest and the Criminal Law and the Funding of Litigation 
The term public interest commonly arises in connection with criminal proceedings and 
evidence.133 The term is used in this sense as the justification for pursuing criminal 
proceedings against an individual.134 The term is also used in connection with the funding 
of public interest litigation.135 In this instance the state will subsidise proceedings which 
challenge the law when it is deemed that the matter is so serious that it will affect the 
community. The parameters of the public interest determination are very wide and it is 
contextualised only by the perceived interest and benefit of the legislation.
4.4.7 The Public Interest and Mergers
Chapters 2 and 3 of Part 3, of the Enterprise Act 2002, provide for the investigation of 
mergers in ‘public interest cases’136 and ‘other special cases’137 respectively. Chapter 
two, of Part 3, and specifically sections 42-58, deal with public interest cases. The
130 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 c.46 Part iii s.61; Coal Mining and Subsistence Act 1991 
c.45, sl9 (Ancient Monuments and listed buildings)
131 Commons Act 2006 c.26 si 6.
132 Commons Act 2006 c.26 s50
133 Criminal procedure and evidence Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 c.24 (Explanatory Note para2); 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 c.12 s.49; Civil Evidence Act 1995 c.38, s7; Coroners and Justice Act 2009,c5, 
Schedule 5; Criminal Justice Act 2003 c.44,276 and s 118; Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 c.25 
9Disclosure s3, 7a, 8,12,14,15,16,21, 24,; Terrorism Act 2000 cl 1, para 14 A(l); Criminal Procedure Rules 
2011/1709. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002c.29, s346, s353, s358, s365,
134 Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act 2004 asp 8 para 6; Crime and Disorder Act 1998 c37, Part IV Dealing with 
offenders; Offender Management Act 2007 Sch 1 para 13; Serious Crimes Act 2007 c27 s.54, s28
135 Access to Justice Act 1999 c22, Explanatory Note paral.
136 Enterprise Act 2002
137 Enterprise Act 2002
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Secretary of State may give an ‘intervention notice’ to the OFT if they believe that one or 
more public interest considerations are relevant to the consideration of a relevant merger 
situation.138 s58(l) specifies national security as a public interest. Section 375 of the 
Communications Act 2003139 adds several additional media public considerations to s58, 
including: (1) the need for accurate presentation of news and free expression of opinion 
in newspapers140 (2) the need for a sufficient plurality of views in newspapers in each 
market for newspapers in the UK141 (3) the need for plurality of media ownership142 (4) 
the need for a wide range of high quality broadcasting outputs, appealing to a wide 
variety of tastes and interests143 (5) the need for media owners to be committed to the 
objectives set out in section 319 of the Communications Act. The Secretary of State is 
given the power to add a new public interest consideration to section 58 of the Enterprise 
Act by statutory instrument.144 This has been done only once. In October 2008 the 
Government presented an order to add the category ‘the interest of maintaining the 
stability of the UK financial system.’145 This addition to the list was accepted by 
Parliament. This particular section of the Enterprise Act, and the list in the Commons Act 
2006, outlined above, represent limited instances where the public interest considerations 
are further defined.146
4.4.8 Contextualising the Regulatory Objective of ‘Protecting and Promoting the Public 
Interest’
As outlined, it is relatively rare to have regulatory objectives expressly included in 
legislation. Rarer still is the occurrence of a regulatory objective which includes the
138 Enterprise Act 2002, s42(l)
139 Enterprise Act 2002 s58(2A) added by s 375 Communications Act 2003.
140 Enterprise Act 2002 s58 (2A)
141 Enterprise Act 2002 s58 (2B)
142 Enterprise Act 2002 s58(2C)(a)
143 Enterprise Act 2002 s58 (2C) (b)
144 Enterprise Act 2002 s58(3) and (4)
145 SI 2008/2645. This Public Interest category allowed the Secretary of State to intervene directly in the takeover of 
HBOS, the UK's largest mortgage lender by Lloyds TSB. The takeover was prompted by the fall of Lehman Brothers, 
and the global financial crisis. The merger raised serious competition concerns as the merged bank would have 30% 
share of customer accounts, and this meant that after the crisis was over it would have considerable influence over the 
banking sector.
146 Attempts have been made to extend the list Lord Puttnam put down an amendment to add energy security as a new 
public interest term. This was resisted by the Government and it was argued that this would be covered by the existing 
national security public interest. (HL Debate 1 July 2008 ccGC50 - 59. Further calls to expand the list have been firmly 
rejected. See Anthony Seely, ‘Takeovers:the "public interest test"’ 4 August 2010, Business and Transport Section 
Standard Note < htto://www.parliament.uk/briefing-Dapers/SN05374> accessed 19 November 2011
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public interest. The references to the public interest in the aforementioned review are 
almost all contextualised in the legislation. The ability to narrow down the important 
factors that go towards making a decision are, to a certain extent, framed by the 
legislation. In certain pieces of legislation, the public interest is further outlined with 
relative public interests articulated. Prominent illustrations of this are the Enterprise Act 
2002 and the Commons Act 2006. Two further cases reinforce the nature of the 
determination to be made with regards to the public interest in these instances. In Lion 
Laboratories Limited v Evans, Griffiths LJ noted:
“The public interest is a term embracing matters, among others, o f standards o f 
human conduct and o f the functioning o f government and government 
instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be for the good order o f 
society and for the well-being o f its members. The interest is therefore the interest 
o f the public as distinct from the interest o f an individual or individuals ”147
Beyond the UK, an Australian Federal Court set out an analysis of the various aspects of 
the public interest as follows:
"The public interest is not one homogenous undivided concept. It will often be 
multi-faceted and the decision maker will have to consider and evaluate the 
relative weight o f these facets before reaching a final conclusion as to where the 
public interest resides. This ultimate evaluation o f the public interest will involve 
a determination o f what are relevant facets o f the public interest that are 
competing and the comparative importance that ought to be given so that "the 
public interest" can be ascertained and served. In some circumstances, one or 
more considerations will be o f such overriding significance that they will prevail 
over all others. In other circumstances, the competing considerations will be 
more finely balanced so that the outcome is not so clearly predictable. For 
example in some contexts, interests such as public health, national security, anti­
147 Lion Laboratories Limited v Evans [1985] QB 526 at p533 Griffiths LJ.
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terrorism, defence or international obligations may be o f overriding significance 
when compared with other considerations. ”148
The regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the Legal 
Services Act 2007 undoubtedly shares many of the characteristics of other instances of 
the public interest in legislation. These cases namely involve a determination and 
evaluation of relevant factors to achieve an outcome. In the context of the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’, the responsibility placed on 
regulators is, however, broader than has hitherto been included in legislation. As opposed 
to the majority of instances in which the public interest is included in legislation where 
the decision maker takes a decision in the public interest, in the Legal Services Act 2007 
the objective is also to protect and promote the public interest. As outlined in chapter 
two, this is not necessarily confined to just the public interest in legal services, though 
this accounted for many of the instances in which the term was mentioned during the 
debates of the Legal Services Bill. It may therefore pertain to other interests. Reference 
was made to the economy and to the reputation of the legal profession abroad during the 
debates.149 In essence this potentially requires a very broad set of values and factors to be 
considered. It is also broader still in the sense that it underpins every decision, action or 
policy that is made in connection with legal services by the regulators and the Office for 
Legal Complaints.
The inclusion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ 
can be explained by the intervention by the House of Lords in the passage of the Bill, as 
opposed to being a term inserted by those who initially drafted the legislation. The 
standard texts on legislative drafting mandate specificity in drafting and the removal of 
ambiguity.150 This point is perhaps to be complemented by the fact that the texts express
148 McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2005] FCAFC 142 para 12.
149 Lord Hunt of Wirral HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 117-118
150 Ian McLeod, Principles o f Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart, 2009) 1 ; Constantin Stefanou, Constantine 
Stephanou; Helen Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation A Modern Approach (Ashgate 2008) 5 ; G C Thornton, Legislative 
Drafting (Tottel Publishing 2006) 23
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caution when drafting explicitly the aims of a piece of legislation.151 Also caution is 
recommended and referred to in one established text regarding use of the term ‘public 
interest.’152 In further understanding the nature of the inclusion of regulatory objectives in 
legislation, the following reflects on the better regulation initiatives. It is argued that this 
holds the key to understanding the insertion of regulatory objectives in recent legislation, 
though it does not explain the inclusion of the public interest as a regulatory objective.
4.4.9 Better Regulation and Regulatory Objectives
The Better Regulation initiatives are principally concerned with regulatory quality. More 
than quality, the initiatives are underpinned by an agenda to remove the negative effect of 
regulatory compliance costs on business and the need to de-regulate by freeing markets 
and reducing administrative and legislative burdens.153 Recent Government advice 
outlines the following as part of its approach to better regulation:
“High quality and efficient economic infrastructure plays a vital role in 
supporting a competitive and growing economy by providing services on which 
all businesses and citizens depend. Competitive markets are the best way in the 
long run to deliver these services to consumers and provide incentives to invest 
and improve efficiency and service quality. In certain sectors network effects 
and/or economies o f scale create circumstances, such as natural monopolies, 
which, under current technological patterns, limit the prospects for effective 
competition. In these areas, independent economic regulation will be needed over 
the long term to continue to provide vital consumer protections and ensure 
consumers ’ interests are promoted through efficient provision o f good quality, 
reliable and sustainable regulation. In the UK, economic regulation has aimed to 
promote effective competition where this is possible, and to provide a proxy for  
competition, with vrotection o f consumers ’ interests at its heart, where it is not 
meaningful to introduce competition. Regulation has typically capped the prices
151 Ian McLeod, Principles o f Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart, 2009) 1-5 ; Constantin Stefanou, Constantine 
Stephanou; Helen Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation A Modern Approach (Ashgate 2008) 5-7; G C Thornton, Legislative 
Drafting (Tottel Publishing, 2006) 21
152 R M King, Legislative Drafting Manual and Bibliography (Commonwealth Secretariat 1978) 15
153 Robert Baldwin, ‘Is better regulation smarter regulation?’, (2005) Public Law 485
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that dominant companies can charge in order to promote efficiency and fairness, 
while providing them a return on their assets and investments. In doing so, these 
regulators have delivered significant benefits to consumers. ”154
The Better Regulation Initiatives are notably concerned with the clear articulation of the 
regulatory problems to be addressed, setting objectives and analysis of policy and 
regulatory solutions.155 Baldwin156 makes an explicit connection between the better 
regulation principles and a clear articulation of objectives of regulation for regulators. He 
has noted that regulators should be able to transparently demonstrate to stakeholders what 
and how they are regulating.157 The desire to bring about better regulation emerged in a 
number of de-regulatory initiatives in the 1980s concerned with liberalisation and de­
regulation.158 The desire for better regulation was, and still is, driven by the European 
Union and the OECD.159 In 1995 the OECD published what has become the first 
internationally recognised set of principles ensuring regulatory quality.160 This included a 
10 point OECD reference checklist for regulatory decision making.161 A number of 
OECD initiatives have followed.162 One particular initiative advocated the use of 
regulatory impact analysis as a major tool with which to achieve better regulation.163 
Following this, regulatory impact analysis has become one of the principle tools to
154 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, ‘Principles for Economic Regulation’ (BIS, April 2011)
< http://mvw.bis.gov.Uk/assets/biscore/better-regu1ation/docs/n/l l-795-principles-for-economic-regulation> accessed 
25th October 2012
155 Ian Bartle, Peter Vass, ‘Risk and the Regulatory State- A Better Regulation Perspective’ (CRI, Research Report 20, 
June 2008) < http://mvw.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/DubDdf/Research Reports/20 Risk Regulatory State.pdf> 
accessed 13 November 2012 p52
156 Robert Baldwin, ‘Is better regulation smarter regulation?’, (2005) Public Law 485
157 ibid
158 ibid
159 OECD, Policy Recommendations on Regulatory Reform (OECD, Paris, 1995) ; OECD, Regulating Policies in 
OECD Countries 90ECD, 2002); OECD, Regulatory Reform (OECD, 1997); OECD, United Kingdom: Challenges at 
the Cutting Edge (OECD, Paris, 2002); OECD, Regulatory Impact Analyses: Best Practices in OECD Countries 
(OECD, Paris, 1997) ; European Commission, Communication on Impact Assessment, COM (2005) 97 final;
160 OECD, Improving the Quality o f Government Regulation (OECD, Paris, 1995)
<httD://acts.oecd.org/lnstruments/ShowInstrumentView.asnx?InstrumentID=128&.InstrumentPID=124&Lang=en&Boo 
k=False> accessed 26 October 2012
161 ibid
162 OECD, Policy Recommendations on Regulatory Reform (OECD, Paris, 1995) ; OECD, Regulating Policies in 
OECD Countries 90ECD, 2002); OECD, Regulatory Reform (OECD, 1997); OECD, United Kingdom: Challenges at 
the Cutting Edge (OECD, Paris, 2002); OECD, Regulatory Impact Analyses: Best Practices in OECD Countries 
(OECD, Paris, 1997) ; European Commission, Communication on Impact Assessment, COM (2005) 97 final;
163 OECD, Regulatory Impact Analyses: Best Practices in OECD Countries (OECD, Paris, 1997)
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achieve better regulation in the UK. Tony Blair endorsed their use in 1998164 announcing 
that no regulatory policy proposal that impacted on business, charities or voluntary 
bodies would be considered by ministers without a Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA).165 RIAs are intended to be used to inform decision making. They are designed to 
encourage better regulation by:
“Clarifying regulatory objectives and definitions o f problems
Ensuring that regulatory objectives are achieved effectively and at lowest cost by 
the strategy that maximises benefits over costs — be that regulatory -  or non- 
regulatory
Identifying alternative options for achieving desired objectives 
Identifying the informational needs o f policy makers
Unpacking assumptions about compliance effects and real world (including 
business) impacts
Facilitating ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny o f regulation 
Increasing regulatory accountability and transparency
Furthering the BRTF’s five principles for good regulation transparency, 
proportionality, targeting, consistency and accountability. ”166
Recent guidance published by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, in 
connection with economic regulators, outlines in its principles for regulation, the need to:
164 Tony Blair, ‘Foreword’, in Better Policy Making A Guide to Regulatory Impact Assessment (Cabinet Office 2003) 
(Reference is made in this document to his endorsement of Regulatory Impact Assessment in 1998)
165 Robert Baldwin, ‘Is better regulation smarter regulation?’, (2005) Public Law 485
166 Cabinet Office, Better Policymaking: A Guide to regulatory Impact Analysis (Cabinet Office, London, 2003) 
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20040116235614/cabinet-office. gov.uk/regulation/ria-guidance/>
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“set the framework for delivering greater clarity about the respective roles o f  
Government, regulators and producers, and greater coherence in an increasingly 
complex and interlinked policy context. ” 167
The foregoing does not account for the insertion of the public interest in the Legal 
Services Act 2007 as a regulatory objective. It is to be remembered that the 
Government’s 2005 White Paper on Legal Services168 and the Draft Legal Services Bill 
were framed ostensibly in market terms, heavily orientated towards the consumer, 
without any reference to the public interest. The economic context of the Bill brought it 
squarely within the framework of the better regulation umbrella. At the point of initial 
drafting of the Bill, reference to the public interest was not an issue. Moreover, when the 
Joint Select Committee’s comments were integrated into the legislation which was 
introduced to Parliament, the public interest had been integrated as part of the statutory 
responsibilities of the Legal Services Board and the approved regulators. It was framed in 
a way in which the regulators were to ‘have regard’ to it. The objectives of regulation 
outlined in the dementi Report and the White Paper on Legal Services169 most likely 
provided the legislative draftsman with an ideal basis for drafting the regulatory 
objectives. These regulatory objectives reflected the Government’s clear policy orientated 
towards the consumer and competition. This effectively means that the public interest 
now appears in a piece of regulation that was constructed along economic lines. This is 
interesting because to date it has been argued by a number of scholars that the broadly 
economic approach to regulation, especially those framed within the Better Regulation 
initiatives, are at odds with the ‘public interest’. The following explores these arguments.
167 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, ‘Principles for Economic Regulation’ (BIS, April 2011)
<litto://w\vw.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/tyi l-795-nrincir>les-for-economic-regulation> accessed 
25th October 2012 p2
168 DCA, The Future of Legal Services: Putting Consumers First (Cm 6679, 2005)
169DCA, The Future of Legal Services: Putting Consumers First (Cm 6679, 2005); David Clementi, Review of the 
Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England and Wales, Final Report (December 2004) 57-58 DCA, Draft 
Legal Services Bill, Explanatory Notes and Regulatory Impact Assessment(HMSO, Cm 6839 May 2006) <
httD://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cin68/6839/6839.ndf>:
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4.4.10 The Regulatory Objectives and the Public Interest
The circumstances of the insertion of the public interest as a regulatory objective in the 
Legal Services Act 2007 is relatively easy to explain as outlined in chapter two. 
However, by inserting the public interest regulatory objective into the Legal Services Act 
2007 this, in part, realises what a number of commentators have been arguing for, for a 
long time. Commentators have wanted regulation to be orientated towards the public 
interest and nothing else.170 The main thrust of these commentators’ arguments is that 
regulation should not be justified wholly on economic grounds, or orientated towards a 
particular private interest group. The point has been summed up by Prosser who criticised 
better regulation initiatives, their reliance on regulatory impact assessments,171 and the 
justification for regulation on the basis of market failure. Prosser noted as follows:
“The problem is, however, that the current processes do not see regulation as an 
organic process that requires a balancing o f competing values setting out the sort 
o f society we wish to live in, but rather as a set o f individual interventions that 
impose technical limitations on the functioning o f markets and are thus always 
second best. Rules limiting the operation o f markets are justifiable i f  they are 
necessary to correct market failure, but are not perceived as representing broader 
social values quite different from those expressed through markets themselves. ”172
170 Frank Souraf, ‘The Public Interest Reconsidered’ (1957) 19 The Journal o f Politics 4,p\> 618; Mike Feintuck,
‘The Public Interest’ in Regulation (OUP 2004); Phillip Selznick, ‘Focusing Organisational Research on Regulation’, 
in Roger Noll, (ed) Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (University of California Press, 1985) See also C W 
Casinelli ‘Some reflections on the concept of the public interest (1958) 69 Ethics who noted: “The reason to study the 
public interest is more or less self evident : it is the benchmark against which we consider public policies, and it is “the 
ultimate ethical goal of political relationships, and institutions and practices are to be judged desirable or undesirable to 
the extent they contribute to or detract from the realisation of the public interest.”
171 Regulatory Impact Assessments effectively require a form of cost benefit analysis. Cost benefit analysis models 
decision making in two unconnected steps: first, 'willingness to pay' information, which stands proxy for individual's 
ends or aims, and then this is aggregated, by calculating the sum of compensating variations. The sum reflects how 
much money individuals affected by a project would be able to give up and remain indifferent with the state they were 
in, in the absence of the project. This sum serves to index the projects social desirability. Richardson notes, therefore 
that this leaves no room for practical intelligence encompassing the ability to reformulate ends and aims in light of 
what emerges. He also argues that CBA ignores distributional issues such as access and affordability, and if it does try 
to incorporate them, it does so crudely and controversially. Richardson also notes that the CBA lacks compelling 
justification, although sometimes connected to individual welfare, it has no theoretical connection. Further, it is usually 
used as a crude evaluation procedure eschewing any concerns beyond market dynamics. Richardson finally criticises 
CBA as running roughshod over important incommensurabilities, which can only come to light once value scepticism 
has been abandoned. Henry Richardson, ‘The Stupidity of Cost-Benefit Analysis’(2000) 29 Journal of Legal Studies 
971, 972, 973; The standard has been considered in a less direct fashion, but no less critical, by Robert Frank, ‘Why is 
Cost Benefit Analysis so Controversial’ (2000) 29, Journal of Legal Studies, 91; Jacopo Torriti, ‘The Unsustainable 
rationality of impact assessment’ (2011) 31, European Journal of Law and Economics, 307,320.
172 Tony Prosser, ‘Regulation and Social Solidarity’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 3, 364
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Prosser173 argues that some regulation can rightly be based on market failure; other 
regulation demands justifications that can be founded in the protection of rights and in the 
maintenance of social solidarity. Whilst Prosser is mainly concerned with outlining a 
theory based on social solidarity, he has not been alone in advocating greater emphasis 
being placed on the public interest in regulation. In a sense the insertion of the public 
interest into the Legal Services Act 2007 might represent a small step forward for the 
advocates of regulation orientated towards the public interest.
4.4.11 The Public Interest in Regulation.
The following examines a number of arguments, made by scholars, that the focus of 
regulation should be the public interest, concentrating on collective interests as opposed 
to individual interests. With regards to the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’, the following seeks to connect its inclusion in the Legal 
Services Act 2007, albeit at the behest of the House of Lords, with a much broader debate 
about the purpose of regulation. The thrust of the following arguments are that regulation 
in the public interest requires a ‘whole analysis’, not just an analysis of factors that fall 
within the dominant methodological and ideological dispositions of those charged with 
regulating. The principle purpose of doing this is to distinguish, in part, the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ from other instances where the 
public interest appears in legislation. This is because in this instance the insertion of the 
public interest arguably affects the principal purpose of the legislation. From this it is 
argued that there is a more compelling need to identify with precision, the public interest.
Feintuck174 has written the seminal text on public interest and regulation. He argued that, 
in the absence of some prominent overarching value system which reflects the public 
interest, there is a significant risk that regulatory intervention will become subjective and 
unpredictable. This argument is bom out of the changing approaches to regulation, the 
dominance of economic modelling and market values in the politics of the post-Thatcher
173 ibid
174 Mike Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (OUP, 2004) 23.
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/ Regan era.175 In particular Feintuck noted that social values which may have formed a 
significant part of the original justification for existing regulation can easily become lost 
or badly distorted.176 He argued that:
“in so far as constructs o f the public interest currently in play can be viewed as 
insubstantial, this is a result o f their reflecting almost exclusively “economic 
considerations” and therefore containing inadequate recognition o f important 
democratic expectations. ”177
This statement reveals a problem, whereby a number of scholars have framed market 
failure analysis within an economic theory commonly referred to as the ‘public interest 
theory of regulation.’178 For present purposes scholars, including Feintuck, consider that 
this has been an unfortunate mislabelling and that the public interest requires the 
consideration of much broader factors. Feintuck, in particular, argues that this connection 
throws substantial doubt upon the validity of claims for justifying regulation in the public 
interest by reference exclusively, or even primarily, to economic argument.179 He draws 
from this that models of the public interest, based upon the value of market forces, fail to 
recognise or incorporate a wider set of values and a broader set of interests. Such models, 
he asserts, do not reflect a broader democratic value set and ignore a range of 
philosophical and constitutional principles and expectations.180
Feintuck is not alone in making these assertions. Other scholars181 have been seeking to 
resurrect public interest theory, arguing that the widespread use of market-based reforms 
for the delivery of public goods and services has altered the relationships between the 
citizen and the state. This they argue has compromised commitments to the collective
175 ibid
176 ibid
177 ibid
178 Micheal Hankte-Domas, ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation’ (2003) 15 
European Journal of Law and Economics 2,165,185
179 Mike Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (OUP 2004) 7.
180 ibid
181Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest -  Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 20; Mike Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (OUP, 2004); Jon Pierre, The 
Marketization of the State in Guy Peters and Donald Savoie (eds) Governance in a changing environment (McGill- 
Queens University Press 1995)
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good.182 Blancard, Hinnant and Wong183 compared the roles of citizens as beneficiaries, 
participants, and owners with the new market failure theory which regards citizens as 
‘customers and consumers’. They conclude that a ‘customer/consumer’ concept of the 
citizen changes the nature of the states’ social contract. They note that this tendency is 
exacerbated with increased privatization, contracting out, and marketization of particular 
professions. The thrust of their argument is that this has fundamentally altered the 
relationship between the state and the citizen and has created a form of ‘social 
subcontract,’ one that trades political empowerment for one that prizes economic 
empowerment.184 In counterpoint to the preponderant influence of the market, Milne185 
identifies the ‘social responsibility’ of government as being specifically that of 
representing community interests above and beyond sectional or individual interests. His 
rationale for greater understanding and integration of the public interest is based around 
the need to prescribe a predetermined set of outcomes to the consideration of particular 
issues establishing the institutions of the state, as opposed to the institutions of the 
market, as the legitimate forum in which conflicting claims and interests are to be 
resolved in the interest of the community.186
The challenge suggested by Reifner187 is to attempt to understand and operationalize the 
public interest so as to move beyond a model of ‘ignorant markets’ to a situation where 
responsibility finds a position in the marketplace as a non-commodity value with a 
standing equal to other more readily quantifiable economic or monetary values. 
Bozeman188 notes that, in the same direct and indirect ways that market-orientated 
theories support the march toward market-orientated policy and management, there is a 
potential for theories of public interest and public value to exert a valuable and warranted 
influence. Cassinelli suggests that the reason to study the public interest is more or less
182 Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (OUP 2004);
183 Lloyd Blanchard , Charles Hinnant, Wilson Wong, ‘Market Based Reforms in Government: Toward a Social 
Subcontract?’ (1998) 30 Administration and Society 483
184 ibid
185 Alan Milne ‘The Public Interest, Political Controversy, and the Judges’ in Roger Brownsword (ed) Law and the
Public Interest — Proceedings o f the 1992 ALSP Conference (Franz Steiner, 1993)
187 Udo Reifner, ‘The Lost Penny -  Social Contract Law and Market Economy’, in Thomas Wilhelmsson, and Samuel 
Hurri (eds), From Dissonance to Sense: Welfare Expectations, Privatisation and Private Law, (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
1999).
188 Barry Bozeman , Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown 
University Press 2007)
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self-evident. He argued that the public interest is the benchmark against which public 
policies are considered, and it is: “the ultimate ethical goal o f political relationships, and 
institutions and practices are to be judged desirable or undesirable to the extent they 
contribute to or detract from the realization o f the public interest”1*9
The problem is squarely identified by Bozeman.190 He notes that those who argue for a 
market based approach to policy or public regulation have at their disposal, among other 
possibilities, market failure theory, public goods theory, proprietary property rights 
theory, principal-agent theory, and a large number of analytical tools such as cost benefit 
analysis flowing from these theories.191 The problem is forcefully put by Pierre192, who 
notes:
“Despite obvious concern about perceived trends o f market-based public 
management driving out or reshaping the public interest, the critics o f this trend 
have, by and large, failed to provide notions o f the public interest, collective 
good, or civic responsibility that are sufficiently coherent to serve as a sharp 
counterpoint to “marketization ”193
The foregoing connects with the insertion of the public interest in the Legal Services Act 
2007. Whilst members of the House of Lords objected to the emphasis placed on the 
consumer and competition, chapter three of this thesis has clearly linked these with the 
market. Whilst this thesis is primarily concerned with the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’, there is an obvious connection with this 
scholarship. In rhetorical terms at least, the insertion of the public interest in the Legal 
Services Act 2007 has gone some way towards orientating the regulation of legal services 
towards the collective interests of society. This inclusion was made only through the 
peculiarities of the legislative process and the influence of the House of Lords. However,
189 C W Cassinelli, Some reflections on the concept of the public interest. (1958) 69 Ethics 48
190 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest -  Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
University Press, 2007) 20
191 ibid
192 Jon Pierre, The Marketization of the State in Guy Peters and Donald Savoie (eds) Governance in a changing 
environment (McGill-Queens University Press, 1995)
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whilst the insertion of the public interest in the Legal Services Act 2007 may appear, at 
face value to have corrected some of the objections outlined regarding the orientation of 
regulation, the preceding quote by Pierre underlines the problem outlined throughout this 
chapter. The problem is, when it comes to understanding the public interest, a further set 
of problems present themselves. Principally what is the public interest and can it exert 
any influence in policy and regulatory decision making? For present purposes a number 
of conclusions can be drawn in respect of the questions posed at the beginning of this 
chapter.
4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The first question that this chapter sought to address was ‘What attempts have been made 
to understand the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in 
the context of legal services?’ This chapter has outlined three attempts to get to grips with 
the public interest in the context of legal services. These attempts revealed markedly 
different approaches to the term. On the whole these definitions are arguable incomplete. 
It is unclear how they could be translated into either processes of regulatory decision 
making or the wider activities of regulators. It is argued therefore that there is a 
substantial amount of work to be done before the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’, as understood within these definitions, may actually be 
said to protect and promote the public interest.
The second question that this chapter sought to address was ‘How have regulators, and in 
particular the Legal Services Board, pursued the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’? The following conclusions can be drawn. (1) It is clear 
that the Legal Services Board have experienced difficulty both defining and 
operationalizing the public interest; (2) Nearly three years into its operations, the Legal 
Services Board has clearly expressed that it is not entirely sure what the public interest is; 
(3) There is evidence to suggest that the Legal Services Board is actively promoting and 
protecting the consumer interest; (4) There is little evidence, regarding one of the most 
important policy determinations made by the Legal Services Board, that anything beyond 
consumer interests were considered by the Legal Services Board; (5) It is unclear the
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extent to which other regulators understand the public interest, though there is some 
evidence to suggest that the Bar does not share the same vision of the public interest as 
the Legal Services Board.
The final question addressed in this chapter was ‘Can the public interest when used as a 
regulatory objective be distinguished from other uses of the term public interest in 
legislation?’ It has been argued that the context within which the public interest appears 
in the Legal Services Act 2007 is distinct in some respects from other uses of the term 
public interest in pieces of legislation. It is argued that the regulatory objective is a 
broader and more searching obligation than hitherto enshrined in regulation in the UK. 
Not only does the public interest permeate the Act, its inclusion theoretically expressly 
orientates the regulation of legal services.
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CHAPTER 5- DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter considered various definitions of the public interest connected with 
legal services. It also considered the Legal Services Board’s attempts to understand and 
pursue the public interest. The final section of the last chapter connected the regulatory 
objective concerning the public interest with a burgeoning body of scholarship which 
argues that the public interest should be resurrected as the principal justification for 
regulation. These arguments pertain to the desire that Government and regulators 
consider a broader range of issues when making decisions about whether to initiate or 
remove regulation and legislation. This thesis has argued that it is not prudent to regulate 
ostensibly in the consumer’s interest. This line of argument correlates in part with the 
aforementioned scholars’ arguments. For present purposes, however, this chapter is 
concerned with understanding the public interest. The last chapter concluded by asserting 
that there are difficulties associated with the public interest as it is currently understood. 
This chapter is concerned with whether the public interest ‘can’ be both understood and 
operationalized such that the public interest can be protected and promoted in connection 
with the Legal Services Act 2007. This chapter sets out to address one question:
Can the public interest be meaningfully defined?
The first section of this chapter seeks to explore whether the 'public interest' is capable of 
being meaningfully defined. It first examines the ways in which the term has been 
considered in the context of regulation. It explores the problems of definition and a 
number of scholars’ judgments that the public interest is a lost cause. It then moves to 
consider how the public interest has been understood in philosophy, political science and 
public administration literature. Given the voluminous and diverse treatments of the 
public interest, a sub-genre of the literature categorising the meanings and definitions of 
the public interest will then be outlined. The purpose of doing this is to locate the various 
ways in which the public interest has been understood. The categories of the public 
interest will then be considered, referring to the scholars who propound these theories. 
This section will also consider the various academic criticisms pertaining to these
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particular categorisations of the public interest. Given that these classifications have been 
derived, in the main, by political scientists, public administrators and philosophers, the 
various categories of the public interest will be considered in light of the regulatory use 
outlined for the public interest in the Legal Services Act 2007. Building on one strand of 
the academic literature, conclusions are drawn as to a way in which the public interest 
could be understood with regards to the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting 
the public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007.
5.2 DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
5.2.1 The Public Interest and Regulation
This section serves to explain why it is necessary to investigate a broader body of 
literature in pursuit of an idea of what the public interest is. The reason is essentially two 
fold. The first is that in the standard texts on regulation, whilst there are references to 
public interest theories of regulation, few authors expand on what the public interest 
actually is. Where there is reference to the public interest, it is usually equated with 
economic reasons for regulating-with little reference to factors beyond this.1 Making a 
similar point, Feintuck notes that the public interest has received very little attention from 
the writers of texts on regulation.2 The following evidences these assertions.
Ogus3, one of the most influential scholars in the field of regulation identifies a range of 
economic goals that are typically presented as examples of public interest within the 
regulatory system in a liberal democracy. Ogus considers some ‘non-economic1 grounds 
for regulation, but these accounts are dwarfed by the analysis devoted to economic 
grounds for regulation. In short, he places great emphasis on an economic model of the 
public interest which derives from an identification of allocative efficiency.4 Majone5, in
1 Micheal Hankte-Domas, ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation’ (2003) 15 
European Journal of Law and Economics 2,165
2 Mike Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (OUP 2004) 34
3 Anthony Ogus, Regulation Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart 2004) ch3
4 Ogus’s links this to 'a situation in which resources are put to their most valuable use’, which is said to contribute to 
the economic welfare of society as a whole. Anthony Ogus, Regulation Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart 2004) 
ch3
5 Giandomenico Majone, Deregulation or Re-regulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States (Frances 
Pinter 1992)
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‘Deregulation or Re-regulation,’ barely considers the public interest though discusses 
‘industries deemed to affect the public interest’6 without expanding or elaborating on 
what the public interest is. Baldwin and Cave,7 in what has become the standard 
University textbook on regulation, explain public interest theories of regulation, but do 
not seek to explain what the public interest is. The section they devote to ‘why regulate’ 
consists mainly of economic reasons.8 Feintuck, in a monograph advocating a greater 
recognition of the public interest rationale for regulating, argues that an economic public 
interest account seems to have become the accepted meaning for the term and the 
rationale for a large proportion of regulation.9 In connection with a number of reviews of 
legal services a predominately economic conception of the public interest has been put 
forward.10 There is also a discernible trend in the literature to expressly connect the 
public interest rationale for regulation with the market failure approach to regulation.11
The second reason for considering the broader literature on the public interest is 
connected with the forgoing limited explanation of the public interest in regulation. It is 
also connected with the scholars’ arguments set out at the end of the last chapter. These
6 ibid
7 Robert Baldwin & Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation (Oxford 1999) 19-21
8 Robert Baldwin & Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation (Oxford 1999) 9-17 Why regulate includes: Monopolies 
and Natural Monopolies; Windfall Profits; Externalities; Information Inadequacies; Continuity and Availability of 
Service; Anti-competitive Behaviour and Predatory pricing; Public Goods and Moral Hazard; Unequal Bargaining 
Power; Scarcity and Rationing; Distributional Justice and Social Policy; Rationalisation and Co-ordination; Planning.
9 Mike Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (OUP 2004) 34
10 KipViscusi, JohnVemon, Joseph Harrington, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust ( MIT, 2nd ed, 1995); Peter 
Aranson, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation: From Clarity to Confusion’ (1990) 6 Journal of Law and Politics, 247; 
Micheal Hankte-Domas, ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation’ (2003) 15 
European Journal of Law and Economics 2,165,185; Hans Maks and Niels Phillipsen, ‘An Economic Analysis of 
the Regulation of Professions’ in Lode Vereeck Regulation of Architects ( Intersentia, 2002); Oliver James,
‘Regulation inside government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory failures’ (2000) 78 Public Administration 
2
11 OECD, Competitive Restrictions in Legal Professions (OECD, DAF/COMP/(2007) 39) ; Roger Van den Bergh, 
‘Towards Better Regulation of the Legal Professions in the European Union’ (Rotterdam institute of Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series, no 1,2008/7); Iain Paterson, Marcel Fink, Anthony Ogus, Economic impact of 
regulation in the field of liberal professions in different Member States Regulation o f Professional Services (IHS, 
January2003) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/professional services/studies/nrof services ihs part l.pdf> 
accessed on 23 November 2012 ; Legal Services Institute, The Regulation of Legal Services: What is the Case for 
Reservation? (LSI, 2011)
<http://www.legalservicesinstitute.org.uk/LSI/LSI Papers/Institute Papers/The Regulation of Legal Services What 
is the Case for Reservation /> accessed 23 November 2012: See also Llewellyn 1999 cited in the Legal Services 
Institute ( David Llewellyn, ‘The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation’ ( FSA Occasional Papers Series: 1, 
London 1999 )Stephen Mayson in the LSI report (above ) specifically draws attention to the following statement in the 
report: "The influence o f 'market failure' thinking on approaches to regulation has led to a number of regulatory 
interventions to correct such perceivedfailures. The rationale for these interventions is that regulation to avoid market 
failures is in the public interest. The European Parliament has expressed a view that any market failure or 
imperfections that are reducing consumer welfare can provide a basis for regulation. "
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scholars sought to robustly challenge the increasing trend to base regulation on economic 
grounds. This thesis justifies a move beyond considering the public interest in primarily 
economic terms because of the underlying purpose of the public interest in the Legal 
Services Act 2007. The conclusion drawn in chapter two was that the legislative intention 
which underpinned the insertion of the public interest in the Legal Services Act 2007 was 
not concerned with an economic understanding of the public interest. References to 
access to justice, the rule of law and implicit references to sustainability in the debates in 
the House of Lords clearly connected the term with a much broader understanding of the 
public interest. The three definitions of the public interest in legal services outlined in the 
previous chapter also reflect this broader understanding. Undoubtedly there is a sound 
rationale for considering economic and market factors in the regulation of legal services, 
however, this thesis argues that these form only part of the public interest. The following 
moves to consider the public interest outside of the context of regulation.
5.2.2 Difficulties with the Public Interest
Whilst the writers of texts on regulation do not seek to try and define public interest, and 
the last chapter reflected on the Legal Services Board’s attempts to get to grips with the 
public interest, the following puts these into perspective. This section outlines some of 
the problems inherent in defining the public interest. The following statement alludes to 
the variety of disciplines that have considered the public interest. It also serves to draw 
attention to the fact that studies of the public interest are likely to be subjective. To this, it 
may also be added that various trends in academia, such as empiricism, and more recent 
reactions to neo-liberalism and economic individualism, affect the conclusions drawn by 
scholars. Frank Souraf squarely locates the challenge of understanding the public interest 
as follows:
“A concept as nebulous as the public interest invites not definition but absorption. 
The scholar can make o f it what he will by projecting into it whatever content or 
meaning he finds congenial. Regardless o f what his own particular intellectual 
orientation may be, he can thereby incorporate his personal vision o f the public 
interest into his work. But by becoming all things to all people, the public interest
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has found at best a superficial acceptance and achieved only the survival o f the 
innocuous. ”12
Following this statement, it is perhaps unsurprising that no study has yet discovered an 
authoritative objective standard conception of the public interest.13 This conclusion may, 
however, appear counter intuitive. In chapter two it was argued that members of the 
House of Lords appeared to know what the public interest was. A large number of the 
Lords were unified by calls for it to be included as a regulatory objective. This is one of 
the key features of the public interest -  at one level everyone intuitively thinks they know 
what it means, and therefore it is used frequently. However, beyond this there is a 
problem as Dhavan has noted:
“The public interest in British law has, by and large, a somewhat mirage like 
quality, appearing to take various concrete forms but then receding or 
evaporating as one approaches. ”14
A similar comment was made in 1948 by Harold Wilson.
“I  think every Member o f the house knows what he means by the Public Interest 
and applies that test to a very wide range o f questions that come to him for  
judgement. But I  doubt whether any Member could provide a legal definition o f  
what he means by the public interest. ”15
The problem therefore, as revealed throughout this chapter, depends on the context in 
which the term public interest is used or studied. Used casually or rhetorically there are 
few problems with the public interest. However, when the term is used to justify policy, 
the way a politician or public servant acts or takes decisions, or is used as a regulatory 
objective in a piece of legislation, then matters become less clear cut. It is perhaps no
12 Frank Souraf, ‘The Public Interest Reconsidered’ (1957) 19 The Journal of Politics 4, 618
13 Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Defining the ‘Public Interest’ (Griffith University, 2008) 244
14 Rajeev Dhavan, ‘Whose Law? Whose Interest?’ in Jeremy Cooper & Rajeev Dhavan (eds), Public Interest Law 
(Blackwell 1986), 33.
15 Harold Wilson, Hansard, H.C. vol 449, cols 2035-7 (22 April 1948)
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wonder that the public interest has been the subject of an array of books, articles and 
conference papers.16 The public interest has been studied by philosophers, political 
scientists, public administrators, economists and lawyers. The underlying point that 
unifies all of these endeavours is that there is no agreement as to what the public interest 
is, or how it is to be operationalized. The lack of definition or consensus about what the 
public interest is, has led a number of prominent commentators to suggest that quests to 
either define or operationalize the public interest are a lost cause. The following examines 
some of these arguments.
5.3.3 The Public Interest -  A Lost Cause
Whilst the foregoing has outlined some specific problems with the public interest, the 
following draws attention to a number of scholars’ despondency with the public interest. 
The purpose of doing this is to frame the challenges involved in understanding the public 
interest. Feintuck, in his text on regulation and the public interest, comes close to 
suggesting that the concept should be abandoned, noting “it remains the case that in the 
absence o f such restricted usage and redefinition abandoning the concept may be the 
most sensible option. ”17 Beatson, who sought to understand the parameters of the public 
interest and unpick a plethora of understandings of the term came to the following 
conclusion: “the public interest is a hopelessly ambiguous term”1* In a similar vein, 
Souraf, after surveying uses of the public interest asserted that the public interest was 
“burdened with too many meanings for valuable use as a tool o f political analysis and is 
anyway nothing but a “myth ”19 and that it should - “join a list o f ambiguous words and 
phrases which would never be missed. ”20 Souraf qualified his assertions by saying: “not 
only do scholars disagree on the definition o f the public interest, they disagree as well 
about what they are trying to define: a goal, a process, or a myth.”21 Schubert was also 
sceptical that the search for a public interest definition would yield anything worthwhile,
16 Adam Wolfson, ‘Public Interest Lost?’ (2007) 136 Daedalus 4, 20 -29
17 Mike Feintuck , ‘The Public Interest ’ in Regulation (OUP 2004) 77
18 Jack Beatson, ‘What is the ‘Public Interest’ and what is a ‘Public Interest Case?’ (Conference Paper, Law Society 
Public Interest Seminar, 26 March 1998) 1
19 Frank Souraf, ‘The Conceptual Muddle’ in Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967) 
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noting: “there is no public interest theory worthy o f the name .... It may also be nothing 
more than a label attached indiscriminately to a miscellany o f particular compromises o f  
the moment. ” 22 Downs noted: “it soon becomes apparent that no general agreement 
exists about whether the term has any meaning at all, or, i f  it has what the meaning is, 
which specific actions are in the public interest and which are not, and how to distinguish 
between them. ”23 More specifically he noted that
a) “The term is vague and ambiguous
b) Individual authors are not consistent in their usage o f the term
c) Many concepts o f the public interest are virtually indistinguishable from more 
general concerns o f morality
d) There have been few  efforts to measure the public interest, none entirely 
successful. ”24
Dahl and Lindblom ventured further noting that the public interest “is usually left totally 
undefined. Rarely can it be read to mean the preferences o f the greater number. Often 
enough a precise examination would show that it can mean nothing more than whatever 
happens to be the speaker’s own view as to a desirable public policy.”25 Rather than 
merely asserting that there was little point in continuing with the public interest, two 
scholars have gone further to suggest that the fluidity with which the public interest has 
been interpreted verges on the dangerous. Weisbrod observed that the public interest has 
“been used throughout history to justify everything from democracy to totalitarianism”26 
Kristol provides the most damning assertion: “It is probable that as much mischief has
22 Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (Free Press Glencoe 1960) 24
23 Adam Wolfson, ‘Public Interest Lost?’ (2007) 136 Daedalus 4, 20 -29; Anthony Downs ‘The Public Interest; Its 
Meaning in Democracy’ (1962) 29 Social Research 1; Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper 
1957)
24 Anthony Downs ‘The Public Interest; Its Meaning in Democracy’ (1962) 29 Social Research 1; Anthony Downs, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper, 1957)
25 Robert Dahl Charles Lindblom, Politcs, Economics and Welfare (Harper 1963) 501 ; Virginia Held, The Public 
Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 9
26 Burton Weisbrod, ‘Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis’ in Burton Weisbrod, Joel 
Handler, Neil Komesar, (eds.,) Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis (University of California 
Press, 1970)
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been perpetrated upon the human race in the name o f the ‘public interest ’ as in the name 
o f anything else. Indeed, there are even political scientists who, disgusted by the whole 
business, insist that the phrase be discarded... It is either misleading or meaningless, 
they say; there is no such thing as ‘the public interest. ”27 Feintuck has also made similar 
assertions “Though the phrase ‘the public interest’ has an air o f democratic propriety, 
the absence o f any identifiable normative content renders the concept insubstantial and 
hopelessly vulnerable to annexation or colonisation by those who exercise power in 
society. ”28
A picture begins to emerge of the public interest that invites a conclusion that the term is 
what it is i.e. a frequently used two worded phrase without an agreed understanding of 
what it really means. However, because the public interest is used so frequently, and in 
such important ways, the forgoing conclusions regarding its lack of meaning or need to 
be removed from current usage will never likely be acted upon. Moreover, as Flathman 
rather pointedly observed, if the public interest is abandoned it will mean simply that the 
same problems will have to be wrestled with under some other heading.29 For present 
purposes, to accept that the public interest is incapable of definition would mean that 
there is little or no chance that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest’ could realise the legislative intention which underpinned its inclusion in 
the Legal Services Act 2007. The inability to define the public interest would mean that 
any value judgment as to whether a regulatory objective could contribute to the fulfilment 
of the public interest would be impossible. This would have the effect of suggesting that 
the public interest, whatever this may or may not be, may or may not be protected and 
promoted by the regulators charged with regulating the legal services market. This is a 
particularly unsatisfactory conclusion, given the fact that the legislature specifically 
inserted the term ‘public interest’ into the Legal Services Act 2007, and, as outlined in 
chapter two, an embryonic understanding of what it stands for can be discerned from the 
debates in the House of Lords.
27 Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, 6Foreword’(1965) 1 The Public Interest,!, 1
28Mike Feintuck, ‘The Public Interest’ in Regulation (OUP 2004) 33
29 Richard Flathman, The Public Interest An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse Politics (John Wiley 1966) 
67; Virginia Held , The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 4
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Due to the fact that the public interest is used so frequently, as the Legal Services Act 
2007 aptly illustrates, the necessity to get to grips with the public interest still remains. 
Despite all the scholarship that preceded a 2010 public administration paper its authors 
still arrived at the conclusion that:
“All areas o f public administration would benefit from a clearer set o f values, 
decision rules, and frameworks for defining, explaining, and applying the public 
interest. 30
Around the same time that this paper was published other scholars drew the conclusion 
that it is highly unlikely that a consensus on how to crystallise the notion of the public 
interest would ever emerge.31 In qualifying this assertion, the scholar also noted that there 
were probably an unlimited number of avenues of research to pursue in further pinning 
the public interest down.32 This presents something of an insoluble problem. The 
following seeks to ascertain whether any of the existing ‘public interest’ theories might 
be utilised such that the public interest ‘can’ be better understood in a way that the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ can realise the 
legislative intention that underpinned its insertion in the Legal Services Act 2007. This 
chapter progresses by outlining the various genres of public interest study. It then 
examines a sub-genre which has focused on classifying the public interest. It then seeks 
to determine if progress can be made towards an understanding in the context of the 
Legal Services Act 2007, or whether an alternative conclusion, along the lines of those 
outlined in this section, is more tenable.
5.4 SCHOLARSHIP AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The following locates and outlines the main periods of study of the public interest and 
some of the seminal publications which have been preoccupied with the public interest.
30 Stephen King, Bradley Chilton, Gary Roberts, ‘Reflections on Defining the Public Interest’ (2010) 41 
Administration and Society 972
31 Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Defining the ‘Public Interest’ (Griffith University 2008) 252
32 ibid
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This section also identifies a number of trends as well as the disciplinary foci pertaining 
to these studies of the public interest. Whilst this section serves as a general introduction 
to the literature, the next section of this chapter distils from these works elements that are 
pertinent to this thesis.
The first references to the public interest, albeit couched in slightly different terms to the 
public interest, appeared in ancient Greece, and more specifically in the works of the 
great philosophers. Whilst few of the great philosophers referred directly to the term 
‘public interest’ a variety of synonyms have been argued, by scholars33, to be equivalent 
to the public interest.34 Significantly, traces of the classical philosophers’ propositions 
underpinned many later works during the 1950s and 1960s. In essence classical 
philosophy generally prioritised the collective over and above special and individual 
interests.35 Otherwise framed, the 'public* sphere of activity was often to be contrasted 
with the private activities of individuals. Throughout most, though not all, theories of 
justice of the time the public or common good was emphasised as opposed to special 
interest.36 There are many distinctions to be drawn within the works of different 
philosophers. These differences reflect the emphasis placed variously on religion, public 
welfare and politics. Scholars maintain that Socrates was the first recorded philosopher to 
inquire about what constitutes the good life in connection with both society and societal 
security.37 Modem interpretations of Socrates view his understandings of the good life to 
be the conditions acceptable for humans to "flourish, achieve, learn, appreciate and 
e n j o y . Edwards,39 in particular, draws a parallel with quest for ‘good life’ with the 
public interest and moreover the responsibility placed on philosopher kings, or, as they
33 The following substitutes these synonyms with the term public interest. This practice has been widely adopted in 
contemporary scholarship concentrating on the public interest. Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual 
Interests (Basic Books 1970)
34 Dale Murphy including common profit, common good, common weal (Cicero), commonweal, commonwealth, 
common well-being, public welfare, bien publique, propriety of the community, general good 'the general will' 
(Rosseau) and general welfare; Dale Murphy, ‘Defining the Public Interest in a Global World’ (Conference Paper, 
International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Diego, 23 March 2006)
35 Cameades may however, be distinguished from those that advocated a general unitary conception of the public 
interest. He argued that politics and law was based on individual interests
36 Virginia Held , The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 47
37 Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Defining the ‘Public Interest’ (Griffith University 2008) 22
38 The Greeks emphasised the search for the good life rather than the destination. Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Defining the 
‘Public Interest’ (Griffith University, 2008) 22
39 Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Defining the ‘Public Interest’ (Griffith University 2008) 22
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might be understood today, publically appointed officials to bring about the structure of 
governance which realises the public interest. In essence the public interest was the 
central underpinning factor, urging and orientating governance toward the common 
good.40
Plato referred to the relationship between private interests and the public good. In his 
Dialogues41 he challenged the Sophists42 who argued that the laws of any polity, 
including Athens, could be reduced to self-interest. Plato considered that the common 
good is that which is at one with God's law and opposed to vanity, greed and conceit.43 
Aristotle44 emphasised the role of state in promoting the common good.45 He equated 
rightness and justice with the common interest.46 Aristotle was of the view that the 
common interest of a society is that which is best for all men of that society.47 For 
Aristotle, political good, or what might be called the public interest, embraces all other 
goods, and what is good for the polity is good for its members.48 Aristotle’s notions were 
developed by Augustine and Aquinas. Aquinas49 saw a society's common good as 
including all those things "which everyone in the society needs, desires or shares in, 
either actually or potentially, directly or indirectly"50 Aquinas argued that law, if it is 
truly law, is "ordained to the common good" and a valid judgment of either public or 
individual interest must be valid for all in common.51 He took the view that since 
individuals, the state and also the church, in their various ways, sought a rationally 
defined common good, a judgment of interest for any must, if valid, be compatible with
40 ibid
41 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato (Translated by Bob Jowett, Random House, 1937)
42 In ancient Greece, the sophists were a group of teachers who used philosophy and rhetoric to teach excellence and 
virtue
43 Plato, Republic, (506); Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 136
44 Aristotle, ‘Politics’ in Ernest Barker, The Politics o f Aristotle (OUP 1962)
45 For Aristotle, any Government which does not pursue the common interest is not, in Aristotle's view, a justifiable 
form of government Aristotle, ‘Politics’ in Ernest Barker, The Politics o f Aristotle (OUP 1962) 27
46 Aristotle, ‘Politics’ in Ernest Barker, The Politics o f Aristotle (OUP 1962)
47 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 141 ; Gerhart Niemeyer, ‘Public 
Interest and private Utility’ in Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967) 2-3
48 ibid
49 Aquinas, ‘Summa, I-IF in Dino Bigongiani ed The Political Ideas of St Thomas Aquinas (Hafher, 1953); Virginia 
Held , The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 142
50Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Defining the ‘Public Interest’ (Griffith University, 2008) 22; Gerhart Niemeyer, ‘Public Interest 
and private Utility’ in Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967) 3-4
51 Aquinas, ‘Summa, I-IF in Dino Bigongiani ed The Political Ideas o f St Thomas Aquinas (Hafher 1953); Virginia 
Held , The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books, 1970) 142
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all other valid judgments of interest.52 He also noted that "The common good is the end 
goal or purpose for which human society exists,"53 including social good such as 
education, civil peace, or defence.54 Augustine, noted that "the unity required to speak o f 
a people presupposes the creation o f a common good. In every community, the individual 
persons are united by the good that they desire in common. "55
These various snapshots of the works of the classical philosophers variously align the 
public interest as a benchmark for the actualisation of a functioning society. As outlined 
below, Held56 categorises these approaches to the public interest as a "unitary 
conception." She noted that they each assert a normative position for the public interest. 
This normative position is largely regarded as a moral concept, constituted by a unitary 
scheme of moral judgements designed, ideally, to guide decision making in society.57 The 
importance of the classical scholars’ determinations is to be found in later works, 
specifically in the period after the Enclosure Acts during the 15th and 16th centuries.58 A 
number of prominent works of the time written by More59, Starkey60 and Elyot61, based 
their condemnation of social groups who pursued their own interests to the detriment of 
the public good / interest on classical philosophy.62
Hume,63 Smith,64 Bentham65, Hobbes 66 and Mill67 marked a seismic shift in thinking 
from the conception of the public interest built out of classical philosophy.68 Broadly
52 Apparent conflict between judgments of public interest and individual interest must indicate that one is mistaken. 
Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books, 1970) 144
53 Aquinas, ‘Summa, I-IF in Dino Bigongiani ed The Political Ideas of St Thomas Aquinas (Ha&er 1953); Virginia 
Held , The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 142
54 ibid
55 Dale Murphy, ‘Defining the Public Interest in a Global World’ (Conference Paper, International Studies Association 
Annual Conference, San Diego, 23 March 2006); Gerhart Niemeyer, ‘Public Interest and private Utility’ in Carl 
Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967) 4-
56 Virginia Held , The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 141
57 ibid
58 Dale Murphy, ‘Defining the Public Interest in a Global World’ (Conference Paper, International Studies Association 
Annual Conference, San Diego, 23 March 2006)
59 Thomas More, Utopia, Clarence Miller (Translator) (Yale University Press 2001)
60 Thomas Starkey, Dialogue (Royal Historical Society Reprint 1989)
61 Thomas Elyot, Governor (Everyman’s Library. Reprint, 1962)
62 Dale Murphy, ‘Defining the Public Interest in a Global World’ (Conference Paper, International Studies Association 
Annual Conference, San Diego, 23 March 2006)3
63 David Hume, Hume’s Moral and Political Philosophy, Henry Aiken (ed) (Hafher, 1948); David Hume, An Inquiry 
Concerning the Principles o f Morals (Liberal Arts, 1957); David Hume, Treaty on Human Nature (Dover 
Publications, New Edition 2004)
64 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments ( A Millar 1761) Adam Smith, An inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations ( University of Chicago; Facsimile of 1904 ed, 1977)
225
speaking they framed the public interest as nothing more than an aggregation of 
individual happiness.69 In essence they privileged private interests over public interests. 
Held70 labelled their approach as ‘Preponderance accounts of the public interest’. This is 
on the basis that they took the public interest to be represented by policies which satisfy 
the majority of individuals or, at least, increase aggregate satisfaction. The most 
influential theory from this period is Bentham’s71 utilitarianism. Bentham was a prime 
exponent of the preponderance calculations, stating that the formula for determining the 
right decisions in any situation is to avoid pain and maximise happiness for the greatest 
number of people.72 The principles of the utilitarian approach are to be found today 
within welfare economics and more specifically, within cost-benefit analysis where the 
costs and benefits expected in a particular decision are outlined with a view to 
determining the most cost efficient solution to a problem, theoretically maximising 
benefits to general welfare.73
During the twentieth century a number of major publications related to the public interest 
emerged including: The Public Interest and Individual Interests by Virginia Held;74 The 
Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept by Glendon Schubert,75 
and The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics by 
Richard Flathman.76The subject also became the focus of collaborative scholarly efforts. 
In 1959 the Philosophers Wayne Leys and Chandler Perry put together a scholarly
65 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation (Dover Publications, Reprint, 2009) 
Jeremy Bentham, The Works o f Jeremy Bentham Vol 11 (ed John Bowring, William Tait, 1843)1
66 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (OUP, Reprint, 1996)
67 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Prometheus Books, 1991) John Stuart Mill, On 
Liberty (Penguin Classics; Reprint edition, 1982)
68 Dale Murphy, ‘Defining the Public Interest in a Global World’ (Conference Paper, International Studies Association 
Annual Conference, San Diego, 23 March 2006); Gerhart Niemeyer, ‘Public Interest and private Utility’ in Carl 
Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967)5-6
69 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 50; Gerhart Niemeyer, ‘Public 
Interest and private Utility’ in Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967)5-6
70 ibid
71 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation (Dover Publications, Reprint, 2009)
31
72 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
University Press, 2007) 90
73 Michael Saks, Professions and Public Interest (Routledge 1994) 40
74 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 141
75 Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (Free Press, Glencoe, 1961) 23
76 Richard Flathman, The Public Interest -  An essay concerning the Normative Discourse o f Politics (New York: Wiley 
1966)61
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collection entitled Philosophy and the Public Interest.77 It sought to clarify the public 
interest. A few years later, NOMOS (V), edited by Carl Friedrich, dedicated a volume of 
essays to the meaning of the public interest.78 Generally what preoccupied these scholars 
during this period was the question of definition or how to classify the public interest. A 
number of scholars were concerned in the late 1950s with ascertaining an understanding 
of the public interest from empirical analysis and observation. The result of this emphasis 
on empiricism meant that to a number of scholars the public interest appeared either too 
theoretical or normative.79 As outlined above, a number of these scholars were drawn to 
the conclusion that the there was no overall understanding of the public interest.80 
Political scientists, not concerned with empiricism, were preoccupied with the process of 
democratic accountability and the extent to which a process or processes could be used to 
reveal the public interest. A consensus emerges, from those who were not concerned with 
the public interest from a predominately empirical or political science approach, that the 
public interest was a normative standard. This understanding will be discussed below. 
Following the conclusion that the public interest was a form of normative standard or 
ideal, a number of scholars were concerned with how the public interest could come to be 
discovered. The philosophical and political science literature on the public interest 
appears to have dried up in the 1970s without reaching any consensus on what the public 
interest meant.81
The public interest has attracted renewed attention in the last fifteen years.82 Two distinct 
bodies of literature have emerged. Both of these can be connected with the influence of
77 Wayne Leys, Chandler Perry, Philosophy and the Public Interest (Chicago University Press 1959)
78 Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967)
79 Stephen King, Bradley Chilton, Gary Roberts, ‘Reflections on Defining the Public Interest’ (2010) 41 
Administration and Society 972
80 Geoffrey Edwards, 'Defining the ‘Public Interest’ (Griffith University 2008) 22; Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, 
‘Foreward’(1965) 1 The Public Interest, 1 ;Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (Free Press Glencoe, 1960) 24; Frank 
Souraf, ‘The Conceptual Muddle’ in Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos VThe Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967) 183; 
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper 1957)
81 ibid
82 Howard Elcock, ‘The Public Interest and Public Administration’ (2006) 26 Politics 2,101; Eric Mintz , ‘Voices and 
Echoes : Public Interest representation in the 1990s and beyond’ (2001) 42 Canadian Journal of Political Science 2,42; 
Heather Campbell & Robert Marshall, ‘Moral Obligations, planning and the Public Interest A commentary on current 
British Practice’ (2000) 27 Environmental Planning B -  Planning & Design 2, 297; Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, 
‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ (Paper Prepared for the External Advisory Committee 
on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004)15; Barry Bozeman, Public Values and 
Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown University Press 2007) 90; Oliver James, 
‘Regulation inside government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory failures’ (2000) 78 Public Administration
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neo-liberalism. The first academic treatment comes from public administration 
practitioners and scholars. More specifically, practitioners and scholars have detected 
widespread professional and public dissatisfaction with the dominant model of public 
management, termed ‘New Public Management’. This prioritises the efficiency of public 
sector administration rather than an orientation towards broader values which many 
regard as important. Consequently, a burgeoning area of study is to be found attempting 
to reconnect public services and management to public values. Within the last 10 years 
emphasis has been placed on new public management which seeks to reconnect services 
with the public interest. These practitioners’ and scholars’ considerations of the public 
interest have centred on questions such as whether public administration upholds the law 
and constitutional settlement;83 should decisions be made rationally; should decisions be 
based on a utilitarian greatest good for the greatest number; what values and standards 
should be the foundation of informed decision making. Some specific attempts have been 
made, as outlined below, to operationalize the public interest in decision making.84
A second body of literature is focused on importing the term, public interest, with some 
form of democratic meaning as a counterweight85 to the liberal market interests. These 
scholars argue that liberal market values undermine the democratic element of the liberal 
- democratic settlement.86 Reference has been made to this body of scholarship at the end 
of the previous chapter. Two notable contributions include Mike Feintuck's 87 monograph 
titled ‘The Public Interest in Regulation’ and Barry Bozeman's88 book entitled ‘Public 
Values and Public Interest -  Counterbalancing Economic Individualism.’89
2, 327;Carolyn Wells, A Public Interest Framework for Public Policy Development: A Property and urban planning 
perspective, (Referred Paper, Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Monash University, 24th 
September 2007)
83 A considerable amount of the scholarship related to public administration emanates from the Americas. Therefore, a 
not inconsiderable amount of ink is expended considering the relationship between decision making and its 
compatibility with the US Constitution.
84 Stephen King, Bradley Chilton, Gary Roberts, ‘Reflections on Defining the Public Interest’ (2010) 41 
Administration and Society 956
85 Mike Fein tuck, ‘The Public Interest ’ in Regulation (OUP 2004) 33, Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public 
Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown University Press, 2007)
86 Mike Fein tuck, ‘The Public Interest ’ in Regulation (OUP 2004) 33
87 ibid
88 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
University Press, 2007)
89 Stephen King, Bradley Chilton, Gary Roberts, ‘Reflections on Defining the Public Interest’ (2010) 41 
Administration and Society 956
228
Within the literature of the last 60 years a number of authors have sought to classify the 
various different meanings and definitions of the public interest. The following sets out 
four key classifications of these meanings and definitions. Drawing on these 
classifications, the following section explains the most common and relevant meanings 
and definitions of the public interest. This thesis then progresses by examining and 
assessing them in terms of the broader academic scholarship. The search throughout the 
following section is for a suitable lens or lenses with which to view the public interest in 
connection with the public interest regulatory objective in the Legal Services Act 2007.
5.5 CLASSIFYING DEFINITIONS. MEANINGS AND THEORIES OF THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST
The main purpose of the following section is to outline the various scholarly attempts at 
identifying and classifying meanings of the public interest. A number of classifications 
are set out to demonstrate that despite some subtleties, a number of common 
understandings of the public interest exist. These common understandings are then 
discussed at length throughout the rest of this chapter. The following outlines four 
important classifications of public interest theories. The first three outlined classifications 
are insightful as they are based on empirical studies of the use or understanding of the 
public interest. The fourth classification is bom out of extensive reviews of works written 
by philosophers, political scientists, public administrators and academic lawyers. In a 
simple sense, the following categories define the public interest as either an interest 
common to all, an aggregation of individual interests, the product of a democratic 
process, or an ethical or normative value. The latter may either be unitary, transcendental 
or as discussed later in this chapter specific to a situation or context. Some also classify 
the public interest as a rhetorical device devoid of any real definitive meaning. Souraf 
undertook a study of the instances in which the public interest was mentioned throughout 
public life. He discovered five meanings for the public interest in current use at the time -  
these are set out as follows:
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“Commonly held values, ” 90 
This includes values, which if they are not universally accepted are at least very widely 
held. As examples, Souraf cites morality, efficiency, justice and tradition.
“The wise or superior interest, ”
This approach equates the public interest with an interest which its supporters believe 
commands a special priority among individuals because of its superior wisdom or 
desirability. This belief may be shared by only a small group
“Moral imperative, ” 91 
Within this view, the public interest is equated with natural law, natural rights and a 
higher ethic. Within this view natural rights such as freedom, justice, property and the 
brotherhood of man may be seen to typify the public interest.
“A balance o f interest, ” 92 
Rather than aligning the public interest with one group or section of society, this 
approach is seen as an elaboration of the compromise between conflicting groups.
“Undefinedpersonal view ”93 
This approach refers to the fact that for a vast number of people, the public interest 
represents a personalised view of what constitutes wisdom in high places, so personalised 
as to defy consensus or agreement.
Leys and Perry94 conducted an empirical study into the public interest, speaking to 75 
lawyers, philosophers and social scientists in an attempt to conclude that the public 
interest can have several radically different meanings. They found the following uses of 
the public interest:
90 Frank Souraf, ‘The Public Interest Reconsidered’ (1957) 19 The Journal of Politics 4,619
91 ibid 622
92 ibid 622
93 ibid 623
94 Wayne Leys, Chandler Perry, Philosopher and the Public Interest (Chicago University Press 1959) 44
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“1) Formal meanings: whatever is the object o f duly authorised, governmental 
action
2) Substantive meaning: the object that should be sought in governmental action 
(or in non-governmental action that is a delegation o f governmental power or 
accepted in lieu o f governmental action).
a) Utilitarian or aggregationionalist conceptions: the maximisation o f 
particular interests.
b) The decision which results when proper procedures are used
i) Simple conceptions: due process o f law, majority rules, 
etc.
ii) Pluralistic conceptions: observance o f the procedural rules o f  
whatever legal or political process happens to become the decision 
maker for a given issue95.
c) A normative conception o f public order. ”96
Within this definition, formal meanings are the express objective of ‘duly authorised 
governmental action.’ The substantive meaning of the public interest is the “object that 
should be sought in governmental action” and it can be subdivided into two categories. 
The first is the aggregational conception which views the public interest as ‘the 
maximisation of particular interest.’ The second is the procedural conceptions which hold 
that the public interest is best served when proper procedures have been employed to 
arrive at public decisions. Normative conceptions of the public interest mandate that the
95 Wayne Leys, Chandler Perry, Philosopher and the Public Interest (Chicago University Press 1959) 44
In a later paper, Leys, noted that "I agree with the sceptics that no one can formulate an abstract principle, called the 
"public interest" There seems to be no single definition which will enable us to "prove" that "the public interest" exists 
in a variety of divergent situations. Wayne Leys, ‘The Relevance and Generality of “The Public interest” in Carl 
Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967) 237
96 Frank Souraf, ‘The Public Interest Reconsidered’ (1957) 19 The Journal of Politics 4,619
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public interest is a substantive value, such as social equality, that must be maximised for 
the public interest to be served.97
Schubert98 surveyed academic works in political science over a period of thirty years and 
maintained that three major groups of theorists of the public interest existed. Rationalists, 
Idealists and Realists. His work concluded:
“The rationalists are pro-public, pro-party, and anti-interest group. They 
postulate a common sood. which reflects the presumed existence o f various 
common - frequently- maioritarian -interests. The common good finds expression 
in a popular will; the common obligation o f all public officials is faithfully to 
execute the popular will.
The idealists are pro-public, anti-party, and anti-interest group. Idealists support 
the true interests o f the public, which do not necessarily coincide with the 
interests o f the public as perceived by the public itself. Idealists believe that the 
public interest reposes not in the positive law made by men, but in the higher law, 
in natural law. The public interest becomes whatever the still, small voice o f 
conscience reveals to each official.
The realists are pro-interest group. Political parties become merely a special kind 
o f interest group, and ‘public ’ becomes segmented as ‘publics ’ in which form it, 
too, merges in the concept o f "interest group. " The Realists, in other words, do 
not oppose the public and political parties; they devour them.
Virginia Held wrote what has become the most celebrated text on the Public Interest. She 
built on work carried out by political and legal philosophers. Held established a critical 
typology of public interest theories, surveying the existing literature, and testing
97 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 95
98 Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (Free Press 1960) 198-201
99 ibid
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hypothesis in legal / regulatory contexts. Held classified the theories of public interest 
into three: preponderance, common and unitary.
The first classification propounded by Held involved preponderance theories. Held 
asserted that these include theories that regard the public interest as involving "a 
magnitude o f some kind, either a degree offorce, or a greater amount o f sentiment, or a 
stronger level o f opinion, or a numerical quantity o f utility, or, simply a ‘higher’ number 
or a number designating a priority in preference ordering. ”100 The theories that Held 
places within this category view the public interest as a reflection of the actual demands 
or preferences of those individuals in a society of conflicting individuals who possess a 
preponderance of power or opinion or numbers.101 Otherwise understood, these theories 
take the public interest to be represented by policies which satisfy the majority of 
individuals, or, at least, aggregate satisfaction.102 The second classification involved 
common interest theories. Held asserted that these theories involve those that consist, or 
are defined in terms of, individual interests which all members of a community have in 
common. She cites instances of such things as being in the interest of every individual in: 
security and defence, a monetary system, or arrangements for the minimal values 
necessary for society.103 The third category of theories which Held classified as unitary, 
consists of a normative position for the public position and expects claims concerning it 
to be valid as moral claims generally. Held argues that such claims can be seen as capable 
of judgment in terms of a unitary coherent system of values.104
From the various classifications outlined above, it is apparent that there are a number of 
approaches to understanding what the public interest actually is. For present purposes, the 
following considers the approaches to the public interest that do not seek to either class 
the public interest as a rhetorical term devoid of any real definition, or those 
classifications that suggest abolition of the concept. For obvious reasons, these 
approaches do not present any possibilities for a better understanding of the public
100 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 49
101 ibid vii
102 Michael Saks, Professions and Public Interest (Routledge 1994) 40
103 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 99
104 ibid 136
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interest in the Legal Services Act 2007. In examining these various meanings and 
definitions of the public interest, the following seeks to narrow down the search, or 
identify an appropriate approach to the public interest with regards to the Legal Services 
Act 2007.
5.5 PREPONDERANCE THEORIES OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Preponderance theories are those that do not seek to connect the public interest with a 
normative content. These theories mandate that the public interest is something to be 
understood by virtue of what is best for a majority or by a process of determination, such 
as by polling or calculation. According to Bozeman,105 these theories have been 
propounded by those who cannot accept a normative view of the public interest but are 
not willing to abandon the concept. 106 These theories can be subdivided into aggregative 
and pluralistic theories.
5.5.1 Aggregative Theories of the Public Interest
Aggregative conceptions of the public interest are rooted in the theories of Bentham and 
other utilitarian scholars.107 It connects with the idea that the public interest is equivalent 
to the greatest good for the greatest number. Bozeman notes that Bentham’s utilitarianism 
has distinct parallels with economic individualism.108 The advantage of these theories of 
the public interest are that, unlike the unitary theories (outlined below), it provides for the 
possibility that the public interest may not be in the interests of all individuals and 
groups. Held, however, argues these theories give the appearance of determining 
mathematically the public interest. Moreover, she argues that they are devices used to 
determine where the perceived public interest resides. This is contrary to a method which 
places emphasis on what values should be protected in its name. Held indicated that they 
are approaches which "define the public interest in terms o f the process used to arrive at 
it.,m  Regarding aggregative approaches, Held also noted that they identify where the
105 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 93
106 ibid 93
107 ibid 93
108 ibid 94
109 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 205
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public interest lies by reference to a sum of individual interests, but take on a strongly 
majoritarian flavour, potentially serving to exclude minority interests from the public 
interest as it may come to be defined.110 Held indicates that calculating the public interest 
from the sum of existing individual interests, might offer some potential as the basis for 
validating policy options, it assumes, however, that preferences and interests can be 
ascertained with adequate clarity.111 The approach also seems likely to be of utility in 
relation to fairly specific policy options rather than more complex, general considerations 
regarding the direction to be taken by society as a whole.112
Two further criticisms can be made of the preponderance theories. The first is that they 
may fail to take account of one of the key features identified by many authors as being 
closely associated with the public interest, namely the interest of future generations.113 In 
Held’s terms, ‘clearly the polity may be more than an existing aggregate o f individuals 
since it may include, at the very least, yet unborn members o f  z/.”114 The second is that 
although preponderance theories of the public interest may appear to have a flavour of the 
moral or ethical qualities that appear to be central to many definitions of the public 
interest, it can be argued that in reality this is not true. Held asserts that they will 
incorporate the values of the status quo, serving to reflect and reinforce the values and 
inequalities inherent in existing power relationships. 115
Beyond the critique set out by Held, Bozeman further argues that the means of 
aggregating interests is not self-evident. He notes that whether one ponders the ‘greatest 
good for the greatest number’ or ‘aggregation of all interests’ - the possibility of a 
scheme for calculation does not (indeed cannot) emerge.116 No voting scheme ensures the 
greatest good for the greatest number nor does any decision making process. In a similar 
sense to Held, Bozeman emphasises the fact that even if a satisfactory aggregation
110 ibid
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scheme could be identified, there is no evidence for assuming that individual’s interests 
and the valuation schemes for those interests are appropriate.117
5.5.2 Aggregative Theories of the Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007
The utilitarian approach to the public interest is effectively to be found, as noted, in 
theories underpinning, public choice theory and micro economics.118 A vision of the 
public interest understood as being measured in this way, would arguably, in the context 
of the Legal Services Act 2007, add little to the apparently dominant expression of the 
consumer’s interest. As outlined in previous chapters and for reasons to do with 
individualism and preferences, this approach to the public interest risks regulating in the 
interest of individuals, rather than in the interests of society as a whole. For the purposes 
of this thesis, it is argued that this approach does not offer an appropriate lens with which 
to view the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and protecting the public interest’. It is 
clear from chapter two that the insertion of this regulatory objective was to move beyond 
a mere aggregation of an individual’s interests in legal services. In connection with the 
Legal Services Act 2007, it is also difficult to envisage how, outside of some voting 
scheme, polling data or economic model, regulators would be able to establish the public 
interest. In connection with the regulatory objective, this approach is arguably ill 
equipped to satisfactorily frame the values that should be promoted in the interests of 
members of society.
5.5.3 Pluralistic Theories of the Public Interest
The second form of preponderance theory maintains that the product of a process is the 
public interest. It shares a number of similarities with the procedural approach to the 
public interest, set out below. The pluralistic theory of the public interest is linked to 
Schubert119 and Smith.120 Schubert refers to this theory as the ‘mechanist faction’ of the
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realist school.121 Schubert explained that within this theory the public interest has 
“significance only as a slogan which symbolizes the compromise resulting from a 
particular accommodation or adjustment o f group interaction.”122 Smith formulates the 
most complete statement of this theory.123 Smith argues that the definition of the public 
interest must depend upon the decision-making process and private interests. This theory 
can be distinguished from procedural conceptions of the public interest because it 
identifies the public interest with the outcome of the process, rather than with the process 
itself.124 In summary, Smith holds that the public interest is identified with the result of 
the democratic process as long as that result is responsive to the substantive community
125consensus.
The problem with this theory is that there can be no guarantee that the consensus is 
respected other than the guarantee given by the process itself.126 Smith127 expressly ruled 
out a normative understanding of the term. He further argued that if no one has the 
authority to say that a particular policy ought to be followed (because only the process 
itself can determine such questions), then no one has the authority to determine when a 
policy is responsive to the substantive community consensus.128 There is an implicit 
belief that the result of the decision-making process will be beneficial to society. 
McConnel129 has argued that “to define politics without reference to a purpose o f social 
benefit is to relegate it to the sphere o f anomic and pathological behaviour”130
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122 Glendon Schubert, ‘Is there a Public Interest Theory’ in Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton 
Press 1967) 162
123 ibid 18; Clarke Cochran, ‘Political Science and “The Public Interest’” (1974) 36 The Journal of Politics 2, 339
124 ibid 22
125 ibid 340
126 Clarke Cochran, ‘Political Science and “The Public Interest’” (1974) 36 The Journal of Politics 2, 341
127 Howard Smith, Democracy and the Public Interest (University of Georgia Press, 1960); Cochran Clarke Cochran, 
‘Political Science and “The Public Interest’” (1974) 36 The Journal of Politics 2, 342
128 Clarke Cochran, ‘Political Science and “The Public Interest’” (1974) 36 The Journal of Politics 2, 327
129 Grant McConnel, Private Power and American Democracy (Alfred A Knopf, 1966); Clarke Cochran, ‘Political 
Science and “The Public Interest’” (1974) 36 The Journal of Politics 2, 341
130 ibid
237
5.5.4 The Pluralistic Theories of the Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007
This conception of the public interest is unlikely to be of any direct use on its own to the 
understanding of the public interest in the context of the regulatory objectives in the 
Legal Services Act 2007. Principally, this classification relates to an attempted 
understanding and legitimation of the political process. If this theory were to be followed, 
then, depending on the process operationalized by the regulators and the Legal Services 
Board, the process would be the public interest. In essence this does not progress the 
understanding of the public interest in connection with the Legal Services Act 2007.
5.6 PROCEDURAL THEORIES OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Benn and Peters131 presented one of the best known cases for a proceduralist view of the 
public interest. They argued that the public interest is a procedural principle, not a 
substantive concern.132 Herring is widely credited with laying the foundations of this 
theory.133 This theory seeks to avoid the difficulties involved in identifying the public 
interest. It does this by declaring that the outcome of the political process itself is the 
public interest- provided that certain standards of ‘due process’ are observed.134 Souraf 
frames this theory more succinctly as “the process o f compromise and accommodation, 
so characteristic o f democratic politics, becomes the enunciator o f the public interest. ”135 
Cochran noted that this approach exhibits a fatal logical flaw. He questioned whether the 
process is aiming at a certain substantive result, or not. He cites Gerwith, who notes, “I f  a 
process may be viewed as aiming at a certain substantive result, such that the process is 
to be evaluated by its success in achieving that result, then the envisaged result cannot be 
defined in terms o f the process for the process would by definition already contain the
131 Stanley Benn & Richard Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State (Allen and Uniwin 1959) Barry 
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result. ”136 Cochran therefore concludes that procedures are not self-justifying. The theory 
has received robust criticism. Bodheimer noted:
“Although the public interest cannot be determined by a mechanical counting o f 
private interests, it is likewise impermissible to identify it with the policy decisions 
o f the public authorities. In other words, it cannot be conceded that the public 
interest consists in whatever the public authorities, by their fiat, declare it to be. I f  
the organs o f government were always and necessarily endowed with the will to 
accomplish as well as the capacity to discern the best interests o f the community 
unfailingly and without deviation, then perhaps there would be room for an 
identification o f the public interest with governmental decision making. ”137
More recently, Bell, has argued that this approach is fundamentally flawed because it is 
nothing more than ‘a black box’ out of which appears a solution which is labelled the 
‘public interest.’138
5.6.1 The Procedural Theories of the Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007 
This particular approach to the public interest puts faith in both Governments and 
regulators. For present purposes this conception provides little assistance regarding the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’ Were this theory to 
be adopted, the regulatory objective would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would rubber 
stamp and approve any policy that was the result of a process created by the regulators. It 
remains unlikely that a regulator would attempt to design a process that correlated with 
the sorts of processes approved of by the political scientists advocating this particular 
theory. This particular classification of the public interest on its own is of little use in 
furthering an understanding of the public interest in the context of the Legal Services Act 
2007. In common with all the forgoing explanations, this approach does not orientate the 
public interest with what ought to be achieved in its name.
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5.7 COMMON INTEREST THEORIES OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The common interest theories of the public interest equate it with individual interests 
which are shared by all members of a polity.139 At face value the theory is very appealing, 
given that a strong argument can be made that everyone shares an interest in justice, 
morality, national security etc. The theory is largely derived by scholars from Rosseau’s 
initial contribution to the subject.140 Rosseau argued that the law establishing government 
must, itself, be in the common interest, or based upon unanimous consent if it is to be 
capable of serving the public interest and not only the interests of those with a superiority 
of force or opinion. Rosseau derives authority from unanimity141 declaring:
"There will always be a great difference between subduing a multitude and 
governing a society... I f  there was no prior convention, where would we be unless 
the election was unanimous the obligation which should bind the minority to 
submit to the choice o f the majority? The law which gives the majority o f votes the 
power o f deciding for the whole body can only be established by a convention, 
and proves that there must have been unanimity at one time at least. "142
Saks argues that since Rosseau felt that the common good could only be established if the 
‘whole people’ could meet in assembly, his notion of the ‘general will’ can therefore be 
regarded as inapplicable in modem states.143 Arguably Rosseau’s writings are open to 
interpretation, and indeed, his view could be explained in light of a contemporary polis. 
A contemporary interpretation of Rosseau’s theory brings the common interest approach 
much closer to the procedural approach outlined above. The requirement for unanimity 
means that the theory is effectively based on an aggregation of individual existing 
interests. This means that it suffers from a number of problems already outlined with 
respect to preponderance theories. Problems also emerge regarding how to define the 
interests that all have in common.144 There is also no way of knowing whether these
139 Michael Saks, Professions and Public Interest (Routledge, 1994) 43
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interests are indeed worth having, and finally, there is a problem with discerning whether 
they accommodate longer term interests.145
A more recent common interest approach has been propounded by Brian Barry who 
equated the meaning of ‘the public interest’ to “those interests which people have in 
common qua members o f the public. ”146 Souraf notes, however, that a standard of 
universality or consensus for the public interest is too demanding.147 Moreover, he notes, 
that group activity by definition implies a lack of consensus and agreement. If a particular 
interest were embraced by all citizens, or even a large part of them, it would be accepted 
and noncontroversial. There would consequently be no need to debate it or secure the 
support of the public for it.148 Held concluded that the common interest conceptions of 
the public interest are too restrictive in a moral, as well as an operational sense and thus 
they are to be regarded as inapplicable in today’s complex society.149 Moreover, she 
notes that there is a fundamental problem constructing a common interest from individual 
interests, given the fact that if individual interests are to exist they must be allowed to be 
a free expression.150
5.7.1 Common Interest Theories of the Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007 
The common interest approach is intuitively appealing as it frames the public interest as 
an interest that everyone has in common. However, theoretical issues pervade this theory, 
and as such it is conceptually maligned. From a political science perspective the above 
sets out a number of problems with the theory. From the perspective of the regulatory 
objectives of the Legal Services Act 2007, the problem that pervades this theory is the 
emphasis on individual interests. Moreover, the absence of a sound determination 
whether the common interest is worth pursuing provides a serious problem. The absence 
of any method by which this approach can be pursued in the context of regulation, 
whereby the public interest or public interests can be identified, also renders this 
approach difficult to operationalize.
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5.8 NORMATIVE THEORIES OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Arguably the most concise description of the normative theory of the public interest is 
provided by Bozeman:
“A normative concept o f the public interest assumes that there is a common good 
that is different than the aggregate o f private benefit and, as usually expressed, 
that common good is something that is in the interest o f the community as a 
whole, even i f  it is against the interests o f some o f the individuals in the 
community. ”151
There is a clear connection between this approach and mention made earlier of the 
classical philosophers’ view of the public interest. The normative nature of the public 
interest theory has, however, been refined from these initial philosophical conceptions. 
Cochran152 noted that the public interest becomes an ethical standard for evaluating 
public policies and a goal which the political order should pursue. The theory was 
advanced by Cassinelli, who argued the public interest “is taken to comprise the ultimate 
ethical goal o f political relationships, and institutions and practices are to be judged 
desirable or undesirable to the extent that they contribute or detract from the realisation 
o f the public interest. ”153 Lippman argued that the public interest “may be presumed to be 
what men would choose i f  they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and 
benevolently.”154 Banfeild argued that the public interest is ; “A decision is said to serve 
special interests i f  it furthers the ends o f some part o f the public at the expense o f the 
ends o f the larger public. It is said to be in the public interest i f  it serves the ends o f the 
whole public rather than those o f some sector o f the public. ”155
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The normative approach to the public interest has been largely marginalised by political 
scientists.156 They have on the whole been more preoccupied with issues of democracy 
and ensuring that political processes and decision making approximates the public 
interest. The approval and legitimacy of policies have been a central focus of their work. 
Normative theories have, however, been embraced by a number of philosophers as the 
main way in which the public interest may be understood. Normative theories have also 
been accepted by lawyers and philosophers as the only conceivable way of understanding 
the public interest. In part, the arrival at this conclusion has been brought about by the 
problems exhibited by other theories of the public interest. Held157 and Feintuck158 both 
advocate a normative approach to the public interest arguing that both common and 
preponderance theories exhibit a ‘quantitative’ approach to the public interest, as opposed 
to a qualitative approach. Held explains that they give the appearance of determining 
mathematically the locus of the public interest and that they are essentially devices which 
determine where the public interest resides, rather than methods which indicate anything 
about what values should be protected in its name. They represent what Feintuck 
identifies as an approach which “defines the public interest in terms o f the process used 
to arrive at zY.”159
The inevitable question in connection with the normative theories of the public interest is 
what should the normative ideal, value or conception be? In considering the content of 
the normative standard, Feintuck notes that those who attempt a normative definition 
usually connect it with ‘community, general welfare, human dignity, and the maintenance 
o f conditions that permit an on-going social order’} m In particular: Griffith,161 
Cassinelli,162 and Pennock163 link the concept to an idea of general welfare, though they
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all leave the parameters of the term general welfare largely undefined. Laswell164 links 
the term to dignity, including widespread and active participation in society, again, 
however, he leaves the parameters undefined. Cohen165 notes that the public interest 
serves to complement the concepts of human rights and duties associated with 
citizenship. Milne connects the term with ‘community.’ Feintuck connects the term with 
‘citizenship equality.’ Downs,166 despite advocating a preponderance approach to the 
public interest, based on an economic majoritarian approach,167 in later papers responding 
to criticisms of his work acknowledged that the public interest had to be linked with 
‘elements o f the minimal value structures that define so c ie ty .^  There is no consensus to 
be found amongst scholars regarding the ideal that approximates the public interest. 
Moreover, it is difficult to envisage how these standards could be operationalized in a 
regulatory context. From these approaches, there is a degree of similarity in the 
orientation of the various normative conceptions towards important societal values. Two 
recent contributions to the discourse on the public interest appear to traverse some of the 
definitional issues associated with understanding what the normative standard is that 
approximates the public interest. Rather than confine considerations to one specific 
normative value, they cast the net wider to effectively consider a much broader range of 
values. As outlined earlier in this thesis, Mayson advocated the following broad brushed 
normative conception of the public interest:
“The public interest concerns objectives and actions for the collective benefit and 
good o f current and future citizens in achieving and maintaining those 
fundamentals o f society that are regarded by them as essential to their common 
security and well-being, and to their legitimate participation in society. ”169
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Bozeman defined the public interest as follows:
“In a particular context, the public interest refers to the outcomes best serving the 
long-run survival and well-being o f a social collective construed as a “public. ”170
Both of these definitions encapsulate many ideals, and importantly capture some of the 
critical incidents of the public interest common to many of the theories. These approaches 
provide useful orientating instructions, namely an emphasis on the collective, as opposed 
to the individual, and the long term as opposed to the short term. However, there is a limit 
to their usefulness as Edwards notes:
“Governments have the duty to secure for their citizens the conditions under 
which people can pursue an honourable and socially harmonious life within the 
carrying capacity o f the planet; and this is ultimately where the public interest 
lies. But agreement with their conceptual proposition does not by itself constitute 
a workable or objective set o f criteria. ”171
In light of this, whilst Mayson and Bozeman’s definitions provide some form of 
consensus regarding the public interest in a very broad way, any attempt to move beyond 
these definitions is paralysed. The following considers these points in light of the Legal 
Services Act 2007, it then moves to consider a number of theories orientated by 
normative ideals combined with a process for the discovery of the public interest.
5.8.1 Normative Theories of the Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007 
With regards to the public interest regulatory objective in the Legal Services Act 2007, of 
all the approaches that have been set out so far, normative theories exhibit a degree of 
promise. In essence this theory connects it with the vision of the public interest outlined 
in chapter two. The construction of the regulatory objective in the Legal Services Act 
2007, by using the word ‘the’ in front of the ‘public interest’ does suggest that there is a 
normative public interest. However, the absence of any consensus regarding an 
identifiable normative standard, ideal or benchmark against which to judge decisions and 
policies pertaining in general, or specifically, to legal services presents a problem.
170 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
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Bozeman and Mayson’s normative ideals are appealing, but, in the context of the 
regulatory objectives it presents a number of further questions. Most important of which 
is how are the outcomes that best serve the collective to be identified? Regarding 
Mayson’s definition, a problem arises as to what objectives and actions are in the public 
interest? It may be questioned whether he is referring to values. These normative 
conceptions shed some light on the public interest. However, from a regulatory 
perspective, with the exception of Bozeman, these authors do not specify further how the 
public interest may be operationalized. In the absence of this sort of explanation, from a 
regulatory perspective, it is difficult to incorporate the public interest into a methodology, 
so that the objective might usefully be pursued. Further to this it is arguable that in 
equating the public interest with one normative standard as some scholars do, there is a 
risk of both semantic and conceptual displacement. Whilst Feintuck argues that the public 
interest is citizenship equality, this is an equally difficult term to get to grips with. It may 
drill down a little towards what may be in the public’s interest, but not too far. The same 
argument can be made about many of the other normative standards put forward. Whilst 
those who suggest one normative standard for the public interest might be challenged for 
providing too narrow a conception of the public interest, the breadth of Bozeman and 
Mayson’s ideals leaves too much room for creative interpretation. Were these normative 
understandings to be interpreted by a regulator, a panalopy of values and interests may be 
justified in the name of the public interest. In counterpoint to this, aligning the public 
interest with a universal normative ideal precludes the possibility that there may be other 
public interests. The wisdom of both Bozeman and Mayson’s approaches are that they 
implicitly accept that there may be many public interests.
In an attempt to circumvent some of the problems evident with the normative approach to 
the public interest, the following considers the work of Flathman, Bell and Bozeman. 
Bozeman sought to provide further clarification of the public interest, beyond the 
aforementioned definition. These scholars have connected the public interest with a 
normative standard or ideal, but they have also sought to avoid the difficulties of 
specifically defining the standard or ideal. They have used a value orientated process of 
discovery to seek an understanding of the public interest. In light of the foregoing 
classifications, these approaches, combine two, and in some cases three of the previously
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outlined theories. These theories do not fall conveniently within the classifications 
outlined above. For these reasons, the following terms these contributions ‘hybrid 
theories’, and considers them separately. The scholars who advocate a hybrid approach 
make a radical departure from standard normative theories. They do so by suggesting a 
contextual consideration of the public interest, and in doing so they move away from the 
inconvenient, primarily philosophical tradition of framing the public interest as a 
universal value. They argue that there are many public interests. The following sets out 
the aforementioned theories by Flathman, Bell and Bozeman. It seeks to examine how the 
approaches differ. The attendant benefits of these approaches are outlined, as well as the 
problems that each of these theories leaves unresolved.
5.8.2 Public Interest Theory and Richard Flathman
Richard Flathman identified one of the profound questions associated with traditional 
normative theories of the public as being whether there is one public interest, or indeed 
many public interests. Flathman172 argued that classical philosophical approaches to the 
public interest related it to the relationship between a policy and a truth or body of truths 
which exists antecedent to the policy.173 Flathman noted that Plato sought objectivity and 
timeliness of content for ‘public interest’ through transcendence of the particular, through 
expanding the concept of the common good to equivalence with ultimate truths about life 
and the universe.174 Flathman disagreed with these theories arguing that a descriptive 
meaning of the public interest eliminates the possibility of using that concept as a 
framework within which to maintain a discourse concerning conflicting values.175 In 
validating this approach one comprehensive study of the public interest has recently 
concluded that there is no consensual transcendental normative understanding of the 
public interest.176 Flathman, proposed the following approach to the public interest:
“The public interest is a normative concept, normative considerations are 
necessary to determine its descriptive meaning. The facts about and consequences
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o f specific policies (the contextual factors) must be uncovered, for they are what 
must be evaluated. But to evaluate we must examine their relation to and impact 
on normative criteria. These criteria will consist partly o f substantive values and 
moral rules or precepts (such as “maximise human freedom, “promote justice ” or 
“preserve stability”) The service o f any single value may constitute the 
descriptive meaning o f “public interest” in a specific case, but, because o f its 
general commendary function, the descriptive meaning o f the concept cannot be 
made equivalent to any single substantive value. Community values will be a 
major source o f these substantive criteria ”
He further noted :
“We conclude that “public interest” is a general commendatory concept used in 
selecting and justifying public policy. It has no general, unchanging, descriptive 
meaning applicable to all policy decisions, but a non-arbitrary descriptive 
meaning can be determined for it in particular cases. This descriptive meaning is 
properly found through reasoned discourse which attempts to relate the 
anticipated effects o f a policy to community values and to test that relation by 
formal principles. ”177
Flathman departed from a strict interpretation of the normative understanding of the 
public interest, by emphasising that it is broader than individual or special interests. He 
argued that it does not require an invariant or universal public interest.178 The implication 
of Flathman’s view is that each set of policies may have unique or distinctive public 
interest criteria and that these may change over time.179 Flathman’s approach incorporates 
an element of procedure due to its reliance on the method of vetting community values 
through formal principles.180 In contrast to common interest or preponderance theories it
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Wiley, 1966) 67
178 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
University Press, 2007) 91
179 Richard Flathman, The Public Interest—An essay concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics (New York: 
Wiley, 1966) 67
180 ibid
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is not reliant on the aggregation of individual interests. Formal principles of evaluation 
are a critical requirement of Flathman’s approach. They require a comprehensive inquiry 
examining the full consequences of proposed policies.181 It also requires the philosophical 
principle of ‘universalizability’182 to be satisfied in relation to each policy. In simple 
terms this means that for every contextual consideration of the public interest, the ‘good’ 
would have to be identified. For each policy or decision a set of criteria would also have 
to be understood to establish what ‘good’ meant. Whilst it may be argued that Flathman’s 
approach principally advocates a procedural approach to the public interest, others have 
convincingly argued that it is much more than this. Cochran notes183: ‘‘Flathman’s 
definition serves as a reminder to decision makers to remember moral considerations, to 
abide by formal principles, to employ community values, and to give reasons in terms o f 
these values for their decisions. ”184 The benefits of contextual consideration of the public 
interest aside, Flathman himself noted that inquiries into the ‘good’ would be difficult; 
moreover, a simple identification between community values would create both practical 
and normative problems in any assessment pursuing this approach. Bozeman further 
argues that Flathman’s approach is an extraordinarily difficult undertaking to pursue in 
regards to every possible policy. This is based on the assertion that every possible policy 
has a unique public interest criteria, and that this may change over time. To also 
understand what the ‘good’ is, with regards to each policy, Bozeman argues that this 
would necessitate a deep philosophical inquiry.185 The conception of ‘the good’ also 
varies, depending on the philosophical approach adopted, and therefore, further tiers of 
difficulty could very well emerge adopting this approach. For present purposes this 
approach, despite the problems to do with what is ‘good’ is valuable because it moves 
away from the idea that there is just one public interest. It also connects the public 
interest with a process and a consideration of a policy in terms of other values. In
181 Bozeman argues that this takes on a utilitarian nature, in that it seeks to relate the benefits of a good policy to the 
broadest concpetin of the public. Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic 
Individualism ( Georgetown University Press 2007) 103
182 Richard Flathman, The Public Interest-An essay concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics (New York:
Wiley, 1966) 87 - 95 ‘universailzability’ in simple terms this is a principle whereby an act is good if everyone should in 
similar circumstances do the same without exception. The finer points of the principle are a matter of some contention. 
The concept is squarely attributed to Immanueal Kant.
183 Clarke Cochran, ‘Political Science and “The Public Interest’” (1974) 36 The Journal of Politics 2,351
184 ibid 327
185 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
University Press 2007)91
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essence, this approach paves a path for the public interest’s discovery within the context 
of other values. It also represents what may be the optimum approach to the public 
interest, in that every policy is subject to a deep examination of it effects, potential effects 
and its forbearance on society, and individuals as a whole. Such an approach has, as 
outlined below, been slimmed down with the aim of realising some of the more practical 
aspects of the approach, without losing all of the valuable deductive elements.
5.8.3 Public Interest Theory and John Bell
John Bell is one of the most often cited scholars in contemporary investigations into the 
public interest.186 At the 1992 Association of Law and Philosophy Conference, Bell187 
argued that the ‘public interest’ has an objective element defined by established interests 
of the community, which establish a set of specific objectives within which the public 
interest can be found. He also argued that reasoning about the public interest is 
instrumental to achieving those objectives. In arguing against a solely procedural 
conception of the public interest, Bell noted that the outcome of a process of decision 
making is not a sufficient justification for the action. To make it the right thing to do he 
argued it is necessary that there are substantive reasons which support the course of 
conduct.188 Following Flathman’s argument, Bell suggests that the public interest 
identifies with certain social values which can be discussed and defended. Bell ultimately 
argued that the public interest has a role in identifying values which are to be defended 
either as in the interests of all, or more commonly, in the interests of the social 
institutions upon which society depends.189 Rather than advocate a complex philosophical 
inquiry into what is good, Bell advocated a much simpler investigation that he argued 
would approximate the public interest. In understanding the fundamental values which 
need to be considered, as reflective of the overall public interest, Bell cited his previous 
endeavours. These endeavours involved a paper written on judicial conceptions of public 
policy. He suggested that by inquiry, there are a number of relatively specific values
I86Mike Feintuck, ‘The Public Interest’ in Regulation (OUP 2004); Stephen Mayson, ‘Legal Services Regulation and 
‘The Public Interest’ (Legal Services Institute, July 2011) 10; Michael Saks, Professions and Public Interest 
(Routledge, 1994) 40
187 John Bell, ‘Public Interest : Policy or Principle’ in Roger Brownsword (ed) Law and the Public Interest Proceedings 
of the 1992 ALSP Conference (Franz Steiner, 1993) 28
188 ibid
189 ibid
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which the public interest embraces. He argued that it was certainly possible to list many 
of these values. By way of an example, Bell listed public policy values such as protecting 
governmental institutions, protecting recourse to the courts, protecting the institutions of 
the family, protecting economic institutions, protecting constitutional values, protecting 
certain moral values and preventing fraud.190 He asserted that these fundamental values 
characterise the basic structures of society. Bell’s approach, therefore, presents a more 
realisable approach encompassing the fact that there are many public interests, that the 
public interest is founded within social values, and that public policy needs to be justified 
in light of these if it is to approach the public interest. Whilst Bell’s approach seemingly 
suggests that relevant values are easily identifiable, and he indeed seeks to prove this, one 
question remains. This is: how should values be identified and what weight should be 
accorded to them? Working within a pool of values, which he interchangeably refers to as 
social or fundamental, Bell arguably narrows the field of relevant types of values, by 
example. He does not however, advance a methodology for their selection.
5.8.4 Public Interest Theory and Barry Bozeman
Barry Bozeman, in a comprehensive study of the public interest and public values sought 
to advance both discourses and in so doing connect public interests and public values. In 
doing so he, in part, sheds light on some of the problems so far identified with Flathman 
and Bell’s public interest theories. Bozeman’s study was orientated by a desire to 
counterbalance economic individualism and market based interpretations of the public 
interest, in the context of public administration. Bozeman concluded that Flathman’s 
approach was ultimately too complex to be utilised in public administration. Instead 
Bozeman relies heavily on John Dewey’s little known contribution to the discourse on 
the public interest. In many ways Flathman and Dewey’s theories on the public interest 
are similar. They both advocate contextual study, a process for the discovery of the public 
interest and the fact that the process should be orientated by values. Whilst Flathman 
references community values, Dewey refers to shared values. Whereas Flathman 
advocates a deeply philosophical inquiry into the good of a particular policy, Dewey, 
concerned with pragmatic political philosophy, advocated a process involving
190 ibid
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experimental and social inquiry.191 Bozeman drew on Dewey who advocated a normative 
approach to the public interest based on a co-operative and contextual search for the 
relationship between a particular policy and shared values. Eschewing the procedural 
aspect of Dewey’s theory, which required civic deliberation about the relationship 
between the policy and shared values, Bozeman attempted to realistically operationalize 
the public interest. Bozeman sought to advance the public interest discourse by 
advocating the definition outlined above. To advance understanding further he refined the 
processual dimension of both Flathman and Dewey’s theories. Instead of social or civic 
deliberation, or reasoned discourse involving deep philosophical inquiry, Bozeman 
sought to provide a template within which public administrators might be able to better 
discern the public interest. In essence, Bozeman’s main work is orientated towards 
promoting a degree of deliberation about public values, though the scope of this 
deliberation remains unspecified. It is ultimately unclear what Bozeman’s procedural or 
process aspect of the theory would look like. This omission has not gone un-noticed.192 
What Bozeman does do, however, is make headway with regards to the identification of 
values to be connected with the public interest. As such, Bozeman makes a vital 
connection between values, public values and the public interest. The methodology 
concerning public values is, however, incomplete. Bozeman’s model, in an attempt to 
render it useful for public administrators to theoretically make decisions which correlate 
more closely with public values, looses, in part, some of the tiers of either moral inquiry 
or civic inquiry.
191 ‘Dewey viewed the public interest not as an absolute, universal or empirical good. He argued that it was 
constructed in each polity and problem context. For this, he argued, the designated public interest on any given policy 
question could not be stated in advance o f the democratic appraisal o f causes and consequences and the contextual, 
cooperative search for a wider shared interest in a specific problematic situation. Dewey advocated experimental and 
social inquiry into actual and potential public problems, a process that he modelled on natural and technical sciences. 
His approach also focused on social learning and interest transformation ’. See - (Barry Bozeman, Public Values and 
Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown University Press 2007) 108) There is a 
parallel between the work of Dewey and interest transformation and the work of Jurgen Habermas see Jurgen 
Habermas, Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy (MIT press 1996). 
There is also a connection with civic republicanism. This focuses on collective decision making processes, especially 
the political process. It seeks to articulate a normative framework in which it is possible to identify and achieve the 
public good through political deliberation, and to describe the institutional arrangements and doctrinal shifts necessary 
to implement the republican vision of politics. See: Jane Baron & Jeffrey Dunoff, ‘Against Market Rationality: Moral 
Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory’ (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 451
192 E R Alexander, ‘Effectuating Public Values by Institutional Design’ (Conference Paper, Creating Public Values in a 
Shared Power World, Minneapolis 2012)
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5.8.5 Analysis of Hybrid Theories of the Public Interest
The foregoing set out three theories regarding the public interest. In essence the three of 
them are closely related in their approach to the public interest. They each maintain that 
the public interest is a normative standard or ideal. They each set out that there are many 
public interests. They each advocate a procedural method which attempts to discover the 
public interest in relation to any given policy. In essence they advocate a process which 
involves either discussion or reasoned deliberation regarding the extent to which the 
policy correlates with various important normative criteria or values. Each approach does 
not specify the parameters of the values to be considered. Flathman refers to community 
values, Bell refers to shared and fundamental values, Bozeman refers to public values. It 
is also pertinent to outline that Dewey referred to shared values. In essence the same 
predicament outlined with universal normative standards or ideals applies to these 
theories. This is - what is the normative value or values which approximates the public 
interest? However, in the absence of a universal definition of the public interest, these 
theories represent a useful method for attempting to identify the public interest. The 
following moves to address the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. It then 
maps out how this thesis progresses.
5.9 MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
This chapter sought to address the following question -  can the public interest be 
meaningfully defined? This chapter has discussed a variety of theories and definitions 
pertaining to the public interest. There are indeed many theories and definitions regarding 
the public interest. In a simple sense the answer to this question might read yes, though 
this undoubtedly rests on how the term ‘meaningfully’ is interpreted. As outlined, there 
are those who advocate a majoritarian or utilitarian understanding of the public interest. 
There are those who advocate a common interest approach or argue that the public 
interest is either the result of a democratic process, or indeed the process itself. There are 
those scholars who argue that there are universal or overarching public interests. 
However, there is no received consensus as to what this universal or overarching 
understanding may be. Others have argued that there never will be an all-embracing 
definition of the public interest. If the question were to read, is it possible to ascertain a
253
universal definition of the public interest that is widely embraced, then the answer to the 
question is ‘no.’ To confuse matters further, it appears that the various meanings of the 
term ‘public interest’ are all used and as such separating out one particular meaning 
above all others is a difficult exercise.
The answer to this question arguably hangs on what is meant by meaningful. In 
connection with the Legal Services Act 2007, this thesis takes the meaningful part of the 
question to refer to a theory that affords the opportunity to be utilised by the Legal 
Services Board, and the approved regulators and other stakeholders, such that they may 
be able to give effect to the legislative intention that underpinned the public interest’s 
insertion in the Legal Services Act 2007. In this regard the search is for a definition that 
is both accepted and capable of being operationalized within the spectrum of instances in 
which the regulatory objectives pepper the Act. For this reason, in this instance it is 
argued that rhetorical or everyday meanings of the public interest provide little use. Were 
this to be the approach advocated, the public interest could be used without reference to 
justify any policy or decision. Moreover, it would be impossible to operationalize and 
would provide no resistance to the consumer interest, which, as outlined in chapter three 
comes armed with a range of predetermined ambitions and methodologies for its 
deployment. It is further argued that common interest theories are of little assistance for 
present purposes. Theoretically, they share many of the problems that preponderance 
approaches exhibit which, this thesis argues on their own, provide little assistance. The 
central reason why this thesis argues they are not appropriate to consider is that they are 
connected with individual interests, and as such rely on either an aggregational model to 
understand interests, or, some form of majority or process to discern where the public 
interest resides. The problems of aggregating individual preferences were illustrated in 
chapter three. The problem is that these approaches run the risk, even if they could be 
appropriately deployed in the context of the Legal Services Act 2007, of identifying 
where the public interest resided and not where it ought to reside. Procedural theories of 
the public interest would also yield unsatisfactory results. It is difficult to envisage a 
process on its own, suitably identifying what the public interest in a particular situation 
ought to be. Moreover, a strictly procedural approach is incompatible with a regulatory
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objective, because an objective requires something to orientate towards, not necessarily a 
process.
This thesis argues that the only set of theories which it might be appropriate to explore 
further in the context of the Legal Services Act 2007, are normative theories. As noted, a 
number of scholars, in the context of regulation, policy design and delivery, have found 
that this is the only theory that represents any real possibility of understanding the public 
interest. As this chapter has outlined, there are those who attempt to argue that there is 
one normative standard or ideal that encapsulates the public interest. However, this 
represents a hurdle that many have argued is insurmountable. Moreover, in the context of 
the Legal Services Act 2007, whilst it appears from the regulatory objective that there is 
only one public interest, this thesis argues that the approaches advocated by Flathman, 
Bell and Bozeman are appropriate for further consideration.
Returning to the question that this chapter sought to address, this thesis argues, in the 
context of the Legal Services Act 2007, that the only potentially meaningful way of 
determining the public interest is to pursue the hybrid theories outlined above. In this 
case, it is argued that the public interest may not be meaningfully defined, but it may 
become more meaningfully understood.
In line with the overall research question of this thesis, the following seeks to explore 
whether the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ is 
capable of realising the legislative intention that underpinned its inclusion in the Legal 
Services Act 2007. The following, discusses further, the approaches advocated by 
Flathman, Bell and Bozeman. The remainder of this chapter seeks to build on aspects of 
the theories further. It then seeks to address the question of which values should be 
identified to effectively frame the public interest. The next chapter builds on this work 
and seeks to outline a series of values, which it is argued, taken together frame the 
important values which policies and regulatory decisions should be measured against in 
order to ensure that policy or regulation approximates the public interest. It is also argued 
that by identifying these factors, the parameters of the public interest begin to emerge.
255
The second part of the next chapter moves to outline a methodological process, which is a 
vital element of the theoretical approach pursued, especially in the context of policy and 
regulatory decision making. It is argued that this is also vital to operationalize the public 
interest in the context of policy and regulatory decision making. The limits of the 
approach pursued are outlined.
5.10 ‘HYBRID’ THEORIES OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND VALUES 
What this thesis terms ‘hybrid’ theories of the public interest have already been outlined 
above. For present purposes, the following restates the key elements. It also seeks to 
frame them in light of the regulatory objectives in the Legal Services Act 2007. The first 
key element towards operationalizing these theories is that there is a form of deliberation 
or consideration which is specific to the proposed policy or regulatory proposal. The 
second element is that the deliberation has to consider the policy or regulatory proposal in 
light of normative criteria which have variously been described as community, shared, 
public or fundamental values. The three theories outlined above, as noted, differ. The 
main difference relates to the method and intensity with which the policy or regulatory 
proposal is considered in light of values. Flathman advocated a philosophical inquiry 
seeking, through the universalizability principle to discern what might be describe as the 
‘public good.’ This is perhaps the optimum approach, though this is inherently dependent 
on the philosophical approach adopted. Bell, advocated a less searching requirement, 
though he emphasised that any justification for a policy must strictly accord with shared 
or fundamental values. Bozeman, however, places greater emphasis on actually 
identifying public values, and then deliberating policies and regulatory proposals in light 
of these identified values. Bozeman advocates a pragmatic approach to both identifying 
the public interest and public values. It can be argued that his approach is conditioned by 
the pressures and realities of real world regulatory endeavours and public 
administration.193
193 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown 
University Press, 2007) 3 By conditioned by the pressures and realities of the real world, Bozeman arguably refers to 
the conditions which many regulators and public administrators are under in terms of limited resources, limited time 
and a veritable array of expectations including those that they regulate on behalf.
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The next chapter sets out to suggest a framework methodology within which the 
deliberation of values can occur. This is done, in pursuance of the theories advocated 
above, so as to provide a forum whereby identified values can be related to policies and 
regulatory decisions. The framework is constructed mindful of the pressured environment 
within which regulators operate. The development of the process of identification and 
consideration of values, it is argued, is an important step forward towards the 
operationalization of the public interest. For present purposes, the most immediate 
question is ‘what values need to be identified so as to form the substance of the normative 
orientating element of the process of discovery of the public interest?’
5.10.1 Values
Possibly the most important question regarding the hybrid theories of the public interest, 
is what values should orientate the process of discovery of the public interest. As 
outlined, the values put forward by scholars advancing these theories differ. The terms 
fundamental value, community value, shared value, public values have all been used. 
Further to this, the value to be accorded to the different values poses an altogether more 
vexing question. This thesis draws on more recent studies of values within public 
administration and sociology literature. It is apposite to draw on public administration 
scholarship because, above all, it has most recently been occupied with questions of 
values and how to identify them, how to rank them and finally their relationship to the 
public interest. Indeed, as noted, Bozeman, amongst others has made a major contribution 
to the discourse. Recourse to public administration scholarship is also pertinent, because 
aspects of this discipline are directly related to ensuring that government and regulator’s 
policy and decision making reflects public values which connects with their public 
mandate.194 Moreover, there are signs of a paradigm change in the approach to public 
management, within the literature and in practice, from ‘New Public Management’ 
(NPM), principally concerned with efficiency and key assumptions that democratic
194 Paul Davis and Karen West, ‘What do public values mean for public action?: Putting Public Values in their plural 
place’ (2009) 39 The American Review of Public Administration, 604. (“0«e heroic strand o f public administration 
work seeks to map constellations of values through the grouping or core and derivative values against the various 
institutions o f government, their conduct, and their mode o f engagement with each other and their publics”)
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governance reflects consumer choice,195 to new forms of ‘Managing Publicness’ or 
‘Public Value Management’ (PVM) concerned principally with public values.196
There are a myriad of views regarding values. Hitlin and Piliavin,197 Jorgensen,198 
Jorgensen and Bozeman,199 and Williams and Shearer,200 have all comprehensively 
surveyed the literature pertaining to values. Without exception, the conclusions drawn by 
these authors are that there is no central way of defining a value. There are a variety of 
synonyms201 which cloud a clear determination. Commonly used synonyms include 
ideas, ethos, standards, principles, norms and traits.202 Whilst the authors express a need 
to identify a means of ranking or prioritising values, no robust recognised approach 
exists. The conclusion drawn by Bozeman is as follows: “values are ubiquitous but, as in 
the case with so many fundamental social concepts, not subject to a single, obvious 
approach to either conceptualisation, construct development, measurement, or 
analysis.”203 Despite the disagreements involved in defining values, Kluckhohn’s 
definition is repeated regularly. The definition is as follows:
195 Ricardo Blaung, Louise Homer, Rohit Lekhi, ‘Public value, politics and public management’ (The Work 
Foundation, 2006) 5
196 Paul Davis and Karen West, ‘What do public values mean for public action?: Putting Public Values in their plural 
place’ (2009) 39 The American Review of Public Administration, 602. Davis and West note that an influential 
conference of public administration practitioners was held in London in 2006. This concerned the proper treatment of 
public heritage assets . They also note that the BBC Trust uses a public value test to exercise oversight of the public 
corporation’s management. They note that Accenture has a dedicated US based institute for Public Service Values. See 
English Heritage ‘Capturing the public Value of Heritage: The Proceedings of the London Conference’ (Conference, 
Swindon, 25th January 2006). BBC, ‘Building public value -  Renewing the BBC for a digital world’ (BBC, 2004) 
<httn://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/policies/odf/bDv.pdf> accessed 11 November 2012 and Diane Coyle, 
Christopher Woodland, ‘Public Value in Practice -  Restoring the ethos of public service’, (BBC Trust, 2012) 
<http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regu1atorv framework/pvt/public value nractice.pdf> accessed
11 November 2012. See also : Ricardo Blaung, Louise Homer, Rohit Lekhi, ‘Public value, politics and public 
management’ (The Work Foundation, 2006) 20. Further evidence of the connection may be seen in the Legal Services 
Board report to the Public Administration Committee: Ministry of Justice, Triennial Reviews, Legal Services Board 
and Office for Legal Complaints Combined report on Stage one and two (MOJ, July 2012) 
<https://consiilt.iiistice.gov.uk/digital-communications/review-lsb-o1c> accessed 17th November 2012
197 Steven Hitlin and Jane Piliavin, ‘Values Reviving a Dormant Concpet’ (2004) 30 Annual Review of Sociology 359
198 Torben Jorgensen, ‘Public Values, Their Nature, Stability and Change. The case of Denmark’, (2007) Public 
Administration Quarterly, 366
199 Torben Jorgensen, Barry Bozeman, ‘Public Values: An Inventory’ (2007) 39 Administration and Society 354.
200 lestyn Williams and Heather Shearer, ‘Appraising Public Value: Past Present and Futures’ (2011)89 Public 
Administration 4
201 Torben Jorgensen, ‘Public Values, Their Nature, Stability and Change. The case of Denmark’, (2007) Public 
Administration Quarterly, 366
202 ibid
203 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism ( Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 143
258
“A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive o f an individual or 
characteristic o f a group, o f the desirable which influences the selection from 
available modes, means, and ends o f action. ”204
Bozeman’s adopts the following definition for values:
“A society’s ‘‘public values ” are those providing normative consensus about (a) 
the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be 
entitled; (b) the obligations o f citizens to society, the state, and one another; and 
(c) the principles on which governments and policies should be based. ”205
In essence the breadth of the aforementioned definition is arguably wide enough to 
subsume any of the labels attached to the term ‘value’, so far outlined in this thesis. 
Fundamental values, shared values, community values would all likely fit within this 
definition. In some regards the public administration literature is of little assistance in 
nailing down the term ‘value’. It is, however, useful as it draws attention to the broad 
problem of value identification and ranking. For Bozeman, this does not represent a 
critical problem as the following passage from his book bears out:
“A pragmatic approach to an ideal based public interest requires attention to 
public values, but not monolithic public value constructs. The striving to identify, 
measure and debate public values is inherently valuable to a procedurally 
orientated notion o f public interest. ”206
There is much to be said for advocating a broad brushed approach to the identification of 
values, especially when they are then the subject of reasoned deliberation and debate. 
Where there is a stage in a methodological search for the public interest, whereby values 
are then assessed, this stage can be charged with determining the value of values. The 
inherent problem is that there is a persistent search for clarity and a way of grading
204 Clyde Kluckhohn ‘Values and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and 
Classification in Talcot Parsons (eds) Towards a General Theory o f Action ( Harvard University Press 1962) cited in 
Torben Jorgensen, ‘Public Values, Their Nature, Stability and Change. The case of Denmark’, (2007) Public 
Administration Quarterly, 367
205 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 132
206 Ibid 143
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values. This is likely to undermine any subjective determinations occurring at a defined 
stage in any methodology of decision making in the public interest. The benefits of 
Bozeman’s approach is that it allows for the identification of values, to be put on the 
table to be discussed, which in some respects is an advance beyond approaches currently 
adopted by regulators. As previously outlined in this thesis, part of the problem with 
values is the challenge of even identifying them in the decision making process. Support 
for an open textured approach to the identification of values, if they are to undergo 
scrutiny comes from the many instances in which courts, and organisations are charged 
with making decisions about the public interest. As the last chapter profiled, the courts 
are often required to make determinations about the priorities to be accorded to various 
values. They analyse evidence, consider values, and make judgments, absent a structure 
or framework to decide upon which values are more important than others. To a certain 
extent this may well explain the relatively un-codified approach advocated by Bell, 
towards the public interest as outlined above.
In contrast to Bozeman’s approach, many scholars, whilst not defining clearly which 
values are to be considered in a search to approximate the public interest do hint, label or 
prefix them in a way that signifies that they are the most important values. This may not 
be as spurious as it may seem. Bell in particular makes reference to values that 
characterise the basic structures of social and political associations. Downs referred to the 
values that connect with the “elements o f the minimal value structures that define 
society. ” 207 Referring to the potential problems of identification, Bell, confidently asserts 
that the identification of fundamental rights “are no more contestable or difficult to state 
than are arguments about rights. ” 208 On this basis, this thesis argues that it is pragmatic 
to limit the identification of values to those that relate to the basic structures of society. 
Whilst this does not provide an absolute definition, it orientates the search for values. 
However, in connection with the Legal Services Act 2007, and perhaps more generally, 
this thesis argues that the search should not be limited to these values alone. To do so
207 Anthony Downs ‘The Public Interest; Its Meaning in Democracy’ (1962) 29 Social Research 1
208 John Bell, ‘Public Interest : Policy or Principle’ in Roger Brownsword (ed) Law and the Public Interest Proceedings 
of the 1992 ALSP Conference (Franz Steiner, 1993) 28 “when we refer to the public interest, we have in mind the basic 
pattern o f value participating and the established institutions which are protected andfulfilled by the legal order. ’’ Bell 
also notes that there are likely to be disagreements about values. However, he explains that this is inevitable.
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would potentially omit very useful values which explain or contribute to how the end 
value is to be achieved. Values can be separated into those that reflect an end, and those 
that relate to the means.209 It is argued that fundamental values correlate with those ends 
to be achieved, yet there may be many values related to the achievement of that value. 
Van Dyke, draws attention to the possibility of values being constructed like rungs on a 
ladder, or links in a chain.210 He notes that a value may be endorsed either for its own 
sake or because it contributes to a second value, this second value may be endorsed either 
for its own sake, or because it contributes to a third, and so it may go on. 211 As outlined 
in the next chapter, the rule of law is argued to be a fundamental value, however, the 
achievement and realisation of it, in the context of legal services, is closely connected 
with the realisation of a number of other values. For present purposes therefore, to limit 
the search for pertinent values to just the most fundamental would be, this thesis argues 
erroneous. Therefore, this thesis argues that connected values should form a valuable part 
of the enquiry. In this regard Cohen’s approach to values is apposite as he refers to basic 
values being the rules of the game. He also places emphasis on including ‘fundamental 
methods for achieving them’ in his search for values.212 The next section briefly sets out 
where values may be found, as part of the process of their discovery.
5.10.2 Finding Values
The following briefly sets out ideas in the literature regarding where values are to be 
found. Because Bozeman’s theory of the public interest is intimately connected with 
values he devotes nearly a chapter to this topic.213 It is to be borne in mind that he was 
preoccupied in the main with just identifying public values, whereas as the above noted, 
this thesis is limited to identifying end values and values connected with methods for 
achieving these end values. Bozeman, asserts that values can be found everywhere, and 
that this may lead to a surfeit of identified public values. This does not present him with a 
particular challenge. He argues that useful values can be found in scholarly literature,
209 Vernon Van Dyke, ‘Values and Interests’ (1962) 56 The American Political Science Review 3, 567
210 ibid
211 ibid
212 Julius Cohen, ‘A Lawman’s View of the Public Interest’, in Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest 
(Atherton Press 1967) 156-7
213 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 132-143
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intuition and reasoned judgment, cultural artefacts, traditions, government documents and 
opinion polls (with some caveats).214 Bozeman argues that public values permeate 
society, and it is these that provide much of the structure of civil society.215 He does, 
however, advocate caution with regards to some societies that are founded on dubious 
foundations, and also the difficulties of rationalising public values in pluralistic societies. 
Hitlin and Piliavin216 attempt to discern where public values come from, they cite: 
biology, race, ethnicity, gender, social structure and family. For present purposes, it 
would appear that these scholars cast the net particularly widely. More recent work, with 
a practical focus, has been preoccupied with how to use survey and opinion polls to 
discern public values. Most notably, the BBC217 has developed a number of empirical 
approaches. For present purposes this thesis does not draw on these methods, but notes 
that this may represent an interesting avenue of further research. One last category of 
values, however, is worth noting. Edwards undertook to search for whether there was any 
global consensus as to what might be a universal understanding of the public interest.218 
He came to the conclusion that there was not. He did observe, however, that International 
Treaties ratified by the United Nations are normative and could be interpreted, in a global 
sense, to be a valuable source of values that come close to approximating the public 
interest.
5.12 CHAPTER SUMMARY
From a review of the scholarly literature on the public interest, it is argued that, in the 
context of the Legal Services Act 2007, there is one approach which could usefully be 
operationalized to provide at least a better degree of understanding of the public interest. 
By accepting that there are many public interests, and that an understanding of the public 
interest is inherently related to the context within which it is considered, it is argued some
214 Bozeman limits this to those opinion polls that receive valid and representative responses to questions about core 
values.
215 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 142
216 Steven Hitlin and Jane Piliavin, ‘Values Reviving a Dormant Concept’ (2004) 30 Annual Review of Sociology 
359368-379
217 Christopher Woodland, ‘Public Value in Practice -  Restoring the ethos of public service’, (BBC Trust, 2012)
<http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/reuulatory framework/pvt/public value r>ractice.pdf> accessed 
11 November 2012
218 Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Defining the ‘Public Interest’ (Griffith University, 2008) 251
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headway may be made. This thesis, therefore, considers an approach which accepts that 
the public interest is a normative ideal, but also one that is substantively defined by the 
values which closely connect with the fundamental values that underpin society. In both 
identifying these values, deliberating and debating these values and then considering 
policies or regulatory developments in light of them, the result, it is argued, should come 
to approximate the public interest. Other approaches including rhetorical definitions 
whereby a regulator arbitrarily decides what the public interest is, lacks legitimacy. The 
approach advocated in this thesis is contingent on deliberation and debate, the 
identification of relevant values, and then the process of connecting these. The 
identification of values is a process which warrants more scholarly study, because as yet 
the process of evaluation is open to a degree of question. This thesis, however, argues 
that it is, as close a route to discovering the public interest as may exist. 
Methodologically the approach may suffer but it is argued that judicious evaluation takes 
place in the courts nearly every day. The next chapter develops this approach in two 
ways. Firstly, it endeavours to identify a number of values connected with legal services. 
Secondly, it suggests a methodology, whereby policy and regulatory proposals can be 
deliberated in light of identified values, in pursuit of the public interest.
263
CH APTER 6 -  O PERATIO NALIZING  THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE
LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter drew the conclusion that of the available theories pertaining to the 
public interest, the ones which represent a possibility of reflecting the meaning intended 
by the legislature in the context of the Legal Services Act 2007 were those put forward by 
Flathman, Bell and Bozeman. These theories involve discerning the public interest 
through a process of deliberation orientated by normative values. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine whether these theories provide a way understanding and 
operationalizing the public interest in the context of the regulatory objective in the Legal 
Services Act 2007. This chapter addresses three questions:
What values might form the normative substantive criteria to be used to assess policies 
and regulatory proposals within a deliberative process, to ascertain the public interest in 
connection with the Legal Services Act 2007?
Is it possible to devise a methodology to incorporate the public interest into decision 
making processes such that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest’ might fulfil the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion into 
the Legal Services Act 2007?
Do theories of the public interest present an opportunity to understand the public interest, 
such that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ fulfils 
the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion into the Legal Services Act 
2007?
Discovering whether it is possible to locate the values which orientate a process designed 
to ascertain the public interest is important to the theories outlined by Flathman, Bell and 
Bozeman. By attempting to identify these values, this chapter seeks to examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of the approach outlined at the end of the last chapter. On its
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own, identifying values will not lead to an understanding of the public interest. As 
outlined, the theories advocate some form of process, whereby a policy, or proposal for 
regulation is subject to deliberation, in light of the identified values. This chapter 
therefore also seeks to outline a methodology by which the identified values may be 
considered as part of the policy and regulatory decision making processes. This is an 
important endeavour as it underpins the possibility of the public interest being usefully 
operationalized. This methodology is examined and the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach are discussed. This chapter then evaluates the approach advocated in the 
theories. The chapter then reflects on the insertion of the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007.
6.2 LEGAL SERVICES AND VALUES
This section addresses the question: ‘What values might form the normative substantive 
criteria to be used to assess policies and regulatory proposals, within a deliberative 
process to ascertain the public interest in connection with the Legal Services Act 2007?’ 
This section progresses as follows. The first part sets out a number of indicators which 
suggest that, in the context of legal services, the main fundamental value which orientates 
the public interest is the rule of law. This connection is then followed by a discussion of 
the link between the rule of law, lawyers and legal services. Once this connection 
between the rule of law and legal services has been made the next part attempts to 
identify values related to this relationship. In attempting to explicate these values, this 
thesis examines sets of principles, recommendations and resolutions from the United 
Nations,1 Council of Europe,2 European Parliament,3 the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe4 and the International Bar Association.5 These are used to identify a
1 United Nations, Basic Principles on the Role o f Lawyers, (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 118,1990)
<htto://www2.ohchr.org/en gli sh/1 aw/1 awvers.htm> accessed 19th November 2012
2 COE, ‘Explanatory memorandum on the Recommendation No. R(2000) of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer’ (CM (2000) 56,2000) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.isp?id=352537&Site=CM> accessed 20 November 2000
3 European Parliament resolution on the legal professions and the general interest in the functioning of legal systems of 
23 March 2006 fP6_TA-PROV(2006W108') < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do7pubRef~ 
//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2006-0108+O+DOC+WORD+V0//EN > accessed 20 November 2012.
4 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010)
<http://www.ccbe.eu/fi1eadmin/user upload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.pdf> accessed 20 
November 2012
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range of values.6 These values are then categorised. These categories are briefly 
explained and reference is made to the scholarly literature which further expands on the 
range of values. Conclusions are drawn about the values identified and the extent to 
which they may be used as substantive normative criteria to frame deliberations regarding 
the public interest.
6.2.1 The Rule of Law as the Fundamental Value
The previous chapter outlined the scholarship on values, derived in the main from the 
public administration discipline. It also outlined the approaches taken to identifying 
values by Bozeman7 and Bell.8 Further to this, this thesis advocated an identification 
process based in the first instance on the identification of values pertaining to the basic 
structures of society. It then advocated an analysis of the values which connect and 
contribute to this value, or which are important to the overall values’ fulfilment.9 In 
ascertaining the main value connecting legal services to the basic structures of society, it 
is argued that there a number of sources which lead to the same conclusion. The clearest 
indicator of this value is in the Legal Services Act 2007 itself. Regulatory objective 1(b) 
reads "supporting the constitutional principle o f the rule o f law. ,10 In confirming the 
connection between the rule of law and the basic structures of society, the normative role
5 IB A, International Principles for the Legal Profession (IB A, 2006)
<http://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.aspx> accessed 20 November 2012
6 Whilst these various pronouncements are framed as principles, this thesis argues that they may also be interpreted as 
values. It is argued that the fulfilment of these principles are instrumental to the realisation of the Rule of Law. 
Therefore, within the definition of values propounded by Kluckhohn they are implicitly valued by the public and 
society. Moreover, the recognition of these values. In other circumstances many of the important principles relating to 
the legal profession are regarded as (Core Values). “A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive o f an 
individual or characteristic o f a group, o f the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, 
and ends o f action ” C Kluckhohn ‘Values and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action: An Exploration in 
Definition and Classification in Talcot Parsons (eds) Towards a General Theory o f Action (Harvard University Press 
1962) cited in Torben Jorgensen, ‘Public Values, Their Nature, Stability and Change. The case of Denmark’, (2007) 
Public Administration Quarterly, 367
7 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (Georgetown 
University Press 2007) 93
8 John Bell, ‘Public Interest : Policy or Principle’ in Roger Brownsword (ed) Law and the Public Interest Proceedings 
of the 1992 ALSP Conference (Franz Steiner 1993) 29
9 According to Cohen, basic values may ‘relate to substance as well as the rules o f the game -  to ideals o f human well­
being, to fundamental methods for achieving them, and to basic procedures for resolving disputes when disagreement 
and conflict concerning means and ends arise. They ultimately determine what satisfactions are sought, who are to be 
satisfied, and at whose expense. The basic values need not have originatedfrom all or most o f the members o f the 
community; indeed, as is more likely, they spring from the more articulate and influential within it. What makes them 
community values is acquiescence in them by its members, either overtly, implicitly, reluctantly or by default’ Julius 
Cohen, ‘A Lawman’s View of the Public Interest’, in Carl Friedrich (ed), Nomos V The Public Interest (Atherton Press 
1967) 156-7
10 Legal Services Act 2007, Pt 1, s (1) (b)
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of the state in Rawls’ Theory of Justice provides a useful theoretical lens. Rawls 
proceeds from the basis that the first virtue of social institutions is justice. He structures 
this according to two principles. The first of which is “that each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others. ’n  Rawls explains the basic liberties as including the following:
“Freedom o f thought and liberty o f conscience; political liberties and freedom o f 
association, as well as the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and 
integrity o f persons; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule o f 
law. ”12
For Rawls therefore, one of the primary values that defines the basic parameters of the 
social contract between the state and society is the rule of law.13 The importance to be 
attributed to the rule of law in society is also outlined by the United Nations in numerous 
documents.14 It is also referred to as a central component of the United Nations 
Recommendation on the Basic Principles of the Role of Lawyers.15 The salience of the
11 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness (Harvard University Press 2001) 44
12 ibid
13 It would be erroneous to not note that both justice and the rule of law are essentially contested concepts in 
themselves see: Rachael Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’, in Thomas Carothers, (eds) Promoting 
the Rule ofLaw : In Search of Knowledge, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006) at 32: "Read any set o f 
articles discussing the rule o f law, and the concept emerges looking like the proverbial blind man's elephant - a trunk 
to one person, a tail to another. In fact the phrase is commonly to imply at least five separate meanings or end goals"; 
Michael Trebilcock, Ronald Daniels, ‘Rule of Law Reform and Development Charting the Fragile Path of Progress’, 
(Edward Elgar 2008) note: 'Scholars have characterised the varying definitions o f the Rule of Law in degrees from 
"thin " to "thick". Generally, a "thin " definition pertains to universal qualities - for example, the Rule of Law being a 
system of laws that protects liberty and property rights, and that the laws are universally applied. "Thicker" definitions 
incorporate ideas unique to a particular culture, for instance, the rule of law incorporates a democratic process to 
create and revise laws, the existence o f written laws, predictable procedures and methods for enforcement of laws and 
the existence of a fair and impartial judiciary, and the right to due process. ’ For one of the most salient accounts see: 
Tom Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (Penguin, 2011). Katharina Sobota suggests that the Rule of Law includes: 1) 
principle of the constitutional State based on fundamental rights; 2) supremacy of the constitution; 3) principle to 
adhere to the constitution; 4) constitutional jurisdiction; 5) liberty; 6) equality before the law; 6) basic(human) rights; 8) 
separation of power; 9) legality, 10) principle to adhere to the law; 11) justice; 12) primacy of the law; 13) statutory 
reservation; 14) principle of legal certainty; 15) clearness of competences; 16) publicity of State acts; 17) adequate 
organisation of public authority; 18) fair administrative procedures; 19) just extent of State activity; 20) legal security; 
21) general duty to legal protection; 22) legal protection towards the public authority; 23) Governmental liability; 24) 
principle of proportionality. (Katharina Sobota, "Das Prinzip Rechsstaat" Verfassungs - und verwaltungsrechtliche 
Aspekte, (Mohr Siebeck, 1997)
14 UN, The Rule of Law at the National and International Level (UN, 19th September 2012)
<http://www.unrol.org/files/Officia1%20Draft%20Resolution.pdf> accessed 19 November 2012; see generally the UN 
website devoted to the rule of law : <http://www.unrol.org/> accessed 19th November 2012.
15 United Nations, Basic Principles on the Role o f Lawyers, (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 118,1990)
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/1 aw/1 awvers,htm> accessed 19th November 2012
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connection has also been made in recent calls for the development of a Global Lawyer 
Regulatory umbrella organisation to preserve the rule of law in the 21st century.16 It is 
argued therefore that the rule of law provides the central value around which it is then 
possible to structure a search for supporting values in the context of legal services. The 
following draws on literature which connects legal services and the rule of law.
6.2.2 The Rule of Law and Lawyers.
Gillian Hadfield17 has written the clearest discoverable account of the practical 
interrelationship between lawyers and the rule of law. She argues that without the 
exercise of the role of a lawyer, the rule of law would arguably come to mean very little. 
In particular she notes:
"Lawyers play a critical role in the generation and maintenance o f the rule o f  
law. In part, lawyers communicate legal rules to individuals and organisations 
and represent their interests in planning and adjudication against the backdrop o f 
legal rules....The far more fundamental role that lawyers play in promoting a rule 
o f law is found in the dynamic and subtle relationships between what lawyers do, 
the legal human capital that accumulates in a regime over time, and the way legal 
rules adapt to local and changing conditions. It is an error - one lawyers 
themselves make - to characterise what lawyers do solely in terms o f their 
advocacy o f particular interests in a zero sum setting. ”18
Hadfield connects the importance of a lawyer both intrinsically with the rule of law and 
extrinsically, to issues pertaining to democracy, human rights, justice and fundamental 
freedoms.19 Beyond this, Hadfield argues that what lawyers do, needs to be assessed 
from the perspective of what they do at a micro level. To be effective she argues the rule 
of law must be integrated into the complex, decentralised choices made by millions of
16 Laurel Terry, ‘Preserving the Rule of Law in the 21st Century: The Importance of Infrastructure and the need to 
Create a Global Lawyer Regulatroy Umbrella Organisation’ (2012) Michigan State Law Review 1
17 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Don't Forget the Lawyers : The Role of Lawyers in Promoting The Rule of Law in Emerging 
Market Democracies’ (2007) 56 Depaul Law Review 401
18 ibid
19 ibid
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individuals and entities. It is here that the contribution provided by lawyers plays a real 
role.20 She suggests that lawyers act as repositories of complex of legal rules and 
principles relevant to the structuring of relationships and resolving disputes within 
them.21 Hadfield notes that this is not merely an information transmission function, but 
emphasises that this is often a creative one whereby lawyers need more than knowledge 
of the rules, requiring also knowledge of complex environments and relationships.22 To 
this Hadfield notes that the regulatory construct around lawyers needs to embody a 
systematic web of principles, values and ethical considerations to enable lawyers to fulfil 
their various roles.23
Other scholars have explored the contribution lawyers have played in connection with the 
rule of law and society. Kao24 explored the need for an intermediary function in society 
between the law, the state and society, and concluded that lawyers are uniquely placed to 
undertake this function. Sociologists have also drawn attention to the valuable 
intermediary function that lawyers play and its connection with the rule of law. One of 
the most celebrated sociologists of recent times studied the legal profession. Amongst his 
conclusions Talcott Parsons noted:
"The very existence o f the legal profession as an entity in society is a result o f the 
fact that the maintenance o f such a tradition in terms o f its own integration and 
continuity, and its application in relation to our multifarious system o f social 
interests would not be possible without some powerful intermediate mechanism 
operating between the political organs which carry ultimate legal authority, the 
constitution and the formal acts o f legislatures, and the actual implementation o f 
legal control o f on-going social processes. "25
20 ibid
21 ibid
22 ibid
23 ibid
24 Su Po Kao , ‘The Legal Profession as an Intermediary: A Framework for Lawyers in Society’ (2004) 7 Legal Ethics
25 Talcott Parsons, ‘A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession’ in Talcott Parsons (ed), Essays in Sociological Theory 
(The Free Press New York, 1954)
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Far from being an academic connection the importance of lawyers to the rule of law has 
been recognised by a number of initiatives. The World Justice Project has recently 
compiled the ‘Rule of Law index.’26 Part 4 of the index maintains that ‘Diverse, 
competent, and independent lawyers and judges ’ are a central component of the rule of 
law. The International Bar Association's ‘Rule of Law Resolution’27 equally places 
emphasis on a strong and independent legal profession and confidential communications 
between a client and their lawyer.28 A developed explanation of the connection between 
the lawyer and the rule of law can be found in the CCBE’s Charter of Core Principles29 
which notes:
"in a society founded on the respect for the rule o f law the lawyer fulfils a special 
role. The lawyers' duties do not begin and end with the faithful performance o f 
what he or she is instructed to do so far as the law permits. A lawyer must serve 
the interests o f justice as well as those whose rights and liberties he or she is 
trusted to assert and defend and it is the lawyer's duty not only to plead the 
client's case but to be the client’s adviser. Respect for the lawyer's professional 
function is an essential condition for the rule o f law and democracy in Society. "30
The forgoing serves to outline, generally, the important role that lawyers and legal 
services play in society and indeed in connection with the rule of law. Some of the most
26 The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index (WJP, 2011) http://wor1diusticeproiect.org/rule-of-law-index/ accessed 
20 November 2012 The other three components include: 1) A system o f self-government in which all persons, including 
the government, are accountable under the law; 2) A system based on fair, publicised, broadly understood and stable 
laws ; 3) A fair, robust, and accessible legal process in which rights and responsibilities based in law are evenly 
enforced
27 International Bar Association, Rule of Law Resolution (IB A, 2009 )
http://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.aspx accessed 20 November 2012; International Bar 
Association, Commentary on IBA Council Rule of Law Resolution of September 2005 (IBA, 2009) 
http://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.aspxaccessed 20 November 2012 
^International Bar Association, Rule of Law Resolution (IBA, 2009 )
http://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.aspx accessed 20 November 2012; International Bar 
Association, Commentary on IBA Council Rule o f Law Resolution of September 2005 (IBA, 2009) 
http://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.aspxaccessed 20 November 2012 “An independent, impartial 
judiciary; the presumption of innocence; the right to a fair and public trial without undue delay; a rational and 
proportionate approach to punishment; a strong and independent legal profession; strict protection o f confidential 
communications between lawyer and client ; equality o f all before the law; these are all fundamental principles o f the 
Rule of Law. "
29 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010) http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user upload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.pdf 
accessed 20 November 2012
30 ibid
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ardent critics of the self-regulating professions recognise the important role that lawyers 
and legal services play in relation to the rule of law and society.31 Whilst this locates the 
importance of lawyers and legal services in general terms, it does little to unpick the 
values which need to be satisfied to ensure that this role is fulfilled. The following extract 
from a paper written by Stephen Mayson alludes to the complex web of inter-relating 
ideals, principles, and values that are involved in ensuring that both the practice of the 
law and the rule of law are secured. Mayson notes that not only is the role of a lawyer 
imperative to the rule of law, the rule of law is contingent on other factors such as the 
administration of justice and access to justice. Therein, it is argued that these concepts are 
intimately connected with the quality, availability, competency and sustainability of legal 
services. Each of the values, as outlined by Mayson, interlinks with the other and 
intrinsically relies on lawyers to ensure that they operate effectively.
“The rule o f law is key to the security and well-being o f society, and access to 
justice is a necessary platform to being able to assert one’s rights in accordance 
with the rule o f law. Maintaining the rule o f law also means that there should be 
an effective system o f administration o f justice, and that strong and independent 
legal advice and representation should exist to hold an over-bearing State, or 
other powerful agents, accountable within the law. ” 32
The importance of lawyers to the fundamental structure of society has not escaped the 
attention of the United Nations,33 the Council of Europe34 and the European Parliament.35
31 Richard Abel, English Lawyers Between the Market and State The Politics of Professionalism (OUP 2004) preface 
“Lawyers are a pivotal institution in civil society: mediating between citizens and state, workers and capital; allowing 
government to function (since it can only through law); redressing civil wrongs; creating, dissolving, and managing 
families; making the economy work (constituting its actors, defining their rights and obligations, facilitating 
transactions amongst them); and articulating essential concepts o f justice and power. These roles are powerfully 
shaped by how many lawyers there are, who they are, how they practise, how they are paid, and how they regulate and 
govern themselves ”; Michael Zander M, Lawyers and the Public Interest A Study in Restrictive Practices (Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson 1968) viii
32 Stephen Mayson, ‘The Regulation of Legal Services: What is the case for reservation?’,( Interim Strategic 
Discussion Paper, Legal Services Institute, February 2011) <httn://www.leqalservicesinstitute.orq.uk> accessed 20 
November 20Î2 page 15-16
33 United Nations, Basic Principles on the Role o f Lawyers, (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev.l at 118,1990) 
<httn://w\vw2.ohchr.org/enqlish/law/la\wers.htm> accessed 19th November 2012
34 COE , Recommendation No.R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the freedom of exercise 
of the profession of lawyer (COE, 2000)
<httns://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=:com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&lnstranetImage=533749&Sec 
Mode=l&DocId-370286&Usaqe=2> accessed 20 November 2012
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These organisations have produced principles and recommendations outlining the 
minimum requirements for the function of a lawyer in society. The UN’s Basic Principles 
and the Council of Europe’s recommendations have been used by the American Bar to 
compile the internationally recognised Legal Profession Reform Index.36 In attempting to 
discern the normative values which frame the public interest in connection with legal 
services it is argued that the UN principles, the Council of Europe’s recommendations, 
the European Parliament’s resolution represent a valuable source of values. To these, the 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe’s Charter of Core Principles37 of the 
European Legal Profession and the International Bar Association’s International 
Principles for the Legal Profession also represent a useful articulation of values.38 This 
thesis uses these resources to identify the spectrum of values connected with legal 
services. Whilst the CCBE and IBA principles may appear to be legal profession centric, 
they are the result of multi-state analysis of common values connected with lawyers.3" An 
explanation of the scope and methodologies used to develop these sets of principles and 
values is to be found in the Appendix 3 in this thesis alongside the full text of these 
documents.
6.2.3 Examination of Values
The approach taken towards identifying values in this thesis consists of extrapolating the 
contents of the principles and recommendations regarding the role of lawyers and 
computing them into a spread sheet. A full spread-sheet outlining the values is to be
35 European Parliament resolution on the legal professions and the general interest in the functioning of legal systems of 
23 March 2006 (P6 TA-PROVf2006101Q8f < http://\\rww.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?r)ubRef=- 
//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2006-0108+0+DOC+WORD+V0//EN> accessed 20 November 2012.
36 American Bar Association, Legal Profession Reform Index Factors',
<http://wmv.americanbar.org/advocacv/rule of law/publications/assessments/lpri/lori factors.html > accessed 20 
November 2012 The LPRI is based on 24 factors derived from internationally recognised standards for the legal 
profession developed by the United Nations and the Council of Europe. It also draws on the work of the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe. The ABA use the LPRI 
to help strengthen the role of lawyers in countries in transition. It is used to assess the role of lawyers and the legal 
environment in which they operate.
37 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010)
<http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user upload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.pdf> accessed20 
November 2012
38 IBA, International Principles for the Legal Profession (IBA, 2006)
<http://mvw.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.aspx> accessed 20 November 2012
39 A full account of the way in which this work was conducted is to be found in the appendix, accompanying the text of 
these sets of principles.
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found in Appendix 4. A table showing a condensed version appears below. This simple 
methodological approach mirrors Bozeman and Joergsen’s search for public values 
within public administration literature.40 The extrapolated values were then grouped 
according to the relationship between lawyers and the courts, clients, citizens, the State 
and the law, organisational structure of legal services, human rights and intrinsic lawyer 
values. Given the importance to be attributed to the legal profession and legal services, it 
is perhaps not surprising that a large number of values were identified in connection with 
lawyers and legal services. Over 80 values were identified, and for this reason, the 
following seeks to generally explicate them in a contextual discussion. It is argued that 
the sources considered provide an overview of the basic values connected with legal 
services. From these a template of values can be established to begin to understand the 
normative criteria within which the public interest in legal services can be identified. A 
condensed copy of the chart appears below:
40 Torben Jorgensen, Barry Bozeman, ‘Public Values: An Inventory’ (2007) 39 Administration and Society 354. Their 
method is as follows: “Our method o f inventorying public values is a simple one: We review the relevant literature. 
This does not o f course, lead to a fully populated public values universe, but at least it provides candidates for public 
values as well as some indication of the likely difficulties o f identifying and agreeing on a public value set” (page 255)
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sim. \ N D L \ w i r i t s
; Government and profession programmes to inform  individuals o f  their rights j UN  
i Lawyers prevented from  persecution by governm ent j UN
L auM rsrcsjH kUilln tn>\ c in r u n t UN
; Governm ent providing funding for poor |U N
I Lawyer able to  travel freely and com m unicate w ith clients j U N , COE
: Lawyers shall not be threatened when discharging duties according to rules î UN ,C O E
; lawyers shall not be prosecuted when discharging duties according to rules ï U N ,C O E
Lawyers not to  be sanctioned administratively /  econom ically s UN ,C O E
; W here security o f  lawyer threatened when practising law - Authorities w ill prot< UN  
: Lawyer free to exercise duty w ithout hindrance j U N , COE
| Lawyer free to exercise duty w ithout harassment |U N , COE
I Lawyer free to  exercise duty without improper influence t  U N ,C O E
: Lawyers not to  be associated with their clients $ U N ,C O E
; Lawyers to receive civ il and penal im m unity for statements made in good  faith s U N ,C O E  
; Lawyers entitled to appropriate inform ation in regards to cases ï UN ,CO E
i Lawyers to co-operate w ith governm ent where appropriate \  U N
= Independent legal profession jU N , EP,C CB E. IBA
| LAW YERS A N D  CLIENTS
I Lawyers duty to  auvise clients as to law  and obligation  
I Lawyers duty 10 assist clients in all appropriate ways 
I Lawyer 10 assist clients before courts in all appropriate ways 
I Lawyers loyally  respect interest o f  clients 
| Lawyers to maintain ethical standards 
; Lawyers to honour undertakings given
? Lawyer to account fu lly  for property held and to keep separate from their own
> Fees - A Lawyer is entitled to a reasonable fee for his work
I Lawy er shall not generate unnecessary work
I Fair treatment towards clients in relation to  fees
i Abstention by lawyer should avoid damage to interests o f  clients
i Lawyers duties should not be affected by fees, and who is paying them (pub/ private)
i Lawyers should avoid C onflict o f  Interest (C lient /  C lient) (Lawyer /  C lient)
| U N , C O E , CCBE, IBA 
I U N , CCBE, IBA 
| U N , CCBE, IBA 
| U N , CCBE, IBA |
I IBA 
; IBA 
I IBA
IIBA _
| IBA 
I CCBE 
| COE
I COE
Lawyers should aim to resolve a case amicably
| LAW YERS A N D  TH E C O U R T S  
i Lawyers respect the judiciary  
j Administration o f  Justice
jC O E
j U N ,C O E , CCBE
? Confidentiality
Î Lawyers should not take m ore work than they can reasonably manage  
ï Lawyers should take action to  protect/ respect/ enforce rights in  the interest o f  clients 
s Independent legal profession
! O R G A N ISA TIO N A L STR U C T U R E  O F LAW YERS
C O E , C CBE, IBA
C O E   _____
U N , E P , CC BE,IBA
COE______________
COE _
U N , E P ,C CB E , IBA
I Lawyers show  Integrity and fairness to  court 
j Interest o f  justice
| LA W Y ER  V A LU ES
; Honesty (lawyer) (highest standard of)
Integrity and good  repute o f  individual lawyer 
Lawyers prom ote and uphold cause* o f  justice w ithout fear
: Lawyers show  respect to  professional colleagues 
■ Lawyers act independently , d iligently and fairly 
i I lonour and D ignity
; Co-operate w ith lawyers in  other countries
I IBA 
I IBA
HBA
5 CCBE  
ICO E
I CCBE, IBA _
C O E , CCBE  
U N, C O L , CCBE  
I COE
! LAW YERS, C ITIZEN S a n d  SO C IETY  _  ____ j
; Government and profession have programmes to inform  ind iv idualsof their rig! UN  
; Public confidence in legal system |  EP
: Public confidence in legal profession |E P
; Access to justice I  U N , EP
i LAW YERS H U M A N  RIG H TS A N D  IN STR U M EN TA L VA L U E S Ü
• Presumption o f  innocence 2 U N
: Right to a fair trial /  Independent /  Impartial tribunal j  UN
■ Defence for those accused ? UN
■ Those detained right to  assistance/ com m unication w ith /fro m  lawyer I: UN
: Efficient access to lawyers by all on a non discriminatory basis I U N , EP
• Entitlem ent to lawyer o f  suitable experience and seniority in criminal procecdin UN  
; Foreign service function to foreign countries \ UN  
! Independence, absence o f  conflicts, confidentiality are core interests in Public in tE P
! Freedom f C O E , EP
i  Security jC O E , EP
; Justice j C O E , EP
; Individual Freedoms {COE
j Professional associations o f  lawyers - vital to  rule o f  law  
? Professional standards - made by associations and being upheld by  them  
i Professional association o f  lawyers co-operate in providing legal services to  poor  
I Lawyers educated properly with thorough know ledge o f  law , ethics and practice 
I N on discrimination on entry into the profession 
; Self regulation o f  the legal profession.
< Prom ote and support law  reform . Discuss existing and proposed law  
\ Prom ote the welfare o f  members o f  the profession and their fam ilies
I Lawyers to defend the ro le  o f  lawyers in  society 
I Professional associations to co-operate w ith governm ent 
j Codes o f  conduct w ill be established by legal profession 
i j  Honour and D ignity
i Prom ote lawyers standards o f  competence.
I P rof Associations vital ro le  to  play in  p ro f standards, protecting members 
I Professional ethics - developed by associations and being upheld by them  
I Com plaints against lawyers w ill be dealt w ith properly and expeditiously  
I Lawyers permitted to jo in  /  form local /  national /  international organisations
I  LAW YERS A N D  TH E LAW
î Lawyers have right to  publicly discuss the la w / admin o f  justice and Human Rights 
$ G ovt and legal system provide for individuals to  arbitrate conflicts and interests 
I Maintenance o f  legal relationships and process 
I Fundamental freedoms 
i R ule o f  Law  
î Administration o f  justice 
1 Protection o f  human rights 
> Democracy 
iN on discrimination 
{Equality before the law
U N ,C O E
U N ,C O E ,E P
U N ,C O E ,E P,C C B E
U N ,C O E , CCBE
U N , C O E , EP
LSB, C O E , EP
; U N -U n ited  Nations Basic Principles on the R ole o f  Lawyers 1
i COE - Recommendation on the freedom o f  exercise o f  the profession o f  lawyer j 
i EP - Resolution on the legal profession and the general interest in  the functioning o f  legal systems
■ CCBE - Charter o f  Core Principles o f  the European Legal Profession I
■ IBA - General Principles for the Legal Profession I
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6.2.3.1 Lawyers and the Courts
The values identified in this category relate to the important role that lawyers play in 
achieving justice through the workings of the court. In further locating these values, 
Judge McIntyre’s following observation is pertinent.
“It is incontestable that the legal profession plays a very significant - in fact, a 
fundamentally important - role in the administration o f justice, both in the 
criminal and civil law... I  would observe that in the absence o f an independent 
legal profession, skilled and qualified to play its part in the administration o f 
justice and the judicial process, the whole legal system would be in a parlous 
state. In the performance o f what may be called his private function, that is, in 
advising on legal matters and in representing clients before the courts and other 
tribunals, the lawyer is accorded great powers not permitted to other 
professionals... By any standard, these powers and duties are vital to the 
maintenance o f order in our society and the due administration o f the law in the 
interest o f the whole community. ”41
In developing a practical understanding of what the administration of justice means, 
Spigleman connected it specifically to the lawyers’ duty to the court. Spigelman notes 
that these duties, must override obligations to a particular client and legal service 
providers self-interest.42 Ipp, whilst on sabbatical from the Australian Bench, and 
working at the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, wrote a near exhaustive account of 
lawyers’ duties to the court. He argued that there is an interrelated web of values 
connected with legal services. He framed his arguments in terms of the public interest. 
Ipp noted that lawyers owe duties to ‘the court’ and that these duties are in reality also 
duties owed to the larger community which has a vital public interest in the proper
41 Judge McIntyre, in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [Andrews] cited in Patrick 
Monahan ‘The Independence of the Bar as a Constitutional Principle in Canada’ in The Law Society of Canada (eds) In 
the Public Interest The Report and Research Papers o f the Law Society of Canada's Task Force on the Rule of Law and 
the Independence o f the Bar (Irwin Law, 2007). p 122.
42 Judge Spigelman, ‘Are Lawyers Lemons? Competition Principles and Professional Regulation’ (The 2002 Lawyer's 
Lecture, St James Ethics Centre, 29 October 2002) http://ssm.com/abstract= 1800450. Accessed 2 1st November 2012
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administration of justice.43 Ipp concluded that the public interest is secured by four broad 
overarching duties, namely: the general duty of disclosure to the court;44 the general duty 
not to abuse the court process;45 the general duty not to corrupt the administration of 
justice46 and the general duty to conduct cases efficiently and expeditiously.47
The central point to be taken from the connection between lawyers and the administration 
of justice is that, within common law jurisdictions, the lawyer is an instrumental part of 
every aspect of the important societal process of achieving justice. Masked behind the 
label administration of justice are a complex set of values embodied within the role of a 
lawyer, that properly performed, contribute considerably to the rule of law.
6.2.3.2 Lawyers and Clients
This category was one of the most populous and included a range of values - from 
lawyers fairly and expeditiously working in the best interests of their clients to 
maintaining ethical standards. Within this category a range of critical ethical 
requirements were clearly identified. These included the avoidance of conflicts of 
interest, confidentiality and independence. These values are well entrenched as Andrews 
has noted in a comprehensive review of the ethics of the legal profession since the middle
“The statement o f ethics standards has evolved in subject matter, detail, and 
degree o f enforcement, but the central elements o f a lawyer's professional duty 
have remained substantially unchanged. Lawyers have long had the core duties o f 
fairness in litigation, competence, independence, loyalty, confidentiality, 
reasonableness in fees and public service. The continuation o f these standards
43 David Ipp, ‘Lawyers' duties to the Court’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 63-107.
44 Including the duty to disclose the law and mislead as to facts, the duty of disclosure within the context of the 
adversarial system, the duty of confidentiality owed to the client (legal professional privilege), the limited but important 
positive obligation to disclose (gatekeeping), the duty to know the law, prepare the case and advise the judge. David 
Ipp, ‘Lawyers' duties to the Court’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 63-107.
45 Not to abuse to Court process for an ulterior purpose, to be truthful in pleading, not to use excessive zeal, duty to 
conduct cases fairly, reasonably and with due regard to the client; abide by undertakings to the court; David Ipp, 
‘Lawyers' duties to the Court’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 63-107.
46 Dealing with client confessions and the decision to withdraw; conniving and dishonourable or improper conduct, the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest. David Ipp, ‘Lawyers' duties to the Court’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 63-107.
47 Duty to take due care and skill; Duty to conduct cases expeditiously; case management duties; duty to take all points 
and the duty to exercise an independent judgment. David Ipp, ‘Lawyers' Duties to the Court’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly 
Review 63-107.
48 Carol Andrews, ‘Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800 Year Evolution’ (2004) 57 SMU L. Rev 1385
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suggests certain inherent characteristics o f lawyers and society’s reaction to
them  The 800-year tradition o f the core standards suggests something
fundamental: that lawyers always have played an important role in society and 
that society demands integrity in that role.fr49
Further locating the importance of these values Edwards50 notes that despite global, 
economic, technological and demographic changes - these should not affect the 
fundamental values of the legal profession. He notes that ‘fundamental values’ are 
founded on the highest ideals of the profession- inspiring lawyers to serve their clients 
and the public good and to understand how these commitments are not mutually 
exclusive. He goes further to note that the traditional sources of legal ethics roughly 
codify the fundamental values of the legal profession which in turn reflect the central 
values of society. As noted below in the section on organisational structure, there are 
profound disagreements as to how best to preserve and integrate these values in modem 
business and legal organisational environments.51 For present purpose this category of 
values outlines the minimal ethical values to be sustained in any scheme of regulation. To 
compromise this set of values would arguably undermine the critical tenants of the 
lawyer-client relationship established over 800 years.
6.2.5.3 Lawyers. Citizens and Society
Classed within this heading were values connected with access to justice and pro bono. 
Access to justice is widely acknowledged to be a poorly defined and multi-layered
49 ibid
50 Harry Edwards, ‘Renewing our commitment to the Highest Ideal of the Legal Profession’ (2006) 84 North Carolina 
Law Review, 1426
51 James Elkins, ‘Ethics: Professionalism, Craft and Failure’ (1985) 73 Kentucky Law Journal, 937 938; Nathan 
Crystal, ‘Professional Responsibility : Problems of Practice and the Profession’ (Aspen,2nd ed, 2000) 9; Stephen 
Cillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 1 (Aspen 6th ed. 2002) James Jones, Bayliss Manning, 
‘Getting at the Root of Core values: A "Radical" Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal 
Practice’ (2000) 84 Minn. L. Rev 1186; Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer; Failing Ideals o f the Legal Profession 
(Belknap Press, 1993) ; Nathan Crystal, ‘Core Values: False and True’ (2001) 70, Fordham Law Review 747; Ross 
Cranston, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility(C\axenàon Press, 1996) ; Paul De Jersey, ‘Public Interest and 
Public Policy: Unruly Horses Alike?’ (2003) 6 Legal Ethics 16; Alan Demack, ‘Public Interest of Common Good of the 
Community?: Bringing Order to a Dog's Breakfast’ (2003) 6 Legal Ethics 23; Carl Selinger, ‘The Public's Interest in 
Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the Legal Profession’, (1997), 32, Wake Forest Law Review, 861; Lars 
Bergstrom, ‘What is a Conflict of Interest?’ (1970) 3, Journal of Peace Research, 3; Janine Griffiths Baker, Serving 
Two Masters, Conflicts o f Interest in the Modem Law Firm, (Hart, 2002); Jonathan Auburn, Legal Professional 
Privilege Law and Theory (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000); Richard O’Dair, Legal Ethics Text and Materials (CUP 
2001)81
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concept.52 However, the importance of access to justice has been clearly articulated by 
Hulbert as follows:
"Society must have mechanisms to solve disputes between persons and business 
organisations and Governments, and to adjudicate on criminal charges. Persons 
and business firms require skilled and faithful legal assistance, and society's 
deeply-held values require that skilled, faithful and confidential legal assistance 
be available to the members o f society. The increasing complexity o f affairs in 
general makes those needs even more acute. Only a major upheaval in society 
and societal values would do away with those needs. The court system is 
entrenched beyond any significant likelihood o f abolition. " 53
The term access to justice is generally used to describe three values. Each of these three 
narrower meanings also featured in the list of values. The first meaning identifies with 
the role lawyers play in the ability of individuals to access the processes that afford for 
the just resolution of disputes. Trebilcock and Daniels conclude that lawyers play a very 
important role in the ability of individuals to access both the law and ultimately the 
concept of justice.54 The second meaning relates to the State’s commitment to liberal 
values by ensuring that each party has access to adequate and roughly equal legal 
representation.55 In essence this describes the State’s responsibility to provide financial 
assistance to enable individuals in certain circumstances56 to be able to avail themselves 
of legal assistance. The third meaning rests on the legal professions, and legal services 
providers, moral and some, would argue, social and professional duty to provide
52 Thomas Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950) 10-11.
53 William Hurlburt, The Self-Regulation of the legal profession in Canada and in England and Wales ( Alberta Law 
Reform Institute 2000) 201.
54 Michael Trebilcock, Ronald Daniels, Rule ofLaw Reform and Development Charting the Fragile Path o f Progress ( 
Edward Elgar 2008) 236
55 Michael Trebilcock, Ronald Daniels, Rule o f Law Reform and Development Charting the Fragile Path of Progress ( 
Edward Elgar 2008) 236
56 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires in Article 14 that everyone have the right 
to legal assistance in criminal proceedings, including without payment where they do not have sufficient means to pay 
for it. The United National Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers state that in criminal matters, all persons should 
have access to lawyers and legal services, and that governments should ensure that legal services for poor and 
disadvantaged persons receive sufficient funding. The European Court of Human Rights, The Council of Europe and 
European Union all have similar provisions. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened 
for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16,1966. Entry 
into force March 23,1976. http://www.ohchr.oru/enulish/law/ccpr.htm. Accessed 23 November 2011
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assistance for free, otherwise known as pro-bono assistance.57 Regarding pro bono, 
Sossin58 argues that there is an important public interest in lawyers providing pro bono 
services. She notes: "Lawyers are the key guardians o f the rule o f law, which in a
democracy is a cornerstone o f the public interest. There is a clear public interest benefit 
in lawyers to ensure access to the rule o f law, especially on the part o f the vulnerable, 
pro bono underpins this. ”59 Whilst the term access to justice might be contested, it is 
clear that three important values emerge that underpin the realisation of the rule of law. 
Therefore, any attempts to regulate lawyers and the provision of legal services needs to 
ensure that there is a sustainable and accessible body of practitioners across the spectrum 
of legal needs, with particular emphasis on access for those unable to pay, or pay much 
for legal assistance.
6.2.3.4 Lawyers and the State
Within this category, a number of critical values relating to the relationship between the 
state and legal profession are outlined. These require little further explanation. Also 
identified within this category was the independence of the legal profession. There exist a 
number of proclamations about the importance of the independence of lawyers and the 
concomitant connection with the rule of law.60 As an illustration, the International Congress of 
Jurists, in 1959, noted:
"the independence o f the judiciary and the legal profession are essential to the 
maintenance o f the Rule o f Law and to the proper administration o f justice. 
Independence is interpreted widely in this context to mean freedom from coercion, 
unwarranted intervention, inappropriate police power and illegitimate state 
sanction. "61
57 Michael Trebilcock, Ronald Daniels, Rule o f Law Reform and Development Charting the Fragile Path of Progress ( 
Edward Elgar, 2008) 236
58 Loma Sossin, ‘The Public Interest, Professionalism and Pro Bono Publico’ (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
131.
59 ibid
60 International Bar Association, IBA Standards for the Independence of the Legal Profession (IBA,1990) 
<www.ibanet.ore/imaaes/downloads/Standards%20fbr%20the%201ndenendence%20of%20Le2al%20Prof%2019901.n 
df> accessed 21st June 2011 ; Alice Woolley, ‘Rhetoric and Realities: What Independence of the bar requires of lawyer 
regulation’, (2012) 45 UBC L Rev 145
61 International Congress of Jurists, The Rule o f law in a Free Society (New Delhi 1959)
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The generality of these declarations aside, a number of academics have sought to explore the 
concept of independence. The clearest explication of the dimensions of independence are set out 
by Gordon who argued that independence of lawyers should occur in four ways:
”1) Independence from outside regulation - the legal profession should have 
autonomy in the regulation o f its own practices
2) Independence from client control - the legal profession should have autonomy 
to decide which clients and causes to represent and how to conduct that 
representation
3) Independence from political control - lawyers should be able to assert and 
pursue client interests free o f external controls, especially influence and pressure 
from government ; and
4) Independence to pursue public purposes - lawyers may provide services and 
technical skills for hire but their personal and political convictions cannot be 
purchased or coerced - a part o f the lawyer's professional persona must be set 
aside for dedication to public purposes. ” 62
The term independence, as a label, once again masks a number of critical values connected with 
the provision of legal services.
6.2.3.5 Lawyers and the Law
Values categorised under this heading in part have been considered above in the section 
which develops the connection between lawyers and the rule of law. All of the documents 
examined refer to the connection between lawyers and the rule of law. Also placed within 
this category were references to the important role that lawyers play in protecting 
fundamental freedoms, democracy, protection of human rights, and equality before the 
law. The value relating to the ability of lawyers to engage with the law, to work towards 
its development, and to debate its merits in public warrants further explanation. This 
value was identified by the United Nations and the Council of Europe. This value
62 Robert Gordon, ‘The Independence of Lawyers’ (1988) 68, Boston University Law Review. 1 at 6-10.
280
connects with an important strand of writing by Parsons,63 who noted that a valuable 
aspect of the existing legal profession was the ability for lawyers to reflect on the law, to 
work within academia, to graduate to the judiciary, and ultimately to strive towards a 
better and more enhanced progressive understanding of the law. Hadfield reaffirms this 
particular point noting:
"The legal profession as a whole - including not only lawyers in private practice 
but also judges, hearing officers, legal scholars, and those employed by the 
executive and legislative branches - defines the industry in which the costly 
creative and analytical work o f interpreting, applying , adapting, and designing 
legal rules takes place. It is the factory in which the rule o f law is built. "64
This set of values moves the understanding of the lawyer’s relationship with the law 
beyond the mere mechanical practice of it. In essence this category serves to identify the 
complex relationship between the law, lawyers and a broad range of other professions 
involved in the realisation of the rule of law.
6.2.3.6 Lawyers. Human Rights and Instrumental Values
The UN principles and the COE recommendations extend, as is a significant part of their 
institutional remit, to the relationship between human rights, States and the rule of law. A 
number of the values identified by these organisations relate to the way in which an 
accused should be entitled to representation so as to not compromise the system of 
justice. Therefore, a number of important values specify that those accused of crimes 
should be entitled to legal assistance and the conditions within which lawyers should be 
able to provide this, absent of any illegitimate pressures. Many of these values are to be 
also found framed in Human Rights instruments.
63 Talcott Parsons ‘A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession’ in Talcott Parsons (ed), Essays in Sociological 
Theory (The Free Press New York 1954)
64 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Don't Forget the Lawyers : The Role of Lawyers in Promoting The Rule of Law in Emerging 
Market Democracies", (2007), 56, Depaul Law Review, 401.
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623.1  Lawyers Values
This category lists behaviours which lawyers should uphold, as part of the validity and 
integrity of their role within the legal system. It includes honesty, respect towards 
colleagues and integrity. It also outlines the value of honour and dignity. These values 
have been explored by Sellinger. His work sheds light on these values. Selinger65 argued 
that dignity and honour is a critical incident of the public interest. Selinger surveyed the 
delivery of legal services around the world and noted that fragmented legal professions 
the world over can do little to resist the usurpations of governmental power, corruption 
and the victimisation of minority populations if the legal profession was not held in high 
esteem.66 In developing his arguments, Sellinger connects justifiable public confidence 
with ‘honour and dignity’ noting that the loss of dignity on the part of lawyers could 
undermine the public's respect for the fairness of the judicial process and eventually its 
willingness to accept the outcomes of that process.67 Both Sellinger and Humbach68 argue 
that honour and dignity can only come about from the adherence by lawyers to core 
ethical values. The importance of these values is brought profoundly into relief by 
Sellinger who notes that a loss of dignity, honour and confidence on the part of the legal 
profession could adversely affect the willingness of potential clients, officials in the 
legislature and, executive branches of government, and, ultimately, the public generally 
to rely on lawyers when they ought to do so. This he argues would impact gravely on the 
rule of law.
6.2.3.8 Lawyers and Organisational Structure
A number of values attach to the way in which the legal profession is structured. Both the 
UN and the COE stipulate that the professions should be self-regulating. Beyond this, 
other values identify with the fact that lawyers should be able to associate freely and join 
professional organisations. The identified values also indicate that these professional
65 Carl Selinger, ‘The Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the Legal Profession’ (1997) 32 Wake 
Forest Law Review 861
66 ibid
67 Carl Selinger, ‘The Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the Legal Profession’ (1997) 32 Wake 
Forest Law Review 870. Quotes Wright: "when people lose confidence in lawyers, they lose confidence in the rule of  
law", the public has an interest "in ensuring that its lawyers behave with dignity and decorum in the courtroom’’'
Charles Alan Wright, The President’s Letter (1997) 19 A.L.I. Rep 1
68 John Humbach, ‘The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty, "Lawyer Honesty" and Public 
Trusts in the Legal System’ (1999) 20 Pace Law Review 93
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organisations should be responsible for seeing that their members are appropriately 
educated, that codes of ethics are in place, and that the ethical rules are adhered to by 
members. Other values pertain to the professional organisations ability to deal with 
complaints efficiently and expeditiously. There is a comprehensive debate regarding the 
best regulatory structure for legal services in addition to debates about self-regulation and 
independence of the legal profession. Regarding the structure of the profession there is a 
protracted debate as to whether it fits within one of two paradigms - the first 
professionalism, the second the business paradigm. A wealth of academic ink has been 
used to debate the merits of both.69 This thesis argues that two critical values underpin 
these debates. The first is the capacity to elicit behaviour from legal service providers that 
conforms to the various values identified in the sections titled above pertaining to lawyers 
and clients, lawyers and the law, lawyers and citizens, and intrinsic lawyer values. This 
point has been saliently made by Jeffrey Stempel as follows:
“A regulatory system must seek to elicit behaviour from the regulated that serves 
society well in light o f the goals at issue. ” 70
The point has been similarly made by Durkheim:
“no social function can exist without moral discipline, otherwise, nothing 
remains but individual appetites, and since they are by nature boundless and
69 Alan Paterson, ‘Professionalism and the Legal Services Market’(1996) 3 International Journal of the Legal 
Profession, 2, 137 ; Neil Hamilton, ‘Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the Formation of an Ethical 
Professional Identity’ (2008) 5 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 470; Robert Dingwall, Paul Fenn, ‘A 
Respectable Profession? Sociological and Economic Perspectives on the Regulation of Professional Services’ (1987) 7 
International Review of Law and Economics, 51, 64; William Hurlburt, The Self Regulation o f the Legal Profession in 
Canada and in England and Wales (Law Society of Alberta Alberta Law Reform Institute, 2000) 158; Friedson, E,. 
"Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in Lawyers' Ideals / Lawyers' Practices; Transformations in the American 
Legal Profession 215. ( Robert L.Nelson et al eds. 1992); Atkinson, R,. A Dissenter's Commentary on the 
Professionalism Crusade", (1995-1996) 74, Texas Law Review, 259, pp 271; Jerome Bickenbach, ‘The Redemption of 
the Moral Mandate of the Profession of Law’ (1996) IX Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1,51; Russell 
Pearce, ‘The Lawyer’s Role in a Contemporary Democracy, Tensions between various conceptions of the Lawyer’s 
Role, Rethinking the Legal Reform Agenda: Will Raising the Standards for Bar Admission Promote or Undermine 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law?’ (2009) 77 Fordham Law Review 4; Laurence Friedman ‘Lawyers in 
Cross Cultural Perspective’ in Richard Abel(ed), Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories ( Beard Books 1989) 9
70 Jeffrey Stempel, ‘Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for Conceptualising and Regulating 
the Legal Profession’ (1999) 27 Florida State University Law Review 25
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insatiable, i f  there is nothing to control them they will not be able to control 
themselves. ” 71
In essence therefore, irrespective of the structure of regulation, and whether this involve 
professions, or a new mix of service delivery, the central requirement is that the values 
outlined above are secured and preserved. This links to the second critical value which, 
this thesis argues is implicit from the values articulated. This is sustainability. It argues 
that sustainability both relates to the structure of regulation, but also the form and nature 
in which legal services are delivered. The effective and long term sustainable delivery of 
legal services necessitates a structural environment that allows for the pursuance and 
achievement of the identified values. The overall structure of legal services needs to 
uphold the rightful practice of law and be structured in a manner capable of meeting the 
demands of society in a form that does not risk the overall provision of legal services in 
the short, medium and long term.
6.2.4 Analysis of Values
The values identified in the previous sections make for familiar reading. This is 
unsurprising given they are largely framed from seminal documents outlining the basic 
requirements for lawyers in society. Underpinning the values identified is a wealth of 
academic scholarship debating these values. These values are effectively simple 
expressions of much more complex values. This draws attention to the much bigger 
challenge involved in considering these values. A small snapshot of the literature has 
been used to explain some of the values. This aside, these assimilated values arguably 
represents a simple expression of the normative values required to be both fulfilled and 
secured such that, as far as is possible, from the perspective of legal services, the rule of 
law can be realised. The values identified coincide with a number of values expressed to 
be in the public interest during the debates on the Legal Services Bill in the House of 
Lords. In the debates Lord Thomas connected the public interest with integrity, 
independence and the administration of justice72 and also the sound supply of legal
71 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (London, Routledge 1992) ppl 1
72 Lord Thomas, HL Deb 6th December 2006, vol 687, col 1171
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services and their continuity.73 Lord Kingsland connected the public interest with justice 
and the courts.74 Lord Borrie connected the public interest with good standards of legal 
practice.75 Lord Hunt connected the public interest with the rule of law.76 Baroness 
Ashton connected the public interest with pro bono and access to justice.77 From this 
perspective, the values identified connect with some of the intuitive understandings of the 
public interest in the debates which led to the Legal Services Act 2007. It is argued that 
this provides a robust indication of the values which need to be secured, in connection 
with legal services, and therein provides a valuable set of normative criteria against 
which any policy or regulatory decision should be assessed in a process seeking to 
approximate the public interest in the Legal Services Act 2007.
In addressing the question, ‘What values might form the normative substantive criteria to 
be used to assess policies and regulatory proposals, within a deliberative process, to 
ascertain the public interest in connection with the Legal Services Act 2007?’ problems 
arise from the forgoing approach and the values identified. The identified values are 
essentially connected to one value underpinning society, the rule of law and therefore 
associated values regarding the legal profession and legal services. In the debates in the 
House of Lords, Lord Hunt also asserted that the public interest related to the economy, 
and the reputation of the English and Welsh legal professions abroad.78 These assertions 
draw, attention to the fact that the public interest in the regulatory objectives was not 
explicitly linked to just the public interest in legal services. Other values might need to be 
considered as part of a process of deliberation. This opens up the enquiry into values to a 
much larger set of values, constrained only by the interpretation of the terms 
‘fundamental values’ or the values that relate to the ‘basic structure of society.’ It raises 
the question -  can, or should the free market and the economy be considered as 
fundamental values? Do they relate to the basic structures of society? The answer really 
depends on how these terms are interpreted and the ideological disposition of the
73 Lord Thomas, HL Deb 6th February, vol 689, col 629
74 Lord Kingsland, HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 121-122
75 Lord Borrie, HL Deb 8 May 2007, vol 691 col 1323
76 Lord Hunt, HL Deb 8 May 2007 vol 691, col 1324
77 Baroness Ashton, HL Deb 8 May 2007, vol 691, col 1327
78 Lord Hunt, HL Deb 8 May 2007 vol 691, col 1324
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advocate extolling their connection. Despite Bell’s argument that the identification of 
values is "no more contestable or difficult to state than are arguments about rights,79 in 
the context of the Legal Services Act 2007, this thesis argues to the contrary. The 
identification of values relating to the ‘basic structures of society’ or ‘fundamental 
values’ in connection with the Legal Services Act 2007 is likely to be open to serious 
discussion and disagreement. The disagreements in the debates on the Legal Services Bill 
point to the myriad of views on legal services. To make the point, market liberals, as 
referred to in this thesis commonly align the public interest with the free market and 
competition. They are unlikely to accept that values associated with competition and the 
markets are not inherently connected to the basic structure of society. The absence of a 
sound theoretical understanding of values presents a problem in this context. It is 
therefore nearly impossible to state, beyond those values already outlined, what other 
values should be considered. It is argued that the values outlined are largely indisputable 
because they are derived in the main from the UN and COE. However, the breadth of the 
term public interest, and the possibility of a range of other values to be connected means 
that the need to be able to prioritise and weight these values does then become more 
pressing.
The conclusions to be drawn from the forgoing reaffirms that there is much to be settled 
theoretically, if ever it can, regarding the identification of values. The identification of 
values is an inherently subjective exercise and, in the context of the Legal Services Act 
2007, likely to be contested. Profound ideologies are likely to influence the values 
identified, and the grip that neo-liberalism has on the social sciences is likely to mean that 
the identification of values related to society is at the very least going to be a contested 
exercise. The exercise of determination is further complicated, as noted, in the previous 
chapter, because little advance has been made in the field of public administration or 
sociology regarding the measuring of values. In essence the utility of discerning the 
public interest by virtue of a process involving normative values will depend heavily on
79 John Bell, ‘Public Interest : Policy or Principle’ in Roger Brownsword (ed) Law and the Public Interest Proceedings 
of the 1992 ALSP Conference (Franz Steiner 1993) 28 ‘when we refer to the public interest, we have in mind the basic 
pattern of value participating and the established institutions which are protected and fulfilled by the legal order”. Bell 
also notes that there are likely to be disagreements about values. However, he explains that this is inevitable.
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the values identified. For this, it is argued that whilst this approach offers some 
possibilities for identifying values it, as predicted in the previous chapter, remains little 
more than an opportunity to identify values.
This thesis perseveres and the following section outlines a methodology whereby 
identified values are considered within a methodology connected with regulatory decision 
making. To try and circumvent some of the problems identified in this section the 
methodology attempts to identify values, and then to include an independent expert panel 
to try and alleviate some of deficiencies regarding the valuing and prioritisation of values. 
It is acknowledged that this places great faith in those charged with making these 
determinations.
6.3 OPERATIONALISING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The following section of this chapter is concerned with the design of a methodology so 
that the public interest can be integrated into policy and decision making processes. It 
builds on the theories advocated in chapter five, and the approach taken to them in this 
thesis in light of the Legal Services Act 2007. In essence, this thesis has suggested a 
method by which the public interest is better understood, by assessing policies and 
proposals for regulation in the light of values. The previous section has outlined an 
approach to values, and identified relevant values in connection with legal services. It has 
also identified problems regarding the systematic identification of them. This section 
seeks to integrate a consideration of these values, whatever they may be, into the policy 
and regulatory decision making processes. In doing so, the following seeks to 
operationalize the public interest in a way that might give effect to the intention which 
underpinned the insertion of the regulatory objective in the Legal Services Act 2007. This 
section seeks an answer to the following question:
Ts it possible to devise a methodology to incorporate the public interest into regulatory 
decision making processes such that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’ might fulfil the legislative intention which underpinned its 
insertion into the Legal Services Act 2007?’
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This section first discusses existing suggestions about how a methodology might be 
integrated into both a regulatory and policy making decision framework. It then examines 
an existing public interest accountability framework designed to integrate the public 
interest into regulation. This public interest accountability framework is included in 
Appendix 5 in this thesis. This section examines the framework and considers it in light 
of the public interest theories discussed in chapter five. This section then devises an 
alternative methodology for use in connection with the regulatory objective of ‘protecting 
and promoting the public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007.
6.3.1 Integrating the Public Interest alongside Regulatory and Policy Impact Analysis 
The question of when to include a methodological device requiring the consideration of 
the public interest is an important one. Two suggestions have been made that the public 
interest should be considered alongside regulatory impact assessments. The following 
outlines these suggestions and their nature and form. It also considers the rationale for 
including them in regulatory decision making. The first suggestion is made by Michael 
Feintuck80 the second is made by Pal and Maxwell.81
6.3.2 Michael Feintuck and ‘Democratic Impact Assessments’
As outlined in the previous chapter Feintuck made an argument that the public interest 
was a normative value and that the value which best framed it was ‘citizenship equality.’ 
He also briefly made reference to operationalizing the public interest. In doing so he drew 
on ‘environmental impact assessments’ noting that new legislation is accompanied by 
‘regulatory impact assessments.’ He suggested that in the context of regulation and in the 
delivery and review of public services, reference to a concept of public interest, explicitly 
linked to the fundamental expectation of equality of citizenship, and the collective 
context within which such an expectation must exist, could serve as a standard against 
which policies and practices could be judged. He suggested that a ‘democratic impact 
assessment’ should accompany all regulation and legislation and that this should feature
80 Mike Feintuck, ‘The Public Interest ’ in Regulation (OUP 2004) 252
81 Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, ‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ (Paper Prepared for the 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004)
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alongside existing impact assessments. Apart from suggesting the idea, Feintuck did not 
expand on how, or what form it might take. His rationale for the insertion of an 
assessment framework into the decision making process is interesting as it reaffirms some 
of the arguments made in this thesis. Feintuck82 argued that the assessment would, in a 
polity which increasingly emphasises liberal individualism, serve both as a reminder of 
the democratic and collective basis of society, and as a means of justifying interventions 
in pursuit of such values.83 By drawing attention to public service values, Feintuck 
argued that a developed concept of public interest may help to ensure that the ‘liberal -  
democratic’ society remains not only liberal, but also meaningfully democratic.84 In 
essence Feintuck draws attention to one of the key advantages of public interest impact 
assessments, in that they draw attention to values which underpin the ‘public interest.’85
6.3.3 Pal and Maxwell and ‘Public Interest Accountability Frameworks’
Pal and Maxwell were commissioned by the Canadian Government to produce a report 
on the public interest and to outline how it may be better integrated into regulatory 
decision making.86 In this report Pal and Maxwell noted the importance of the concept of 
the public interest as a guide for regulatory decision making and how the public interest 
is universally valued but poorly articulated and defined in any given instance.87 They 
believed that it is possible to make these public interest considerations more systematic 
and explicit.88 They suggested that as part of regulatory policy, the Canadian government 
should require all regulatory agencies to add a new dimension to their decisions. Pal and 
Maxwell developed a ‘Public Interest Accountability Framework’ (PIAF), which they 
argued should parallel the Canadian Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS).89 
Whereas the RIAS concentrates on the ‘how’ of regulation, Pal and Maxwell argued that 
the PIAF would focus attention on the ‘why’ of regulation.
82 Mike Feintuck, 'The Public Interest' in Regulation (OUP 2004) 252
83 ibid
84 ibid
85 ibid
86Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, ‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ (Paper Prepared for the 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004) Page 15.
87 ibid
88 ibid
89 This is substantively equivalent to the Regulatory Impact Assessment discussed earlier in this thesis.
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6.3.4 Timing and Composition of the Insertion of a Methodological Device
Both Feintuck and Pal and Maxwell suggest the insertion of an assessment or 
accountability framework into the regulatory decision making process, at the same time 
as a regulatory impact assessment. Doing this in the context of legal services would be 
possible as it was outlined in the previous chapter that the Legal Services Board have 
committed to undertaking a cost benefit analysis90 as part of their regulatory decision 
making process.91 The Solicitor’s Regulation Authority also includes cost benefit analysis 
in its regulatory decision making processes.92 Whilst the Legal Services Board and the 
Solicitors Regulation Authority have published their approach to decision making, the 
other approved regulators have not. However, departing from the idea that inclusion of 
the public interest should appear alongside impact assessment, this thesis advances the 
idea that consideration of the public interest should infuse the whole policy and 
regulatory decision making process if it is to be of optimal utility. Therefore, it departs 
from the idea that the results of a methodology should be published at one particular 
point. It argues that considerations of the public interest should be integrated at key 
stages in the existing decision making process. The basis for this approach is that policy 
and decision making processes are unlikely to change imminently. Regulators, in the 
short to medium term are also unlikely to depart from existing commitments to market 
failure and cost benefit analysis. This thesis suggests an approach that is complementary, 
but also interwoven into existing decision making approaches. The following discusses 
the Pal and Maxwell Public Interest Accountability Framework as a basis upon which to 
suggest an alternative methodology.
6.3.5 Pal and Maxwell’s ‘Public Interest Accountability Framework’
In undertaking their review of the scholarly literature associated with the public interest, 
Pal and Maxwell deduced that there are five ways of understanding the public interest.
90 This cost benefit analysis seeks to ascertain the impacts of any regulatory proposal.
91 Legal Services Board, Enhancing consumer protection, reducing regulatory restrictions -  A discussion document 
about how the LSB will assess the boundaries o f legal services regulation and connected regulatory decisions (Legal 
Services Board, 29 July 2011)
<http://wmv.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/onen/ndf/enhancing consumer protection reducing 
restrictions final 2807201 lx.pdf> accessed 24 May 2012 pi 1 
^Solicitors Regulation Authority, Indicative Cost Benefit Analysis (SRA, 2012)
<http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/ofr/cost-benefit-analvsis.page> accessed 23 November 2012
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These included the public interest as a process, majority, utilitarian, common interest, or 
shared (normative) values. These theories accord with those identified and discussed in 
chapter five. Pal and Maxwell conclude that their evidence suggests that the public 
interest cannot be defined as one general principle to apply to all policy or regulatory 
decisions. This also correlates clearly with the scholarship previously discussed in 
chapter five of this thesis. They argue that the public interest is embedded in the evidence 
and the reasoning of regulators as they write their decisions.93
The accountability framework advocated by Pal and Maxwell is an important practical 
and theoretical step forward towards operationalizing the public interest. It contains a 
number of valuable ideas. These are notably: the clarity and simplicity of the framework, 
the way in which it requires decisions to be made transparently, the linked requirement 
that a process needs to be followed to identify the public interest and the fact a regulator 
has to clearly demonstrate this and, finally, the inclusion of a normative standard as part 
of their approach to discerning the public interest. The Pal and Maxwell framework is the 
only discoverable attempt at operationalizing the public interest that pays any reference to 
the public interest theories outlined in this thesis. Other attempts to operationalize the 
public interest exist but they omit any reference to the theoretical literature, or consider 
the public interest from a purely economic perspective, discounting any values which 
cannot be quantified.94
Pal and Maxwell’s model advocates what this thesis describes as a ‘melting pot’ 
approach. It seeks to identify a range of interests (majority, utilitarian, individual, 
common and shared values) and then balance them all. It proceeds on the basis of two 
mutually reinforcing stages. Stage 1 requires a statement of the evidence gathered in the 
relevant situation. In effect it requires a description of all interests. It is designed to 
ensure engagement with all interests. Stage II then requires all these interests to be
93 Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, ‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ (Paper Prepared for the 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004) 19.
94 Carolyn Wells, ‘A Public Interest Framework for Public Policy Development A property and urban planning 
perspective’ (referred conference paper, Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, 25th September 
2007) ; C N Teulings et al. De Calculus Van Het Publieke Belong (Kenniscentrum voor Ordeningsvraagstukken, 2003); 
Micheal Hankte-Domas, ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation’ (2003) 15 
European Journal of Law and Economics 2,165,185
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balanced against each other, with specific reference to individual interests, enterprise 
interests, and social values. Stage II analysis is designed to bring trade-offs to the surface, 
and be the basis for a clearer statement of the public interest in relation to the issue.95 The 
following identifies a number of points connected with the model which it is suggested 
could be further developed and clarified. Pal and Maxwell adopt a very innovative 
approach to the public interest. In the absence of a definitional consensus regarding the 
public interest it connects most existing theories of the public interest together, and, as 
noted, combines all theoretical views and seeks to make something of them. In doing this 
it is questionable the extent to which they embrace some of the criticisms of the 
preponderance and common interest theories of the public interest outlined in chapter 
five. Both of these approaches largely determine where the perceived public interest 
resides, rather than what might actually be the public interest. They have therefore been 
criticised for placing insufficient emphasis on what values should be protected in the 
public interest’s name.96 On this basis, it is questionable at what point these interests 
should be considered, and the degree of significance that they should assume in this 
model. It is also questionable the extent to which the theoretical understanding of the 
procedural and process approach to the public interest can be transposed into Pal and 
Maxwell’s approach. As outlined in chapter five of this thesis, the theorists who advocate 
these approaches were predominately concerned with asserting that the public interest 
was either directly related to a democratically sanctioned process or the product of an 
appropriately constructed political process. It is argued therefore, that these approaches 
should not be included in the melting pot approach advocated by Pal and Maxwell, 
especially where the regulator alone is making the determination.
It is suggested that the Pal and Maxwell framework would benefit from a clearer 
delineation of its role in the decision making process. At present it is unclear what the 
exact role of the public interest accountability framework is designed to fulfil. Whilst it 
appears to discern the public interest, no mention is made of how it is to be considered
95 Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, ‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ ( Paper Prepared for the 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004) 19.
96 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970) 99; Mike Feintuck, ‘The Public 
Interest ’ in Regulation (OUP 2004)
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alongside other methods of regulatory decision making. It remains unclear whether this is 
the primary instrument for decision making, or, whether regulators are likely to continue 
to use other methods for decision making, and somehow the public interest framework 
advocated is meant to fit in alongside. Pal and Maxwell suggest that the framework 
should sit alongside the regulatory impact analysis (RIA). If this is the case, to what 
extent does the framework influence the assessments undertaken in the RIA? The 
framework would therefore benefit from a codification as to how it might interrelate with 
other commonly used regulatory decision making tools. One principle reason underpins 
the need for this clarification. There remains the possibility that individual and special 
interest groups interests may have been accounted for in other parts of the decision 
making process. In the absence of clarification, it remains a possibility that these interests 
may be considered twice using Pal and Maxwell’s model. Once in the PIAF, and then 
again in traditional decision making approaches. On this basis these interests may assume 
a significance that compromises a normative role for the public interest in decision 
making.
Despite the simplicity of the model it is argued that this approach would yield results that 
may be insufficiently orientated towards public values. Whilst Pal and Maxwell make 
reference to ‘subjecting all’ of the identified interests a “normative test in light o f deeply 
held and broadly shared values ” it is unclear within the model the extent to which this is 
prioritised, or indeed, how these normative values are to be identified. It is argued that if 
the public interest is to assume any significance in decision making the values which 
underpin the normative understanding of the public interest need to orientate the 
discovery of the public interest. This argument has been made in chapter five. Arguably 
the normative element of the public interest needs to assume a much greater significance 
than it does in the model advocated by Pal and Maxwell. In a framework, designed to 
elucidate the public interest, it is argued that there needs to be a much clearer focus on 
discerning normative values first. Only after this has been done might it be conceivable 
for other interests to be considered.
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Drawing on the essence of the Pal and Maxwell PIAF, the following suggests an 
alternative methodology and framework suitable for the discovery of the public interest in 
the context of the Legal Services Act 2007.
6.4 METHODOLOGY FOR INCLUDING PUBLIC INTEREST IN DECISION 
MAKING
The following seeks to outline a methodology to operationalize the public interest. It is 
suggested that the process of identification of the public interest is undertaken 
simultaneously with existing approaches to regulatory decision making. It remains 
unlikely that regulators are going to eschew entrenched methodological approaches 
towards decision making in the foreseeable future. For this reason the following 
advocates a complementary methodology, that is interspersed throughout the decision 
making process. As part of this process, the following embraces elements of Pal and 
Maxwell’s framework but concentrates on normative values as the most important aspect. 
In essence, it seeks to require a regulator to prove that a policy or regulatory intervention 
is in the public interest. The following explains each stage. It then presents this in a 
tabular form afterwards. It is to be noted, that this approach is complementary to existing 
methods of decision making. This model does not have the perceived advantages of 
diagnosing when policy or regulatory intervention is necessary, as it may be argued 
market failure analysis does. The methodology for operationalizing the public interest is 
outlined in 6 stages.
6.4.1.1 Stage 1 -  Identifying the Public Interest
This stage requires regulators, in considering a particular policy or regulatory 
intervention to identify, as exhaustively as possible, the important values connected with 
the issue that they discern as requiring a policy or regulatory response. A robust and 
legitimate identification of these ‘values’ may be collected by using the following 
sources: experts, academics, members of the judiciary, and non-partisan organisations. It 
may also be conceivable to court the views of stakeholders, professionals, members of 
civic society and partisan interests. However, any of these submissions should be 
considered with a degree of caution.
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It is conceivable that this requirement to identify relevant ‘values’ could be partially 
achieved by inserting a question into a consultation document. Most policy and 
regulatory initiatives now involve a consultation stage.97 A question in a consultation 
document might read ‘what valuable fundamental, community, public or substantive 
values do you consider relate to the proposed policy or regulatory intervention?’ The 
forgoing section in this chapter has sought to set out a set of values which it argues 
represents a first step in identifying important values to be considered in the context of 
the public interest and legal services. It is argued that, over time, this particular stage 
might become less onerous, as consensus builds regarding the important values connected 
with legal services.
It is likely that academic and expert opinion may have to be appropriated on values, 
depending on the policy or regulatory proposal. In part this could be said to mirror the 
information function that the Consumer Panel was established to fulfill, regarding the 
consumer interest, in the Legal Services Act 2007.98 Where crucial information gaps are 
identified pertaining to the connection between a proposed policy or regulatory 
intervention and the values outlined, it is appropriate for the regulator to appropriate 
relevant research and evidence. It is suggested that the research be of a high quality and 
peer reviewed. It is suggested that the peer review comments are published and acted 
upon.
6.4.1.2 Stage 2 -  Assimilation of public values
Following the identification of the various values outlined in stage 1, the values should be 
assimilated, along with appropriate explanations of the values and their relationship with
97 HM Government, Reducing Regulation Made Simple -  Less Regulation, better regulation and regulation as a last 
resort’ (TSO, 2010) <httn://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/r/10-l 155-reducing-re»u1ation-made- 
simp1e.pdf> accessed 23 November 2012 p 12; Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, A Code of 
Practice on Good Guidance on Regulation (BERR, 2008)<htto://vvww.bis.gov.uk/files/file44379.pdf> accessed 23 
November 2012
98 Legal Services Board ‘Transitional plans for Consumer Panel Chair announced as LSB welcomes Annual report’ 
(Legal Services Board 29 June 2011.)
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/2011/tra pla.htm> accessed 21 June 2012 
98 Lord Kingsland HL Deb 15th May 2007 vol 692 pt 86
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the policy or regulatory proposals. This stage could be undertaken by the regulator. It is 
crucial that all suggestions and representations are presented to the next stage.
6.4.1.3 Stage 3 Consideration bv Panel of Independent Experts
A panel of experts independent of the regulator should then be assembled with the 
explicit intention of identifying the public interest." This panel should ideally comprise 
of independent individuals who are not representative of any particular interest group 
involved in legal services.100 This panel should review the submissions regarding the 
values. The aim of this particular stage is to frame a specific understanding of the values 
which are relevant to the policy and are appropriate for further consideration. The panel 
should identify any conflicting values and seek to prioritise them. They may also 
appropriate any further research or evidence if this is deemed necessary. Any values 
identified in stage 1 that are not deemed worthy of further consideration should be 
removed from further consideration. Removal should, however, be accompanied by an 
explanation as to why they are not appropriate for further consideration. This should be 
included in an appendix to the report produced by this panel. This panel should then 
make recommendations regarding the appropriate values to be promoted and protected to 
the regulator in the form of a report. This will then need to be considered during stage 4.
The purpose of limiting this stage to an expert panel is based on the requirement for 
reasoned deliberation. It does not seek to open the deliberation up to the public because 
of the restraints within which policy and regulatory decision making occur. There will 
likely be time and cost implications regarding the overall process of decision making. 
One further reason for including an expert panel is to try and mitigate some of the 
difficulties associated with identifying and prioritising values outlined in earlier sections. 
There is one final reason for suggesting the development of an expert panel. This is in
99 Michael Saks, Professions and Public Interest (Routledge, 1994) 53; In the context of decision making in medicine,
perspectives on specialist or expert panels have been offered by Basson who argued that specialist panel determination 
of public interest criteria within specialist fields is the most appropriate method of determining the public interest. Marc 
Basson ‘Choosing among candidates for Scarce Medical Resources’ (1979) The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4, 
313 - For a contrary perspective see Leo Shatin ‘Medical Care and the Social Worth of a Man’ (1966) 36 Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 96. Basson and Shatin both cited in Pascoe Pleasance and Sarah Maclean, The Public Interest (Legal 
Aid Board Research Unit 1998)
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direct response to the number of regulators involved in regulating legal services. 8 
approved regulators and the Legal Services Board are charged with ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’. As already identified in previous chapters, there is a risk 
that each would come to identify the public interest in a different way. It is envisaged that 
the expert panel would, over time, become a fixture. Rather than assembling a panel from 
scratch every time the public interest needs to be considered, it is envisaged that a panel 
could be established, that would serve both to advise the Legal Services Board and the 
other approved regulators. By doing this, it is argued that an element of uniformity might 
begin to emerge regarding public values and therefore the approach to the public interest. 
Whilst the panel would necessarily be considering the normative constituents values of 
the public interest, it reduces the chance of differing approaches to the public interest 
materialising.
6.4.1.4 Stage 4 -  Rationalising Other Interests with the Public Interest 
It is envisioned that at the same time that stages 1, 2 and 3 have been undertaken, other 
work pertaining to the policy or regulatory proposal will have been undertaken. This will 
likely take the form of consumer interest research, polling data, market failure analysis 
and cost benefit analysis. Based on the findings of these processes stage 4 becomes 
operational. All proposals for developing the policy or regulatory intervention by the 
regulator, as likely identified in the cost benefit analysis or regulatory impact analysis, 
should then be evaluated in light of the expert panel’s report on important public interest 
values. The regulator would then be required to consider all possible policy and 
regulatory solutions in light of the identified values. For each possibility for moving 
forward the regulator would be required to explain how the values, identified as an 
expression of the public interest, would be protected and promoted. In essence, this 
attends to the deliberative discussion of values in connection with policy, outlined in the 
theories advocated by Flathman, Bell and Bozeman.
As part of this stage the regulator should draw attention to any individual or sectional 
interests that exist. For instance, if it is identified that a policy is designed to further the 
consumer interest this should be clearly identified. The rationale for identifying these 
interests at this point in the process would be to distinguish between individual and
sectional interests that have a genuinely beneficial effect on collective interests and 
values and those that do not. The regulator would then be required to explain clearly why 
promoting individual or sectional interests are compatible with the values identified as an 
expression of the public interest. In instances that the interest or sectional interest 
promoted by the regulator are not compatible with the values identified by the expert 
panel, an extended report would need to be submitted to the expert panel for full 
consideration.
In effect this stage requires the regulator to explain why a proposed policy or regulatory 
intervention promotes and protects the values and theoretically advances the public 
interest. The reports from this stage should be published.
6.4.1.5 Stage 5 - Evaluation of Final Policy Proposal bv the Independent Panel of Experts 
Having produced and published the report showing how the regulators policy or proposed 
regulatory decisions would protect and promote the important identified values. It is 
suggested that this report and an indication of the regulator’s proposed course of action is 
once again considered by the expert panel. The expert panel would be required to assess 
the explanations provided by the regulator as to how the policy or regulation would 
protect and promote the values that they identified. The expert panel would be required to 
produce and publish a statement or a report outlining whether they were in agreement, or 
not, with the regulator’s approach. In the event that they were not, the regulator should 
commence stage three again and either produce evidence that their proposed course of 
action does protect and promote the identified values, or, reconsider their proposed 
course of action. When agreement with the proposed course of action has been given by 
the expert panel, they should publish a statement outlining their agreement.
6.4.1.6 Stage 6 -  Decision and Outlining Compliance
One stage remains pivotal to ensuring that the integrity of this methodology remains 
intact. This would be to require the regulator to publish, in a consolidated report, how 
they have complied with each of the forgoing stages. It is envisaged that this report would 
be published at the same time that an announcement is made publishing the regulators
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decision regarding the proposed policy or regulation. It is suggested that this requirement 
is also included in the regulator’s institutional audit.
The following sets these stages out in a tabulated form:
6.4.2 Public Interest Methodology
Stage Requirement Outcome
Stage 1 Regulator to identify relevant 
fundamental, substantive, 
public, community values 
connected with the proposed 
policy or regulation
Stage 2 Regulator to assimilate all 
responses collected from stage 
1
Compilation of responses in a 
format ready for consideration. 
This provides the basis for 
reasoned discourse and 
deliberation.
Stage 3 Appoint panel of experts to 
consider the identified values 
and where necessary also 
obtain research or evidence.
Expert Panel considers raw data 
and produces a report outlining 
the appropriate values to be 
protected and promoted by the 
proposed policy or regulation. 
Conflicting values will be 
prioritised. Values not deemed 
appropriate will be removed 
from overall report, though they 
will be included in an appendix 
to the overall report with a 
critical explanation as to why 
they are not appropriate for 
further consideration
Stage 4 Report considered by 
regulator. Regulator is charged 
with explaining and producing 
a report showing how 
proposed options for moving
A report is produced by the 
regulator.
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forward protect and promote 
the values identified by the 
expert panel.
Stage 5 Report produced by the 
regulator is returned back to 
the expert panel for 
consideration and further 
commentary
Report is either approved by the 
expert panel or it is not. If it is 
approved, the regulator should 
be free to progress with the 
favoured option. If it is not 
approved, the regulator is 
required to return to stage 4 and 
resubmit a new report to the 
expert panel
Stage 6 Final report of decision of 
regulator regarding policy or 
regulatory intervention is 
published, with account of how 
the foregoing stages have 
progressed, what has been 
done. All relevant material 
must be published
Transparency is secured, and it is 
possible to assess the extent to 
which the regulator has both 
sought to understand and 
incorporate the public interest in 
its policy or regulatory decision 
making method.
6.4.2 Analysis of Methodology
This section discusses a number of observations connected with this methodology, before 
seeking to address the question that this section sought to answer. One of the main 
reasons for developing a methodology is, as noted in previous chapters, that the consumer 
interest may dominate decision making and policy. Therefore, the foregoing endeavours 
to frame the public interest methodologically such that the public interest and important 
values are not marginalised in the regulatory decision making process. It is argued that a 
number of things will advance the utility of the public interest in the context of the Legal 
Services Act 2007. By including a definitive step, expressly focusing on the public 
interest in any method of regulatory decision making, this will necessitate the public 
interest’s consideration by the Legal Services Board and the approved regulators. This is 
arguably an advance beyond the possibilities of regulator’s ambivalence, semantic 
confusion or passivity as identified in previous chapters of this thesis and chapter four in
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particular. It is to be noted that the Legal Services Act 2007 requires the Legal Services 
Board and the approved regulators to consider the public interest, along with the other 
regulatory objectives, as part of its general statutory obligation. However, as noted in the 
previous chapter, it is clear that consideration of the public interest needs to occur in a 
more searching and systematic way. The Legal Services Board’s regulatory decision 
making process, as referred to in chapter four, does briefly include the public interest. 
However, the consideration of it appears cursory and unsystematic. The consideration of 
the public interest by the Board is also without reference or any real orientation towards 
the full catalogue of important values that underpin the provision of legal services. As the 
regulatory decision making process stands, it allows the Board to effectively make of the 
public interest what it wishes. By making it necessary to consider the public interest in a 
defined and systematic way, this will arguably stimulate debate about the public interest. 
In effect, the outlined methodology, inserted into the decision making process would 
force the Legal Services Board and the approved regulators to consider much more 
rigorously what the public interest is. By stimulating debate, because of the requirement 
to consider it much more rigorously, it is further argued that this should progress the 
study of the public interest further-drawing attention to its scope and importance.
A second observation to be made pertaining to the outlined methodology is that through 
the principle of transparency, embodied in the better regulation guidelines, it should 
become evident if the methodology outlined above is adopted. From this it might become 
easier to assess the extent to which regulators are taking account of the public interest. 
Through the publication of relevant documents, the principle of transparency should 
positively reinforce the commitment of regulators to consider the public interest. In the 
event that the public interest is not considered, this stands as a method by which 
stakeholders and civil society may be able to hold regulators more easily to account. In 
essence, this thesis argues that one of the most important steps towards ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’ is the trigger by which it is properly considered. 
Transparency is therefore an important tool, which may stimulate a regulator’s 
willingness and capacity to consider the public interest.
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The effectiveness of the regulatory objective pertaining to the public interest is influenced 
by the attitude of the regulator and its organisational environment. Specific reference 
was made to the problems of organisational attitude in chapter four. If a regulator takes 
an approach of not wishing to discover the public interest, then the public interest may or 
may not be protected and promoted. It may therefore be a matter of chance whether a 
policy or regulation coincides with the public interest. The regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007 is a 
daunting one. It is not an easy task to undertake. It requires a systematic and a non- 
ideologically based search. Its realisation is in part contingent on it receiving the attention 
that it warrants. As outlined in chapter four, the Legal Services Board has appropriated a 
considerable amount of research, and likely spent a lot of money, getting to grips with the 
consumer interest. The public interest arguably deserves the same attention and 
expenditure, if not much more. The methodology outlined above provides the stimulus 
for this attention.
6.4.4 Operationalizing the Public Interest
This section sets out to address the following question, in light of the foregoing: ‘Is it 
possible to devise a methodology to incorporate the public interest into decision making 
processes such that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ might fulfil the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion into the 
Legal Services Act 2007?’ This chapter has outlined a number of reasons why the 
insertion of this methodology might be a valuable way of integrating considerations of 
the public interest into policy and regulatory decision making. It was argued that by 
inserting a requirement to consider the public interest, beyond that already outlined in the 
statutory obligations of the regulators, into policy and regulatory decision making 
processes, this might go some way towards enhancing both the public interest’s value and 
utility. It also goes some way towards dealing with issues identified in previous chapters 
regarding why considerations of the public interest may be marginalised.
In short the answer to the question that this section seeks to address is, yes, but with a 
number of caveats attached. It is suggested that a methodology complementary to 
existing decision making processes used by regulators offers an approach whereby
302
values, that orientate the public interest are considered throughout the decision making 
process. However, because the methodology outlined above is constrained to instances 
where existing process of decision making are used, this affects the scope of the 
methodology. Because it is complementary to existing methods, it only serves to integrate 
the public interest into decisions where it has been decided that regulatory action should 
be taken. It does not, as other methodologies seemingly promise, specify when regulatory 
action is necessary. For this reason the methodology remains beholden to other means of 
identifying when regulation is needed. Therefore, the capacity of the methodology to 
‘protect’ and ‘promote’ the public interest is framed by the parameters of existing 
approaches to regulation and policy decision making.
Regarding the methodology outlined above, it is important to recognise the fact that it is 
relatively long and involved. This is in the sense that it requires the establishment of an 
expert panel and a number of reports to be produced, coupled with the added requirement 
to ascertain values. It inevitably lends itself to the charge of being overly bureaucratic. 
Slimmed down versions of the approach may well yield some improvements regarding 
the extent to which regulators and the Legal Services Board integrate public interest 
considerations into their decision making processes. However, this thesis posits that this 
methodology is the optimal pragmatic way in which a reasoned search for the public 
interest may be achieved. In this instance it is suggested that the legislative intention 
which underpinned the insertion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting 
the public interest’ could be achieved.
6.5 UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The final section of this chapter seeks to answer the following question:
‘Do the theories of the public interest present an opportunity to understand the public 
interest, such that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ fulfils the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion into the Legal 
Services Act 2007?’
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This section commences with an overall determination of the approach to the public 
interest advocated by this thesis. Taken together, the identification of values and the 
consideration of these values within the methodology outlined represent an opportunity 
for the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ to more 
realistically achieve the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion in the Legal 
Services Act 2007. The theory is, however, inherently contingent on the identification of 
values. As demonstrated, it is possible to draw effectively from the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe and the other sets of principles, values which connect with the role of 
lawyers in society. Other similar ways of identifying these values and the associated 
discourses, which debate the extent of these values, also exist and would provide a furtive 
ground for further research. However, which values should be identified remains an 
important question and both public administration theory and sociological theory have 
yet to yield a satisfactory answer which can guide this process independently. It is posited 
that it is unlikely that an accepted theory will emerge in the foreseeable future. This thesis 
sought to place some limits on the values to be identified but, given the broad sense in 
which the public interest exists as a regulatory objective in the Legal Services Act 2007, 
it remains likely that a wealth of other values may come to be identified, or need to be 
identified. This therefore means that should a methodology, similar to the one advocated 
in this thesis, be used, then the expert panel may experience difficulty in weighting values 
and difficulty determining the normative criteria that a policy may need to be assessed 
against. The independent expert panel does, however, at least provide a neutral territory 
for values to be debated and in part, compensates for the theoretical problems associated 
with valuing values. More importantly the expert panel might in part, also mitigate any 
ideological predispositions that a regulator may have that cloud their ability to consider 
the spectrum of public values. It may also serve as a counterweight to instances of 
interest group capture or regulatory capture. Outlined at various point throughout this 
thesis are examples of the Legal Services Boards entrenched commitment to the free 
market, the consumer and the Consumer Panel. The Legal Services Board’s connection of 
the public interest with public confidence also suggests that a broad spectrum of values 
might not be being considered. They have at least acknowledged that they need to 
understand the public interest further. Any consideration of important values might be
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considered an advance on the status quo. Any stimulus to do this, as the aforementioned 
methodology does, may bring about a more systematic approach to, and understanding 
of, the public interest. The approach to the public interest outlined in this chapter and the 
theories outlined in chapter five provide therefore, in part, a way of understanding the 
public interest in the context of policy and regulatory decision making.
The broad sense with which the regulatory objectives are included in the Act, as noted in 
chapter one, leads to a conclusion, that in places, the public interest is regarded as a 
normative standard in and of itself. S3101 of the Act requires the Legal Services Board, so 
far as is practicable, to act in a way which is compatible with the regulatory objectives. 
This requires them therefore to protect and promote the public interest, along with the 
other regulatory objectives. The same goes for the approved regulators in s 28(2)(b).102 
Beyond these two instances the Legal Services Board has a range of powers to set 
performance targets, give directions, intervention directions and cancel an approved 
regulator’s designation as an approved regulator. In each of these instances the section in 
the Act reads ‘upon forming the view that the approved regulator has acted or omitted to 
act in a way that has an impact on one or more of the regulatory objectives.’103 The 
query in these situations is whether the methodology outlined in this thesis is of particular 
assistance. The answer that this thesis reaches on this point is that it may be of 
assistance. It may be of use because a prudent regulator may seek views on what are 
important values, and the advice of the expert panel in any given situation. However, the 
approach advocated by the theories suggests a deliberative approach whereby policies, 
decisions and judgments are considered in light of important values. This still remains a 
valuable approach, and if undertaken diligently, impartially and prudently, a regulator 
may still be able to more realistically achieve the role envisioned for the public interest 
by the legislature. However, absent a diligent, impartial and prudent evaluation of the 
identified values, whatever understanding is propounded will be subjective rather than
101 Legal Services Act 2007, s3
102 Legal Services Act 2007, s28(2)(b)
103 See Appendix 1 in this these for a full outline of how the regulatory objectives appear in the Legal Services Act 
2007.
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one that might approach objectivity. If these prudent steps are not taken it remains the 
case that only a partial vision of the public interest may be realised.
6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In assessing the public interest theories, and the approach outlined in this chapter, it is 
argued that there is one critical litmus test involved in answering the question posed at 
the beginning of this section. This is the extent to which understandings and the 
operationalization of the public interest is capable of countering the consumer interest 
and orientating policies and decisions which would not realise the public interest. It has 
been argued in this thesis that the main reason which led to the public interest’s insertion 
into the Legal Services Act 2007 was a desire, certainly vocalised in the House of Lords, 
to counter the consumer interest and re-orientate the regulation of legal services toward 
the public interest. It is suggested that the approach outlined in this chapter exhibits the 
potential to require the public interest to be systematically considered in decision making 
and policy processes. As identified earlier in this chapter, a methodology that identifies 
valuable values and considers policies and regulatory proposals in light of these values 
might bring policy and regulatory decisions closer to the public interest than might 
otherwise be the case. It also offers a systematic approach to consider the public interest, 
which is more than appears to be in place at present. Public interest theories, including 
the one advocated remain, however, conceptually vague. It would perhaps be a very 
peculiar world if values could be properly accounted for in a theory. For present 
purposes, however, it remains that case that with the omnipresent requirement of 
transparency and accountability, the conceptual simplicity and utility of market failure 
analysis and cost benefit analysis for regulators are too good to be true. From the 
perspective of the public interest they might be regarded as being neither good nor true.
Therefore, of the available theories on the public interest, attempts to regulate in the 
public interest remain at the mercy of the regulators desire to undertake its discovery in 
any given situation. The conclusions to be drawn in this instance, regarding the 
regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’, in the Legal 
Services Act 2007, are as follows. There are many meanings attributable to the public
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interest. It remains highly unlikely that any universal understanding of the term will 
appear in the foreseeable future. Of the existing public interest theories, one strain of 
these represents a possibility of fulfilling the legislative intention which underpinned the 
insertion of the term ‘public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007. These theories have 
been set out, and they maintain that there are many public interests, and as such they are 
only capable of determination in a given situation. To do this requires a considered 
process of discovery. The product of the process of discovery is contingent on the 
integrity of the process and, indeed, the identification of important and relevant values. In 
the absence of a reasoned process of discovery any judgment or determination regarding 
the public interest is likely to be a subjective judgment or determination. In the context of 
the Legal Services Act 2007, the ramifications of this are as follows. In not adopting a 
systematic process of discovering the public interest, the public interest will remain 
elusive. In policy and decision making partial visions of the public interest may be 
included, but certainly with regards to the approach advocated by the Legal Services 
Board notions of the public interest remain hopelessly vulnerable. They are likely to be 
subordinated by other considerations connected with existing methods of decision 
making. Therefore, it remains likely that policies and regulations will be orientated 
towards the consumer interest and competition. Despite the efforts of the House of Lords 
to insert the term ‘public interest’ into the Legal Services Act 2007, and absent a desire 
on the part of regulators to search for its meaning in any given situation, it remains the 
case that the public interest will only assume a rhetorical significance. This rhetorical 
significance is ultimately important, as it alludes to the important fact that the public 
interest is there to be found. However, until the desire to find it is placed at the forefront 
of regulators’ endeavours, problems pervade the public interest.
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION
This thesis set out to answer the question: Ts the regulatory objective of 'protecting and 
promoting the public interest' capable of realising the legislative intention which 
underpinned its inclusion in the Legal Services Act 2007?’ The answer to this question is 
not entirely straightforward and contingent on a number of factors. The following seeks 
to answer this question.
The first chapter of this thesis set out why study of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting 
and promoting the public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007 is both interesting and 
timely. It was demonstrated that the regulatory objectives not only exist to provide a 
guide to the purpose of the Act, but that they are also referred to over thirty times in the 
Act. These references to the regulatory objectives qualify the statutory objectives of the 
regulators of legal services. They also form the basis upon which a whole host of 
determinations need to be made by regulators of legal services. The literature on 
regulatory objectives in pieces of legal services regulation was discussed and it was 
questioned whether the regulatory objective to ‘protect and promote the public interest’ is 
capable of positively orientating the regulation of legal services. This critique is based on 
the fact that, as discussed, the public interest is capable of many definitions and 
understandings and there is compelling criticism of its use in regulation. Whilst a number 
of attempts to change the regulatory landscape of lawyers have been attempted in the 
recent past, they have not been entirely successful. This thesis drew attention to the 
serious problems of complaints against members of the legal profession and the enhanced 
competition policies at international, European and domestic level aimed at removing 
anti-competitive restrictions in the liberal professions. It also drew attention to the Labour 
Government’s commitment to competition and consumer issues. It was argued, that taken 
together, these factors provided an environment in which profound change could be 
attempted. This thesis asserted that the critical turning point was the change in Lord 
Chancellor in 2003 from Lord Irvine to Lord Falconer. Lord Falconer was far more open 
to radical change than his predecessor. It was demonstrated that from the beginning of 
Lord Falconer’s tenure as Lord Chancellor, events rapidly unfolded. This period of time
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was also important because it signalled an almost exclusive focus in policy on the 
consumer of legal services and competition. Reference to the public interest in 
connection with the regulation of legal services was conspicuously absent during this 
period. This represented a sea change in attitude, and an important signal regarding the 
orientation of proposed legal services regulation.
Critical to any answer of the overall research question is a determination of the legislative 
intention which underpinned the inclusion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007. Chapter two of this thesis 
outlined the journey to the public interest’s inclusion in the Act. It was concluded that 
had the Legal Services Bill not been introduced into the House of Lords then it would 
have been unlikely that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ would have been included in the Legal Services Act 2007. This is because of tne 
unrestrained time afforded to the House of Lords at Committee and Report stages to 
debate the proposed piece of legislation. A number of valuable concessions, including the 
addition of the public interest in the Legal Services Act 2007 were brought about by the 
House of Lords. The weight accorded to the public interest in the Joint Select 
Committee’s report and then the subsequent calls for its insertion in the debates in the 
House of Lords were robust. This thesis argued that the principal motivation for the 
inclusion of the public interest is overwhelmingly apparent from the speeches in the 
House of Lords. It is clear from the analysis undertaken in this thesis that there were 
serious concerns with the prominence accorded to the ‘consumer interest’ in the proposed 
legislation. This was fuelled by the Government’s enduring magniloquence that the 
legislation should be orientated firmly towards the consumer interest. Despite the 
Government’s protestations that the contents of the Legal Services Bill were in the public 
interest, during the debates in the House of Lords, it was forced to expressly include the 
‘public interest’ in the legislation. In announcing the insertion of the regulatory objective 
of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ into the Legal Services Bill, Baroness 
Ashton was effectively manoeuvred into stating that it was an important objective of the 
legislation in its own right.1 Despite the inclusion of the public interest as a regulatory
1 Baroness Ashton HL Deb 9th January 2007, vol 688, col 125
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objective in the Legal Services Act 2007, in chapters two and four of this thesis, it has 
been noted that the focus on the consumer interest and competition survived the inclusion 
of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest.’ References 
to the consumer interest appear in bold rhetorical statements pertaining to the regulation 
of legal services. References to the consumer interests are still to be found in recent 
speeches and official documents emanating from the Legal Services Board.2
This thesis progressed having drawn the following conclusions. The regulatory objective 
of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest was inserted as an objective and as an 
expression of the purpose of the Legal Services Act 2007. This thesis concluded that this 
is an important aspect of the overall determination of legislative intention. Whilst the 
motivation for the public interest’s insertion into the Act was to broaden the purpose of 
the legislation beyond the consumer interest, the effects of its inclusion are much greater. 
In the first instance, any actions pertaining to the consumer interest, or the other 
regulatory objectives are to also be in the public interest. It is possible to detect from the 
speeches in the House of Lords some idea of the scope of the interests that were regarded 
as being in the public interest. These related to the administration of justice, the rule of 
law, the protection of professional standards, the sustainability of supply of legal 
services, justice, pro bono, integrity and good standards of legal practice. It was also 
evident that the public interest related to other broader interests, including the importance 
of the legal services to the economy and the reputation of the English and Welsh legal 
professions abroad. Whilst it is possible to assemble a list of the interests mentioned 
during the legislative process, this does not provide an exhaustive list of interests. This 
thesis argues that references to the public interest in the speeches in the debates does, 
however, valuably indicate that a purely economic conception of the public interest, as 
argued by some to be the key way of understanding the public interest,3 was not in the
2 David Edmonds, ‘Regulatory Standards and assessing regulatory performance’ (2012) 20 Legal Compliance Bulletin accessible: 
<http://www.1ega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/speeches presentations/2012/legal compliance bulletin article issue 20 i 
ulv 2012.pdf> accessed 23 October 2012 ;Legal Services Board, Strategic Plan 2012-15 Business Plan 2012/13 (Legal Services 
Board, April 2012) <bttn ://www. legal servi cesboard. org.uk/news publications/nublications/nd ('/business plan 201213 final.ndl> 
Accessed 30 April 2012 pl2
3 KipViscusi, JohnVemon, Joseph Harrington, Economics o f Regulation and Antitrust ( MIT, 2nd ed, 1995); Peter 
Aranson, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation: From Clarity to Confusion’ (1990) 6 Journal of Law and Politics, 247; 
Micheal Hankte-Domas, ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation’ (2003) 15 
European Journal of Law and Economics 2,165,185; Hans Maks and Niels Phillipsen, ‘An Economic Analysis of
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contemplation of the legislature. Therefore, the legislative intention that underpinned the 
insertion of the public interest regulatory objective includes the consideration of a range 
of values and interests, many of which are hard to quantify in market or economic terms.
The third chapter of this thesis sought to understand the potential problems that might 
emanate from regulating in the consumer interest as opposed to the public interest. The 
purpose of this chapter was to understand why regulating in the consumer interest might 
also prove to be problematical in the context of legal services. This thesis accepts that the 
true consumer interest is an important interest, provided, however, it is compatible with 
the public interest. This chapter revealed that the consumer interest, at the time of the 
drafting of the Legal Services Bill was understood to relate to individuals and their 
economic relationship with suppliers of goods or services. This thesis highlighted how 
the consumer interest has, within a number of policy documents and a broad body of 
scholarly literature been equated with price, quality, innovation and choice. It outlined 
how the consumer interest is positioned quite clearly within methods of policy and 
regulatory decision making, including market failure analysis, which are commonly used 
by regulators including, notably, the Legal Services Board. This chapter discussed the 
problems associated with the focus on the consumer in these methods and concluded that 
they are largely based on preference maximisation as opposed to the identification and 
facilitation of collective interests. A number of problems associated with the 
maximisation of individual preferences were discussed in light of legal services. These 
centred on the fact that whilst these interests can be easily identified, it is questionable 
whether these interests should be furthered, especially when they do not benefit the 
collective or public interest. Reference in this thesis was also made of the perverse 
incentives that regulations orientated towards the consumer may have. It was highlighted 
that lawyers and providers of legal services might be tempted to prioritise the consumer 
interest beyond the interests of justice and responsibilities to the court and in so doing cut 
comers and not abide by well entrenched ethical and regulatory obligations.
the Regulation of Professions’ in Lode Vereeck Regulation of Architects ( Intersentia, 2002); Oliver James, 
‘Regulation inside government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory failures’ (2000) 78 Public Administration
2
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This thesis drew reference to the fact that methods of decision making concentrating on 
consumer interests are ill-equipped to consider interests that cannot easily be translated 
into economic values. Therefore, the prevalence with which these methods are used and 
the way in which they fail to take account of broader public interests was highlighted as a 
serious problem. This thesis concluded that this presents a serious obstacle to be 
overcome in connection with the regulation of legal services. A connection was made in 
chapter three between policies designed to promote consumer interests and competition 
law and policy. A number of issues associated with the ideology of competition law were 
identified, and examples were discussed to highlight how, in a number of instances, it is 
unclear whether consumers have actually benefitted from competition policies to promote 
consumer interests. A body of literature was discussed that outlined the short term 
benefits of competition and longer term dis-benefits. This thesis discussed a number of 
instances where evidence would suggest that the consumer has been harmed in the long 
term. This chapter also drew attention to the possibility of interest group capture. It noted 
the potential pendulum swing from what, in the past, has been argued to be regulatory 
capture by the legal professions, to a position whereby the consumer interest, in the hands 
of the Legal Services Board are promoted above all else. The close connection between 
the Legal Services Board and the Consumer Panel was identified as a potential source of 
concern and maybe an example of interest group capture. Chapter four of this thesis 
outlined a number of clear examples where the Legal Services Board has both heavily 
relied on the Consumer Panel and failed to take account of interests, including public 
interests, beyond consumer detriment concerns. This chapter sought to draw many of 
these concerns and findings together in an examination of the optical sector. Both the 
Government and the Legal Services Board have used this example of liberalisation to 
demonstrate the potential benefits consumers of legal services should see as a result of 
the Legal Services Act 2007. It was concluded that there was only, at the very best, 
‘casual empiricism’ to support claims of consumer benefits in the optical sector. This 
thesis drew attention to findings which suggest that seventeen years after the legislation 
which liberalised the selling of spectacles, prices for consumers are now rising. It also 
drew attention to the fact that there exists no evidence to validate assertions that quality 
has been improved. The composition of the optical market was considered and it was
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revealed that it has become very concentrated with a small number of companies owning 
a major share of the market. It was outlined how a number of these companies are owned 
by off-shore holding companies which also own major elements of the supply chain. 
This chapter referred to changes in the legal services market which indicate that similar 
developments are occurring, in particular, in the personal injury and conveyancing 
markets. The appropriateness of these developments was considered, and found to be 
concerning.
Chapter three further drew attention to the way in which the consumer interest is 
operationalized in regulatory decision making. It noted how the requirements of 
transparency and accountability which regulators are obliged to satisfy, has led regulators 
to systematically seek and then rely on methods of policy and regulatory decision making 
that are seemingly robust and defensible. This appears to account for the widespread use 
of economic analysis, market failure analysis and cost benefit analyses. The public 
interest has, as a result, become conceptually marginalised. By comparison regulation and 
policy orientated towards the consumer interest has become commonplace. This has led 
commentators such as Helliwig to describe the consumer interest as: “the golden calf 
around which economics and other economic participants are invited to dance”4 In 
essence, the focus on the consumer interest and the dominance of modem decision 
making processes reinforces the House of Lords claims for the public interest to be 
inserted into the Legal Services Act 2007. It also draws attention to the fact that the 
consumer interest potentially subordinates other regulatory considerations, by being the 
main focus of decision making. This was found to present something of a quandary, 
because in some instances policy and regulatory decision making processes promote the 
consumer interest, which may be in the public interest. The response to dealing with 
complaints against members of the legal profession is a good example. However, there 
may be instances where decisions are taken to further the consumer interest, but these do 
not take account of wider public interests. One example of this is set out in chapter four
4 Hans Jürgen Hellwig, ‘Consumerism at the Expense of the Function and Core Values of the Lawyer’ (IBA Bar 
Leaders Conference, 2006)
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concerning referral fees. This thesis outlined evidence to suggest that only matters to do 
with consumer detriment were considered as opposed to the public interest in legal 
services. Chapter three also reflected on recent work undertaken by Lunt and 
Livingstone5 and the findings of a Select Committee on Regulators.6 It was outlined that 
there exists a degree of semantic confusion amongst regulators regarding the difference 
between consumer, citizen and public interests. Many regulators assimilate the consumer 
and public interest. This presents a problem which might in and of itself lead to the public 
interest being subordinated in policy and regulatory decision making situations. Other 
factors were identified including the organisational attitude of a regulator towards the 
interests that it is designed to promote. Evidence suggests that Ofcom and the FSA have 
experienced serious difficulties understanding issues beyond the consumer interest. The 
consumer interest appears to be much easier to diagnose. A final connected issue arises 
from the research and the evidence that regulators rely upon. Lunt and Livingstone draw 
attention to a predilection to appropriate quantitative research from private companies 
which validates the regulators assumptions as opposed to broader, qualitative and 
independent research which might in fact challenge the regulator’s assumptions. This 
chapter establishes that considered on its own, the consumer interest has the potential to 
deliver benefits which are neither in consumers’ interests or the public’s interest. 
Irrespective of this, the methods of policy and decision making commonly employed by 
regulators insufficiently consider issues beyond the consumer. It was concluded that how 
a regulator goes about regulating and setting policies is a vital component in the 
achievement of regulation orientated towards the public interest.
The fourth chapter in this thesis reviewed three existing attempts at defining the public 
interest in connection with the Legal Services Act 2007. It was revealed that there were 
quite profound differences in these understandings of the public interest. This underlines 
many of the points outlined above. This thesis drew attention to the Legal Services 
Board’s acknowledgement that they are experiencing difficulties understanding what the 
public interest is, and indeed, how it may differ from the consumer interest. This led to
5 Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, ‘Regulation in the Public Interest’ (2007) 17 Consumer Policy Review 4
6 The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic Regulators(HL 2006-2007, J89-II)
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the conclusion in this thesis that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest’ may at best, only be partially realising, in practice, the legislative 
intention which underpinned its inclusion in the Legal Services Act 2007. This 
conclusion is supported by the Legal Services Board’s systematic focus on the consumer 
in connection with policy determinations regarding referral fees, and an expressed 
commitment to use market failure analysis and cost benefit analysis in its regulatory and 
policy making process. A wealth of publicly available material was discussed evidencing 
the Board’s prevailing focus on the consumer. Although it was found that the Legal 
Services Board makes reference to the public interest in its published approach to 
regulatory decision making, the public interest appears marginalised and absent a 
systematic approach to its identification. Whilst the Legal Services Board has published 
an understanding of its approach to the public interest in decision making, none of the 
other regulators have. There is emerging evidence to suggest that one of the regulatory 
bodies, the Bar, has a different vision of the public interest to the Legal Services Board. 
This thesis argued that if multiple visions of the public interest are being pursued this, in 
and of itself, casts doubt over the regulatory objectives’ ability, in the hands of legal 
service regulators, to realise the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion in 
the Legal Services Act 2007.
The fourth chapter of this thesis also concluded that the insertion of the public interest in 
a set of explicit regulatory objectives is a rare occurrence in legislation. For this reason 
the Legal Services Act 2007 and the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting 
the public interest’ can be distinguished in some respects from the other ways in which 
the term ‘public interest’ is commonly included in legislation and regulation. Set out as 
the first regulatory objective, the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the 
public interest’ provides a powerful orientating signal of the purpose of the Legal 
Services Act 2007. This is not common in legislation, though it is something most likely 
to be applauded by a number of scholars, as discussed in chapters four and five, who have 
been at pains to argue that the only legitimate reason for regulating is the public interest. 
These scholars are mainly concerned with suggesting that regulation should be orientated 
towards the public interest as opposed to promoting ideologies connected with markets
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and consumption. This thesis also argued that the Legal Services Act 2007 can be 
distinguished, again, from other pieces of legislation including the public interest, 
because of the number of references to it in the Act and also the way in which it 
permeates every facet of it. This qualifies the importance of understanding what the 
public interest is, notwithstanding the threat that existing methods of policy and decision 
making pose because they focus on individualism and the consumer. In understanding 
further the inclusion of the public interest in the Legal Services Act 2007, this thesis 
discussed the better regulation initiatives. It identified, in light of relevant scholarship, the 
drafting incentive in economic regulation to better outline the objectives of regulation. 
Reflecting on the fact that aspects of the Legal Services Bill involved economic 
regulation this thesis argues that it was perhaps more by accident rather than design that 
the public interest regulatory objective appeared alongside objectives clearly connected 
with economic regulation. This conclusion is bolstered by the conclusions drawn in 
chapter two.
This thesis argued that the inclusion of the public interest in the Act is undoubtedly to be 
regarded as an important development because of the powerful rhetorical signal it emits 
as an objective of the Legal Services Act 2007. However, as Weisbrod7 has noted, the 
public interest has been used to justify everything from democracy to totalitarianism. As 
noted in chapter two, intuitively most people think they know what the public interest is. 
However, upon critical scrutiny this understanding commonly disintegrates and the 
public interest is capable of morphing into multiple meanings without any fixed referent. 
The absence of a fixed referent or consensus as to how to either define or understand the 
public interest invites the conclusion that many have arrived at, as outlined in chapter 5, 
that the public interest is a veritable Pandora’s box. However, this thesis argued that an 
understanding of the public interest, and indeed, the right understanding of the public 
interest is critical, because the integrity of legal services are explicitly linked to the rule 
of law and the very fabric of society. Because of these problems of definition, this thesis 
argued that whilst the public interest may emit a powerful rhetorical signal, it is
7 Burton Weisbrod, ‘Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis’ in Burton Weisbrod, Joel 
Handler, Neil Komesar, (edsj Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis (University of California 
Press, 1970)
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questionable whether, in practice the regulatory objective is capable of fulfilling the 
legislative intention which underpinned its insertion in the first place. This thesis argued 
that unless the public interest can be both better understood by regulators, and then 
integrated into judgments, actions, policy and regulatory decision making; the insertion 
of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ will result, in 
the worst case, with the public interest being neither protected or promoted. There is 
therefore the potential that, in the case of the Legal Services Act 2007, the Labour 
Government’s original policy objective of protecting and promoting the consumer 
interest will be realised. Interests such as competition and the consumer interest, which 
are more easily accommodated in policy and decision making processes, may be 
compatible with the public interest or they may not. This therefore leads to the 
conclusion: that if the public interest, in the hands of a regulator, is pursued by virtue of a 
purely subjective definition and / or unsystematic approach, it remains a matter of chance 
whether the legislative intention underpinning the regulatory objective is realised. In this 
regard it is likely that the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ will only partially and unsystematically realise the legislative intention which 
underpinned its inclusion in the Legal Services Act 2007.
Chapter five of this thesis sought to discover if, any meanings and theories of the public 
interest might afford the opportunity for the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest’ to realise the legislative intention which underpinned its 
insertion in the Legal Services Act 2007. Philosophers, political scientists and lawyers 
have tried in vain, and failed to establish a definition, understanding, or meaning for the 
public interest that is commonly accepted. Indeed a recent study, along with the findings 
of many others disparages the idea that there is a universally understood and accepted 
overarching definition or meaning of the public interest. The lack of a definition of the 
public interest, or the many meanings attributed to it presents a number of problems in 
the context of the Legal Services Act 2007. Following an examination of the scholarly 
literature on the public interest, a number of public interest theories were discussed and 
considered in light of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ in the Legal Services Act 2007. This thesis found many meanings attributable to
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the public interest. These include those that view the public interest as a universal 
normative ideal, an interest common to all, a process or procedure or the interest of a 
majority. This thesis argued that the most promising theories to pursue in the context of 
the Legal Services Act 2007 were those that frame the public interest as a normative 
ideal. This thesis identified one set of theories which it argued bridged many of the 
difficulties associated with the public interest in a regulatory context. In particular this 
thesis argued that the works of Richard Flathman, John Bell and Barry Bozeman were 
particularly apposite for further consideration. These theorists rationalise normative 
theories of the public interest. They each advocate a contextual approach, and crucially 
depart from many theorists who argue that there is one public interest. Each of the 
forging scholars argues that there are many public interests. In the context of the Legal 
Services Act 2007, it is argued that these theories offer the possibility of better 
understanding where the public interest resides, and an opportunity, when integrated into 
regulators’ methods of policy and regulatory decision making, of realising the legislative 
intention that underpinned the insertion of the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and 
promoting the public interest.’ This thesis argued, however, that each of these scholars’ 
theories could not be simply applied in the context of the Legal Services Act 2007 
because a number of issues have yet to be resolved. The theory propounded by Richard 
Flathman mandates a search for the public interest based on a philosophical enquiry into 
what is ‘good.’ The approaches of Bell and Bozeman do not. Bell and Bozeman eschew a 
philosophical enquiry, rather they seek to identify important values, against which 
proposed policies and regulatory action may be analysed in a deliberative process. Two 
problems were identified with these theories in the context the regulatory objective of 
‘protecting and promoting the public interest in the Legal Services Act 2007. These were: 
what values should judgments, policies and regulatory proposals be deliberated in light 
of? And - what form should the process of deliberation take? The problem of which 
values should be identified, and how these values should be identified and what value 
should be accorded to these values, remains a difficult questions to answer. Rather than 
pursuing a broad brushed approach towards the identification of values advocated by 
Bozeman, or a search for ‘fundamental values’ suggested by Bell, this thesis suggested a 
two tier search for values. The first tier search involves identifying values which underpin
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the basic structures of society, building on assertions made by Bell and Downs. The 
second tier search involves a search for values which underpin the fulfilment of the first 
values. In the context of legal services, this thesis identified the first tier value with the 
rule of law and the second with a set of values which relate to the role of lawyers in 
society. In doing this, this thesis was able to identify a number of values in light of which, 
it suggested, judgments, policies and regulatory proposals could be considered. These 
values were drawn from seminal declarations and sets of principles which articulate the 
role of lawyers in society.
In pursuing the approach advocated in this thesis, a variety of issues were raised, 
regarding the way in which values might be valued and ranked. A partial solution was 
tendered through the design of a methodology in chapter six of this thesis. It was 
suggested that this methodology could be integrated alongside existing regulatory and 
policy decision making processes. This methodology developed existing attempts to 
identify and operationalize the public interest in policy and regulatory decision making. 
One existing public interest accountability framework was significantly modified to 
require the systematic identification of relevant values by which policies and regulatory 
proposals could be discussed - in order to understand where the public interest lies. The 
methodology also integrated the consideration of values throughout the decision making 
process. To accommodate some of the shortcomings identified regarding values, the 
methodology advocates the establishment of an ‘expert panel’ to provide an opportunity 
to consider relevant values and mitigate the extent to which the ideological identification 
of values by regulators might distort the realisation of regulation in the public interest. It 
was also argued that the ‘expert panel’ might remove the potential for different regulators 
to pursue different conceptions of the public interest by centralising the consideration of 
values.
This thesis argued that deliberating policy and regulatory proposals, in light of relevant 
identified values throughout the policy and regulatory decision making process, as 
specified in the outlined methodology, represents a more systematic and considered 
approach to the public interest than that hitherto undertaken by regulators of legal
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services. This thesis, however, identified a number of issues associated with the proposed 
approach which might ultimately undermine the ability of the regulatory objective of 
protecting and promoting the public interest to realise the legislative intention that 
underpinned its insertion in the Legal Services Act 2007. The first is that this approach is 
inherently parasitic on existing methods of decision making. For this reason the approach 
does not identify when regulatory intervention is required. The second relates to the fact 
that not all actions taken by the Legal Service Board or approved regulators trigger 
formal decision making processes. As outlined in chapter one and more extensively in 
Appendix 1, the regulatory objective of protecting the public interest appears throughout 
the Act. The statutory duties of the regulators are extensive. Therefore, in many 
instances, it is envisioned that there will be actions taken by a regulator which may be 
broadly termed ‘regulatory’ but which do not engage formal decision making processes. 
In these instances, this thesis posits that it would be difficult for the approach outlined in 
this thesis to be directly integrated into these considerations. This thesis, suggests, 
however, that the methodological approach advocated is flexible enough to be adapted. In 
these instances, it is argued that the approach advocated in this thesis, which mandates 
the identification of values and a process of deliberation, still represents the optimum way 
of approaching the public interest. In these situations, the extent to which the regulatory 
objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public interest’ comes to fulfil the legislative 
intention, (which underpinned its insertion in the Legal Services Act 2007), rests heavily 
on a diligent, extensive and non-ideologically biased search for values and a 
comprehensive, thoughtful consideration by the regulator of the issue at hand in light of 
them. A prudent regulator open to unquantifiable interests or non-economic interests, 
beyond those of the consumer, may very well begin to realise a vision of the public 
interest embodied in the Legal Services Act 2007.
This thesis concludes that whilst it is not possible to arrive at an overall understanding of 
the public interest, the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ is capable of realising the legislative intention which underpinned its insertion in 
the Legal Services Act 2007. The path towards realising the public interest is, however,
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inherently reliant on the integrity of the approach used to discern and apply values to the 
issue at hand.
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APPENDIX 1 -  How the Regulatory Objectives Appear in the Legal Services Act 
2007
Broad Reference to the Regulatory Objectives
Section 3 of the Act requires the Legal Services Board, so far as is practicable, to act in a 
way which is compatible with the regulatory objectives1. The Board must also act in a 
way that it considers appropriate for the purposes of meeting those objectives.2 In 
essence, the Legal Services Board is under a statutory duty to consider, throughout the 
fulfilment of its functions, the regulatory objectives. The Board is further required, in 
Section 6 of the Act, to prepare a report, which amongst other things, must describe the 
extent to which, in its opinion, they have met the regulatory objectives.3 Beyond the 
Legal Services Board, all approved regulators4 are, by virtue of section 28 of the Act, 
under a duty to act in a way which is compatible with the regulatory objectives.5 The 
approved regulators are also under a duty to act in a way which they consider most 
appropriate for the purpose of meeting those objectives.6 In the same vein as the Legal 
Services Board the approved regulators are therefore under a statutory duty to consider 
and act in accordance with the regulatory objectives.
Regulatory Objectives and the Powers of the Legal Services Board 
The powers of the Legal Services Board, as outlined, above are broad. In connection with 
their general oversight function of the approved regulators the Board has a number of 
specific powers set out in the Act. The following sets out how these are connected with 
the regulatory objectives.
Performance Targets
The Board may set the approved regulators performance targets relating to their 
performance. Section 31(2)7 sets out the circumstances in which the Board can exercise 
this function, namely where the Board considers that an act or omission of the approved 
regulator has had, or is likely to have, an adverse impact on one or more of the regulatory 
objectives.8 The decision to take this action, as a result of section 31(2)(b)9 requires this
1 Legal Services Act 2007, s 3 (2)(a)
2 Legal Services Act 2007, s 3 (2)(b)
3 Legal Services Act 2007, s 6 (2) (b)
4 Approved regulators are those who are approved to regulate professionals to practice ‘reserved areas of work’ -((the 
exercise of a right of audience; the conduct of litigation; reserved instrument activities; probate activities; notarial 
activities; the administration of oaths) The Approved regulators are: The Law Society; The General Council of the Bar; 
The Master of Faculties; The Institute of Legal Executives: The Council for Licensed Conveyancers; The Chartered 
Institute of Patent Attorneys; The Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys; The Association of Law Costs Draftsmen).
5 Legal Services Act 2007, s (2) (a)
6 Legal Services Act 2007, s 28(2) (b)
7 Legal Services Act 2007, s31(2) (a)
8 Legal Services Act 2007, s31(2) (a)
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determination regarding the impact on the regulatory objectives, to be viewed in terms of 
the impact that it may also have on the other regulatory objectives.10
Directions
Further to the setting of targets the Legal Services Board, again in contemplation of the 
regulatory objectives may make a direction to an approved regulator. Section 32(l)(a)n 
of the Act gives the Board, upon forming the view that the approved regulator has acted 
or omitted to act in a way that has an adverse impact on one or more of the regulatory 
objectives12, a direction to undertake action.13 The Board needs to also, as in regard to 
performance setting, consider the impact of any direction on the other regulatory 
objectives.14
Censure
In what is an increasingly serious set of tools accorded to the Legal Services Board, the 
Legal Services Board, in the same instances outlined in the previous section, namely, 
where an act or omission by an approved regulator has an adverse impact on one or more 
of the regulatory objectives, the Legal Services Board may publicly censure15 an 
approved regulator, in accordance with the procedure laid down in section 36 of the 
Act.16
Intervention Directions
On identification of an act or omission, in the form stated above, Section 41(1) of the Act 
enables the Board to give an approved regulator an intervention direction.17 An 
intervention direction is a direction that a regulatory function is now to be exercised by 
the Board itself18, or less dramatically that the Approved Regulator must comply with 
instructions given to it.19
Cancelation of an Approved Regulators Designation and an Approved Regulator
One of the most serious powers that the Board has is again contingent on the regulatory
objectives. Section 4520 outlines the grounds by which the Board can cancel an approved
9 Legal Services Act 2007. s 31(2) (b)
10 Legal Services Act 2007. s 31(2) (b)
11 Legal Services Act 2007, s31(2) (a)
12 Legal Services Act 2007, s31(2) (a)
13 Legal Sservices Act 2007, s 32(4) The action is confined to action that is within the power o f the Approved 
Regulator. By virtue of S 31 (4)(b) this action may require the Approved Regulator to modify any part of its regulatory 
arrangements.
14 Legal Services Act 2007 s 32 (3)(3)
15 Legal Services Act 2007 s 35(2) enables the Legal Services Board to publish a statement censuring the approved 
regulator for the act or omission.
16 Legal Services Act 2007, s 35
17 Legal Services Act 2007 s 41(1)
18 Legal Services Act 2007 s 41(2)(a)
19 Legal Services Act 2007 s 41(2) (b)
20 Legal Services Act 2007, s45
325
regulators designation as an approved regulator. This means that the Legal Services 
Board, could remove the powers of the Bar or the Law Society to regulate their members. 
This would mean that either barristers or solicitors would no longer be able to practice 
reserved areas of law. The grounds that the Board needs to be satisfied of are outlined in 
section 45 (5)21 of the Act. The Board needs to be satisfied that either an act or omission 
of the Approved Regulator has had or is likely to have an adverse impact on one or more 
of the regulatory objectives, and, that it is appropriate to cancel the body’s designation in 
relation to the activity or activities in question, and in particular the impact on the other 
regulatory objectives.
Changes to an Approved Regulators Regulatory Arrangements
If an Approved Regulator’s wishes to alter their regulatory arrangements for whatever 
reason, unless exempted within the Act, this has to be approved by the Legal Services 
Board. The Board may refuse such an application if it (the Board) is satisfied that the 
proposed change would be prejudicial to the regulatory objectives.22
Discussion of the Regulatory Objectives in connection with the Legal Services Board.
The section titled ‘broad reference to the regulatory objectives’ (above) outlines where 
the legislation places a general statutory duty on the Board and the approved regulators to 
act in pursuance of the regulatory objectives. What followed, demonstrated that the 
regulatory objectives are also connected to the Legal Services Boards considerable range 
of powers and are the basis upon which these actions can be taken. Upon the Legal 
Services Board’s determination of both the behaviour of the Approved Regulator and 
their subjective understanding that an adverse impact has been had on one of the 
regulatory objectives, then ultimately a serious sanction can be levelled. This 
demonstrates that far from a passive role in the legislation the regulatory objectives are 
directly connected with the process of regulation and judgments taken by the regulator. 
The following outlines other important instances whereby determinations taken by the 
regulators have to take account of the regulatory objectives.
Regulatory Objectives and the Regulation of Alternative Business Structures 
Further to the appearance of the regulatory objectives in regards to the powers of the 
Legal Services Board, they also feature within the section of the Act dedicated to the 
development and regulation of Alternative Business Structures.23 As part of the 
legislation, approved regulators have to apply to become a “licensed authority”. Once 
licensed, they are then able to licence alternative business structures, within the remit of 
their licence. The following sets out more specifically where the regulatory objectives are 
to be considered.
21 Legal Services Act 2007, s45(5)
22 Legal Services Act 2007, sch 4, pt3, s25(3)(a)
23 Legal Services Act 2007, pt 5
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The Legal Services Board’s power to recommend removal of designation as a licensing 
authority
Whilst the process for becoming a licensed authority requires a legislative process to be 
undertaken, section 76 (5)24 of the Act enables the Legal Services Board to recommend to 
the Lord Chancellor that an order is made cancelling an approved regulator’s designation 
as a licensing authority. The Lord Chancellor can only, however, cancel a licensing 
authority’s designation if it has received the Board’s recommendation.25 The grounds 
upon which such a recommendation can be made, require the Board to be satisfied that an 
act or omission of the licensing authority has had, or is likely to have, an adverse impact 
on one or more of the regulatory objectives.26 This judgement has to be appropriate and 
judged in light of the cancellation’s impact on the other regulatory objectives.27
Licensing Authority’s Statement of Policy
In the same manner that the Legal Services Board and the approved regulators, by virtue 
of section 8228, must prepare a report each year outlining how they have worked in line 
with the regulatory objectives, each licensing authority must prepare and issue a 
statement of policy as to how, in exercising its functions it will comply with the 
regulatory objectives. Further to this, the Licensing Authority, who are the bodies who 
consider requests by bodies to become ABS, must have, according to s 82(5)29 within its 
licensing rules, a provision as to how the licensing authority will consider, in furtherance 
of its duties to the regulatory objectives30, a specific consideration of the regulatory 
objective of improving access to justice.31
The Legal Services Board’s Duty to articulate the effects of ABS
In connection with ABS, the Legal Services Board, by virtue of sllO32 requires the Board 
to articulate, in its own opinion how the activities of licensing authorities and licensed 
bodies have affected the regulatory objectives.33
Grounds for granting a Licence or rejecting ownership of an ABS 
Further to the preceding paragraph, the grant of a licence by an approved licensing 
authority is contingent on those who are not authorised by an approved regulator to 
undertake reserved work, but who wish to own part or the whole of an ABS, fulfilling the
24 Legal Services Act 2007, s76(5)
25 Legal Services Act 2007, s76(2)
26 Legal Services Act 2007, s76(5)(a)
27 Legal Services Act 2007, s76(5)(a)
28 Legal Services Act 2007, s82(l)
29 Legal Services Act 2007, s82(5)
30 Legal Services Act 2007, s 3(2) and s 28(2)
31 Legal Services Act 2007, s 83 (5) (b)
32 Legal Services Act 2007, s 110
33 Legal Services Act 2007, si 10(1)
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approval requirements, as judged by the licensing authority. Where an individual’s 
holding of that interest compromises the regulatory objectives, this means that the 
licensing authority cannot permit the application.34 In a similar vein, Schedule 13, part 
3,35 enables a licensing authority to object to an investor acquiring a holding in an ABS, 
if it considers that it is desirable for the purposes of protecting any of the regulatory 
objectives.36 A licensing authority may also impose conditions on a person who holds an 
interest if it again considers that it is necessary or desirable to do so for the purposes of 
protecting any of the regulatory objectives.37
Regulatory Objectives and the Office for Legal Complaints
In connection with the Office for Legal Complaints, they must, in accordance with 
Section 118 of the Legal Services Act 200738, explain how, in their opinion, they have 
met the regulatory objectives.39 As a corollary, the Legal Services Board, in connection 
with section 16240 of the Act, may give guidance to the Office for Legal Complaints for 
the purposes of meeting the regulatory objectives.41
34 Legal Services Act 2007, sch 13 specifically Legal Services Act 2007, sch 13, ptl, s 6(1 )(a)
35 Legal Services Act 2007, sch 13, pt 3
36 Legal Services Act 2007, sch 13, pt 3, s 31 (3)
37 Legal Services Act 2007, sch 13, pt 2, s 33 (4)
38 Legal Services Act 2007, si 18 (2) (b)
39 Legal Services Act 2007, s 118
40 Legal Services Act 2007, s 162
41 Legal Services Act 2007, s 162 (1) (d)
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APPEN DIX 2: THE W O RK  OF THE LEGAL SERVICES BOARD
Background
The Legal Services Board is the oversight regulator for the legal sector, independent of 
both the profession and government. It is sponsored by the Ministry of Justice, paid for 
by levy on approved regulators (ARs). It currently has an operating budget of under £5m, 
with 33 employees, and 9 Board Members.1 In 2008, David Edmonds was appointed 
Chair of the Legal Servces Board, and by July 2008 the other Board members were in 
place. The Board ‘went live’ on the 1st January 2009 with statutory powers to make 
rules. In September 2009 the statutorily required Consumer Panel was appointed, chaired 
by Diana Hayter. In November 2009, the Board released its first consultation on 
Alternative Business Structures (ABS), which represented the culmination of the most 
ambitious aspects of the Legal Services Act 2007. The Board went ‘fully live’ on the 1st 
January 2010, replete with enforcement powers and full operational license. In March 
2010, the Board announced that ABS would be fully licensed by 6th October 2011. This 
represented an aggressively short time span to put in place the regulatory framework to 
allow for effectively multidisciplinary practices, and external capital to finance legal 
services. In October 2010, in full cooperation with the Legal Services Board, the Legal 
Ombudsman opened.
The Legal Services Board's principal role under the Legal Services Act 2007 is the 
oversight of approved regulators, by setting out rules and requirements with which 
approved regulators must comply, providing guidance, overseeing the function of 
individual approved regulators and the system of approved regulators as a whole, and, if 
necessary, taking enforcement action in respect of any approved regulator who falls short 
of the requirements and standards expected.2 An important theme in the Legal Services 
Act 2007 is the separation between the regulation of authorised persons on the one hand 
and their representation within the regulatory framework on the other. The Legal Services 
Board is responsible both for overseeing the exercise by approved regulators of their 
regulatory functions, and also for ensuring that the separation of those functions from 
representative functions is maintained effectively.3 A key element of the Legal Services 
Boards's oversight role is its responsibility for ensuring that approved regulators do not 
act (or fail to act) in a way that would, or might have an adverse impact on the regulatory
1 The Board is made up of a lay chair and CEO and 4 other lay members. The Board has 3 Professional members. Legal 
Services Board, ‘Our Board’ <www.legalservicesboard.ora.uk/about us/our board/index.htm> accessed 26 November 
2012> accessed 12th November 2012. Patricia Robertson, Katherine Watt, ‘The LSB's Role in the regulatory 
Framework, in James Thome, Ian Miller, (eds) "Guide to the Legal Services Act 2007, (Lexis Nexis, 2009) 39
2 Patricia Robertson, Katherine Watt, ‘The LSB's Role in the regulatory Framework, in James Thome, Ian Miller, (eds) 
Guide to the Legal Services Act 2007, (Lexis Nexis 2009) 39
3 Patricia Robertson, Katherine Watt, ‘The LSB's Role in the regulatory Framework, in James Thome, Ian Miller,
(eds) Guide to the Legal Services Act 2007, (Lexis Nexis 2009) 41
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objectives, that they comply with the requirements imposed on them by or under the Act.4 
The Legal Services Board has the power to make statutory rules required to flesh out the 
Act. They seek not only to be a rule making institution, but much more, as the task that 
Parliament has designated the Legal Services Board is far wider than that and of central 
importance to society as a whole.5
In preparing their first business plan - the Legal Services Board developed a vision of the 
way in which they wanted to see the legal services market deliver for consumers over a 
five year period. They noted "that the components are simple "namely:
Greater competition in service delivery and the development o f new and 
innovative way o f meeting consumer demand;
A market that allows access for all consumers, in particular bridging the divide 
for those whose incomes exceed legal aid thresholds but fa ll below the level 
required to purchase essential legal services
Empowered consumers receiving the right quality o f service at the right price
An improved customer experience with swift and effective redress i f  things go 
wrong
Legal service professions which are diverse as the community they serve and 
which constantly strive to improve standards o f practice, quality and education;
Certainty and confidence in the regulatory structures underpinning the market. "6
The 2009/2010 Legal Services Board’s Business Plan developed seven work streams to 
achieve the objectives of the Legal Services Act 2007. These work strands survived until 
they were amended in 20117. The following outlines the work streams, and indicates how 
the work is currently structured. The strands are as follows.
4 Patricia Robertson, Katherine Watt, ‘The LSB's Role in the regulatory Framework, in James Thome, Ian Miller, (eds) 
"Guide to the Legal Services Act 2007, (Lexis Nexis, 2009) 43
5 Legal Services Board Business Plan 2009-2010 (Legal Services Board 2009)
http://www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/business plan 2009 10.pdf accessed 12th 
November 2012 p 2 (Foreword by David Edmonds.)
6 Legal Services Board, ‘Business Plan 2009-2010 (Legal Services Board 2009)
<www.legalsei-vicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/business plan 2009 10.pdf> accessed 12 
November 2012(pt 4)
7 The 2011/12 Business Plan has two elements: the Legal services Board's core regulatory activities and strategic 
initiatives. Sections 2A and 2B demonstrate how they will undertake their day to day activities, including their 
approach to approval of changes to regulatory arrangements, their programme of thematic reviews and evidence 
gathering. Sections 3A-E (which correlate with the initial work streams) describe 5 areas I which the LSB will
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A. Putting consumer and public interest at the heart of regulation
B. Widening access to the legal market (ABS)
C. Improving service by resolving complaints effectively
D. Developing excellence in legal services regulation
E. Securing independent regulation
F. Promoting access to a diverse legal profession
G. Developing research and public legal education strategies.8 
(H) Improving Access to Justice9.
The ‘Putting consumers and public interest at the heart of regulation’ work-stream has 
predominantly revolved around the development of the Legal Services Board's Consumer 
Panel10 and putting in place mechanisms to understand the experience of different groups 
of legal services consumers. Together with the Consumer Panel, this workstream has also 
involved jointly agreeing research priorities.11 This has resulted in the Legal Services
undertake work to deliver their statutory responsibilities to assist in the maintenance and development of standards of 
regulation in the sector and education and training of lawyers.
Legal Services Board, ‘Business Plan 2011-2012’
<www.le2alservicesb0ard.0rs.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/lsb business plan 11 web fmal.pdf> ‘accessed 
26 November 2012
8 Legal Services Board, ‘Business Plan 2009-2010’ (11)
<www.1esalservicesboard.ors.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/business plan 2009 10.pdf> accessed 26 
November 2012
9 This was not strictly one of the original work streams, but by implication developed later on in the LSB's operations.
It now features as one of the most active workstreams, hence its insertion here.
10 Dianne Hayter was appointed Chair on 17 July 2009. Legal Services Board, ‘Legal Services Board announces 
appointment of Chair of Consumer Panel’, (17th July 2009)
<www.lesalservicesboard.ors.uk/news publications/press releases/2009/09 2009.htm> accessed 26 November 2012 
In November 2009, the panel established identity and website www.lesa1serviceseonsmerpane1.ors.uk. In March 2010 
the Panel published its work plan for 2010/2010. Legal Services Board, ‘ Our role and work 2010-2011’ (March 2010) 
<www.1esalservicesconsumerpanel.ors.uk/publications/corporate documents/documents/ourroleandwork2011 -11 .pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
Details of research undertaken by them can be found from the following link; 
<www.lesalservicesconsumerpanel.ors.uk/ourwork/index.html> accessed 26 November 2012 
Research into Referral Fees can be found at; Legal Services Board, ‘Referral Arrangements’
<www.1esalservicesconsumerpanel.ors.uk/ourwork/referral arransements/index.html> accessed 26 November 2012 
See also Legal Services Board, ‘Consume Impact Report 2011’
<www.lesa1servicesconsuinerpane1.ors.uk/pub1ications/research and reports/documents/ConsumerPanel Consumerlm 
pactReport 2011.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012
11 The Legal Services Board has sought the Consumer Panel's advice on a range of matters where they needed to better 
understand the consumer interest including:
Approaches to Licensing;
Legal Services Board, ‘Consultation Response: Legal Services Board: ABS -  Approaches to Licensing’ (17 February 
2010) <www.leaalservicesconsumerpanel.oru.uk/publications/consultation responses/documents/2010-02- 
17 LSB ABS.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012 
‘Legal Complaints’
<www.leealservicesconsumerpanel.or2 .uk/ourwork/Comolaints.html> accessed 26 November 2012 
‘Referral arrangements’ <www.leealservicesconsumerpanel.ore.uk/ourwork/referral arraneements/index.htm1> 
accessed 26 November 2012
‘Will Writine’<http://www.leealservicesconsumerpanel.ore.uk/ourwork/Wi11writina.html> accessed 26 November 
2012
‘Applications received from approved regulators about changes to their regulatory arrangement’ 
<www.leealservicesconsumeroanel.ore.uk/ourwork/Comolaints.html> accessed 26 November 2012
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Board producing research and generating debate around the issues of referral fees,12 will 
writing,13 broader research into legal services,14 consumers of legal services,15 and small
12 Legal Services Board, ‘Referral fees, referral arrangements and fee sharing’ (September 2010) 
<www.leealservicesboard.ore.nk/what we do/pdf/20100929 referral fees.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012 
University of Westminster, ‘Diversity in the Legal Profession in England and Wales: A qualitative study of Barriers 
and Individual Choices’ (Legal Services Board) 2011
<www.leealservicesboard.ore.uk/what we do/Research/research events/pdf/lsb diversity in the leeal profession.pdf 
> accessed 26 November 2012
13 IFF Research, ‘Understanding the consumer experience of will-writing services’ (Legal Services Board) 
<www.1eea1servicesboard.ore.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdt/1 sb will writine report final.pdf> accessed 
26 November 2012
14 Legal Services Board, ‘The future of the legal services sector’(14 June 2010)
<www.leealservicesboard.ore.uk/news nubl icati on s/nubl i cation s/pdf/14 june conference papers.pdf> accessed 26 
November 2012
Rosaline Sullivan, ‘Barriers to the legal profession’ (Legal Services Boar, July 2010)
<www.1eealservicesboard.ore.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/literature review on diversitv2.t)df> 
accessed 26 November 2012
Alex Roy, ‘Regulating and Deregulating Lawyers: Improving access to justice -  can changing regulation help?’ 
(Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 3 June 2010)
<www.leealservicesboard.ore.uk/what we do/Research/research events/pdf/reeulatine lawyers conference small fir 
ms and abs.pdf>
Christopher Decker, George Yarrow, ‘Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation’ (Regulatory 
Policy Institute, 31 October 2010)
<www.leea1servicesboard.ore.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/economic rationale for Leeal Sendees Reeulati 
on Final.r>df> accessed 26 November 2012 
and the collection of essays that they published
Legal Services Board, ‘Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation -  A collection of essays’ 
(March 2011)
<www.1eealservicesboard.ore.uk/news publications/latest news/odf/economics of leeal services reeulation discussi 
on papers publication final.t>dfi> accessed 26 November 2012
Legal Services Board, ‘Enhancing consumer protection, reducing regulatory restrictions’ (July 2011)
<www.leealservicesboard.ore.uk/what we do/consultations/open/odf/enhancine consumer protection reducine restri 
ctions final 2807201 lx.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012
15 During the LSB's first year, they noted that "Central to our way of working is making sure that we take the widest 
range of consumers' interests and views into account in our work’’. Legal Services Board, ‘Annual Report 2009/2010’ 
<www.1ecalservicesboard.orc.uk/ncws pub1ications/publications/pdf/lsb009 annual report web 2 final.pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
On the 1st Jan 2010, when the LSB formally assumed statutory powers, they published YouGov research into the 
perspectives of legal services consumers. Legal Services Board, ‘First-tier Complaints Handling’ (June 2011)
<www.lecalservicesboard.orc.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/final report for Isb ftch09 06 11 .ndf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
They also sought to draw on the Legal Services Research Centre; Legal Services Board, ‘Understanding consumers’ 
views of quality in legal services in England ad Wales’
<www.leea1servicesboard.ore.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/ndf/consumer views of quality research spec.p 
df> accessed 26 November 2012 which has carried out consumer surveys aimed at improving understanding of how 
consumers handle legal problems. (www.lecal researchresearclf)
Legal Services Board, ‘Research Specification: understanding consumer experience of first tier complaints’
<www.lccalserviccsboard.orc.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/understandinc consumer experience of firs 
t tier comolaints.odf> accessed 26 November 2012
See also research by Opinion Leader; Legal Services Board, ‘Developing measures of consumer outcomes for legal 
services’ (March 2011)
www.lecalservicesboard.orc.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/consumer outcomes final research report.odf 
accessed 26 November 2012
See also; Legal Services Board, ‘Research Strategy’ (June 2010)
<www.leca1servicesboard.orc.uk/what we do/Research/pdf/lsb research strategy 2010 formatted version.pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
Legal Services Board, ‘Regulatory Information Review -  Literature Review Research Specification’
<httn://www.leca1servicesboard.orc.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/odf/RIR Literature Review workv3.ndf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
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business users.16 In 2011/2012 this work-stream was removed, and the work distributed 
across the whole of the Legal Services Board's operations. The Legal Services Board now 
notes that "promoting the consumer and public interest is at the heart o f our programme 
and the title o f the LSB's Business Plan 2011/2012 illustrates that it is an important part 
o f all o f our work"17
The ‘Widening access to the legal market’ work-stream has focused on the development 
of a licensing regime for ABS. The Legal Services Board have undertaken a number of 
consultations regarding the framework for ABS.18 The Legal Services Board has worked 
closely with the CLC19 and SRA20 towards becoming competent licensing authorities. 
Part of this process has been geared towards outcomes focused codes of conduct. The 
Legal Services Board have also published documents relating to establishing which 
bodies can hear appeals by ABS, or potential ABS, against decisions made by licensing 
authorities. Due to wavering commitments by the SRA, the Legal Services Board, 
pursuing Parliament's wish that ABS operate, set up the Licensing Authority Committee 
to advise the Board as to necessary action to enable the Board to undertake a licensing 
authority role, in the event that none of the existing ARs were forthcoming or deemed 
suitable to regulate. The Legal Services Board have undertaken an aggressive public 
relations campaign communicating the ABS message. This is in addition to regular ABS 
implementation group meetings.21 The Legal Services Board Business Plan for 
2011/2012 indicates that the Legal Services Board will be monitoring closely the 
development of ABS and pushing for a single designated body to hear all legal services
16 LSB Commissioned research into how businesses coped as customers of legal services. AIA, ‘Legal Advice for 
Small Business Qualitative Research’ (Legal Services Board, June 2010)
www.lccalscrvicesboard.oru.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/fmal small firms report.pdf accessed 26 
November 2012
17 Legal Services Board, ‘Business Plan 2011/2012’ pg 10.
<www.lecalservicesboard.orc.uk/what we do/consultatlons/open/pdf/lsb business plan 10 web fmal.pdf> accessed 
26 November 2012
18 Legal Services Board, ‘Consultations : Rules for applications for Approved Regulator and Qualifying Regulator 
designation’
<www.lecalservicesboard.orc.uk/what we do/consultations/closed/pdf/Oualifyine Reculator status/20110328 Rules 
for applications Approved Reculator Oualifvine Reeulator desienation 1 April.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012 
See also expectations on licensing rules to ensure ABS are treated consistently. Legal Services Board, ‘Consultation: 
Designating Approved Regulators as Licensing Authorities’
<www.1eca1servicesboard.orc.uk/what we do/consultations/2009/ndf/final cp app LA.ndf > accessed 26 November 
2012 )
19 Insert reference as to their applications on the LSB website
<www.lecalservicesboard.orc.uk/what we do/reculation/sra licensinc authority ann1ication.htm> accessed 26 
November 2012
20 <www.1eca1servicesboard.orc.uk/what we do/reculation/ndf/la application complete 20110214.pdf >_accessed 26 
November 2012
21 Legal Services Board, ‘ABS Implementation Group Minutes’
<www.1eca1servicesboard.orc.uk/Proiects/abs/crouominutes.htm> accessed 26 November 2012 The group includes 
representatives from across the approved regulators, MOJ and the Panel.
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appeals. They are likely to commission research into the changing consumer experiences 
when ABS go live in 2012.22
The work stream dedicated to ‘improving service by resolving complaints effectively’ 
has seen the Legal Services Board work closely with the newly established Office for 
Legal Complaints.23 The Legal Services Board has sought to work with ARs to ensure 
lawyers embed best practice in complaints handling into their services. The Legal 
Services Board considered it necessary to introduce a specific signposting requirement 
using sll2(2)24 of the Legal Services Act 2007 in the interest of consumer protection. 
The Legal Services Board's first priority was to work with ARs to establish a consistent 
approach to dealing with complaints about lawyers at the earliest stage. The Legal 
Services Board issued guidance about the outcomes they expect from those they 
regulate.25 The Legal Services Board commissioned independent consumer research into 
first tier complaints handling by YouGov.26 This workstream is now titled ‘Ensuring
22 Legal Services Board, ‘Business plan 2011/12’ page 19. The Legal Services Board have committed to 
commissioning research to compare changing consumer experience of legal services.
Legal Services Board, ‘Research Specification: understanding the consumer experience of will writing services’ 
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/research specification testing will writing 
market.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012
Legal Services Board, ‘Understanding consumers views of quality in legal services in England and Wales’
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/consumer views of quality research spec.p 
df> accessed 26 November 2012
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Pub1ications/speciflcations.htm> accessed 26 November 2012
23 The Legal Services Act 2007 established the OLC to administer and run an Ombudsman Scheme.
The LeO opened for business on 6th October 2010 - (Accessed Via : <www.1 e gal ombudsman. org.uk/> accessed 26 
November 2012 ).
The Legal Services Board oversees and agrees the OLC's budget and monitors its Performance Management Legal 
Services Board, ‘Legal Ombudsman and the office for Legal Complaints’
<www.1egalservicesboard.org.uk/about us/office for legal complaints/> accessed 26 November 2012 September 
2010 - the LSB agreed that OLC would provide quarterly information regarding timeliness, cost-efficiency, quality and 
satisfaction
24 This makes it mandatory for all legal services providers to make clear to consumers that they have a right to 
complain, how, to whom and when, in the first instance and, following that, to the Legal Ombudsman once the first tier 
process has been exhausted.
25 The first stage complaints handling process was designed to put in place a process for consumer complaints, without 
necessary recourse to the Legal Services Ombudsman. The Guidance decision can be found at; Legal Services Board, 
‘First-tier complaints handling’ (May 2010)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/Proiects/pdf/10 05 24 Isb signposting requirement and guidance Decision docu 
ment.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012
Work on how Approved Regulator’s collect information about how they regulate complaints is on-going, guidance can 
be found via the following; Legal Services Board, ‘Improving service by resolving complaints effectively’ 
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/Proiects/first tier complaints handling/index.htm> accessed 26 November 2012 
Legal Services Board ‘First-tier complaints handling; Implementation -  Progress Review Report’ (February 2011) 
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/04 03 11 Initial FTCH regulatory review report 
FINAL.odf> accessed 26 November 2012 
^ Legal Services Board, ‘First-tier Complaints Handling’ (June 2011)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/publications/pdf/final report for Isb ftch09 06 ll.pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
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effective redress for consumers.’ Anticipated work27 for 2011/12 involves research into 
consumer perceptions of the outcomes that they experience with first tier complaints 
handling, review of first tier complaints handling regulatory frameworks, and reviewing 
consumer satisfaction with the Legal Ombudsman.28
The ‘Developing excellence in legal services regulation’ work-stream has sought to 
develop an agreed methodology to review the effectiveness of ARs. One of the key 
drivers for the introduction of the Legal Services Act 2007 was the need to separate legal 
regulation from representation.29 The Legal Services Board consulted during 2009 on 
how best to achieve this, and encourage public confidence in the legal system.30 In the 
2009/10 Business Plan, the Legal Services Board set out an intention to develop and 
publish an agreed methodology for use by both ARs and the Legal Services Board to 
assess regulatory performance. The task was greater than the Legal Services Board 
anticipated and this work-stream was extended into 2010/11. The Legal Services Board 
agreed in June 2010 to reconsider its approach and this led to the publication of its 
revised strategy in April 201131. The Legal Services Board also developed a project 
focusing on smaller approved regulators32 which reported in June 2011. Since their 
inception, the Legal Services Board have made eleven decisions about changes to 
regulatory arrangements.33
The initial priority of the ‘Securing independent regulation’ work-stream was to make 
sure the ARs had appropriate internal governance rules in place, to deliver independent, 
public interest focused regulation, separate from representative interests. During 2010,
27 Legal Services Board, ‘ABS Implementation Group Minutes’
<www.leaalscrvicesboard.orc.uk/Proiects/abs/urounminutes.htm> accessed 26 November 2012. The group includes 
representatives from across the approved regulators, MOJ and the Panel
28 Legal Services Board, ‘Business Plan 2011/12’ pg 17
<www.leaalservicesboard.orq.uk/news nublications/nublications/pdfdsb business plan 11 web final.pdb> accessed 
26 November 2012
29 The LSB note that parliament recognised a system whereby a body could on the one hand represent their members 
whilst simultaneously acting as their regulator does not have a place in the modem regulatory world. It send a 
confusing message to consumers of legal services and creates the perception of regulation being run by lawyers in the 
interest of lawyers rather than the wider public.
30 LSB Consultation.<www.leaalservicesboard.orq.uk/what we do/consultations/closed/index.htm> accessed 26 
November 2012
Legal Services Board, ‘Regulatory Independence: Consultation on proposed rules to be made under sections 30 and 51 
of the Legal Services Act 2007 (c.29)’ (2009)
<www.leaalservicesboard.ora.uk/what we do/consultations/2009/pdf/reaulatorv indenendence.r>df> accessed 26 
November 2012
3'Legal Services Board, ‘Evaluation Framework’ (April 2011)
<www.1eaalservicesboard.orq.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/evaluation framework april 2011 .pdf > 
accessed 26 November 2012
32 The aim of the project was to better understand the specific challenges that they and their membership face in 
modernising regulation. Legal Services Board, ‘The smaller approved regulators’ (June 2011)
<www.leaa1servicesboard.orq.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/r>df/20110622 sar report final.pdf> accessed 26 
November 2012
33 A list of the reports showing matters under consideration can be located at;
<www.leaalservicesboard.orq.uk/what we do/reau1ation/annlications.htm> accessed 26 November 2012 ; 
<www.leaa1servicesboard.orq.uk/what we do/reaulation/index.htm> accessed 26 November 2012
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ARs were required to undertake and complete regulatory independence certificates 
assessing their compliance with IGRs (internal governance rules).34 This led to further 
work to develop action plans for compliance. Timely and proportionate steps were taken 
by the Legal Services Board to oversee this work.35 Through-out this work-stream, the 
Legal Services Board also sought to approve practising fees applications in accordance 
with the rules36 it developed.
The work-stream ‘Promoting access to a diverse legal profession’37 commenced with the 
intention of undertaking a central co-ordinating role of the wide range of work already 
underway to promote professional diversity. This has morphed into supporting the 
approved regulators in their work to consider (and then provide) what consumers and 
procurers of legal services expect from the legal workforce.38 Work has taken place 
towards encouraging more diversity and social mobility in the legal profession.39 This 
work has led to a consultation exercise in developing a framework for ARs to increase 
diversity and social mobility.40 Work has also taken place regarding the education 
system41, though this initiative has been watered down from Legal Services Board control
34 Legal Services Board, ‘Internal Governance Rules 2009’ (15 December 2009)
<www.leaa1servicesboard.orq.uk/what we do/regulation/pdf/intemal governance rules 2009.pdf> accessed 26 
November 2012
35 Detailed assessments and issues logs are available at:
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/regulation/applications decision documents.htm > accessed 26 
November 2012
36 Legal Services Board, ‘Practising Fee Rules 2009’ (15 December 2009)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/regulation/pdf/practising fee rules.odf > accessed 26 November 2012. 
Which includes details of their approval process.
37 Changed in the Legal Services Board, ‘2011/2012 Business Plan’ to "Developing a workforce for a changing 
market".
38 Legal Services Board, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2010/11 ’ (13 June 2011) pg 15
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/publications/pdf/lsb annual report 11 web final iune.pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
39 Conference at Westminster University
Legal Services Board, ‘Diversity in the legal profession in England and Wales: A qualitative study of barriers and 
individual choices’
<www.1egalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publ icati on s/ndf/l sb diversity in the legal profession final. 
pdf > accessed 26 November 2012
Literature review "The Barriers to the Legal Profession"; Gateways to the Professions Collaborative Framework. 
Rosaline Sullivan, ‘Barriers to the Legal Profession’ (Legal Services Board, July 2010)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/odf/Hterature review on diversitv2.pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
40 Legal Services Board, ‘Increasing Diversity and social mobility in the legal workforce : transparency and evidence’ 
(16 December 2009)
<www.1ega1servicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/open/pdf/diversity consultation mib1ish.ndf> accessed 26 
November 2012
Legal Futures, ‘Publish and be Damned : LSB says regulators should inspect firms’ diversity data’ (26 July 2011)
<www.lega1futures.co.uk/regulation/Dublish-and-be-damned-lsb-savs-regu1ators-should-insDect-firms-diversitv-data> 
accessed 26 November 2012
41 Legal Futures, ‘Edmonds to back regulators’ education and training review as LSB role is
curbed’<www.1egalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/edmonds-to-back-education-and-training-review-as-1sb-role-is-curbed> 
accessed 26 November 2012
David Edmonds subsequently announced that the LSB would support the SRA, BSB and ILEX in their review to assess 
current legal education requirements.
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to the ARs. This work stream has also been involved in quality assurance, including work 
undertaken in a connection with the Joint Advocacy Group on the design of a quality 
assurance scheme for criminal advocates. The Legal Services Board has also 
commissioned the Consumer Panel42 and others43 to provide research on a variety of 
consumer quality and assurance schemes. The result of this research has resulted in the 
Legal Services Board agreeing to the development of a quality assurance strategy. The 
2011/12 Business plan re-labels this work stream "Developing a changing workforce for 
a changing market". The overall aims are articulated as 1) developing the education and 
training framework to ensure that it equips both the existing workforce and workforce of 
the future 2) focus on ensuring quality through continual development and 3) promoting 
diversity and social mobility. With respect to education, the Legal Services Board set out 
that they wish to firstly, articulate their view on what is required to meet the regulatory 
objectives in the context of education and training, secondly to specify the outcomes that 
they would like to see approved regulators achieve through their review and thirdly to 
define principles that any proposed changes to education and training requirements would 
need to meet.
Developing research and public legal education strategies work stream.
During the first year of operation, the Legal Services Board sought to map the ground for 
its work stream and develop its strategic direction.44 The 2011/12 Business Plan notes 
that the Legal Ombudsman and ARs share a responsibility to increase public 
understanding of citizen's rights and duties. During the following year the Legal Services 
Board will receive research done by the Consumer Panel into price comparison websites 
and note they will examine the extent to which they can usefully add value to a range of 
existing initiatives. 45
Improving Access to Justice.
David Edmonds, ‘Lord Upjohn Lecture; Training the Lawyers of the Future, a Regulators Perspective’ (19 November 
2010) <www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/speeches presentations/2010/de lord uniohn lec.ndf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
42 Requested the Consumer Panel to provide advice about the robustness of existing quality schemes (March 2011)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/20110525 letter chris kenny to dianne havter.n 
df> accessed 26 November 2012
In July 2010 commissioned advice into how consumers view the quality of legal services.
Legal Services Board, ‘Quality in Legal Services: Response to advice from the Legal Services Consumer Panel’ (2010)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/press releases/2011/Consumer panel response.pdf> accessed 26 
November 2012
43 Independent research into assurance schemes was commissioned by the Legal Services Board.
Legal Services Board, ‘Quality Assurance for Advocates: best practice assessment methods and scheme design’ 
<www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/quality assurance for advocates best nracti 
ce.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012
44 Legal Services Board, ‘Annual Report 2009/10’ p9
<www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/news publications/Dub1ications/r>df/1sb009 annual report web 2 fina1.ndf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
45 Legal Services Board ‘Business Plan 2011/12’ page 13.
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news nublications/nublications/ndf/lsb business plan 11 web final.ndf > accessed
26 November 2012
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This work-stream seeks to better understand some of the factors affecting access to 
justice and how they may be addressed. In the signposting initiative in the business plans, 
this is the only area in which the Legal Services Board indicate, by implication, that they 
are not working in the public interest. This work stream correlates heavily with the first 
work stream set out above, revolving around how and when consumers use the legal 
services market. Through this work stream the Legal Services Board have been 
considering the reservation of work, questioning whether the list of reserved legal 
activities is right. The Legal Services Board have commissioned Stephen Mayson46 and 
Decker and Yarrow47 to provide them with research and recently the Legal Services 
Board published a consultation48 on how to take this area further. Work has also been 
commissioned from Opinion Leader into consumer outcomes.49
Other matters undertaken through this work stream involve preparations to take on 
responsibility for oversight of approved regulators' regulation of immigration advice and 
services.50 Due to concerns raised with the Legal Services Board about will writing, a 
specific review of will writing has been undertaken, in close consultation with the 
Consumer Panel. The Legal Services Board commissioned research into the types and 
scales of consumer detriment from current practice in writing wills. This work stream has 
also comprehensively considered referral fees. The Legal Services Board was asked to set 
out a new regulatory strategy. The Legal Services Board sought to understand the effect 
that referral fees had on the market and for consumers and for those who work with them. 
Economic research into the cost benefit of referral fees was published by the Legal 
Services Board51 as was independent consumer research52. In September 2010 a
46 Alex Roy, Chris Handford, ‘Reserved and Unreserved Lawyers’ Activities’
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/reserved and unreserved lawvers.pdf> accessed 
26 November 2012
^Christopher Decker, George Yarrow, ‘Understanding the economic rationale for legal services regulation’
(Regulatory Policy Institute, 31 October 2010)
<www.legalservicesboard.orc.uk/news publications/latest news/pdf/economic rationale for Legal Services Regulati 
on Final.ndf> accessed 26 November 2012
48Legal Services Board, ‘Enhancing consumer protection, reducing regulatory restrictions: A discussion document 
about how the LSB will assess the boundaries of legal services regulation and connected regulatory decisions’ (July 
2011)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/onen/pdf/enhancing consumer protection reducing restri 
ctions final 2807201 lx.pdf> accessed 26 November 2012
49 Rosaline Sullivan, ‘The legal needs of consumer groups’ (Legal Services Board, April 2011)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/publications/pdf/demand literature review.ndf> accessed 26 
November 2012 ,
Legal Services Board, ‘Developing measures of consumer outcomes for legal services’ (March 2011)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/ndf/consumer outcomes final research renort.pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2012
50 The Legal Services Board's responsibility for this area took effect on 1 April 2011
Legal Services Board, ‘LSB assumes an oversight role in the regulation of immigration advice and services’ (01 April 
2011)
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news publications/latest news/2011/010411 .htm> accessed 26 November 2012
51 Economic research into Referral Fees (Charles River Associates)
Kyla Malcolm, Tim Wilsdon and Charles Xie, ‘Cost benefit analysis of policy options related to referral fees in legal 
services, (Legal Services Board, May 2010)
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consultation53 was launched on whether referral fees should be banned. The Legal 
Services Board agreed an approach54 to referral fees in March 2011 and published their 
recommendations.55 The 2011/2012 Business Plan re-labels this work stream ‘Improving 
access to justice: rationalising the scope of regulation.’ The plan for 2011 builds on the 
above research and seeks to determine if will writing should become a regulated activity, 
and seeks to conclude the approach for making regulatory decisions in this field. The 
overall aim in this field is articulated as "setting out, for the first time an underlying 
rationale for regulation, both the Legal Services Board and the ARs can be agile in 
identifying the right extent and form o f regulation that is needed to protect consumers in 
an increasingly dynamic market".56
Work streams post 2011.
The 2011/12 Business Plan57 has two elements: the Legal Services Boards's core 
regulatory activities, and strategic initiatives. Sections 2A and 2B demonstrate how they 
will undertake their day to day activities, including their approach to approval of changes 
to regulatory arrangements, their programme of thematic reviews and evidence gathering. 
Sections 3A-E (which correlate with the initial work streams) describe 5 areas in which 
the Legal Services Board will undertake work to deliver their statutory responsibilities to 
assist in the maintenance and development of standards of regulation in the sector and 
education and training of lawyers. Section 2A notes that the work for the year is likely to 
include the processing of applications for changes to regulatory arrangements, 
applications to extend reserved activities and the consideration of new ARs. The Legal 
Services Board will also conduct a small number of thematic reviews where they note 
intelligence suggests they may need to respond to risk. These areas include Appeals 
regarding ABS licensing, Immigration, Conveyancing, and Smaller approved regulators
<www.leca1senncesboard.orc.uk/riews publications/latest news/pdf/cra impact of referral arrangements final 14ma 
v2010(STQ.pdfl> accessed 26 November 2012
52 Independent Consumer research into referral fees
IFF Research, ‘Research Report: Understanding the consumer experience of will-writing services’ (Legal Services 
Board)
<www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/what we do/Research/Publications/pdf/lsb will writing report fmal.pdO accessed 
26 November 2012
53 Legal Services Board, ‘Referral fees, referral arrangements and fee sharing: Discussion document on the regulatory 
treatment of referral fees, referral arrangements and fee sharing’ (Legal Services Board, Sept 2010) 
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/ndf/20100929 referral fees.ndf> accessed 26 November 2012
54 Legal Services Board, ‘Referral fees, referral arrangements and fee sharing: Decision Document’(March 2011) 
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/closed/ndf/20110525 referral fee decision paper fina13. 
pdf> accessed 26 November 2012
55 Speculative research and points from the Law soc Gazette about how they are not working in the Public Interest.
56 Legal Services Board, ‘Business Plan 2011/12’ pg 29
<www.lega1servicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/onen/ndf/lsb business plan 10 web final.pdf> accessed 
26 November 2012
57 Legal Services Board, ‘Business Plan 2011/12’ pg 29
<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/onen/ndf/lsb business plan 10 web final.pdf> accessed 
26 November 2012
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and Public Legal Education.58 Section 2B, titled “Developing Our Evidence Base”, 
indicates that the Legal Services Board seek to develop a considerable evidence base to 
inform regulatory decisions. Section 3A-3E59 roughly correlates with the above.
58 Legal Services Board, ‘Business Plan 2011/2012’ pg 12 & 13
13<www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what we do/consultations/open/pdf/lsb business plan 10 web final.pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2012.
59 3A, Ensuring effective redress for consumers; 3B Widening Access to the legal services Market; 3C Securing 
Independent Regulation; 3D Developing a Changing Workforce for a Changing Market; 3E Improving Access to 
Justice: Rationalising the Scope of Regulation;
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341
Appendix 3 A.
(UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers) Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers,
Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Havana, 27 August to 7 September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.l at 118 (1990).
UN1 - Basic Principles of the Role of Lawyers
At its 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, the UN 
adopted the Basic Principles of the Role of Lawyers. The Principles were prepared to assist States 
in their task of promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers in Society.2 In its resolution 
45/121 of December 1990, the General Assembly of the UN ‘welcomed’ this instrument adopted 
by the Congress, and invited governments to be guided by them in the formulation of appropriate 
legislation and policy directives and to make efforts to implement the Principles contained therein 
in accordance with the economic, social, legal, cultural and political circumstances of each 
country.3 The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers were formulated to assist Member States in 
their task of promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers, and that these should be respected 
and taken into account by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and 
practice and that they should be brought to the attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such 
as judges, prosecutors, members of the executive and the legislature, and the public in general. 
These principles also apply, as appropriate, to persons who exercise the functions of lawyers 
without having the formal status of lawyers. 4 The Principles cover: the access to lawyers and legal 
services; special safeguards in criminal justice matters; qualifications and training; guarantees for 
the functioning of lawyers; freedom of expression and association; professional associations of 
lawyers and disciplinary proceedings.
(UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers) Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Eighth 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 
August to 7 September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 118 (1990).
Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples of the world affirm, inter alia, their 
determination to establish conditions under which justice can be maintained, and proclaim as one 
of their purposes the achievement of international cooperation in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion,
Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the principles of equality before the 
law, the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
1 United Nations, Basic Principles on the Role o f Lawyers, (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 118,1990) 
<httn://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/lawvers.htm> accessed 19th November 2012
2 The legal status of declarations, principles, guidelines standard rules and recommendations have no binding legal 
effect, such instruments have an undeniable moral force and provide practical guidance to states in their conduct
3 Explanatory Memorandum on the Recommendation No. (2000) of the Committee of Ministers to member States on 
the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer. Page 1.
4 United Nations, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 118,1990) 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/lawvers.htm> accessed 19th November 2012
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impartial tribunal, and all the guarantees necessary for the defence of everyone charged with a 
penal offence,
Whereas the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proclaims, in addition, the right 
to be tried without undue delay and the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law,
Whereas the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recalls the obligation 
of States under the Charter to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
freedoms,
Whereas the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment provides that a detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of, and to 
communicate and consult with, legal counsel,
Whereas the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners recommend, in particular, 
that legal assistance and confidential communication with counsel should be ensured to untried 
prisoners,
Whereas the Safe guards guaranteeing protection of those facing the death penalty reaffirm the 
right of everyone suspected or charged with a crime for which capital punishment may be imposed 
to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings, in accordance with article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Whereas the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
recommends measures to be taken at the international and national levels to improve access to 
justice and fair treatment, restitution, compensation and assistance for victims of crime,
Whereas adequate protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all persons 
are entitled, be they economic, social and cultural, or civil and political, requires that all persons 
have effective access to legal services provided by an independent legal profession,
Whereas professional associations of lawyers have a vital role to play in upholding professional 
standards and ethics, protecting their members from persecution and improper restrictions and 
infringements, providing legal services to all in need of them, and cooperating with governmental 
and other institutions in furthering the ends of justice and public interest, The Basic Principles on 
the Role of Lawyers, set forth below, which have been formulated to assist Member States in their 
task of promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers, should be respected and taken into 
account by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and should 
be brought to the attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such as judges, prosecutors, 
members of the executive and the legislature, and the public in general. These principles shall also 
apply, as appropriate, to persons who exercise the functions of lawyers without having the formal 
status of lawyers.
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Access to lawyers and legal services
1. All persons are entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to protect and 
establish their rights and to defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings.
2. Governments shall ensure that efficient procedures and responsive mechanisms for effective and 
equal access to lawyers are provided for all persons within their territory and subject to their 
jurisdiction, without distinction of any kind, such as discrimination based on race, colour, ethnic 
origin, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, 
economic or other status.
3. Governments shall ensure the provision of sufficient funding and other resources for legal 
services to the poor and, as necessary, to other disadvantaged persons. Professional associations of 
lawyers shall cooperate in the organization and provision of services, facilities and other resources.
4. Governments and professional associations of lawyers shall promote programmes to inform the 
public about their rights and duties under the law and the important role of lawyers in protecting 
their fundamental freedoms. Special attention should be given to assisting the poor and other 
disadvantaged persons so as to enable them to assert their rights and where necessary call upon the 
assistance of lawyers.
Special safeguards in criminal justice matters
5. Governments shall ensure that all persons are immediately informed by the competent authority 
of their right to be assisted by a lawyer of their own choice upon arrest or detention or when 
charged with a criminal offence.
6. Any such persons who do not have a lawyer shall, in all cases in which the interests of justice so 
require, be entitled to have a lawyer of experience and competence commensurate with the nature 
of the offence assigned to them in order to provide effective legal assistance, without payment by 
them if they lack sufficient means to pay for such services.
7. Governments shall further ensure that all persons arrested or detained, with or without criminal 
charge, shall have prompt access to a lawyer, and in any case not later than forty-eight hours from 
the time of arrest or detention.
8. All arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided with adequate opportunities, time 
and facilities to be visited by and to communicate and consult with a lawyer, without delay, 
interception or censorship and in full confidentiality. Such consultations may be within sight, but 
not within the hearing, of law enforcement officials.
Qualifications and training
9. Governments, professional associations of lawyers and educational institutions shall ensure that
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lawyers have appropriate education and training and be made aware of the ideals and ethical duties 
of the lawyer and of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by national and 
international law.
10. Governments, professional associations of lawyers and educational institutions shall ensure 
that there is no discrimination against a person with respect to entry into or continued practice 
within the legal profession on the grounds of race, colour, sex, ethnic origin, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, economic or other status, except that a 
requirement, that a lawyer must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered 
discriminatory.
11. In countries where there exist groups, communities or regions whose needs for legal services 
are not met, particularly where such groups have distinct cultures, traditions or languages or have 
been the victims of past discrimination, Governments, professional associations of lawyers and 
educational institutions should take special measures to provide opportunities for candidates from 
these groups to enter the legal profession and should ensure that they receive training appropriate 
to the needs of their groups. Duties and responsibilities
12. Lawyers shall at all times maintain the honour and dignity of their profession as essential 
agents of the administration of justice.
13. The duties of lawyers towards their clients shall include:
(a) Advising clients as to their legal rights and obligations, and as to the working of the legal 
system in so far as it is relevant to the legal rights and obligations of the clients;
(b) Assisting clients in every appropriate way, and taking legal action to protect their interests;
(c) Assisting clients before courts, tribunals or administrative authorities, where appropriate.
14. Lawyers, in protecting the rights of their clients and in promoting the cause of justice, shall 
seek to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by national and international 
law and shall at all times act freely and diligently in accordance with the law and recognized 
standards and ethics of the legal profession.
15. Lawyers shall always loyally respect the interests of their clients.
Guarantees for the functioning of lawyers
16. Governments shall ensure that lawyers (a) are able to perform all of their professional 
functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference; (b) are able to 
travel and to consult with their clients freely both within their own country and abroad; and (c) 
shall not suffer, or be threatened with, prosecution or administrative, economic or other sanctions 
for any action taken in accordance with recognized professional duties, standards and ethics.
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17. Where the security of lawyers is threatened as a result of discharging their functions, they shall 
be adequately safeguarded by the authorities.
18. Lawyers shall not be identified with their clients or their clients' causes as a result of 
discharging their functions.
19. No court or administrative authority before whom the right to counsel is recognized shall 
refuse to recognize the right of a lawyer to appear before it for his or her client unless that lawyer 
has been disqualified in accordance with national law and practice and in conformity with these 
principles.
20. Lawyers shall enjoy civil and penal immunity for relevant statements made in good faith in 
written or oral pleadings or in their professional appearances before a court, tribunal or other legal 
or administrative authority.
21. It is the duty of the competent authorities to ensure lawyers access to appropriate information, 
files and documents in their possession or control in sufficient time to enable lawyers to provide 
effective legal assistance to their clients. Such access should be provided at the earliest appropriate 
time.
22. Governments shall recognize and respect that all communications and consultations between 
lawyers and their clients within their professional relationship are confidential.
Freedom of expression and association
23. Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and 
assembly. In particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters 
concerning the law, the administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human rights 
and to join or form local, national or international organizations and attend their meetings, without 
suffering professional restrictions by reason of their lawful action or their membership in a lawful 
organization. In exercising these rights, lawyers shall always conduct themselves in accordance 
with the law and the recognized standards and ethics of the legal profession.
Professional associations of lawyers
24. Lawyers shall be entitled to form and join self-governing professional associations to represent 
their interests, promote their continuing education and training and protect their professional 
integrity. The executive body of the professional associations shall be elected by its members and 
shall exercise its functions without external interference.
25. Professional associations of lawyers shall cooperate with Governments to ensure that everyone 
has effective and equal access to legal services and that lawyers are able, without improper 
interference, to counsel and assist their clients in accordance with the law and recognized
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professional standards and ethics.
Disciplinary proceedings
26. Codes of professional conduct for lawyers shall be established by the legal profession through 
its appropriate organs, or by legislation, in accordance with national law and custom and 
recognized international standards and norms.
27. Charges or complaints made against lawyers in their professional capacity shall be processed 
expeditiously and fairly under appropriate procedures. Lawyers shall have the right to a fair 
hearing, including the right to be assisted by a lawyer of their choice.
28. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers shall be brought before an impartial disciplinary 
committee established by the legal profession, before an independent statutory authority, or before 
a court, and shall be subject to an independent judicial review.
29. All disciplinary proceedings shall be determined in accordance with the code of professional 
conduct and other recognized standards and ethics of the legal profession and in the light of these 
principles.
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Appendix3 B
Recommendation Rec(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer
Explanation -_The Council of Europe have acknowledged that an independent legal profession is 
essential to the protection of Human Rights, as well as the maintenance of the Rule of Law.5 The 
COE, with its aims to protect Human Rights, as well as the promotion of the Rule of Law at a pan- 
European level, in the period leading up to 2000, resolved that "it could not remain insensible" to 
the need for the legal profession to be able to exercise freely its activities, without any undue 
pressure from any quarter. In its framework of activities of legal co-operation with Central and 
Eastern European Countries, the Council of Europe organised various multilateral meetings on the 
theme "The role and responsibility o f the lawyer in a society in transition".6 In the conclusions of 
the 1997 Multilateral Meeting on this subject, it was noted, in the part relating to the organisation 
and administration of the profession of lawyer, that
"lawyers in all societies are bound by the following general principles: independence, 
moral integrity, confidentiality, respect for ethical rules avoidance o f conflict o f interests, 
avoidance o f activities incompatible with the discharge o f their duties, advertising and 
personal publicity (taking into account Article 10 o f the Convention for the Protection oj 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), protection o f the client's interests and respect 
for the courts"?
In the Framework of its intergovernmental activities, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe has adopted numerous Resolutions and Recommendations, dealing with questions relating 
to justice and also including matters concerning the role and profession of lawyers.8 In light of its 
1994 Recommendation, on the independence, efficiency and the role of judges, the Council of 
Europe decided to prepare a similar Recommendation concerning lawyers, which would take 
account of existing instruments and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.9 The 
European Committee on Legal Co-operation was asked to prepare a draft recommendation on the 
freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer. The draft recommendation was adopted on the
5 COE, ‘Explanatory memorandum on the Recommendation No. R(2000) of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer’ (CM (2000) 56, 2000) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.isr>?id=352537&Site=CM> accessed 20 November 2000
COE , Recommendation No.R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the freedom of exercise of 
the profession of lawyer (CM (2000) 56, 2000)
<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraSer\det?command:=coin.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=533749&Sec 
Mode=l &DocId=370286&Usage=2> accessed 20 November 2012
6 The Council of Ministers issues recommendations to Member States on matters for which the Committee has agreed 
on a common policy. Recommendations are not binding on Member States.
7 COE , Recommendation No.R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the freedom of exercise of 
the profession of lawyer (COE, 2000)
<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Instranetlmage=533749&Sec 
Mode=l&DocId=370286&Usage=2> accessed 20 November 2012
8 COE, ‘Explanatory memorandum on the Recommendation No. R(2000) of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer’ (CM (2000) 56, 2000) 
<httns://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.isp?id=352537&Site=CM> accessed 20 November 2000
9 COE, ‘Explanatory memorandum on the Recommendation No. R(2000) of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer’ (CM (2000) 56,2000) 
<httns://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.iso?id=352537&Site=CM> accessed 20 November 2000
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25th October 2000, at the 727th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.10 The recommendation sought 
to state the nature of the independence of the legal profession, the reasons for it, its importance for 
society, the responsibilities which it entails, the ways in which it can and should be ensured and 
protected, and the standards and discipline needed in order to maintain i t 11 The principles and 
rules relate to the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer (Principle 1), legal education, 
training and entry into the legal profession (Principle II), role and duty of lawyers (Principle III), 
access for all persons to lawyers (Principle IV), professional associations (Principle V) and 
disciplinary proceedings (Principle VI).12
COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
Recommendation Rec(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on 25 October 2000
at the 727th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe,
Having regard to the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights;
Having regard to the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, endorsed by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1990;
Having regard to Recommendation No. R (94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role of 
judges, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 13 October 1994;
Underlining the fundamental role that lawyers and professional associations of lawyers also play in 
ensuring the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
Desiring to promote the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer in order to strengthen the 
rule of law, in which lawyers take part, in particular in the role of defending individual freedoms;
Conscious of the need for a fair system of administration of justice which guarantees the
10 COE, ‘Explanatory memorandum on the Recommendation No. R(2000) of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer’ (CM (2000) 56, 2000) 
<httns://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.isn?id=352537&Site=CM> accessed 20 November 2000
11 COE, ‘Explanatory memorandum on the Recommendation No. R(2000) of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer’ (CM (2000) 56, 2000) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.isD?id=352537&Site-CM> accessed 20 November 2000
12 COE, ‘Explanatory memorandum on the Recommendation No. R(2000) of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer’ (CM (2000) 56,2000) 
<httns://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.isp?id=352537&Site=CM> accessed 20 November 2000
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independence of lawyers in the discharge of their professional duties without any improper 
restriction, influence, inducement, pressure, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any 
quarter or for any reason;
Aware of the desirability of ensuring a proper exercise of lawyers' responsibilities and, in 
particular, of the need for lawyers to receive sufficient training and to find a proper balance 
between their duties towards the courts and those towards their clients;
Considering that access to justice may require persons in an economically weak position to obtain 
the services of lawyers,
Recommends the governments of member states to take or reinforce, as the case may be, all 
measures they consider necessary with a view to the implementation of the principles contained in 
this recommendation.
For the purpose of this recommendation, "lawyer" means a person qualified and authorised 
according to the national law to plead and act on behalf of his or her clients, to engage in the 
practice of law, to appear before the courts or advise and represent his or her clients in legal 
matters.
Principle I - General principles on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer
All necessary measures should be taken to respect, protect and promote the freedom of exercise of 
the profession of lawyer without discrimination and without improper interference from the 
authorities or the public, in particular in the light of the relevant provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
Decisions concerning the authorisation to practice as a lawyer or to accede to this profession, 
should be taken by an independent body. Such decisions, whether or not they are taken by an 
independent body, should be subject to a review by an independent and impartial judicial 
authority.
Lawyers should enjoy freedom of belief, expression, movement, association and assembly, and, in 
particular, should have the right to take part in public discussions on matters concerning the law 
and the administration of justice and to suggest legislative reforms.
Lawyers should not suffer or be threatened with any sanctions or pressure when acting in 
accordance with their professional standards.
Lawyers should have access to their clients, including in particular to persons deprived of their 
liberty, to enable them to counsel in private and to represent their clients according to established 
professional standards.
All necessary measures should be taken to ensure the respect of the confidentiality of the lawyer-
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client relationship. Exceptions to this principle should be allowed only if compatible with the rule 
of law.
Lawyers should not be refused access to a court before which they are qualified to appear and 
should have access to all relevant files when defending the rights and interests of their clients in 
accordance with their professional standards.
All lawyers acting in the same case should be accorded equal respect by the court.
Principle II - Legal education, training and entry into the legal profession
1. Legal education, entry into and continued exercise of the legal profession should not be 
denied in particular by reason of sex or sexual preference, race, colour, religion, political or other 
opinion, ethnic or social origin, membership of a national minority, property, birth or physical 
disability.
All necessary measures should be taken in order to ensure a high standard of legal training and 
morality as a prerequisite for entry into the profession and to provide for the continuing education 
of lawyers.
Legal education, including programmes of continuing education, should seek to strengthen legal 
skills, increase awareness of ethical and human rights issues, and train lawyers to respect, protect 
and promote the rights and interests of their clients and support the proper administration of 
justice.
Principle III - Role and duty of lawyers
Bar associations or other lawyers' professional associations should draw up professional standards 
and codes of conduct and should ensure that, in defending the legitimate rights and interests of 
their clients, lawyers have a duty to act independently, diligently and fairly.
Professional secrecy should be respected by lawyers in accordance with internal laws, regulations 
and professional standards. Any violation of this secrecy, without the consent of the client, should 
be subject to appropriate sanctions.
The duties of lawyers towards their clients should include:
a. advising them on their legal rights and obligations, as well as the likely outcome and 
consequences of the case, including financial costs;
b. endeavouring first and foremost to resolve a case amicably;
c. taking legal action to protect, respect and enforce the rights and interests of their clients;
d. avoiding conflicts of interest;
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G. not taking up more work than they can reasonably manage.
Lawyers should respect the judiciary and carry out their duties towards the court in a manner 
consistent with domestic legal and other rules and professional standards. Any abstention by 
lawyers from their professional activities should avoid damage to the interests of clients or others 
who require their services.
Principle IV - Access for all persons to lawyers
All necessary measures should be taken to ensure that all persons have effective access to legal 
services provided by independent lawyers.
Lawyers should be encouraged to provide legal services to persons in an economically weak 
position.
Governments of member states should, where appropriate to ensure effective access to justice, 
ensure that effective legal services are available to persons in an economically weak position, in 
particular to persons deprived of their liberty.
Lawyers' duties towards their clients should not be affected by the fact that fees are paid wholly or 
in part from public funds.
Principle V - Associations
Lawyers should be allowed and encouraged to form and join professional local, national and 
international associations which, either alone or with other bodies, have the task of strengthening 
professional standards and safeguarding the independence and interests of lawyers.
Bar associations or other professional lawyers' associations should be self-governing bodies, 
independent of the authorities and the public.
The role of Bar associations or other professional lawyers' associations in protecting their members 
and in defending their independence against any improper restrictions or infringements should be 
respected.
Bar associations or other professional lawyers' associations should be encouraged to ensure the 
independence of lawyers and, inter alia, to:
a. promote and uphold the cause of justice, without fear;
b. defend the role of lawyers in society and, in particular, to maintain their honour, dignity and 
integrity;
c. promote the participation by lawyers in schemes to ensure the access to justice of persons in an 
economically weak position, in particular the provision of legal aid and advice;
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d. promote and support law reform and discussion on existing and proposed legislation;
e. promote the welfare of members of the profession and assist them or their families if 
circumstances so require;
f. co-operate with lawyers of other countries in order to promote the role of lawyers, in particular 
by considering the work of international organisations of lawyers and international 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations;
g. promote the highest possible standards of competence of lawyers and maintain respect by 
lawyers for the standards of conduct and discipline.
Bar associations or other professional lawyers' associations should take any necessary action, 
including defending lawyers' interests with the appropriate body, in case of:
a. arrest or detention of a lawyer;
b. any decision to take proceedings calling into question the integrity of a lawyer;
c. any search of lawyers themselves or their property;
d. any seizure of documents or materials in a lawyers' possession;
e. publication of press reports which require action on behalf of lawyers.
Principle VI - Disciplinary proceedings
Where lawyers do not act in accordance with their professional standards, set out in codes of 
conduct drawn up by Bar associations or other associations of lawyers or by legislation, 
appropriate measures should be taken, including disciplinary proceedings.
Bar associations or other lawyers' professional associations should be responsible for or, where 
appropriate, be entitled to participate in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings concerning 
lawyers.
Disciplinary proceedings should be conducted with full respect of the principles and rules laid 
down in the European Convention on Human Rights, including the right of the lawyer concerned 
to participate in the proceedings and to apply for judicial review of the decision.
The principle of proportionality should be respected in determining sanctions for disciplinary 
offences committed by lawyers.
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Appendix 3 C
European Parliament resolution on the legal professions and the general interest in the 
functioning of legal systems of 23 March 2006 (P6_TA-PROV(2006)0108)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2006- 
0108+0+DOC+WORD+VQ//EN accessed 20 November 2012.
The European Parliament,
having regard to the UN’s Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers of 7 September 1990,
having regard to Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2000) 21 of 25 October 2000 
on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer,
having regard to its resolution of 18 January 1994 on the profession of notary in the 
Community 1,
having regard to its resolution of 5 April 2001 on scale fees and compulsory tariffs for 
certain liberal professions, in particular lawyers, and on the particular role and position of 
the liberal professions in modem society2,
having regard to its resolution of 16 December 2003 on market regulations and competition 
rules for the liberal professions],
having regard to Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective 
exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services4,
having regard to Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 Febmary 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a 
Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained5,
having regard to Council Directive 2003/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to 
justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal 
aid for such disputes6,
having regard to Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
OJ C 44,14.2.1994, p. 36.
OJC21 E, 24.1.2002, p. 364.
OJ C 91 E, 15.4.2004, p. 126.
OJ L 78, 26.3.1977, p. 17.
OJ L 77, 14.3.1998, p. 36.
OJL 26, 31.1.2003, p. 41.
OJ L 255, 30.9.2005, p. 22.
Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2006)0061.
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September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications?,
having regard to its position of 16 February 2006 on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal markets,
having regard to the Commission communication ‘Professional Services - scope for more 
reform’ of 5 September 2005 (COM(2005)0405),
having regard to the European Court of Justice jurisprudence on Community competition 
law and freedom to provide services, with specific reference to national rules on minimum 
legal fees,
having regard to Rule 108(5) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Court of Justice of the European Communities has recognised that:
independence, absence of conflicts of interest and professional secrecy/confidentiality are 
core values of the legal profession that qualify as public-interest considerations;
regulations to protect core values are necessary for the proper practice of the legal 
profession, despite the inherent restrictive effects on competition that may result from this,
the purpose of the principle of freedom to provide services as applied to the legal 
professions is to promote the opening up of national markets through the possibility offered 
to service providers and their clients to benefit fully from the Community’s internal market,
B. whereas any reform of the legal professions has far-reaching consequences going beyond 
competition law into the field of freedom, security and justice and, more broadly, into the 
protection of the rule of law in the European Union,
C. whereas the UN’s Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers of 7 September 1990 provide 
that:
lawyers shall be entitled to form and join self-governing professional associations to 
represent their interests, promote their continuing education and training and protect their 
professional integrity. The executive body of the professional associations shall be elected 
by its members and shall exercise its functions without external interference;
professional associations of lawyers have a vital role to play in upholding professional 
standards and ethics, protecting their members from prosecution and improper restrictions 
and infringements, providing legal services to all in need of them, and cooperating with 
governmental and other institutions in furthering the ends of justice and the public interest;
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers shall be brought before an impartial disciplinary 
committee established by the legal profession, before an independent statutory authority, or
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before a court, and shall be subject to an independent judicial review,
D. whereas adequate protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all
persons are entitled, be they economic, social and cultural, or civil and political, requires 
that all persons should have effective access to legal services provided by an independent 
legal profession,
E. whereas the duties of legal professionals to maintain independence, to avoid conflicts of
interest and to respect client confidentiality are particularly endangered when they are 
authorised to exercise their profession in an organisation which allows non-legal 
professionals to exercise or share control over the affairs of the organisation by means of 
capital investment or otherwise, or in the case of multidisciplinary partnerships with 
professionals who are not bound by equivalent professional obligations,
F. whereas unregulated price competition between legal professionals which leads to a 
reduction in the quality of the service provided operates to the detriment of consumers,
G. whereas the market in legal services is characterised by asymmetry of information between 
lawyers and consumers, including small and medium-sized enterprises, since the latter do 
not have the necessary criteria for assessing the quality of the services provided,
H. whereas the importance of ethical conduct, of maintaining confidentiality with clients and 
of a high level of specialised knowledge necessitates the organisation of self-regulation 
systems such as those run today by legal professional bodies and orders,
I. whereas civil-law notaries are appointed by Member States as public officials whose tasks 
include drawing up official documents with special value as evidence and immediate 
enforceability,
J. whereas civil-law notaries take on extensive investigation and scrutiny work on behalf of
the State in matters relating to non-judicial legal protection, particularly in connection with 
company law -  under Community law in some cases -  and as part of this work they are 
subject to disciplinary supervision by the relevant Member State that is comparable to that 
applicable to judges and civil servants,
K. whereas the partial delegation of the authority of the State is an original element inherent in
the exercise of the profession of civil-law notary, and whereas it is currently exercised on a 
regular basis and represents a major part of the activities of a civil-law notary,
1. Recognises fully the crucial role played by the legal professions in a democratic society to
guarantee respect for fundamental rights, the rule of law and security in the application of 
the law, both when lawyers represent and defend clients in court and when they are giving 
their clients legal advice;
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2. Reaffirms the positions taken in its resolutions of 18 January 1994 and 5 April 2001 and its 
position of 16 December 2003;
3. Notes the high qualifications required for access to the legal professions, the need to 
protect those qualifications that characterise the legal professions, in the interests of 
European citizens, and the need to establish a specific relationship based on trust between 
members of the legal professions and their clients;
4. Reaffirms the importance of rules which are necessary to ensure the independence, 
competence, integrity and responsibility of members of the legal professions so as to 
guarantee the quality of their services, to the benefit of their clients and society in general, 
and in order to safeguard the public interest;
5. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition that reforms are best carried out at national level
and that the authorities of the Member States, notably the legislative bodies, are in the best 
position to define the rules that apply to legal professions;
6. Point out that the Court of Justice has allowed national legislators and professional 
associations and bodies a margin of discretion when deciding what is appropriate and 
necessary to protect the proper exercise of the legal professions in a Member State;
7. Notes that each type of activity of a professional body must be looked at separately, so that
the rules on competition are applied to the association only when it is acting exclusively in 
the interests of its members and not when it is acting in the general interest;
8. Reminds the Commission that the aims of the rules governing legal services are the
protection of the general public, the guaranteeing of the right of defence and access to
justice, and security in the application of the law, and that for these reasons they cannot be 
tailored to the degree of sophistication of the client;
9. Encourages professional bodies, organisations and associations of legal professions to
establish codes of conduct at European level, including rules relating to organisational 
matters, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision, liability and communications, in 
order to ensure that the ultimate consumers of legal services are provided with the 
necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and experience, and to ensure the sound 
administration of justice;
10. Invites the Commission to take account of the specific role of the legal professions in a 
society governed by the rule of law, and to carry out a thorough analysis of how markets in 
legal services operate when the Commission promotes a ‘less regulation, better regulation’ 
principle;
11. Invites the Commission to apply the competition rules, where applicable, in compliance
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with the case-law of the Court of Justice;
12. Considers that the public interests overriding EU competition principles are to be found in 
the legal system of the Member State in which the relevant rules are adopted or produce 
their effects, and that there is no such thing as an EU public-interest test, however defined;
13. Invites the Commission not to apply EU competition law to matters which, under the EU 
constitutional framework, are left to the jurisdiction of the Member States, such as access 
to justice, which includes issues such as the fee schedules to be applied by courts to 
liquidate lawyers’ fees;
14. Stresses that previous obstacles to freedom of establishment and the freedom of legal 
professionals to provide services have, in theory, been effectively removed by Directives 
77/249/EEC, 98/5/EC and 2005/36/EC; notes, however, that the review will take place in 
two years’ time and awaits with interest this thorough assessment;
15. Considers that fee scales or other compulsory tariffs for lawyers and legal professionals, 
even for out-of-court services, do not violate Articles 10 and 81 of the Treaty, provided that 
their adoption is justified by the pursuit of a legitimate public interest and that Member 
States actively supervise the involvement of private operators in the decision-making 
process;
16. Considers that Article 49 of the Treaty and Directives 2005/36/EC and 77/249/EEC make 
provision for the principle of the country of destination to apply to scale fees and 
compulsory tariffs for lawyers and other legal professionals;
17. Considers that Article 45 of the Treaty must be fully applied to the profession of civil-law 
notary as such;
18. Calls on the Commission to consider carefully the principles and concerns expressed in this
resolution when analysing the rules governing the exercise of the legal professions in the 
Member States;
19. Encourages professional organisations to continue developing their activities in the field of
legal aid, in order to ensure that everyone has the right to receive legal advice and 
representation;
20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission.
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Appendix 3 D CCBE
Charter of Core principles of the European legal profession13.
CCBE Charter of Core principles of the European legal profession14 
On 25th November 2006, the CCBE15 unanimously adopted a "Charter of core principles 
of the European legal profession". The Charter contains a list of ten principles common to 
the whole European legal profession. The core principles express the common ground 
which underlines all the national and international rules which govern the conduct of 
European lawyers. The Charter is designed to serve as a pan-European document, 
reaching out beyond the member, associate and observer states of the CCBE. The Charter 
aims to help bar associations that are struggling to establish their independence; and to 
increase understanding amongst lawyers of the importance of the lawyer's role in Society; 
it is aimed both at lawyers themselves and at decision makers and the public in general.16 
The Charter takes account of national professional rules, the CCBE's Code of Conduct 
for European Lawyers, Principles of General Application in the IBA International Code 
of Ethics; The COE recommendation outlined above, the UN Basic Principles on the 
Role of Lawyers (outlined above) the jurisprudence of the ECHR and ECJ, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. The explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the Charter expresses the hope that it will increase the understanding 
among lawyers, decision makers and the public of the importance of the lawyer's role in 
society, and the way in which the principles by which the legal profession is regulated 
support that role. Further to this the explanatory notes indicate
"The lawyer's role, whether retained by an individual, a corporation or the State, 
is as the client's trusted adviser and representative, as a professional respected by 
third parties, and as an indispensable participant in the fair administration o f  
justice. By embodying all these elements, the lawyer, who faithfully serves his or 
her own client's interests and protects the client's rights, also fulfils the functions 
o f the lawyer in Society - which are to forestall and prevent conflicts, to ensure 
that conflicts are resolved in accordance with recognised principles o f civil.
13 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010) httD://www.ccbe.eii/fileadmin/user upload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.ndf 
accessed 20 November 2012
14 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010) httn://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user unload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.ndf 
accessed 20 November 201
15 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010) httD://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user upload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.pdf 
accessed 20 November 2012
16 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010) http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user unload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 130674821 S.ndf 
accessed 20 November 2012
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public or criminal law and with due account o f rights and interests, to further the 
development o f the law, and to defend liberty, justice and the rule o f law"17
The Core Principles articulated by the Charter include: the independence of the lawyer, 
and the freedom of the lawyer to pursue the client's case; the right and duty of the lawyer 
to keep client's matters confidential and to respect professional secrecy; the avoidance of 
conflicts of interests; the dignity and honour of the legal profession, including the 
integrity and good repute of the individual lawyer; fair treatment of clients in relation to 
fees; the lawyer's professional competence; respect towards professional colleagues; 
respect for the rule of law and for the fair administration of justice; and the self regulation 
of the legal profession.18
Charter of Core principles of the European legal profession19.
There are core principles which are common to the whole European legal profession, 
even though these principles are expressed in slightly different ways in different 
jurisdictions. The core principles underlie the various national and international codes 
which govern the conduct of lawyers. European layers are committed to these principles, 
which are essential for the proper administration of justice, access to justice and the right 
to a fair trial, as required under the European Convention of human rights. Bars and law 
societies, courts, legislators, governments and international organizations should seek to 
uphold and protect the core principles in the public interest.
The core principles are, in particular:
the independence of the lawyer, and the freedom of the lawyer to pursue the client’s case;
the right and duty of the lawyer to keep clients’ matters confidential and to respect 
professional secrecy;
avoidance of conflicts of interest, whether between different clients or between the client 
and the lawyer;
the dignity and honour of the legal profession, and the integrity and good repute of the 
individual lawyer;
17 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010) httD://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user upload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.ndf 
accessed 20 November 2012
18 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010) http://www.ccbe.eii/fileadiT)in/user unload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.pdf 
accessed 20 November 2012
19 CCBE, Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
(CCBE, 2010) http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user upload/NTCdocument/EN Code of conductpl 1306748215.pdf
accessed 20 November 2012
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loyalty to the client;
fair treatment of clients in relation to fees; 
the lawyer’s professional competence; 
respect towards professional colleagues;
respect for the rule of law and the fair administration of justice; and 
the self regulation of the legal profession.
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Appendix 3 E
IBA General Principles for the Legal Profession. Adopted by the International Bar 
Association on 20th September 200620
IBA General Principles for the Legal Profession21
The IBA's Principles for the legal profession, consists of ten principles common to the 
legal profession worldwide. The Commentary on these principles, notes: "Respect for  
these principles is the basis o f the right to a legal defence, which is the cornerstone o f all 
other rights in a democracy". The Principles express the common ground which 
underlines all the national and international rules which govern the conduct of lawyers, 
principally in relation to their clients. The Principles take into consideration national 
professional rules from states throughout the world, the UN Basic Principles on the Role 
of Lawyers and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Commentary notes that
"It is hoped that the Principles will increase understanding among lawyers, 
decision makers and the public o f the importance o f the lawyer's role in society, 
and o f the way in which the principles by which the legal profession is regulated 
support that role"22
The IBA Principles include reference to: Independence; honesty, integrity and fairness; 
Conflicts of interest; Confidentiality/ professional secrecy; Clients' interests; Lawyers' 
undertakings; Client's freedom; Protection of property of clients and third parties; 
Competence; Fees
IBA General Principles for the Legal Profession23
Lawyers throughout the world are specialized professionals who place the interests of 
their clients above their own, and strive to obtain respect for the Rule of Law. They have 
to combine a continuous update on legal developments with service to their clients, 
respect for the Courts, and the legitimate aspiration to maintain a reasonable standard of 
living. Between these elements there is often tension. These principles aim at establishing 
a generally accepted framework to serve as a basis on which codes of conduct may be 
established by the appropriate authorities for lawyers in any part of the world. In addition, 
the purpose of adopting these General Principles is to promote and foster ideals of the 
legal profession. These General Principles are not intended to replace or limit a lawyer’s
20 IBA, International Principles for the Legal Profession (IBA, 2006) 
httn://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.aspx accessed 20 November 2012
21 IBA, International Principles for the Legal Profession (IBA, 2006) 
httD://vwvw.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.asnx accessed 20 November 2012
22 IBA, Commentary on IBA International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession, Adopted by the 
International Bar Association at the Warsaw Council Meeting (IBA, 28th May 2011) 
httn://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.asnx accessed 20 November 2012
23 IBA, International Principles for the Legal Profession (IBA, 2006) 
httn://www.ibanet.org/About the IBA/IBA resolutions.asnx accessed 20 November 2012
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obligation under applicable laws or rules of professional conduct. Nor are they to be used 
as criteria for imposing liability sanctions, or disciplinary measures of any kind.
Independence
A lawyer shall maintain and be afforded protection of independence to allow him or her 
to give his or her clients unbiased advice or representation. A lawyer shall exercise his or 
her independent, unbiased professional judgment upon advising his or her client as to the 
likelihood of success of the client’s case and upon the client’s representation.
Honesty, integrity and fairness
A lawyer shall at all times maintain the highest standards of honesty, integrity and 
fairness towards the court, his or her colleagues and all those with whom he or she comes 
professionally into contact.
Conflicts of interest
A lawyer shall not place himself or herself in a position in which his or her client’s 
interests conflict with those of himself, his or her partners or another client, unless 
otherwise permitted by law or, if permitted, by client’s authorisation.
Confidentiality / professional secrecy
A lawyer shall at all times maintain and be afforded protection of confidentiality 
regarding the affairs of his or her present or former clients, unless otherwise required or 
permitted by law or; if permitted, by client’s authorization.
Clients’ interest
A lawyer shall treat the interests of his or her clients as paramount, subject always to his 
or her duties to the Court and the interest of justice, to observe the law and maintain 
ethical standards.
Lawyers’ undertaking
A lawyer shall honour any undertaking given in the course of his or her practice, until the 
undertaking is performed, released or excused.
Clients’ freedom
A lawyer shall respect the freedom of clients to be represented by the lawyer of their 
choice. Unless prevented by professional rules or by law, a lawyer shall be free to take on 
or reject a case
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Property of clients and third parties
A lawyer shall account faithfully for any property of his or her clients or a third party 
which come into his or her trust, and shall keep it separate from his or her own property.
Competence
A lawyer shall carry out his or her work in a competent and timely manner and shall not 
take on work which he or she does not reasonably believe he or she will be able to carry 
out in that manner.
Fees
A lawyer is entitled to a reasonable fee for his or her work. A Lawyer shall not generate 
unnecessary work.
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Appendix 4
STATE AND LAWYERS
Government and profession programmes to inform individuals of their 
rights
Lawyers prevented from persecution by government
Lawyers respected by Government
Government providing funding for poor
Lawyer able to travel freely and communicate with clients
Lawyers shall not be threatened when discharging duties according to rules
lawyers shall not be prosecuted when discharging duties according to rules
Lawyers not to be sanctioned administratively / economically
Where security of lawyer threatened when practising law - Authorities will
protect
Lawyer free to exercise duty without hindrance 
Lawyer free to exercise duty without harassment 
Lawyer free to exercise duty without improper influence 
Lawyers not to be associated with their clients
Lawyers to receive civil and penal immunity for statements made in good 
faith
Lawyers entitled to appropriate information in regards to cases 
Lawyers to co-operate with government where appropriate 
Independent legal profession
UN COE EP CCBE IBA
UN *
UN *
UN *
UN *
UN, COE * *
UN,COE * *
UN,COE * *
UN,COE * *
UN *
UN, COE * *
UN, COE * *
UN,COE * *
UN,COE * *
UN,COE * *
UN,COE * *
UN *
UN, EP,CCBE, BA *
LAWYERS AND THE COURTS
Lawyers respect the judiciary 
Administration of Justice 
Lawyers show Integrity and fairness to court 
Interest of justice
COE
UN,COE, CCBE
BA
BA
LAWYER VALUES
Honesty (lawyer) (highest standard of) BA
Integrity and good repute of individual lawyer CCBE
Lawyers promote and uphold cause of justice without fear COE
Lawyers show respect to professional colleagues CCBE, BA
Lawyers act independently, diligently and fairly COE, CCBE
Honour and Dignity UN, COE, CCBE
Co-operate with lawyers in other countries COE
LAWYERS, CITIZENS and SOCIETY
Government and profession have programmes to inform individuals of their 
rights UN
Public confidence in legal system EP
Public confidence in legal profession EP
Access to justice UN, EP
LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
Lawyers duty to advise clients as to law and obligation UN, COE, CCBE, BA
Lawyers duty to assist clients in all appropriate ways UN, CCBE, BA
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Lawyer to assist clients before courts in all appropriate ways UN, CCBE, IBA
Lawyers loyally respect interest of clients UN, CCBE, IBA
Lawyers to maintain ethical standards IBA
Lawyers to honour undertakings given IBA
Lawyer to account fully for property held and to keep separate from then-
own IBA
Fees - A Lawyer is entitled to a reasonable fee for his work IBA
Lawyer shall not generate unnecessary work IBA
Fair treatment towards clients in relation to fees CCBE
Abstention by lawyer should avoid damage to interests of clients COE
Lawyers duties should not be affected by fees, and who is paying them 
(pub/private) COE
Lawyers should avoid Conflict of Interest (Client / Client) (Lawyer / Client) COE, CCBE, IBA
Lawyers should aim to resolve a case amicably COE
Confidentiality UN, EP, CCBE, IBA
Lawyers should not take more work than they can reasonably manage COE
Lawyers should take action to protect/ respect/ enforce rights in the interest 
of clients COE
Independent legal profession UN, EP,CCBE, IBA
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF LAWYERS
Professional associations of lawyers - vital to rule of law UN
Professional standards - made by associations and being upheld by them UN
Professional association of lawyers co-operate in providing legal services to
poor UN
Lawyers educated properly with thorough knowledge of law, ethics and
practice UN, COE, EP
Non-discrimination on entry into the profession UN, COE,
Self-regulation of the legal profession. CCBE
Promote and support law reform. Discuss existing and proposed law COE
Promote the welfare of members of the profession and their families COE
Lawyers to defend the role of lawyers in society COE
Professional associations to co-operate with government UN,COE,EP
Codes of conduct will be established by legal profession UN,COE
Honour and Dignity UN, COE, CCBE
Promote lawyers standards of competence. COE
Prof Associations vital role to play in prof standards, protecting members EP
Professional ethics - developed by associations and being upheld by them UN
Complaints against lawyers will be dealt with properly and expeditiously UN,EP
Lawyers permitted to join / form local / national / international
organisations UN,COE
LAWYERS AND THE LAW
Lawyers have right to publicly discuss the law/ admin of justice and Human
Rights UN,COE
Govt and legal system provide for individuals to arbitrate conflicts and
interests UN
Maintenance of legal relationships and process EP
Fundamental freedoms UN,COE,EP
Rule of Law UN,COE,EP,CCBE
Administration of justice UN,COE, CCBE
Protection of human rights UN, COE, EP
Democracy LSB, COE, EP
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Non discrimination 
Equality before the law
UN
UN
LAWYERS HUMAN RIGHTS AND INSTRUMENTAL VALUES
Presumption of innocence UN
Right to a fair trial / Independent / Impartial tribunal UN
Defence for those accused UN
Those detained right to assistance/ communication with/from lawyer UN
Efficient access to lawyers by all on a non discriminatory basis UN, EP
Entitlement to lawyer of suitable experience and seniority in criminal 
proceedings UN
Foreign service function to foreign countries UN
Independence, absence of conflicts, confidentiality are core interests in
Public interest EP
Freedom COE, EP
Security COE, EP
Justice COE, EP
Individual Freedoms COE
UN - United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
COE - Recommendation on the freedom of exercise of the profession of
lawyer
EP - Resolution on the legal profession and the general interest in the functioning of legal systems 
CCBE - Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession 
IBA - General Principles for the Legal Profession
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APPENDIX 5
Pal and Maxwell’s Public Interest Accountability Framework
Pal and Maxwell's public interest framework proceeds on the basis of two mutually 
reinforcing stages. Stage 1 is a statement of the evidence gathered in the relevant 
situation. It is designed to ensure engagement with each of the basic dimensions of the 
public interest with respect to specific issues. Stage II addresses the same questions but 
through the explicit optic of the challenge of balancing individual interests, enterprise 
interests, and social values. Stage II analysis is designed to bring trade-offs to the surface, 
and be the basis for a clearer statement of the public interest in relation to the issue.1
In undertaking their review of the scholarly literature associated with the public interest, 
they deduced that there are five distinctive approaches to understanding the public 
interest:
1) Process: The public interest arises from, and is served by, fair,
inclusive and transparent decision making procedures
2) Majority Opinion: The public interest is defined by what a reasonably 
significant majority o f the population thinks about an issue
3) Utilitarian: The public interest is a balance or compromise o f different 
interests involved in an issue.
4) Common Interest: The Public Interest is a set o f pragmatic interests we 
all have in common such as clean air, water, defence and security, public 
safety, a strong economy.
5) Shared Value: The public interest is a set o f shared values or normative 
principles2
Pal and Maxwell noted that with the exception of the process definition, all of the others 
presume some shared values or interest.3 In the context of regulatory decision making, 
they indicate that "most o f these approaches or definitions are used simultaneously or 
sequentially in any given case to determine the public interest".
"Whatever the public interest is in a specific case, it is not going to be discovered 
i f  the process o f discovery and decision are closed to significant groups, i f  
information is not shared, i f  due process and legal rights are not respected. It is
1 Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, ‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ ( Paper Prepared for the 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004) 19.
2 Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, ‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ (Paper Prepared for the
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004)15.
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inconceivable that any regulator or policy maker trying to make a decision in the 
public interest would not consider what the majority o f Canadians actually thinks 
about the issue, what on balance different groups in the process think, what 
shared or underlying interests there might possibly be in the longer term, and 
subject all o f these to a normative test in light o f deeply held and broadly shared 
values"4
The Approach that the advocate is as follows:
Stage 1 : Review of the Evidence on the Public Interest
Key Element Core Questions Possible Benchmarks
Process Was due process followed?
Was there reasonable access by all 
relevant stakeholders?
Transparency
Mechanisms for participation 
Neutrality in decision -  making
Public Opinion Are there majority views?
Are there strong minority views?
Polling data
Specific
Interests
Who are they?
Have the risks been assessed?
What is the distribution of costs and 
benefits among groups for any 
regulatory option?
Common
Interests
What are they?
Have the risks been assessed for 
each balance?
What are the trade offs?
Shared Values
Are there shared values affecting 
this decision?
Are there conflicts among these 
values?
Are there legal rights to consider?
Stage 2 : Assessment of the Evidence : Balance of Interests
4Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, ‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ ( Paper Prepared for the 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004) 7.
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Main Interests (in rank order 
from top to bottom)
Balance
Individual Interests (as 
consumers and / or 
citizens)
e.g. Choice, low prices, access, 
innovation, privacy
Enterprise interests e.g Profits, innovation, 
competition, access to markets
Collective Interests e.g Safety, access, 
conservation, costs to future 
generations
'
The notes that accompany the framework are as follows:
“PIAF Stage 1
1. Has due process been followed in constructing the regulatory decision — making 
process, and can it be said with confidence that the decisions that result from the 
process have been shaped fairly? Key benchmarks here are accessibility, 
transparency (distribution and availability o f information), mechanisms for  
participation and deliberation, accountability and neutrality in decision — 
making.
2. What is the state o f (Canadian) public opinion on the issue/ Are there clear 
majority views on various aspects o f the issue?
3. Which specific interests are connected to the issue, and what are their views? 
How are the costs and benefits o f different regulatory options distributed among 
these groups and more generally among the (Canadian) population?
4. What are the key common interests or public goods at stake in this area -  
examples would include health, security, safety, environmental protection, future 
generations, innovation, competiveness. How are risks assessed? What is the 
balance o f these common interests?
5. Are there shared values or normative guidelines that affect decision making in 
this area? Are there specific legal rights o f either individuals or collectives that 
should be referred to in the decision making process. 5
5 Leslie Pal, Judith Maxwell, ‘Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework’ ( Paper Prepared for the 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Canadian policy Research Networks, January 2004) 17
370
PIAF Stage II
The practice o f regulation involves making trade-offs among equally legitimate and 
important values or objectives. In economic regulation, for example, the interests o f 
enterprises and markets are balanced against the interests o f consumers. In 
environmental regulation, the interests o f current generations are balanced against the 
interests o f future generations. In all regulatory decision making, the public interest is 
arrived at by balancing the interests/ rights o f individuals (as consumers/citizens), o f 
enterprises (the economy), and o f society (social values). That balance shifts over time 
due to changing context (especially economic) and changing public values. Individuals 
have legal and constitutional rights as well as needs (for safety and security, then self 
actualization andfulfilment) ”
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